

A
TREATISE
OF THE
PASSIONS
AND
FACULTIES
Of the Soul of Man.

With the severall Dignities and Cor-
ruptions thereunto belonging.

By EDWARD REYNOLDES, late Preacher
to the honorable Society of *Lincoln's Inn*: And now
Rector of the Church of *Braunston* in *Northamptonshire*.

Juvenal. Sat. 1.


*Quicquid agunt Homines, Votum, Timor, Ira Voluptas,
Gaudia, Discursus, nostri est farrago Libelli.*

L O N D O N,

Printed by R. R. for Robert Bostock, dwelling
in *Pauls Church-yard*, at the Signe of
the *Kings Head*. 1647.

265. f. 11.





TO
HER HIGHNESSE
THE PRINCESSE ELISABETH,
PRINCESSE PALATINE OF
THE RHINE, DUTCHESS OF
BAVARIA, &c. AND ELDEST
Daughter to her Majestie the
Queen of BOHEMIA.

May it please your Highnesse;



That the great Philosopher
hath observed of Mens
Bodies, is, upon so much
stronger Reasons, true of
their Mindes, by how
much our Intellectuall
Maturity is more lingring, and sluggish
then our Naturall, That the too Early
Conceptions and Issues of them do usu-

*Aristot. politic.
lib. 7. cap. 16.*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ally prove but weak and unusefull. And we shall seldom finde, but that those venturous Blossoms, whose over-hastie obedience to the early Spring doth anticipate their proper season, and put forth too soon, do afterwards for their former boldnesse suffer from the injury of severer weather, except at least some happy shelter, or more benigne influence redeem them from danger. The like Infelicity I finde my self obnoxious unto at this time. For I know not out of what disposition of mind, whether out of love of Learning (for * Love is venturous, and conceives difficult things easier then they are) or whether out of a Resolution to take some account from my selfe of those few yeers wherein I had then been planted in the happiest of all soils, the Schooles of Learning ; whether upon these, or any other Inducements, so it hath happened, that I long since have taken boldnesse in the Minority of my Studies to write this ensuing Treatise : That before I adventured on the endeavour of know-

* *Amorem dixit*
Plato Platon
em yeghrtw.
Cal. Rhodig.
lib. 16. cap. 15.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

knowing other things, I might first try whether I knew my self; Lest I should justly incurre the Censure; which that * sowe Philosopher past upon Gramma-rians; That they were better acquainted with the evils of *Ulysses*, then with their own. This hasty resolution having produced so untimely an issue, It hapned by some accident to be like *Moses* in his Infancy, exposed to the seas. Where I made no other account, but that its own weaknesse would there have revenged my former boldnesse, and betraid it unto perishing. But as he then, so this now, hath had the marvellous felicity to light on the view, and fall under the compassion of a very Gracious Princeesse. For so farre hath your Highnesse vouchsafed (having hapned on the sight of this Tractate) to expresse favour thereunto, as not onely to spend hours in it, and require a Transcript of it, but further to recommend it by your Gracious judgement unto publick view. In which particular I was not to advise with mine owne Opinion, being

* *Diogenes apud
Laertium. l.6.*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

being to expresse my humblest acknowledgement to your Highnesse.

This only Petition I shall accompany it withall unto your Highnesse feet, That since it is a Blossome which put forth so much too soon, it may therefore obtain the gracious Influence of your Highnesse favour, to protect it from that severity abroad which it otherwise justly feareth.

God Almighty make your Highnesse as great a Mirrour of his continuall Mercies, as he hath both of his Graces and of Learning.

Your Highnesse

most humble Servant

EDWARD REYNOLDES.



A P R E F A C E

To the READER.



Having been moved to give way unto the publication of this Philosophicall Miscellany, the Fruit of my younger Studies, I conceive it needfull to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply seeme undecent in me, having adven-

tured to publish some few, though weak Discourses in Arguments Divine, that I should now suffer the Blossoms of my youth to look abroad, and run the hazzard of publick Censurè. Whereunto when I shall have given a short answer, I shall rest something the more confident of a candid construction.

And here I might first alledge the honour which God himselfe hath been pleased to give unto Inferiour and Naturall knowledge. In the first Creation, when hee gave unto man the Dominion over other Creatures for his use, he gave him likewise the contemplation and knowledge of them, for his Makers Glory, and his own Delight (for God brought them unto him to give them Names). And as the holy Scriptures are all overfull of the Mysteries of Gods Wisdome in Naturall Things,

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^a Job. cap. 38,
39, 40, 41.
Psal. 104. 1, 7.

So are there some speciall Passages thereof written ^a as if were purposely on that Argument. And we find that Moses and Solomon have therein testimony given unto them, not only of their Divine, but of their Humane and naturall Knowledge likewise

And if we look into the Ancient Christian Churches, or into these of later times, wee shall finde that very many Ecclesiasticall persons have not denyed unto the world, their Philosophicall and Poeticall labours, either whole and alone, or mixed, and directed to Theologicall Ends, as we find in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Eusebius Casariensis, Saint Austins Books De Civitate Dei, and others, Venerable Bede, Isidore Hispalensis, Synesius, Sidorius, Apollinaris, Honorius Augustodunensis, &c. In the Hexamerons of Saint Basil, Nyssen, Ambrose, and the Books of those who have written more directly upon some parts of the Argument of this present Treatise, as Gregory Nyssen, Lactantius, Nemeseus, Procopius, Gazæus, Damascen, and others. And in later times, besides the Schoolmen, and those vast labours of many of that side, in Dialecticall, Physicall, and Metaphysicall writings: wee might instance in very many of the Reformed Churches abroad, some of whose younger labours have seen the Light: as also in Oratory, Logicall, Morall, Historicall, Mathematicall, Miscellaneous writings of many learned Divines of our owne Church: under the Protection of which great Examples I shall use the Apologie which Quintilian ^b dictateth unto mee, Vel Error honestus est magnos Duces sequentibus: That it is no uncomely, but a pardonable Errour, which hath great Exam-

^b Lib. 1. cap. 6.

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Examples to excuse it. In which respect I finde my selfe chiefly subject to this Infelicity, that I am constrained to follow such Examples, as little children doe their Fathers, Non æquis passibus, at a very great Distance.

And truly, when I againe consider the Excellent Use and subordination of humane learning unto learning Divine (It being hardly possible, without it, to understand sundry passages of holy Scripture, depending upon the propriety of Words and Idioms, or upon the customes, Rites, Proverbs, Formes, Usages Lawes, Offices, Antiquities of the Assyrian, Persian, Greeke, and Romane Monarchies, as might be shewed in sundry particulars, and were a labour most worthy the industry of some able and learned pen :) when I consider that the d spoiles of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Israel, and a the spoiles of the Gentiles reserved by David for the building of the Temple: That a b Gentile by legall Purification and Marriage, might become an Israelite: That the c Crowne of Rabbah was put upon the head of David, and the d Sword of Goliath used to slay himself: That the a Gold and Myrrh, and Frankincense of the Wise men of the East, was offered unto Christ: when I finde the b Apostle convincing the Jewes, out of their Law, and the Philosophers out of their Maximes. And that c every gift, as well as every Creature of God is good, and may be sanctified for the use and delight of Man; I then conclude with my selfe, That this Morall and Philosophicall Glasse of the humane Soule may be of some service even unto the Tabernacle, as the d Looking glasses of the Israelitish women were unto the Altar.

d I Sam. 17. 21. a Mat. 2. 11. b Act. 18. 4. 17. 23. 29. c Iac. 1. 17. 1 Tim. 4. 4.

c Est quidem de communibus sensibus sapere in Dei rebus, sed in Testimonium veri, non in Ad-jutorium falsi. Terul. de Resur. carnis. cap. 3. vid etiam Apol. cap. 47. & Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1. p. 203. A. 107. d. E. 114. A. B. 218. 219. 223. 227. 233. 234. Or. l. 6. p. 465. 467. 499. 500. Justin. Martyr. Apol. 1. Aug. Conf. l. 1. c. 15. Christianus Domini sui esse intelligit, ubicunque invenerit veritatem. Aug. de Doctr. Chri. l. 2. c. 18. 39. 40. "Ora dñg nā-π καλὸς εἶναι" nūq̃ 7̃ χεστ-αυαυ̃ εἶν. Justin. Apol. 1. Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 52. Greg. Nazian. Orat. 1. d Exod. 12. 35. a I Chron. 29. b Deut. 21. 12. c 2 Sam. 12. 30. Vid. Pet. Ænod. decret. l. 1. Tit. 8. 9. 4.

d Ex. 38. 8.

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c De Custod.
Virginit.ad
Eustochium.

d Epist.ad
Magn.Orat.
Ep.ad Pam-
mach.de Obi-
tu Paulina.
Apolog.advers.
Ruffin.l.1.

a Vid.Noriss
Cocrodi Rit-
terhusii in I sid.
Pelus. Ep.56.
l.1.
Terul.de præ-
scrip.c.7.de
Idololat.c.10.
contr.Marc.
l.2.c.15.

Nor can I but a little wonder at the melancholy fancy of Saint Hieron, who conceiving himself in a vision beaten by an Angel for being a Ciceronian, did for ever after promise to abjure the Reading of secular Authors. Though I finde^d himselfe both justifying the Excellent use of that kinde of Learning, and acknowledging that conceited vision of his to have beene but a Dreame.

It is true indeed that in regard of the bewitching danger from humane learning, and the too great aptnesse in the minds of men to surfeit and be intemperate in the use of it; Some of the Ancients have sometimes interdicted the Reading^a of such Authors unto Christian men; But this calleth upon us for watchfulnesse, in our studies, not for negligence; for the Apostle will tell us, That to the pure all things are pure. And even of harmefull things when they are prepared, and their malignancy by Art corrected, doth the skillfull Physician make an excellent use. If then we be carefull to Moderate, and Regulate our Affections, to take heed of the pride and inflation of secular learning, not to admire Philosophy, to the prejudice of Evangelicall knowledge, as if without the revealed light of the Gospel, salvation might be found, in the way of Paganisme; if we suffer not these leane Kine to devour the fat ones, nor the River Jordan to be lost in the dead Sea; I meane Piety to be swallowed up of prophane Studies; and the knowledge of the Scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kinde of Learning with much greater Felicity, and successe) to be under-valued, and not rather, the more admired, as a Rich Jewell compared with Glasse. In this case,
and

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and with such care as this, there is no doubt, but secular Studies prepared and corrected from Pride and Prophanesse, may be to the Church, as the Gibconites were to the Congregation of Israel, for Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water; otherwise wee may say of them as Cato Major to his sonne, of the Gracian Arts and learning, b *Quandocunque ista Gens suas literas dabit, omnia corrumpet.*

Nor have I upon these Considerations onely adventured on the publication of this Tract, but because withall, in the reviewing of it, I found very many Touches upon Theologicall Arguments, and some passages wholly of that Nature. Yea, all the Materiall parts of the Treatise doe so nearely concerne the knowledge of our selves, and the Direction of our lives, as that they may be all esteemed Borderers upon that Profession.

In the perusing and fashioning of it for the Presse, I have found that true in writing, which I had formerly found true in Building; That it is almost as chargeable to repaire, and set right an Old house, as to Erect a New one. For I was willing in the most materiall parts of it, so to lop off Luxuriances of Style, and to supply the Defects of Matter, as that with Candid, favourable, and ingenuons Iudgements, it might receive some tolerable acceptation. In hope whereof I rest,

Thine in all Christian service,

EDWARD REYNOLDS.

b Plin. l. 29.
c 1. *Uid. notas*
Xilandri in
Plutarch.
Catonem. S. 13



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A T R E A T I S E

of the Passions and Faculties

of the SOUL of

MAN.

CHAP. I.

*Of the dependance of the Soule, in her
operations upon the Body.*



THath been a just Complaint of Learned Men, that usually wee are more curious in our inquiries after things New than excellent; and that the very neerenessse of worthy Objects, hath at once made them both despised and unknown. Thus like Children, with an idle diligence and fruitlesse Curiositie, we turne over this great Booke of Nature, without perusing those ordinarie

B

Cha-

*Cic. de Div.
lib. 2.
Plin. lib. 2.
ep. 10.*

*Cic. de Nat.
Deor. lib. 2.*

*Sen. qu. Nat.
lib. 7. c. 1.*

*Sen de Benef.
lib. 6. c. 23.*

Charaacters, wherein is exprest the greatest power of the Worker, and excellencie of the Worke; fixing our Admiration onely on those Pictures and usuall Novelties, which though for their rarenesse they are more strange, yet for their nature are lesse worthy. Every Comet or burning Meteor strikes more wonder into the beholder, than those glorious Lamps of Nature with their admirable Motions and Order, in which the Heathen have acknowledged a Divinenesse. Let a Child be borne but with six fingers, or have a part more than usuall, wee rather wonder at One superfluous, than at all Naturall. *Sol spectatorem, nisi cum deficit, non habet; nemo observat Lunam nisi laborantem, adeo naturale est magis nova, quam magna mirari:* None looketh with wonder on the Sunne but in an Eclipse; no eye gazeth on the Moone, but in her Travell: so naturall it is with men, to admire rather things New than Common. Whereas indeed things are fit for studie and observation, though never so common, in regard of the perfection of their nature and usefulness of their knowledge. In which respect, the plaine Counsell of the Oracle was one of the wisest which was ever given to Man to studie and to know himselfe; because, by reason of his own needrenesse to himselfe, he is usually of himselfe most unknowne and neglected. And yet if wee consider, how in him it hath pleased God to stamp a more notable Character of his owne Image, and to make him, amongst all his Works, one of the most perfect Models of created

ted excellencie, we cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the least, yet of the fittest Volumnes, in this great varietie of Nature to be acquainted withall. Intending therefore, according to my weaknesse, to take some view of the inside, and more noble Characters of this Booke, it will not be needfull for me to gaze upon the Cover, to insist on the materials or sensitive conditions of the humane nature, or to commend him in his Anatomie; though even in that respect the Psalmist tells us, that he is fearfully and wonderfully made: for wee commonly see, that as most kind of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertilitie; so many sorts of beasts have a greater activitie and exquisitenesse in their senses than wee. And the reason hereof is, because Nature aiming at a superior and more excellent end, is in those lower faculties lesse intent and elaborate. It shall suffice therefore, onely to lay a ground-work in these lower faculties, for the better notice of mans greater perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependance on them. For whereas the principall acts of mans Soule are either of Reason and Discourse, proceeding from his Vnderstanding; or of Action and Moraltie, from his Will; both these, in the present condition of mans estate, have their dependance on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one precede, in the other follow: To the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey; to the other as Messengers, to performe and execute: To the one,

Sen. Ep. 76.

the whole Body is as an Eye, through which it seeth; to the other a Hand, by which it worketh.

Concerning the ministerie therefore of the Body unto the Soule, wee shall thus resolve; That the Reasonable part of Man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends in all its ordinarie and naturall operations, upon the happie or disordered temperature of those vitall Qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed. For though these Ministeriall parts have not any over-ruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the Soule: Whence wee finde, that sundry diseases of the Body doe oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the minde. For as wheresoever there is a loco-motive facultie, though there be the principle cause of all motion and activitie; yet if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinewes be dis-jointed, shrunke, or any other wayes indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actuall motion; Or as in the Body Politique, the Prince (whom *Seneca* calleth the Soule of the Common-wealth) receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelitie or negligence of those instruments, whom *Xenophon* tearmeth the Eyes and Eares of Kings: In like manner, the Soule of man being not an absolute independant worker, but receiving all her objects

Solinus de quodam refert quod accepto vulnere in occipio ad tantam devenit ignorantiam ut nesciret se habuisse nomen. Honorius Augustodunens. de Philosoph. Mundi. lib. 4. c. 24.

Sen de Clem. lib. 1. cap. 4.

Xenoph. Cyrop. lib. 8. & Arist. Polit. lib. 3. c. 12.

objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments, which *Cicero* calleth the Messengers to the Soule, if they out of any indisposition shall be weakned, the Soule must continue like a *Rasa Tabula*, without any acquired or introduced habits. The Soule hath not immediately from it selfe that strange weakenesse, which is observed in many men, but onely as it is disabled by Earthie and sluggish Organs; which being out of order, are more burthensome than serviceable thereunto.

There are observable in the Soules of men, considered in themselves, and in reference one to another, two defects; an imperfection, and an inequality of operation: the former of these I doe not so ascribe to that bodily weakenesse, whereby the Soule is any way oppressed, as if I conceived no internall darknesse in the faculties themselves; since the fall of man working in him a generall corruption, did amongst the rest insatuate the Mind, and as it were smother the Soule with ignorance; so that the outward ineptitude of bodily instruments, is onely a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection. But for the inequality and difference of mens understandings in their severall operations, notwithstanding it be questioned in the Schooles, Whether the Soules of men have not originally in their Nature, degrees of perfection and weakenesse, whence these severall degrees of operation may proceed; yet neverthelesse that being granted, I suppose, that principally it pro-

ceeds from the varietie, tempers, and dispositions in the instrumentall faculties of the Body; by the helpe whereof, the Soule in this estate worketh: for I cannot perceive it possible, that there should have beene, if man had continued in his Innocencie, (wherein our Bodies should have had an exact constitution, free from those distempers to which now by sinne they are liable) such remarkable differences betweene mens apprehensions, as wee now see there are: for there should have beene in all men a great facilitie to apprehend the misteryes of Nature, and to acquire knowledge (as wee see in *Adam*) which now wee finde in a large measure granted to some, and to others quite denied. And yet in that perfect estate (according to the opinion of those who now maintaine it) there would have beene found a substantiall and internall inequality amongst the Soules of men: and therefore principally this varietie comes from the sundry constitutions of mens bodies; in some, yeelding enablement, for quicknesse of Apprehension; in others, pressing downe and intangling the Vnderstanding; in some disposing the Minde unto one object; in some, unto another; according as the *impetus* and force of their naturall affections carrieth them. And therefore *Aristotle* in his *Politiques* ascribeth the inequality which he observes betweene the *Asiaticque* and *European* Wits, unto the severall Climates and temperature of the Regions in which they lived; according whereunto, the Complexions

ons and Constitutions of their Bodies onely could be alter'd; the Soule being in it selfe, according to the same Philosopher, impassible from any corporeall Agent. And to the same purpose againe he saith, That if an old man had a young mans eye, his sight would be as sharpe and as distinct as a young mans is; implying the diversitie of Perception to be grounded onely on the diversitie of bodily Instruments, by which it is exercised. And therefore he elsewhere observes (I shall not trouble my selfe to examine upon what ground) that men of soft and tender skins have greatest quicknesse of Wit; and on the contrarie, *Duri Carne, inepti mente*: thereby intimating, that there is no more significant and lively expression of a Vigorous or heaveie Soule, than a happie or ill-ordered Body; wherein wee may fundry times reade the abilities of the *Minde*, and the inclinations of the Will: So then it is manifest, that this weakenesse of apprehension in the Soules of men, doth not come from any immediate and proper darknesse belonging unto them; but onely from the co-existence which they have with a Body ill-disposed for assistance and information. For hee who is carried in a Coach (as the Body is *vehiculum anime*) though he be of himselfe more nimble and active, must yet receive such motion as that affords; and Water, which is conveyed through pipes and Aqueducts, though its motion by it selfe would have beene otherwise, must yet then be limited by the posture and

Arist. de Anima, lib. 3.

De anima. lib. 3.

and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth.

CHAP. II.

In what Cases the dependance of the Soule on the Body, is lessened by Faith, Custome, Education, Occasion.



BUt yet this dependance on the Body is not so necessary and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the Soule be in some cases vindicated from the impression of the Body: And this first, in extraordinarie; and next, in more common actions.

In actions extraordinary, as those pious and religious operations of the Soule, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and many others; wherein the Soule is carried beyond the Sphere of Sense, and transported unto more rayed operations: For to believe and know, that there are laid up for pious and holy endeavours *those joyes which eye hath not seene, nor eare heard*, and to have some glimpses and fore-tast of them, which Saint Paul calleth the *Earnest, and first fruits of the Spirit*; What is this, but to leave sense behind us, and to out-run
our

our bodies? And therefore it is that *Evangelical Mysteries* were not at the first urged by disputes of Secular learning, but were sacredly infused; not perswading by *fishly wisdom*, but by a spiritual and heavenly call drawing to the belief of them. *Evangelical truths* do as much transcend the *Natural Reason*, as *spiritual goodnesse* doth the *Natural will* of Man. That one *Nature* should be *three Persons*, and *two Natures* in *One Person*: That the *Invisible God* should be *manifested in the Flesh*, and a *pure Virgin* bring forth a *Son*: these are *Mysteries* above the reach of *Humane*, yea, even of a *Angelical* disquisition. ^b *Sarah* laughed when *Abraham* believed, and ^c *Reason* expected that the *Apostle* should have fallen down dead, when *Faith* shook the viper into the fire.

There is a great difference between the manner of yeelding our Assent unto *natural* and *supernatural* Verities. The *principles* of the one are *ingrassid*, and sutable to the native Seeds, and original Notions of *Reason Natural*. But the principles of the other are *revealed*, and without such Revelation could never have been sifted out of our Implanted light, or by any humane disquisition been discovered. For the *Gospel* being a *Supernatural Science*, the principles thereof must needs transcend the reach of *Natural faculties*, till raised and enabled by *Divine Grace*. And then indeed *Reason* is an excellent *Instrument* to use those principles of *faith* unto our further proficiency in sacred *Knowledge*, which, without *Divine Revelation* proposing the *Object*, and

C

Divine

1 Cor. 2. 4, 5, 6.

14.

Heb. 3. 1.

Δεί γὰρ ὁμοῦς

τοῦ τ' ἐκκλησί-

ας προφῆτες μὴ

λογισμῶς ἀν-

θρώπωνος διου-

σα νεν τα θεῶς,

ἀλλὰ ὡς τὸ βού-

λημα τ' διδασ-

καλίας τοῦ μέ-

μα. Ὁ τὸν λί-

γὼν ποιῶνται

τῶν ἔχθρων.

Justin Mart.

Expos. fidei.

a Eph. 3. 10.

Vid. Greg. Nys-

sen. Homil. 8. in

Cantic. & Sixt.

Senens. Biblioth.

lib. 6. Annot.

165 & 259.

b Gen. 18. 12.

c Alf. 18. 5, 6.

Ubi ad profun-

ditatem Sacra-

mentorum per-

venium est, omnis

Platoniorum

caligavis subti-

litas Cyprian. de

spir. vid. eti-

am. August. En-

chirid. c. 4.

Divine Grace disposing the Faculty, it could never have either known or used.

And from hence, I suppose, did arise that usual calummie of the Philosophers against the Christians, that they taught their followers nothing but an illiterate and naked Belief. Though indeed, the revelation of Divine Mysteries, and the Grace of God being presupposed, there is no such height of rational Evidence and Demonstration in all the writings of Philosophers as in the Gospel.

But to return: This freedom from bodily Restraint, hath, according to the School-men, those Raptures and Ecstasies which raise and ravish the Soul with the sweetnesse of extraordinary contemplations, wherein a man is as it were carried out of himself, and transported ^a *Extra connaturallem Apprehensionem*, beyond the usual bounds of sense and common Apprehension.

Now for the Exemption of the more ordinary Actions of the Soul from the Predominancy of the Body, It is chiefly wrought by these three means; Education, Custom, and Occasion. For the Rule of ^b *Aristotle*, though in Agents purely Natural it hold true, yet in voluntary Agents it is not constant, that things which proceed from Nature are unalterable by Custom. For we may usually observe that the Culture of the Minde as of the ^c Earth, doth deliver it from the barrennesse of its own Nature.

And therefore when ^d *Zopyrus* the Physiognomist did ^e conjecture of the disposition of

Socrates

Greg. Naz. 2.

Orat. 3.

Euseb. de pra-

parat. Evang.

lib. 1. c. 1. 3.

Theodoret. Serm.

1. Therapeut.

1 Cor. 2. 7.

^a *Adult.* 12. qu.

28. art. 3. & 29.

qu. 175. art. 1. 4

^b *Ethic.* 1. 2. c. 1.

& 1. 10. c. 9.

^c *Ἡ ἡδὴ καὶ*

τοῦ σώματος καὶ

θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή

καὶ ἡ ψυχή

καὶ ἡ ψυχή

καὶ ἡ ψυχή

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and Faculties of the Soul.

I I

Socrates contrary to that which men believed of him, and thereupon was derided as an ignorant pretender, *Socrates* himself did acquit the man from that Imputation, confessing that he had rightly judged of his natural inclinations, which onely the studie of Philosophie had altered and over-ruled.

Thus, as Hard Bones being steeped in vinegar and alhes (as ^a *Plutarch* notes) do lose their Nature, and grow so soft, that they may be cut with a thred : So ^b the toughest and most unbended Natures, by early and prudent discipline, may be much Rectified, though still indeed, like Simples of a strong and predominant rellish in a compounded Medicine, they will give a tincture to all other super-induced qualities.

Socrates himself, notwithstanding the great mastery which he professed to have gotten over the vitious propensions of his Nature, could not yet always be so faithful to his moral principles, as not to relapse; and betray the loosenesse of his disposition : And that not onely in Anger and Passions charged upon him by his best friends ^c *Aristoxenus* and *Porphyrus* ; but also in unnatural obscenities, the usual sin (as the ^d *Apostle* notes, and as ^e *Plutarch* confesseth) even of their great Philosophers. Whence that of the Poet*.

Now for *Occasion*, that alters the natural Inclinations of the Will and Affections. For so we see that the Bias of mens Desires are often turned, by reason of some sudden emergent Occurrences,

C 2

contrary

a *Plus. Ian virtutis ad felicitatem sufficiat.*

b *ἡ ἀντιλογία τῆ φυσικῆς διδασκαλίας. Democrit. apud Theodoret. Serm. 4. Therapeut.*

Διασπείραξ το λογικόν ὥσθ δια τὰς τῶν ἔσθων παρματίων μάστιγας. *Diog. Laert. 7.*

Vid. Sen. de ira. l. 2. c. 12.

c *Cyrril. Alex. contr. Julian. l. 6. Theodoret. Serm. 12. de virtute Aethiva.*

d *Rom. 1. 24, 25.*

e *Plutarch. περὶ παρὰ φύσιν.*

* *Inter Socraticos notissima fessa Cinados. Juven. Lego partem sententiae Attice Socratem corruptorem Adolescentium pronuntiatam. Terul. Apolog. c. 4.*

*Una salus vix in
nullam sperare
salutem.*

1 Sam. 4. 6, 7, 8.

Justin.

contrary to the standing temper and complexion of the Body. Thus we read sometime of men in War, who notwithstanding of themselves timorous and sluggish, yet being deprived of possibility of flight, and hope of mercy if they should be conquered, have strangely gained by their despairs, and gotten great and prosperous Victories by a forced and unnatural Fortitude. An example whereof we have in the Philistines, who being sorely terrified with the Ark of the Lord in the Camp of Israel, resolved thereupon to quit themselves like men, and fight. Nor could the band of Scythian slaves, who endeavoured to shake off their servile condition, be removed from that insolence, till the sight of Rods, and Staves, and other instruments of Fear, had driven them back into their nature again.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

*Of the Memory and some few causes
of the weaknesse thereof.*

NOW for these inward Senses, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themselves unto sundry operations of differing qualities) I take the two later, to wit, Memory, and Fancy, or Imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man, as being indeed the principal Store-houses and Treasuries of the operations of the Soul. Where, by Memory, I understand not the faculty as it is common to beasts with men; and importeth nothing but the simple retention and conservation of some *species* formerly treasured up by the conveyance of the outward sense: but as it is *Consort & co-operatrix Rationis*, as *Hugo* speaks, a joynt worker in the operations of Reason; which the Latines call *Reminiscentia*, or *Recordatio*, including some acts of the Understanding; which is a reviewing, or (as we speak) a calling to minde of former objects, by discourse, or rational searching for them; which is made by *Aristotle* to be the remote ground of all Arts: For (saith he) Memory is the Ground of Experience, and Experience the Mother of Art: The dignity hereof in man, is seen, both by perfecting the Understanding

*Lib. de spiritum
& anima.*

Metaph. lib. 1.

*Sen. Contro. l. 1.
in Proœmium.*

Plin. lib. 7. c. 24.

*Quintil. lib. 11.
c. 2.*

*Polit. Ep. l. 12.
ad Pic. Mirand.*

standing, in matter of Learning and Discourse, (wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicity; as *Seneca* the elder confesseth of himself, who could immediately recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had been spoken before to him; and *Cyrus*, of whom *Xenophon* testifieth, that he could salute all the Souldiers in his Army by their Names; and *Mithridates*, who being King over two and twenty Countries, did speak so many Languages without an Interpreter: and *Politian* in his Epistles telleth of *Fabius Ursinus*, a Childe but of eleven yeers of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of Invention and Memory, that he could unto five or six several persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many several Epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different arguments, returning after every short period, from the last to the first, and so in order; and in the conclusion, every Epistle should be close, proper, and coherent within it self, as if it alone had been intended:) As also by affording special assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto Precepts and Rules in Morality, or unto Principles of Wisdom and publike Prudence, gathered from Historical observations; while the Minde, by the help of Memory, being as it were conversant with Ages past, and furnished with Examples for any service and employment, doth by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances,

stances, and passages of affairs together ; enable it self with the more hope and resolution , to passe successively thorow any enterprize or difficulty : for *qui credit sperat*, he that believeth, and is acquainted with the happie issue of other mens resolutions , will with the lesse anxiety or discouragement go on in his own.

The principal Corruptions which I conceive of the Memory, are, First, too much slightnesse and shallownesse of observation ; when out of an impatency of staying long, or making any profound enquiry into one object, and out of a gluttonous curiosity to feed on many, the greedinesse of the appetite weakneth the digestion, (for so some have called the Memory, the Belly of the Soul) and an eagernesse to take in, makes uncareful to retaine. And this is the reason why many men wander over all Arts and Sciences, without gaining reall improvement or solidity in any : They make not any solemn Journey to a particular Coast, and Head of Learning, but view all as it were in *Transitu* ; having no sooner begun to settle on one, but they are in haste to visit another. But such men as these (except endowed with an incredible and unusual felicity of dispatch) are no more able to finde the use or search the bottom of any Learning, then he who rides post, is to make a description and Map of his Journeys : who, though by much employment he may toil and sweat more in travelling from place to place ; yet is he far lesse able to discover the nature of the Countreys,

treys, temperature of the Air, Character of the people, Commodities of the Earth, then he, who though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode : and though his haste be lesse eager, yet his observations are more serious. *Omnis festinatio caca est*, saith *Seneca* ; Precipitancy and unstablenesse, as well in the motions of the Wit, as of the Body, dazleth and disableth the eyes : And it is true in the Minde, as in the Stomack ; too quick digestion doth always more distemper then nourish, and breedeth nothing but Crudities in Learning : Nor can I call that so much Studie, as Agitation and restlesnesse of the Minde, which is as impatient of true settled labour, as it is of quiet. Now, the reason why such a temper of Minde as this, is corruptive to the Memory, is, first, because Memory is always joyned with some measure of Love ; and we most of all remember that, which we most respect : *Omnia quæ curant meminerunt* : There where the Treasure is, the Minde will be also : There therefore where our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithful. So that sudden, vanishing and broken desires, which like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over, as they argue an eager love for the present, of what we pursue, and by consequence, a *fastidium* and disesteem of that which we soon forsake : so do they necessarily infer weaknesse on the Memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as *Seneca* speaks, *Caduca memoria futura*

Arist. Rhet.
lib. 2. c. 12.

De Benef. lib. 3.
cap. 3.

future incunivendum; Men strongly bent upon things future, have but weake memories of things past.

Secondly, the body of any one Homogeneall Learning, hath this excellent propertie in it, that all the parts of it doe by mutuall service relate to, and communicate strength and lustre each to other: so that he who goes through with any Science, doth from every new Branch and Conclusion which he meets with, receive a greater clearnesse and more strong impression of his former degrees of Knowledge. Now then, that man who out of impatiencie of that Restraint, cannot endure to goe through an Art, to search into the Root, to observe the knittings and dependencies of the parts amongst themselves, to see by what passages Truth is derived from the Principles, to this or to other Branches; must needs bee so much the more forgetfull of what he knowes, by how much he is ignorant of those other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other causes there are of weaknesse in the Memorie; as namely, a distrust, and from thence an unexercise of it. Whereupon *Plato* telleth us, that the use of Letters, in gathering *Adversaria* and Collections, is a hinderance to the Memorie; because those things which we have deposited to our Desks, wee are the more secure and carelesse to retaine in our Minds. And on the other Extreme, a too great Confidence in it, and thereupon an over-burthening it with multitude of Notions; whereby as it sheds much over, so

D


it

Quintil. lib. 11
c. 2.

It is withall indisposed for the readie use of what it retaines; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuarie heape of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never so easily finde out, or order and dispose what we desire to use, but are confounded in our owne store. But I forbear to insist on these, because I hasten to the higher and more noble part of Man.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Fancie : Its offices to the Will and Reason, Volubilitie of Thoughts, Fixions, Errours, Levitie, Fixednesse.

OW for the Imagination, the dignitie thereof consists, either in the office, or in the latitude of it : Its office, is to be assistant both to the Understanding and the Will; its assistance to the Understanding, is principally in matter of Invention, readily to supply it with varietie of objects whereon to worke, as also to quicken and rayse the Minde with a kind of heat and rapterie proportionable in the inferior part of the Soule, to that which in the superior, Philosophers call Extasie; whereby it is possessed with such a strong delight in its proper object, as makes the motions thereof towards

wards it, to be restless and impatient: And of this, is that of the Poet;

Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus ipso:

By Divine Raptures we aspire,
And are inflam'd with noble fire.

The office of the *Imagination* to the *Will*, is to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object: for it often cometh to passe, that some plausible *Fancie* doth more prevaile with tender Wills, then a severe and fullen Argument: and hath more powerfull insinuations to *perswade*, then the peremptorinesse of Reason hath to *command*. And the reason hereof is, because *libertie* being naturall unto mans *Will*, that course must needs most of all gaine upon it, which doth offer least force unto its *libertie*: Which is done rather by an Argument of delight, then of constraint; and best of all, when a rationall and convincing Argument is so sweetned and tempered, to the delight of the eare, that he shall be content to entertaine Truth for the very beautie and attire of it; so that you shall not know, whether it were the weight of the Reason that over rul'd, or the elegancie that enticed him. A man can be well pleased, to looke with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with as skilfull and curious hand. And therefore, in that great work of mens *conversion* unto God, he is said to *allure*

Μακροδὸς ὁ Σὺ-
εργαστὴς καὶ ἀ-
μείνων ὁ νοῦν-
της ὁ ἄσπασιν.
Arist. Problem.
§. 30.

Hosea 2.14.
 2 Cor. 5.17.
 Cant. 5. 10, 16.
 Hag. 2.7.
 Rom. 11.12.
 Ephes. 3.8.
 1 Tim. 1.15.

Lucret. lib. 4.
 Phil. de edu-
 cat. liberorum.

them, and to *speake comfortably* unto them, to *beseech*, and to *perswade* them; to set forth Christ to the Soule, as *altogether lovely*, as the *fairest of ten thousand*, as the *desire of the Nations*, as the *Riches of the World*, that men might be inflamed to love the beautie of Holinesse. That which must perswade the Will, must not onely have a truth, but a *worthinesse* in it: in which respect, the Principles of knowledge are called *ἀξιωματά*, *worthy* or *honourable* speeches: and the Gospell is not onely called *ἀληθὲς*, a *true* saying; but *ἀξιωματικόν*, a *worthy* saying; and in that respect, fitted for acceptation, It is true of the *Will*, which *Seneca* hath observed of *Princes*; *Apud Reges etiam quæ prosunt ita tamen ut delectent suadenda sunt*; That unto them even things profitable must be represented with the face rather of delight then of necessitie; even as *Physicians*, when they minister a very wholesome *Potion*,

— *Præus oras pocula circum
 Contingunt dulci mellis flavoque liquore:*

That they their Patients may both please & cure,
 With mixed sweets their palats they allure.

And hence is that observation, that the first reformers and drawers of men into Civill societie, and the practise of vertue, wrought upon the *Will* by the ministrie rather of the *Fancie*, then of rigid *Reason*; not driving them thereunto by punctuall Arguments, but alluring them by the sweet-

sweetnesse of Eloquence; not pressing the necessitie of Morallitie, by naked inferences, but rather secretly instilling it into the Will, that it might at last finde it selfe reformed, and yet hardly perceive how it came to be so. And this was done by those Muscical, Poeticall, and Mythologicall perswasions; whereby men in their discourses, did as it were paint Vertues and Vices; giving unto spirituall things Bodies and Beauties, such as might best affect the Imagination; Yea, God himselfe hath beene pleased to honour this way of setting out higher Notions, in that we finde some roome in the holy Scriptures for Mythologies; as that of the Vine, the Fig-tree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes, and Poeticall Numbers and Raptures, whereby heavenly Doctrines are shadowed forth, and do condiscend unto humane frailties. And another reason hereof is, because the desires of men are fixed as well on pleasant as on profitable objects; so that those inducements must needs have most Authoritie, which have that happie mixture of *utile & dulce* together; not onely pressing necessitie upon the Understanding, but pointing as it were and deciphring delight to the Fancie. And this reason *Scaliger* gives in his Inquire, how false Things, such as *Plato* his *Elixium*, *Homers* Fictions, *Orpheus* his Musick, should delight wise men: *Propterea quod exuperant vulgares limites veritatis*, saith hee; because they are not exacted to the rigor and strictnesse of Reason, nor grounded on the severitie of

*Iud. 18. 14. 12.
Hos. 12. 10.*

*Scalig. subtil.
307. 11.*

Truth, but are (as I may so speak) the Creation of the Fancie, having a kind of delightfull libertie in them, wherewith they refresh and doe as it were open and unbind the Thoughts, which other wise, by a continuall pressure in exacter and more masse reasonings, would easily tyre and despaire.

Concerning the Latitude of this Facultie, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one in the multiplicitie of Operations; another, in the framing of objects. To the former of these, I reduce the Thoughts; which, by reason of their quicknesse and volubilitie, and withall their continuall interchanges and successions, are the most numberlesse operations of the Soule of man: where, by Thoughts, I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different objects; for when the Mind begins once to be fixt, and standing, I call that rather Meditation then Thought. This multiplicitie of Thoughts is grounded first upon the abundance of their Objects; and next upon the quicknesse and activitie of Apprehension; that is the matter, this the forme of those Thoughts which I now speake of. The abundance of Objects is seene in this, that it concludes all the varieties of *species* belonging to other faculties; as that knowledge which the Schooles call *Philosophia prima*, doth within its owne limits draw in, in some sort, all the severall Objects of particular Sciences. There are Thoughts belonging unto the Will
flying

aying and pursuing Thoughts, Wishings, and Loathings; and there are Thoughts belonging to the Understanding, assenting and dissenting Thoughts, Beleeve and dis-opinion: There are Thoughts likewise proceeding from Anger, fire and revengfull Thoughts; from Envie, knowing and repining Thoughts; from Joy, sweet and refreshing Thoughts; from Conscience, comforting and affrightfull Thoughts; and so in all other faculties. And for the quicknesse of Working, the motions of the Thoughts shew it, in the concurrence of these two things, suddennesse of journey, and vastnesse of way; while like Lightning they are able to reach from one end of Heaven unto another, and in one light and imperceptible excursion, leave almost no part of the Universe untravelled. Now, of these two grounds of multiplicite in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is *ab extrinseco*, and disperseth over things, (though they are not otherwise the Objects of Thought, then as the Minde reflecteth on the *phantasmata* or images of them in this facultie) but the latter, which is the quicknesse of Apprehension, though it may seeme to be the most peculiar work of Reason, yet the imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper worke of the Understanding, yet the forme and qualitie of that Act (which properly makes it a Thought in that strict sense, wherein here I take it) namely, the lightnesse, volubilitie, and suddennesse there-
of

*Vid. A. Gell.
lib. 9. c. 1.
Aug. de Civ.
Dei, lib. 9. c. 4.*

of, proceeds from the immediate restlesnesse of the Imagination; as is plaine, by the continuall variety of Dreames and other Fancies, wherein that Facultie is the principall worker. The next thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects, wherein it hath a propertie of boldnesse beyond other faculties: For Reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature; and therefore they alwayes frame themselves to the truth of things, yeelding assent to nothing but what they finde: But the Imagination is a Facultie boundlesse, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which it selfe maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of perswasion and insinuation, Poetrie, Mythologie and Eloquence (the Arts of Rationall Fancie) have ever (as was observ'd) been more forcible then those which have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason; it being (as *Scaliger* observes) the naturall infinitenesse of Mans Soule *Aspernari ceterorum finium praescriptionem*, to disdain any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now, the libertie of the Imagination in this particular, is three-fold; Creation, as I may so speake, and new making of Objects; Composition, or new mixing them; and Translation, or new placing them; unto some of which three, will be reduced all Poeticall Fictions, fabulous Transmutations, high Metaphors, and Rhetoricall Allegories; things of excellent use, and ornament in speech.

Now

*Aug. Epist. 72.
ad Nebrid.*

Now, for the Corruptions and Diseases of this Facultie, I conceive the principall to be these three, Error, Levitie, and dull fixednesse: The Error of the Imagination may be taken both actively, and passively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it suffereth. That the Fancie is fruitfull in producing Error, is as manifest as it is difficult to shew the manner how it doth it. Hence, those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Minds of melancholy men (in whom this Facultie hath the most deepe and piercing operation) have beene peremptorily possessed: Hence, those vanishing and shadowie Assurances, Hopes, Feares, Ioyes, Visions, which the Dreames of men (the immediate issues of this Facultie) doe produce: Hence those gastly Apparitions, dreadfull Sounds, black Thoughts, Tremblings, and Horrors, which the strong working of Imagination doth present unto, or produce in men, disquieted either with the ugliness of their Sinnes, or heaviness of their Natures, making them to feare where no feare is: which, whether it be done by affecting onely the Fancie, or by the impression of such formes and shapes upon the Spirits, which goe unto the outward senses, as may thereby affect them with the same Images (not by reception from without, but by impression and transfusion from within) it is manifest, not onely by various relations, but by continuall experience, what strong and strang effects those distempers have produced.

E.

Neither

*Arist. Prob.
Sect. 10 ¶ 12.
Plin. lib. 7. c. 12.*

*Peucer de Te-
nas. copia.*

*Aug. in Gen.]
quest. 93.*

*Vid. Gofinium,
in Arist. Eth.
lib. 7. c. 5. &
Witt. de Pra-
fig. Dem. l. 2.
c. 24, 25, 26. &
l. 3. c. 21.*

*Fran. Mirand.
l. de Imag. c. 8.
Aug. de Civ.
Dei. l. 18. c. 18.
de divin. Da-
mon. c. 5, 6.*

Neither are wee to conceive this impossible when we see as admirable effects in another kind wrought by the same facultie, and, as is probable, by the same means; I meane, the impression of likelinese of an infant in the Wombe, unto the Parents, or some other, who shall work a stronger conceit in the Fancie: Or if this be not ascribed unto the working of this power, but rather to a secret reall vertue intrinsecall unto the Seed of the Parents (as many do affirme) yet that other effect of stamping on the Body the Images and Colours of some things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the Fancie, must needs be hereunto ascribed: As we see commeth often to passe, in the longing of Women; and in her, who having the picture of an *Ethiopian* in her Chamber, brought forth a black Child; and in the course which *Iacob* tooke, in putting *speckled Rods* before the Cattell, when they were to conceive, that the fancie of them might make their Lambes to be ring-straked and speackled.

The Errors which are in the Fancie, are usually of the same nature with those that are wrought by it: Such was the Error of that man, which would not be perswaded, but that he had on his head a great paine of Hornes, and for that reason would not move forth nor uncover his his face to any. And the causes of these Errors are by *Francis Mirandula* ascribed first to the varietie of tempers in the Body, with the predominancie of those humours which give complexion there-

unto; secondly, to the *imposture* of the Sences: thirdly, to the government of the *Will*, (though that, as is granted, hath least power over this Faculty) and lastly, to the ministry of *evill Angels*, who can easily cast into the Fancie strange and false *species*, with such subtletie, as shall easily gaine them plausible credit and admittance. And of this, we finde an expresse example (as I conceive) in that evill spirit, who promised to be a lying spirit in the mouth of *Ahabs* Prophets. For the *visions* of such men being for the most part *imaginarie*, the impression of that lying and deceitfull perswasion was, in all probabilitie, made upon the *Imagination*. For, notwithstanding I confesse, that prophets had events by divers meanes revealed unto them, as by *true Voices*, by reall *accesse* of *Angels*, and by immediate *illapse* of Truth into the Vnderstanding; yet because those two wayes, by *Visions* and by *Dreames*, were (for ought can be observ'd) the most usuall meanes of Revelation; it is not unlikely, that the Devil (who in such things strives, for the better advancement of his owne ends, to imitate Gods manner of working) did by this manner of imposture on the *Imagination*, seeke to possesse the false Prophets, and to delude the King.

Numb. 12. 6.
Isa. 2. 28.

And here, by the way, from the three former, we may take occasion to observe the miserie of mans corrupted Nature; wherein those Faculties which were originally ordained for mutuall assistance, doe now exercise a mutuall imposture:

and as Man did joyne with a fellow-creature to dishonor, and if it had been possible, to deceive his maker; so in the Faculties of man, we may discover a joynt conspiracie in the working of their owne overthrow and reproach, and a secret joy, in one to be deluded by another.

The next *Corruption* which I observed, is the *Levitie* and too much *Volubilitie* of this Power, proceeding from the over-hastie obtrusion of the *species*. For, notwithstanding I grant the quicknesse of its operations to be one principall part of the excellencie thereof; yet I thereby understand the *Power*, not the *Infirmities*; the *Nature*, not the *Disease* of that Facultie; the *abilitie* of having speedy recourse unto varietie of Objects, treasured up in the *Memorie*; or of apprehending new, with dexterity; not that *floating* and *inconstant* humour, whereby it makes many needlesse excursions upon impertinent things, and thereby interrupteth the course of the more needfull and present operation of the Soule. For, since it may fall out, that unto the same Facultie, from diversitie of occasions, contrarie operations may prove arguments of worth; a restraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weaknesse and defect, in that it straitneth and defraudeth the power of those advantages which it might receive by a timely application of the other: There may be a time, when the *Fancie* may have libertie to expatiate; but againe, some object will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore,

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to have a vanishing and lightning Fancie, that knoweth not how to stay and fasten upon any particular, but as an Hanging of divers Colours, shall in one view present unto the Vnderstanding an heape of *species*, and so distract its intention, argues not sufficiency, but weaknesse and distemper in this Facultie.

The last Corruption observed, is in the other extreame; I meane, that heaviness and sluggish fixednesse, whereby it is disabled from being serviceable to the Vnderstanding, in those actions which require dispatch, variety, and suddennesse of execution: from which peremptorie adhesion and too violent intention of the Fancie on some particular objects, doth many times arise not onely a dullnesse of mind, a *Syncope*, and kind of benumbednesse of the Soule, but oftentimes madness, distraction, and torment: Many examples of which kind of depravation of the Phantasie in melancholie men, we everywhere meet withall; some, thinking themselves turned into Wolves, Horses, or other Beasts; others, pleasing themselves with Conceits of great Wealth and Principalities; some, framing to themselves Feares, and others Hopes; being all but the delusions and waking dreames of a distempered Fancie.

Arist. Prob. Sect. 19.

Lucian. in Lucio sive Acino. Apul. in Asino. Plin. lib. 7. c. 22. Olav. Magnus de Region. Septentrion. l. 18. c. 45. 46. 47. Virg. de Praefig. l. 3. c. 21. Thrasitae comites ad litus Pyreum appellantes naves suas credidit. apud Athen.

Virg. Eclog. 8.

*His ego saepe Lupum fieri & se condere Sylvis
Maris, saepe animas imis exte sepulcris,
Atque satas alio vidi traducere menses:*

Here often I have seen this *Maris* worke
Himselfe into a Wolfe, and into Woods lurke ;
Oft have I seen him raise up ghosts from Hell,
And growing Corne translate by Magick Spell.

And upon this over-strong working and stay
of the Fancie on some one or other object, it
hath oftentimes come to passe, that some men,
out of depth of contemplation on some diffi-
culties of Learning, (as is reported of *Aristotle*,
in his meditation on the cause of the ebbing
and flowing of the Sea) others, out of some
strong and predominant passion, as Love, Feare,
Despaire, drawing all the intention of the Mind
unto them, have attempted such strange practi-
ses on themselves, and others, as could not
proceed but from a smothered and intangled
Reason. And thus much briefly shall suffice,
touching the honour of mans common and in-
feriour Faculties.

CHAP. V.

*Of Passi ns, t' e r nature, and distri-
bution; of the Motions of Naturall Crea-
tures guided by a knowledge without them;
and of Rationall Creatures, guided by a
knowledge within them: of Passions Men-
tall, Sensitive, and Rationall.*



Now proceed unto the Soule of Man: of which, I must speake in a double reference; either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the Body, and receiveth from it; or according to those more immanent perfections which it hath within it selfe: under the former of these, come to be considered the Passions of Mans Minde, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as farre as my weaknesse can discover) which the Soule and Body contracted from them.

Passions are nothing else, but those naturall, perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own severall Spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodnesse beareth

beareth a naturall conveniencie or vertue of satisfaction unto them; or by an antipathie and averſation from thoſe, which bearing a contrarietie to the good they deſire, muſt needs be noxious and deſtructive, and by conſequent, odious to their natures. This being the propertie of all unconſtrained ſelf-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Paſſions, is principally the good; and ſecondarily, or by conſequent, the evill of things: as one bareth with it *rationem convenientia*, a quieting and ſatisfactorie; the other, *rationem diſconvenientia*, a diſturb- ing and deſtroying nature.

This being premised touching the nature and generall eſſence of Paſſions, the diviſion of them muſt be then grounded; becauſe (as Philoſophie teacheth us) Faculties and Operations receive their eſſentiall diſtinctions from their objects, and thoſe ſeverall reſpects wherewith they in order to the Facultie are qualified. Now ſince all appetite (being a blind Power) is dependant upon the direction of ſome Knowledge; from the diverſitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime diſtinction of Paſſions.

Knowledge, in reſpect of created Agents, may be conſidered, either as diſ-joyn'd, and extrinſecall to the things moved, or as intrinſecall and united thereunto; both which ſerve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not ſwerve into diſordered and confuſed, or into idle and vaine motions, but

but might ever worke towards that fixed end, which God hath appointed them to move unto.

Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall, are those motions of meerely naturall Agents, which are guided to their generall or particular ends, by the Wisdom and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptorie and uniform order, observed by these kind of Agents in their naturall course, never either swerving or desisting there-from, so farre as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they worke permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variableness nor shadow of changing. And therefore we finde those aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it swerveth from this Law onely, or at least principally in these inferior things; wherein partly from the deficiency and languishing of secundarie Agents, and partly from the excesses, defects, mutabilitie, and the like exigences of matter, we finde sundry times error and enormitie in their severall workes and ends: Which, whether it be to set forth the beautie of regular operations (which by deformitie and confusion will appeare more beautiful) or whether the originall thereof be divine malediction, which for the sinne of man hee pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service,

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(which

(which Saint *Paul* calleth the *vanitie of the Creature*) it proceedeth certainly from the Will and Power of that Law-giver, who is onely able, for Reasons best knowne to his owne wisdome, to dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe: So that all the Miracles that ever God hath been pleased to worke, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations before spoken of, are seene principally in inferiour things. The Earth, being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Mans Fall, which made (if wee will beleve that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen philosopher, upon observation of that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour, to cry out, *Ani Deus Natura patitur, aut mundi machina dissolvetur*; either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universall Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly detain that vertue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observ'd, to note, that the more rayseed and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.

Now

Now, this *naturall Passion* which I speake of, is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers, the *Law*, the *Equitie*, the *Weight*, the *Instinct*, the *Bond*, the *Love*, the *Covenant* and *League* of naturall things in order to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the Vniverse, service of Man, and glory of the Creator; which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents.

By all which wee are given to understand, that when at any time the ordinarie course of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder, there is then admitted a *breach of a Law*; or, as *Aristotle* calls it, *αἰσθησια*, an *error*, (which *Saint Iames* telleth us, is *ἀνομία*, an *iniquitie* of Nature) also a certaine levitie, unusefullnesse, and emptinesse of true worth, which I call in *Saint Pauls* phrase, the *vanitie of the Creature*: thirdly, loosenesse, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon, discord and unserviceablenesse towards the other parts, with which it should joyntly conspire for the glory of the whole.

These are the inconveniences that follow *Nature*; how much greater are those, which follow *Reasons* disobedience? for all this, touching the Passions of *Nature*, I have observed onely to give light unto those of *Reason*, there being the same proportion of government in them all; saving that, what in things destitute of all *Knowledge*, is guided by the Law-giver himselve, is in the rest performed by a *knowledge conjoynd*, and in-

trinfecall to the Worker : and this is either *Mentall*, or *Sensitive*, or *Rationall* ; from all which, arise sundry degrees of Motions, or Passions : *Mentall Passions*, are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the Vnderstanding, which *Aristotle* calleth *Nûs*, the *Latines*, *Mens*, or *Apex animi* ; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixture or commerce with inferior and earthy faculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an *extraordinarie Knowledge*, either of *Visiõ* and *Revelation*, or of an exquisite naturall *Apprehension* ; both which are beyond the compasse of usuall Industrie, here to attain unto : The former of these, I call with the Schoole men, *Extasie* and *Rapture* ; such as Saint *Pauls* was (for so himselfe calleth it) *Novi hominem raptum* ; and such as were the Passions of the Mind in the prophets and holy men of God, when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that joy *unspeakable*, and *Peace past understanding*, which the Apostle makes to be the *fruits of the Spirit of God*, in those hearts wherein he lodgeth ; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soule, the *Mind*, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable Light.

And for the later Branch, *Aristotle* hath placed his

his greatest felicitie in the contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreme part of the Soule. And it was the speech of the Philosopher *Heraclitus* to the same purpose, that *Anima sicca est sapientissima*, (which toucheth something upon that of *Aristotle*, That Melancholy complexions are usually the wisest, for that Temper is the driest of all the rest) That a Mind not steeped in the humours of carnall and grosse affections, nor drench'd in the waves of a disquiet Fancie, but more rayseed and soaring to its originall, by divine contemplations, is alwayes endued with the greater wisdom.

Another Knowledge from whence the Passions of this Facultie are rayseed in Man, is that light of *Naturall Principles*, which the Schooles call *Synteresis*; unto which, the custodie of all *practical Truths* being committed, they therefore worke in the *Conscience* motions of Joy, Love, Peace, Feare, Horror, Despaire, and the like spirituall Passions, according as the Soule, out of those generall Principles, shall gather unto its owne particulars, any either delightfull or disquieting Conclusions.

Sensitive Passions, are those motions of prosecution or flight, which are grounded on the *Fancie*, *Memorie*, and Apprehensions of the *common Sense*: which we see in *brute beasts*; as, in the feare of Hares or Sheepe, the fiercenesse of Wovles, the anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like: So *Homer* describeth the joy of *Vlysses* his

Plutarch de orac. defectu, & de Esu Carnium, Orat. 1. Arist. Problem. §. 30. qu. 1.

Aquin part. 1. qu. 79. art. 12.

Arist. de Hist. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. l. 9. per totum. Diogen. Laert. lib. 7. in Zenon.

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Dog, which after his so long absence, remembred him at his returne.

Odyss. 5.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ὅς ἐστιν, καὶ ἕτα καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἀμφοτέρω.

For wanton joy to see his Master neare,
He wau'd his flattering taylor and cess'd each care.

Sen. de Ira,
lib. 1. c. 3.

Now these *motions* in brute creatures, if we will beleeeve *Seneca*, are not *affections*, but certain characters and impressions *ad similitudinem passionum*, like unto Passions in men; which he calleth *Impetus*, the risings, forces, and impulsions of Nature, upon the view of such objects as are apt to stricke any impressions upon it.

Vid. Aristot.
Ethic. 1. 2. c. 6.
Mag. Mor. 1. 1.
c. 7.
Eadem, 1. 1. c. 2.
& Ethic. lib. 6.
chap. 3.

Rhet. 1. 1. c. 10.

Aquin. part. 1.
q. 81. part. 3.

I come therefore to those *middle Passions*, which I call'd *Rationall*; not *formally*, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immateriall motions of the Soule; but by way of *participation* and *dependance*, by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the *Will* and *Vnderstanding*, and not barely of the *Fancie*, as in other creatures. And for calling *Passion* thus govern'd, *Reasonable*, I have the warrant of *Aristotle*: who, though the *sensitive Appetite* in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradiuided to the *Rationall* powers of the Soule) yet by reason of that *obedience* which it oweth to the Dictates of the *Vnderstanding*, whereunto Nature hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable (though *Corruption* have much slackned and

and unknit that Bond) he justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not intrinsically in it selfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.

Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good; and secondarily, the Evill of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Facultie, in vertue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so doe they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may be considered simply in its owne nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including onely naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie: and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evill, Hatred: which are the two radical, fundamental, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest; and therefore well called *Pondera* and *Impetus animi*, the weight and force, and (as I may so speake) the first springings and out-goings of the Soule. Secondly, the object may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of reall union (though never without that which
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the Schooles call *unio objectiva*, union of Apprehension in the understanding) without which there can be no Passion : and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire ; if Evill, Flight, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Facultie ; and so it worketh, if good, Delight, and Pleasure ; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Againe, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power ; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire ; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare : or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least those aides which it calleth in ; in which regard, Good is presented as Attainable, and so it worketh Hope ; and Evill is presented either as Avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake through it ; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after ; of all which, or at least, those which are most naturall, and least coincident with one another, I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature : But first, I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions ; and what dignities

dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.

CHAP. VI.

Of Humane Passions in generall : their use, Naturall, Morall, Civill : their subordination unto, or Rebellion against right Reason.

 Now *Passions* may be the subject of a three-fold discourse; *Naturall, Morall, and Civill*. In their *Naturall* consideration, we should observe in them, their essentiall *Properties*, their Ebbes and Flowes, their Springings and Decayes, the manner of their severall *Impressions*, the Physicall *Effects* which are wrought by them, and the like.

In their *Morall* consideration, we might likewise search, how the *Indifferencie* of them is altered into Good or Evill, by vertue of the Dominion of right Reason, or of the violence of their owne motions; what their Ministry is in Vertuous, and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions; how they are raysed, suppressed, slackned, and govern'd according to the particular nature of those things, which require their motion.

In their *Civill* respects, we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and im-

impressed; and how, and on what occasions it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and remitt them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish or alter or mix them, as may be most advantageous; what use may be made of each mans particular Age, Nature, Propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of these, whom we are to deale withall.

And this *Civill* use of *Passion*, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of *Aristotle*, in the second booke of his *Rhetoricks*; unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth: because in matter of *Action*, and of *Judicature*, *Affection* in some sort is an *Auditor* or *Judge*, as he speakes. But it seemeth strange, that a Man of so vast sufficiencie and judgement; and who had, as we may well conjecture, an Ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body, which in other mens Labours lay broken and scattered; should yet in his Bookes *De Animâ* over-passe the discoverie of their Nature, Essence, Operations and Properties; and in his Bookes of *Morall Philosophie*, should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie, Irregularitie, Subordination, Rebellion, Conspiracie, Discords, Causes, Effects; consequences of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and dayly use in our Life, and of necessarie and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right Reason.

Touching Passions in order unto Civill or Judiciarie

diciarie affaires, I shall not make any observation; either of the other, I shall in part touch upon, though not distinctly and assunder, but in a briefe and confused collection of some few particulars.

The Order which I shall observe, in setting down the Honour and Corruption of them in Generall (which Method shall in part be kept in their Particulars) shall be this; first, according to the *Antecedents* of their *Motion*, and *Acts*; secondly, according to the *Acts* themselves; and thirdly, according to the *Consequents* of them.

First, touching the *Antecedents* to the Act of *Passion*, they are either the *Outward* Motives thereunto, as namely, the *Objects* unto which it is carryed; and the *Causes*, whereby it is produced: or the *Inward* Root and Principles of the Act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, *Passion* is then said commendable, when it is direct and naturall. And the Corruption is, when it is carryed to an undue *Object*, or proceedeth from an indirect *Cause*: but these are more observable in the particulars, and therefore thither I referre their distinct handling.

For the third, the Dignitie of *Passion* chiefly consists in a *Consonancie* and *Obedience* to the Prescription of *Reason*: for there is in mans *Faculties* a naturall *subordination*, whereby the actions of the inferior receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now *Appetite* was in *Beasts* onely made to be governed by a *sensitive*

sitive Knowledge: But in *Man*, Sense ought not to have any *commanding* or moving Power, but only *Instrumentall*, Ministeriall and Conveying, in respect of the *Object*. The Action of *Sense* was not from the first Institution ordain'd to touch the *Affection*, but to present it selfe primarily to the *Vnderstanding*; upon whose determination and conduct, the *Passions* were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers, in the execution of all such Duties, as it should deeme any way expedient for the benefit of mans nature: so that herein consists a great part of mans infelicities by the *Fall*; that albeit his *Vnderstanding* it selfe be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect *Good* to the inferiour parts; yet that small portion of *Light* which it yet retaineth for the government of our Actions, is become uneffectuall, as being able only to convince, but not to reforme.

The *Corruption* then of *Passion* in this respect; is the *independance* thereof upon its true *Principle*: when it strayeth not to looke for, but anticipates and prevents the Discourses of *Reason*; relying onely on the judgement of *Sense*, wherewith it retains an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the Prophet; *Man being in Honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the Beasts that perish*. For, as in the *Body*, (to use the similitude of *Aristotle*) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yeeld obedience unto the Government of the motive Facultie; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another:

Αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις
ἐννοεῖται καὶ ὡς
ἐν τῇ ἀνθρώπινῃ
ψυχῇ ὡς ἐν τῇ
Theodor. ser. 5.
de natur. Hom.

Psal. 49. 20.
* Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσυχία
ἡ ἀνθρώπων, &c.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. l. 4.
* Ἀποκαταστα-
σις τοῦ κόσμου
τῆς ἐν τῇ
τρεπ. & Tatian.
orat. ad Græc. 3.
Ethic. l. 1. c. 13.

ther: So it is in the *Mind* of Man, when that Naturall continuitie and *Vnion* of Faculties, whereby one was made in operation *dependant* on another, is once dissolved; when *Affections* are dis-joynted from *Reason*, and cast off the reines whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmonie in the motion thereof, which is required to the weale of Mans Nature.

*Vid. Plutarch.
lib. de virtute
Moral.*

It is prodigious to see an *Instrument* (such as all *Appetite* should be) to be the *first* and *selfe-mover* in its owne actions; whence cannot in the *Minde* of Man but follow great danger: it being all one, as if a Waggoner should commit himselfe to the wild and unswayed fancie of his Horses; or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his owne feet, should be permitted to run head-long, without wit or moderation, having no Guid to direct him. For as Fire (though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and usefull while it abides in the place ordained for it;) yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the house-top, it is most mercilesse and over-running: So *Passion* (though of excellent service in Man, for the heating and enlivening of Vertue, for adding spirit and edge to all good undertakings, and blessing them with an happier issue than they could alone have attained unto) yet if once they flye out beyond their bounds, and become subject onely to their owne Lawes, and encroach up on Reasons right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannicall. As *Bias* said of the Tongue, that it was the best and the

*Plutarch. de
Audit.*

worst part of the Sacrifice, so may we of the Affections; *Nec meliores unquam Servos nec Dominos sentit Natura deteriores*; They are the best Servants, but the worst Masters which our Nature can have. Like the Winds, which being moderate, carry the Ship; but drowne it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in Mans little Common-wealth, as in greater States, That there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the publike Good, than those who are best qualified for service and imployment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon publique Ruines. And indeed it is universally true, Things most usefull and excellent in their Regularitie, are most dangerous in their Abuse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Exccercise of Passion: of Stoicall Apathie: of Permanencie, Defect, Excess, with the Cure thereof.



The next consideration of *passions*, was according to the Exccercise of their *Act*: which we may consider, either according to the generall *Substance*, or according to some particular *Accidents*, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether Good,

Good, as being nothing else but naturall motion, ordained for the perfection or conservation of the Creature. For, notwithstanding naturall Motion may haply argue some kind of imperfection in the state of the thing moving; as supposing it some way deprived of that, wherein it should rest it selfe (which makes Aristotle conclude, that the noblest Act of the understanding, Knowledge and cleare Vision, is rather the * Rest, than the Motion of that Facultie) yet I say, it alwayes implyeth more naturall Perfection in those things whereunto it belongeth: for as Fire, the perfectest of Elements; and Heaven, the perfectest of Bodies; so the Soule of Man, the perfectest of formes, hath the most vehement motion.

And in this consideration (so it be alwayes Motion Naturall, governed and dependant on right Reason) I finde not any Corruption, though I finde an Error and abuse; that I meane, which maketh Passion in generall to be *Agritudo Animi*, a Sickness and Perturbation, and would therefore reduce the Minde to a senselesse *Apathie*, condemning all life of Passion, as Waves which serve onely to tesse and trouble Reason. An Opinion, which while it goeth about to give unto Man an absolute government over himselfe, leaveth scarce any thing in him, which he may command and governe.

For although there be in the Will over the Body an Imperium; yet in Rigour, this is not so much to be tearmed Command, as Employment; the Body being rather the Instrument, than the Servant of the

* Intellectio
quies intellectus, Arist.
Physic. l. 7. c. 4.
Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.
ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ
τῆς αὐτῆς
ἔσθ.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 4.
Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὅτι
τῆς ψυχῆς ἵκον.
κατακλινεῖ καὶ καὶ
κατακλινεῖ καὶ καὶ
κατακλινεῖ καὶ καὶ
κατακλινεῖ καὶ καὶ
Arist. Problem.
Q. 30. qu. 14.

Animi commo-
tio aversa à
rectâ Ratione,
& contra Na-
turam, Cic.
ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀντιφύσιν,
καὶ πρὸς φύσιν
ἔσθ. c. 14. m. 1.
Zen. apud La-
ertium.

the Soule; and the power which the will hath over it, is not so much the command of a Master over his Workmen, as of the Workman over his Toolles: The cheife subjects to the *Will* are the *Affections*, in the right governing whereof, is manifested its greatest power.

The strength of every thing, is exercised by *Opposition*: We see not the violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge; and the force of the Winde sheweth it selfe most, when it is most resisted: So the power of the Will is most seene in repairing the breaches, and settling the mutinies, wherewith untamed *Affections* disquiet the peace of mans nature; since *excesse* and disorder in things otherwise of so great use requireth amendment, not extirpation; and we make straight a crooked thing, we doe not breake it. And therefore, as he in *Tacitus* spake well to *Otho*, when he was about to kill himself, *Majore animo tolerari adversa quam relinqui*; That it was more valour to beare, than put off afflictions with courage: so there is more honour, in having *Affections* subdued, than in having none at all; the businesse of a wise man, is not to be without them, but to be *above* them. And therefore our * Saviour himselfe sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, sometimes desired, sometimes mourned and greived; but these were not *Passions* that violently and immoderately troubled him; but he, as he saw fit, did with them *trouble himselfe*. His *Reason* excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, according to the rule of perfect, cleare, and undisturbed judgement

In

Hist. lib. 2.

* Heb. 2. 17.
 Heb. 4. 15. 5. 2.
 Mark. 10. 21.
 Luke 10. 21.
 Job. 11. 35.
 Luke 22. 15.
 Marke 3. 5.
 Mat. 26. 37. 38.

In which respect, the *Passions of Christ* are by Divines called rather *Propassions*, that is to say, Beginnings of Passions, then *Passions* themselves; in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due measure, nor transported the *Mind* to undecencie or excesse; but had both their rising and originall from Reason, and also their measure, bounds, continuance limited by Reason. The *Passions* of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea, which bringeth up mire and dirt; but the *Passions of Christ* were like the shaking of pure Water in a cleane Vessell, which though it be thereby troubled, yet it is not fouled at all.

The *Stoicks* themselves confessed, that wise men might be affected with a sudden perturbations of Fear or Sorrow, but did not like weak men yeeld unto them, or sinke under them; but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgments, like *Aeneas* in *Virgil*,

Mens immota manet, lacryma voluntur inanes.

He wept indeed, but in his stable mind
You could no shakings or distempers finde.

b And therefore indeed, this controversie between the *Peripateticks* and *Stoicks*, was rather a strife of Words, then a difference of Judgements, because they did not agree in the Subject of the Question; the one, making *Passions* to be *Naturall*; the other, c *Preternaturall*, and disorderly motions. For the *Peripateticks* confessed, That wise men ought to be fix'd & immoveable in their vertuous resolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or feares

Hieron. in
Math. 26.
Magist. Sent.
lib. 3 dist 15.
Aquin. par. 3.
q. 15. art. 4.

Isa. 57. 20.

a LaRanc. l. 6.
c. 14. Aug. de
Civ. Dei. l. 9. c.
4. l. 14. c. 9. Aug.
Gell. l. 19. c. 1.
Cic. Tusc. qu. l. 4.
Sen. Ep. 85. &
de Ira. l. 2. c. 3.

b Aquin 12.
q. 24. art. 2. 3.
Cic. de fin. l. 4.
c τοῦ πάλιν παρ-
τα ἐν αὐτῇ εἰς
μαρτα τὸ ἵππε
τὸ καλὸν δούκας
τὸ εὐκρίνον.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 2. &
vid in Padag.
lib. 2. cap. 13.
Vid. Sen. ep. 57.
85. & 116.
Diog. Laert. in
Zenon. l. 7.

a Arist. Ethic.
lib. 2. cap. 1.
b Eudæmouv
ἡθικῶν.
Ethic. l. 1. c. 10.
c Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 6.

c Plutarch.
conir. Stoicos.

Plutarch. lib. de
vitioſo pudore.

a deterred or diverted from them : but as a Dye, to be b *four-square* ; and which way ever they be cast, to fall upon a sure and firme bottome. Which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancie of Mind in Vertue, in defence whereof the *Stoicks* banished *Affections* from wise men: not intending thereby to make men like c *Caneus* in the Poet, such as could not be violated with any force, (for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion) but onely to shew, that the wisdom of Vertue should so compose & consolidate the Mind, and settle it in such stabilitie, that it should not all be bended from the Right, by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions. As they then who pull down houses adjoyning unto *Temples*, doe yet suffer that part of them to stand still, which are continued to the *Temple* : so in the demolishing of inordinate *Passions*, we must take heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them, as is contiguous unto *Right Reason* ; whereunto so long as they are conformable, they are the most vigorous instruments, both for the expression, and improvement, and derivation of Vertue on others, of any in Mans Nature.

Now concerning the *Accidents* or manner of these *Acts* which are from *Passion*, it may be considered either in regard of the *Quantitie & Extension*, or of the *Qualitie & Intention* of the *Act*. And both these may be considered two manner of wayes: for the *Quantitie* of *Passions*, we may consider that, as the *Quantitie* of *Bodies*, which is either *Continued* or *Severed*: by *Quantitie Continued*, I understand the manner

manner of a *Passions permanency* and *durance*; by *Severed*, I meane the manner of its *multiplicitie* and *reiteration*; from both which, it hath the denomination of *good* or *bad*, as the *object* whereunto it is carried, hath a greater or lesse relation to the *Facultie*. For some *objects* are *simple*, and without any limitation, *convenient* or *noxious*; and towards these, may be allowed both a more *durable* and a more *multiplied Passion*: others are *good* or *evill* only, with some *circumstances* of *Time*, *Place*, *Person*, *Occasion* or the like; which therfore require both fewer and lesse *habitual motions*. The same may be said of the *Qualitie* of them; wherein they are sometimes too *remisse*, sometimes againe too *excessive* and *exorbitant*, according to varietie of *conditions*.

Concerning all these, I shall observe this one generall Rule; the *permanency* or *vanishing*, the *multiplicitie* or *rarenesse*, the *excesse* or *defect* of any *Passion*, is to be grounded on and regulated by the nature only of its *object*, as it beares reference to such or such a *person*; but never by the private *humour*, *prejudice*, *complexion*, *habit*, *custome*, or other like *qualifications* of the *Mind* it self. To see a man of a *soft* and *gentle nature* over-passe some *small indignitie*, without *notice* or *feeling*; or to see a man of an *hot* and *eager temper* transported with an *extreamer* and more during *Passion*, upon the *sence* of some *greater injury*, more notably touching him in his *honestie* or *good Name*; is not in either of these, any great matter of commendation: because, though the nature of the *object* did in both warrant the *quality* of the *Passion*; yet in those *persons* they both proceeded

ded out of *humour* and *complexion*, and not out of serious consideration of the *injuries* themselves, by which onely the *Passion* is to be regulated.

Of these two *extremes*, the *defect* is not so commonly seene, as that which is in the *excesse*; And therefore we wil here a little observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this *vehemency* of our *Affections*, whereby they disturbe the *quiet*, & darken the *serenitie* of mans *Minde*. And this is done either by *opposing contrary Passions to contrary*; which is *Aristotles* rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of *Passions* from an *extreme* to a *mediocrisie*, to incline & bend them towards the other *extreme*, as Husbandmen use to doe those Trees which are crooked; or as dim and weake eyes do see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow: or else it is done, by *scattering* and *distracting* of them; and that not onely by the power of *Reason*, but sometimes also by a cautelous *admixture* of *Passions* amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current; For, as usually the *Affections* of the *Minde* are bred one of another, (as the Powder in the Pan of a Gun will quickly set on fire that in the Barrell) as Grief by Anger, (*Circumspectis eos cum in a condolenscent*, He looked on them with Anger, being grieved) and Feare by Love;

Res est solliciti plena Timoris Amor :

The things to which our heart Love beares,
Are objects of our carefull Feares.

and Desire by Feare; as in him of whom *Tacitus* speakes, *Fingebat & matum, quod magis concupisceret*, that

Ethic. 1. 1. c. 9.
lib. 10. c. 1.

Marc. 3. 3.

Hist. lib. 1.

that to justifie his *Desires*, he pretended his *Fears*: So likewise are some *Passions* stopt, or at least bridled & moderated by others; *Amor* for as *mittit timorem*, Perfect Love casteth out Fear. It faring in this, as *Plutarch* hath noted in the hunting of Beasts, that they are then easiest taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of Beasts. As we see, the light & heat of the sun shining upon fire, is apt to discourage it, & to put it out. And this was that which made *Saul*, when he was possessed with those strong fits of *Melancholy*, working in him *Fury*, *Grief*, & *Horror*, to have recourse unto such a *Remedy*, as is most forcible for the producing of other *Passions* of a lighter nature; & so by consequence, for expelling those. Thus, as we see in the Body *Military*, (as *Tacitus* hath observed) *Vnus tumultus est alterius remedium*, That one tumult is the cure of another; and in the Body *Naturall*, some *Diseases* are expelled by others: so likewise in the *Mind*, *Passions*, as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntary admission of one losse, is the prevention of a greater: as when a *Merchant* casteth out his *ware*, to prevent a *shipwrack*; and in a *publike Fire*, men pull down some *houses* untoucht, to prevent the spreading of the *flame*: Thus it is in the *Passions* of the *Mind*, when any of them are *excessive*, the way to *remit* them, is by admitting of some further *perturbation* from others, and so *distracting* the *forces* of the former: Whether the *Passions* we admit, be *contrarie*; as when a dead *Palsie* is cured with a *burning Fever*, and *Souldiers* sup-

Job. 4. 18.

Plut. orat. 1.
de fortitud.
Alexandri.

Hist. lib. 2.

Iliad. v. 121.

preſſe the feare of Death, by the ſhame of Baſeneſſe;

Ἄλλ' ἐς ὄρεσ' ἰδέε' ἔργων
Αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν.

O fearfull Grecians, in your minds recount,
To what great ſhame this baſeneſſe will amount:
and the hatred of their Generall, by the love of
their Countrey; as *Vlyſſes* perſwaded *Achilles*:

Iliad. i. 300.

Εἰ δὲ τοι Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ ἀπὶ χθελὸς κρησθὶ μάλλιν,
Αὐτὰς καὶ τὸ δῶρον· οὐδ' ἄλλος πρὶς παρὰ χαλεπὸς
Τηγεστιάδης ἐλέαυρε καὶ Σκαίω, &c.

Though *Agamemnon* and his gifts you hate,
Yet look with pittie on the dolefull ſtate
Of all the other Grecians in the Campe,
Who on your Name will divine honour ſtampe,
When you this glory ſhall to them afford,
To ſave them from the rage of *Hectors* Sword.

Or whether they be *Paſſions* of a different, but not
of a repugnant nature; & then the effect is wrought
by revoking ſome of the ſpirits, which were other-
wiſe all imploi'd in the ſervice of one *Paſſion*, to at-
tend on them; and by that means alſo, by diver-
ting the intention of the Mind from one deep Chan-
nell into many croſſe and broken Streames; as men
are wont to ^a ſtop one flux of bloud, by making of
another; and ^b to uſe frictions to the feet, to call a-
way and divert the humors which pain the head.

Which diſſipation and ſcattering of *Paſſion*, as it is
wrought principally by this mutuall confounding
of them amongſt themſelves, ſo in ſome particu-
lar caſes likewiſe, two other ways; namely, by com-
munion in diſverſe ſubjects, & extention on diſverſe ob-
jects. For the firſt we ſee in matter of Griefe, the
Minde

^a Calores calori-
bus onerando
deprimimus, &
ſanguinis flu-
xum deſuſa
venula revoca-
mus, Teruill.
^b Clem. Alex.
Padag. l. 2. c. 8.

Mind doth receive (as it were) some lightnesse and comfort, when it findes it selfe *generative* unto others, and produces *sympathy* in them: For hereby it is (as it were) disburthened, and cannot but find that easier, to the sustaining whereof it hath the assistance of anothers shoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) observations:

Cura leves loquuntur, inzentis stupent: And,
Ille dolet verè, qui sine se se dolet.

Our tongues can lighter Cares repeat,
When silence swallows up the great:
He grieves indeed, who on his friend
Vntestified teares doth spend.

That *Grief* commonly is the most *heavy*, which hath fewest *venis* by which to *diffuse* it self: which, I take it, will be one occasion of the *heaviness* of infernall torment; because their *Griefe* shall not be any whit *transient*, to work *commiseration* in any *spectator*, but altogether *immanent* and *reflexive* upon it self.

Thus likewise we see (to instance in that other particular branch, of *diffusing* the *Passions* on *diverse objects*) how the multitude of these, if they be *Heterogeneous* and *unsubordinate*, doth oftentimes remit a *passion*: for example, in *Love*; I take it, that that man who hath a *more generall Love*, hath a *lesse vehement Love*; and the *spreading* of *Affection*, is the *weakning* of it, (I mean stil in things not absolute *subordinate*; for, a man may love a Wife more with Children, then without them, because they are the *Seals & Pledges* of that *Love*) as a *River*, when it is cut into many lesser streams, runs weaker & shallower. And this, I conceive, is the reason, why *Solomon*, when he

com-

φιλικαὶ ὑμνεύε-
ται ἐν δὲ τοῖς λέ-
γον.
Phu. de Amic.
multitud.
Anacharsis
apud Laert. l. 1

Iliad. l. 479.
Plutarch. de
multit. Amic.

commendeth a *strong Love*, giveth it but a *single ob-
ject*; there is a friend neerer then a brother; one, in whom
the rayes of this *affection*, like the Sun-beames in a
glasse, being more united, might withall be the
more fervent. I remember not, that I ever read of
wonderfull Love amongst men, which went beyond
Couples; which also *Aristotle* & *Plutarch* have obser-
ved. And therefore we see, in that state there is or
should be greater *affection*, wherein is the least com-
munity: *conjugal Love*, as it is most *single*, so it is usu-
ally the *strongest*; and in the Issues and Blessings
thereof, there is scarce any more powerfull *Epi-
thite* to win *Love*, then *Vnigenitus*, an only Son.

Καί με φίλος ὥσεί τὸ πατὴρ ὃν ταῦτα φίληται
Μόνον Παιδεύων.

*He lov'd me as one loves the onely Sonne
Of's old age, borne to great Possession.*

Infomuch, that even in *God* himselve (to whom
these *Passions* are but by an *Anthropopathy* attribu-
ted) that more generall *Love* of his *Providence* and
Preservation, (which is common to all his *Creatures*)
is (if I may so speake) of a lower degree (though
not in respect of any intention or remission in his
Will, but onely the effects thereof towards the
things themselves) then that more *speciall Love* of
Adoption, which he extendeth onely to those
whom he vouchsafeth to make *One* in him who
was *Vnigenitus* and *Dilectus* from everlasting.

I doe not then (by the way) condemn all *strong* &
united Passions; but only I observe how those, which
hereby grow *exorbitant*, & work prejudice to the *soul*.
may by a *seasonable distracting* of them, be reduc'd unto

a whollome temper: for as it is noted, that amongst men, those who have bodies most obnoxious to dayly maladies, are commonly more secure from any mortall danger, then those who though free from any generall distempers, doe yet find the surprize of one more violent; so is it with mens Passions. Those who have a nature readie, upon sundry occasions to break forth into them, doe commonly finde them lesse virulent and morose, then those who have not their Passions so voluble, and ready to spread themselves on divers objects, but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the effects of Passions, how they sharpen Vertue: Of vitious Concupiscence; of their blinding, diverting, distracting, and precipitating of Reason, and of their distempering the Body.

THe last consideration of Passions, was according to the Consequents of their Act, which are the ends and effects thereof; both which I conclude in one, because the naturall end of all operative qualities, is the effects which they are appointed by their owne, or a superior Vertue to produce.

I

Now.

*Acad. quest. lib.
4. Tuscul. qu. 1.4.*

*Phutarch. lib. de
virt. mor.*

Ethic. 1.2. c.3.

Now, though in the particulars there be several perfections conferred both on the operations of the Will, and of the Understanding, from Passions; yet I cannot think on any other general effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that onely which *Tully* hath observed out of the *Peripateticks* of Anger, that they are the sharpeners and (to keep his phrase) the Whetstones of Vertue, which make it more operative and fruitful: for Passion stirring up the Spirits, and quickening the Fancie, hath thereby a direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Minde; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination, produceth them with the same clearnesse and vigour as they are there represented. And therefore *Aristotle* speaking of these two Elements and Principles of all Passion, Pleasure and Grief, (one of which all others whatsoever partake of) makes them the Rules of all our Actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof, they retain their several portions of Goodnesse. Thus Anger, Zeal, Shame, Grief, Love, are in their several orders the Whetstones whereon true Fortitude sharpeneth its Sword: for men are never more neglectful and prodigal of their blood, then when they are thorowly pierced with a sense of injuries, or grieved with a losse of their own or their Countries Honour: So the Poet saith of *Mezentius*, when *Aeneas* had slain *Lausus* his son:

Estat

— *Æstuat ingens*

*Imo in corde pudor mixtoque insania luctu,
Et furtis agitatæ Amor, & conscia virtus.*

Æneid. lib. 10.

A noble shame boil'd in his lowest brest,
Rage mixt with Grief, suffer'd him not to rest;
Love and a conscious Valour set him on,
And kindled furious Resolution.

So, Love and Compassion are the inciters of
Bounty; Hope, the stay and anchor of Patience;
keeping the Minde, amidst perils and casualties,
from floating and sinking; Fear, the sharpener
of Industry; and Caution an antidote in all our
actions, against Violence, Rashness, and Indis-
cretion: as *Latinus* said unto *Turnus*, when in rage
he hastened to combat with *Æneas*:

— *Quantum ipse feroci*

*Virtute exuperas, tanto me impensius æquum est
Consulere, atque omnes metuentem expendere casus.*

Æneid. lib. 12.

The more undaunted Courage doth you move,
'Tis fit my serious Fears shew the more Love;
In mature Counsels, and in weighing all
The various dangers and events may fall.

Those imputations therefore which *Tully* and
Seneca, and other Stoical Philosophers, make a-
gainst Passions, are but light and empty, when
they call them diseases and perturbations of the
Minde; which requireth in all its actions both

health and serenity, a strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of Passion: For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthful or clear; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome: for, what water more sweet then that of a Spring? or what more thick or loathsome, then that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting it self? As in the Winde or Seas, (to which two, Passions are commonly compared) a middle temper between a quiet Calm and a violent Tempest, is most serviceable for the passage between Countries; so the agitations of Passion, as long as they serve onely to drive forward, but not to drown Vertue; as long as they keep their dependance on Reason, and run onely in that Chanel where with they are thereby bounded, are of excellent service, in all the travel of mans life, and such as without which, the growth, successe, and dispatch of Vertue would be much impaired.

For the corrupt effects of Passion in general, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicity as well of Evil as of Errour, when there is but a unity of Goodnesse or of Truth. And those effects may be either in respect of themselves, one amongst another, or in reference to the Understanding, Will, or Body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutual generating and nourishing of each other; as Fear is wrought by Love, and Anger by Grief; *Dolor*
excitat

velut itas ; as a Lion , when wounded, is most raging.

——— *Fisumque Introvers*

Impavidum frangit velum, & fremit ore cruenta.

David. l. 11.

With bloodie mouth, and an undaunted heart,
Breaks & tears from his wound the fastned dart.

Which effect of Passions, I have before touch-
ed upon ; neither is it always a corrupt effect,
but onely then, when there is in the Passion ge-
nerative some distemper. Secondly, in respect
of the *Understanding* and *Will*, (both which I
comprise under one Name of *Reason*) I conceive
the Corruptions to be principally these four :
Imposure, or Seduction ; *Alienation*, or With-
drawing ; *Distraction*, or Confounding ; and
Præcipitancie, or an Headlong transporting of
Reason.

*Vide Aquin. 12.
qu. 77. art. 1, 2.*

Now concerning these, we are first to remem-
ber, that there is in every Man a Native and
Original struggling between *Appetite* and *Rea-
son* ; which yet proceedeth from Corruption,
and the *Fall* of Man, not from *Nature entire* :
For, from the Law of Creation, there was no
formal *Opposition*, but a *Subordination* between
Spirit and *Sense* ; Man having it in his own
power, to excite, continue, remit, lay down
his Passions, as Reason should dictate unto
him. And therefore (notwithstanding the O-
perations of *Appetite* are common unto Men
and Beasts) yet may we not grant, that they
have

I.

*Plutarch. de
virtute Moral.
Aristot. Ethic.
lib. 1. cap. 13.
Plato apud The-
odor. Sermon. S. de
Nat. Hom. Im-
perat Animus
corpori & pare-
tur: Imperat A-
nimus sibi, &
resistitur. Aug.
Conf. l. 8. c. 9, 10
Aug. Civ. Dei,
l. 14. c. 14, 23,
24, 26.*

*Affectus in homine erant in potestate ejus iri-
plicitur quantum
ad excitationem,
durationem, in-
tentionem, & re-
missionem, Perer.
in Genes lib. 4.*

have the same manner of being educed and governed in both these.

For, as the Operations of the *vegetative Soul*, though common to Beasts, Men, and Plants, are yet in either of these severally so restrained, as that they are truly said to be the proper and peculiar works of that superficial form unto which they are annexed: so likewise the *Sensitive Appetite*, though generally it be common to Men and Beasts, yet in Man it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of *Reason*; and therefore may properly be called an *Humane Appetite*, as being determined, restrained, and made conformable unto Mans Nature: so that as long as Man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a sweet harmony between all his Faculties, and such an happie subordination of them each to other, as that every Motion of the Inferiour power was directed and governed; and therefore might truly and properly be attributed to the Superiour: But, when once Man had tasted of that murdering Fruit, and poisoned him and all his Posterity; then began those Swellings, and inward Rebellions, which made him as lame in his Natural, as dead in his Spiritual Condition. Whence *Passions* are become, now in the state of *Corruption*, Beastly and Sensual, which were before, by *Creation*, Reasonable and Humane: For, *Man being in Honour, was without Understanding, and is become as the Beasts, that perish.*

But

But to return: We are (as I said) to remember, that there is in man, by reason of his general *Corruption*, such a distemper wrought, as that there is not onely *crackednesse* in, but *dissention* also, and fighting between his parts: And, though the Light of our *Reason* be by Man's Fall much dimmed and decayed; yet the remainders thereof are so adverse to our unruly *Appetite*, as that it laboureth against us, as the Philistines against *Samson*, (or rather indeed, as *Dalilah*; for *Samsons* eyes were truly put out, before ever the Philistines were upon him); it laboureth, I say, to deprive us of those Reliques of Sight which we yet retain.

And this is that first corrupt *Effect*, which I call * *Imposture*, or Occæcation; whereby *Passion* reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether of resistance or control, laboureth to muffle *Reason*, and to obliterate those Principles and original Truths, whereby their unrulinesse might be restrained. And hence it is, that every man, when he hath given place, to the violence of *Appetite*, laboureth next to encline and prepare his *Minde* for *Assent*, and to get *Reason* on the same side with *Passion*. * *Disobedience* is ever cavilling, and contentious; and he who will not work the Righteousnesse of God, will be sure to dispute against it, and to stumble at it. And therefore the Apostle telleth us, that *Repentance*, and putting away of Lusts, is the onely pre-

* *Tanta est vis voluptatum, ut & ignorantiam protelet in occasionem, & conscientiam corrumpat in dissimulationem.*

Tert. de Spectat. cap. 1. Arist.

Rhet. lib. 1. c. 3.

Quint. l. c. 2.

Τὸ δὲ σώφρων

οὐ τὸ δὲ δὴ

προσὶν καλῶς.

Eurip. Hippol.

* *Rom. 2. 8. Fro.*

10. 8. Ecclef.

5. 2. 2 Tim. 2.

25. Jam. 1. 19.

20. 21. 1 Pet. 2.

8. Joh. 3. 10.

preparation to *Acknowledge the Truth* : For, so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sinne, he will ever reject the Truth that opposeth it, and bribe *Reason* to say something for it.

And the Reasons hereof are these Two ; 1. *Love of our Passions*, and a *Love of our Ease*. For the former, it is the speech of *Aristotle*, Κακία ἐστὶ φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴς, That evil and inordinate Motions have a power in them to corrupt Principles of Reason, and to make a man commit that, which in Rhetorick is with *Aristotle*, absurd ; but in Divinity, with Saint *Peter*, damnable ; ἡ γὰρ πάντα ἐστρεβλὸν ποιεῖν, to pervert and make crooked that, which should be the Rule and Judge in our Actions. For *Passion*, in opposition to *Reason*, is a like an *Humour*, which falling from the Head to the Eyes, darkeneth the Sight thereof ; or, as some Concave Glasses, which represent the Species of things to the Eye, not as they are in themselves ; but, with those Inversions, Depressions, and other the like Deformities, which the indisposition of the Glasse frameth them unto : or, as it is said of the *Polypus*, that he changeth himself always into the colour of the Rock in which he hides ; and, as they feign of *Proteus* :

Ποικίλα λείων φέρετ' ὑψηλότερον,
 Ἀνὰ τὰς ὑπὸ πτερὰ δρῶντων, καὶ περὶ δαλῶς, καὶ μέγας ἵππος.

He made himselfe a Lyon, and anon
Became a Boare, a Panther, a Dragon.

So likewise, the *Vnderstanding* being once invaded by *Passion*, is brought to change into diverse shapes, and to judge of things, not according to their naked and naturall truth, but according as it finds them beare in the *Fancie* those impressions of *Pleasure*, which are most agreeable to corrupted Nature.

And another Reason why we seeke to warrant and to maintaine a *Passion*, when we have given way unto it, is the Love of our *Ease*: For every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleasure of a Corrupt *Passion*; yet that part of it, which hath the sting in it, is unpleasent: and therefore there is required the hand of *Reason*, by Apologies, Pleadings, and blandishments, either to mollifie the *Passion*, that it shall not then pierce, or to harden and arme the *subject*, that it may not be sensible of it.

And, that this Deceit and *Excacation* is a proper worke of *Passion*, (besides our owne dayly experience) this one Argument might sufficiently proove; namely, the Practice of *Heretiques*: who proposing to themselves either *Gain*, or any other Carnall and corrupt End; did thereupon presently (as the Apostle notes) vent the perverse Disputes of their owne corrupt Minds, and make all Truth an

K

Hand-

Agrotantes
Medici alios
Medicos ad se
vocant, & Ma-
gistri palastræ
alios Magistros
ὡς οὐ διδάσκαλοι
καλεῖται τὸ ἀληθές,
δὲ τὸ κερκεῖον
αὐτοὶ τὸ δικαίον, καὶ
ὡς μάταιον ὄντες.
Arist. Polit.
lib. 3 cap. 16.

Tertul. contr.
Valent. cap. 4.

1 Tim. 6. 3.

Tertul. de Fuga.
Isid. Pelut. l. i.
ep. 102.Herod. Thalia.
Aenead. lib. 2.

Hand-maid and Lacquey to their owne Lusts. And proportionably thereunto, their custome hath been, *Prins persuadere quàm docere*, to creepe upon the Affections of Men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false Doctrines: And as it is said of GOD, that hee first accepted *Abel*, and then his Sacrifice; so doe they labour first, to worke an approbation of their persons in the hearts of Men; whence, in the second place, their perverse Conceits doe finde the easier accessse to their Vnderstandings.

For, when silly and unstable Mindes shall once be brought to such a Prejudice, as to have the Persons of Men in Admiration; when they shall see an Impostor come unto them, as a *Man* that had wholly renounced the World; like *Zopyrus* or *Symon*, clothed and deformed with seeming Povertie and Repentance; drawing in and out his breath with no other motions, than sighes; pretending to bring nothing but the plentiful Promises of Salvation, Teares in his Eyes, Oyle and Honey in his Mouth, and the most exquisite Picture of true Holynesse, which it is possible for the art or Hypocrisie of mans Invention to draw out: How can the Vnderstanding of weake and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto beliefe, by those two Credulous Qualities, of Ignorance and Feare) but be made inclinable to receive, not only

onely willingly, but with greedinesse also, whatsoever poysonous Doctrine, under pretence of wholesome and saving Physick; such a subtile Impostor shall administer unto them? Such a great force there is in Voluntary Humilitie, neglecting of the Body, and other the like pretended pious Frauds, to insinuate and take possession of weake and credulous Natures; with whom haply, more Reall, Serious, and Spirituall Arguments, coming with lesse pompe and ostentation, would not prevaile.

——— *Captique dolis, lacrimisque coactis*
Quos neque Tydides nec Larissæus Achilles:
Non anni domuère decem, non mille carina.

They are surpriz'd by *frauds* and forced tears,
 In whom their greatest foes could work no fears;
 Whom ten years war not won, nor thousand ships
 Are snar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips.

The second manner of *Corruption*, which *Passion* useth on the Understanding and Will, was *Alienating* or withdrawing of Reason from the serious examination of those *Pleasures*, wherewith it desireth to possesse the *Minde*, without controule; that when it cannot so farre prevaile, as to blind and seduce Reason, getting the allowance and *Affirmative Consent*

2.

thereof, it may yet at least so farre inveagle it, as to with-hold it from any *Negative Determination*, and to keepe off the *Mind* from a serious and impartiall consideration of what *Appetite* desireth; for feare least it should be convinced of Sinne, and so finde the lesse sweetnesse in it.

2 Pet. 3. 5.

Rom. 1. 18.

And this is the Reason of that affected and *Voluntarie Ignorance*, which Saint *Peter* speakes of; whereby *Minds* pre-possessed with a love of Inordinate courses, doe with-hold and divert Reason, and forbear to examine that Truth, which indeed they know; as fearing, least thereby they should be deterred from those Vices, which they resolve to follow. Which is the same with that excellent *Metaphore* in Saint *Paul*; who saith, That the wrath of God was revealed from Heaven, on all ungodlinesse and Vnrigh-teousnesse of Men, τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ καὶ ἡμιγνῶσιν, which hold or detain the Truth in Vnrigh-teousnesse: that is, which imprison and keepe in that τὸ γνωστὸν Θεοῦ, as the Apostle interpreteth himselfe in the next verse; all those Notions of Divine Truth, touching the Omnipotencie and Justice of God, which were by the finger of Nature written within them, to deterre them from, or (if not) to make them inexcusable, in those unnaturall pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus *Medea* in the Poet.

Καὶ μαρτυροῦντες ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν κατὰ
 θυμὸν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτιοῦται.

*I know 'tis wicked that I goe about,
 But Passion hath put all my Reason out.*

And therefore, that Maxime of the Stoicall Philosopher, out of *Plato*; is false; *πάντα φύγει καὶ φοβέται τὴν ἀλήθειαν*. That all men are unwillingly deprived of Truth; since, as *Aristotle* hath observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of *Saint Peter*, there is *ἄγνοια ἐκ περιουσίας*, an elected or *Voluntarie Ignorance*, which for their Securities sake, men nourish themselves in.

And that there should be such an *Alienation* of the *Minde* from Truth, when the Fancie and Heart are hot with *Passion*; cannot be any great wonder: For, the *Soule* is of a limited and *determined Activitie* in the Body; insomuch, that it cannot with perspicuitie and diligence give attendance unto diverse Objects. And therefore, when a *Passion* in its fulnesse, both of a violence and delight, doth take it up, the more cleare and naked brightnesse of Truth is suspended and changed: So that as the Sunne and *Moone* at their rising and setting, seeme farre greater than at other times, by reason of thick Vapours which are then interposed; so, the *Mind* looking upon things through the *Mists* and Troubles of *Passion*, cannot possibly judge

Eurip. Medea.
Vid. Clem.
Alex. Strom. l. 2
p. 284. Edit.
Heins.

Arri. Epist. lib. 1. cap. 28.
Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 1.
Malum nescire quia jam ederunt. Tertull.
Apol. c. 1.
Βούλει τὴν ἄγνοιαν.
Justin. lib. qu. & Resp. q. 140.
Ἐξ ὁρίων ἐκείνων.
Clem. Alex.

of them, in their owne proper and immediate Truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into; by prejudice and distemper.

3.

But then, thirdly, if *Reason* will neither be *deluded* nor wonn over to the patronage of *E-will*, nor *diverted* from the knowledge and notice of *Good*; then doth *Passion* strive to confound and distract the Apprehensions thereof, that they may not with any firmenesse or efficacy of Discourse, interrupt the Current of such irregular and head-strong Motions. And this is a most inward and proper Effect of *Passion*: For, as things presented to the *Minde*, in the nakednesse and simplicitie of their owne Truth, doe gaine a more firme Assent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; so, on the contrarie side, those things which come mixt and troubled, dividing the intention of the *Minde* betweene *Truth* and *Passion*, cannot obtaine any settled or satisfactorie Resolution from the Discourses of *Reason*.

And this is the Cause of that *Reluctancie* betweene the *Knowledge* and *Desires* of *Incontinent* Men, and others of the like Nature: For, as *Aristotle* observes of them, they are but *inquit* *impos*, *Halfe-Evill*, as not sinning with that full and plenarie Consent of *Will*, but *Præter Electionem*, as he speakes; so I may more truly say of them, that they have but an *Halfe-Knowledge*, not any distinct and applicative

Ethic. l. 7. c. 10.
In confinio concupiscentie & penitentie aspera & tumultuosa gaudia.
Plutarch. lib.
Philosophand.
cum princip.

plicative Apprehension of Truth, but a confused and broken Conceit of things in their Generalitie: Not much unlike unto Night-talkers, who cannot bee sayd to be throughly asleepe, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kinde of inordinate temper betweene both; or (as *Aristotle* himselfe gives the similitude) it is like a *Stage-Player*, whose Knowledge is expresse and cleare enough, but the things which it is conversant about, are not personall and particular to those men, but belonging unto others whome they personate: So, the *Principles* of such men are in the generall, Good and True; but they are never brought downe so low, as if they did concerne a mans owne particu'ar Weale or Woe, nor thorowly weighed, with an assuming, applying, concluding Conscience; but, like the notion of a Drunken or sleeping man, are choaked and smothered with the Mists of *Passion*.

And this third Corruption is that, which *Aristotle*, in the particular of Incontinencie, calleth *Αδυνα*, the *Weakenesse* and disabilitie of *Reason*, to keepe close to her own Principles and Resolutions: Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet; *How weake is thy heart, seeing thou doest all things, the workes of an imperious Whorish Woman?* And elsewhere, Whoredome and Wine are sayd to *take away the Heart*. So *Hector* describes lascivious *Paris*:

Ethic. lib. 7.
cap. 3.

Ethic. lib. 7.
cap. 7.

Ezek. 16. 30.

Hos. 4. 11.

καλόν,
Εἶδος ἢ δὴν ὡς ἴσιν βίῃ ὁρᾷν ὅτι τὴν δὴν.

Iliad. 7. 45.

*Thy face hath beautie in't, but in thy brest
There doth no strength nor resolution rest.*

4.

The last Effect (which I shall but name) is that which *Aristotle* calleth *μεγίστην, Rashnesse* or *Precipitancie*; which is the most Tyrannicall Violence which *Passion* useth; when, in spite of all the Dictates of *Reason*, it furiously over-ruleth the *Will*, to determine and allow of any thing, which it pleaseth to put in practise; and like a Torrent, carryeth all before it; or, as the Prophet speakes, *rusheth like an Horse into the Battell*: So *Lust* and *Anger* are sometimes in the Scripture called *Madnesse*; because it transporteth the Soule beyond all bounds of Wisedome or Counsell, and by the Dictates of *Reason* takes occasion to become more outrageous, *Ipsaque praesidia occupat*, feedes like Wild-fire upon those Remedies, which should remove it: As she said in the Poet;

Jer. 50. 38.
Psal. 102. 3.
Eccles. 9. 3.
Luke 6. 11.

Senec. Medea.

*Levis est dolor, qui capere consilium potest,
Libet ire contra.*

That's but light griefe, which counsell can abate;
Mine swells, and all advice resolves to hate.

The

The corrupt effects which Passion worketh in the last place on the Body, are divers; according to the particular nature of the passions; sometimes too sudden and violent, sometimes too heivie oppression of the heart; the other, sudden perturbation of the spirits. Thus old *Ely* dyed, with sudden griefe; *Diodorus*, with shame; *Sophocles*, *Chilo* the *Lacedemonian*, and others, with joy; Nature being notable to beare that great and sudden immutation, which these Passions made in the Body. The causes and manner of which cogitation, I referre (as being inquiries not so directly pertinent to the present purpose) unto Naturall Philosophers and Physicians. And from the Generalitie of Passions, I proceed unto the consideration of some particulars, according to the order of their former division: In all which, I shall forbear this long Method of the antecedents, Concomitants, and Consequents of their Acts, (many particulars whereof, being in the same nature in all Passions, will require to be observed only in one or two, and so proportionally conceived in the rest) and shall insift principally in those particulars which I handle on the causes and effects of them; as being Considerations, wherein commonly they are most serviceable or prejudiciall to our Nature.

CHAP. IX.

*Of the affection of Love, of Love naturall,
of generall communion, of Love rationally,
the object and generall cause thereof.*



Now the two first and fundamentall Passions of all the rest, are Love and Hatred. Concerning the passion of Love, we will therein consider first its object, and its causes; both which being of a like nature, (for every morall object is a cause, though not every cause an object) will fall into one.

Love then consists in a kind of expansion or egress of the hearts and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawne and attracted; whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is in that respect the object and generall cause of Love. Now, as in Nature so in the Affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: The first, is that naturall or impressed sympathie of things, whereby one doth inwardly incline an union with the other, by reason of some secret vertues and occult qualities disposing either subject to that mutual friendship, as betweene Iron and the Loadstone: The other, is that common and more discernable attraction which every thing receives from those natures or places, whereon they are ordained and directed by the Wisdome and

Provi-

and Faculties of the Soul.

79

Providence of the first Cause, to depend both in respect of the perfection and conservation of their being. For, as God in his Temple, the Church, so is He in his Pallace, (if I may so call it) the World; a God of Order, disposing every thing in Number, Weight, and Measure, so sweetly, as that is all harmonious, from which harmonic, the Philosophers have concluded a Divine Providence) and so powerfully, as that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation.

And this Order and Wisdom is seen chiefly in that sweet subordination of things each to other, and happy inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto Him who is the Fountaine, whence issue all their streames of their limited being, and the fulnesse of which, all his creatures have received. Which the Poet, though something too Poetically, seemeth to have express'd:

*Principio Cælum ac Terras camposque liquentes
Lucentemque globum Lunæ Titanique Astra
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per Artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.*

(Lighrs,
Heaven, Earth, and Seas, with all those glorious
Which beautifie the Day, and rule the Nights,
A Divine inward Vigour, like a Soule,
Diffus'd through ev'ry joint of this great Whole,
Dorh vegetate, and with a constant force
Guideth each Nature through its fixed course.

L 2

And

Arrian. Ep &
lib. 1. ca. 6.

Æneid. lib. 6.
Per Crinit.
li. 6. c. 12.

*Græci enim
τὸ πᾶν νο-
cant.

And such is the naturall motion of each thing to its owne Sphere and Center ; where is both the most proper place of its consistng, and withall, the greatest freedome from forraine injurie or violence.

But we must here withall, take notice of the generall care of the Creator ; whereby he hath fastned on all creatures, not onely his private desire to satisfie the demands of their owne nature, but hath also stamp'd upon them a generall charitie and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the Universe or common Body ; wherein cannot possible be admitted (by reason of that necessarie mutuall connexion betweene the parts thereof) . any confusion or divulsion, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclin'd the nature of these necessarie agents, so to worke of their discords the perfect harmonie of the whole, that if by any casualtie it fall out, that the Body of Nature be like to suffer any rupture, deformitie, or any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniforme and naturall motions of the particulars, they then must prevent such damage and reproach, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their owne natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions, whercunto considered in their owne determinate qualities, they have an essentiall reluctancie. Which propertie and sence of Nature in common, the Apostle hath excellently set downe 1 Cor. 12. where he renders this reason of all, that there might be no

Schisme

Schisme in the Body: which likewise he divinely applyeth in the mysticall sense, that all the severall gifts of the Spirit to the Church, should drive to one common end, as they were all derived from one common Fountaine; and should never be used, without that knitting qualirie of Love, to which he elsewhere properly ascribeth the building, continuation, and perfecting of the Saints.

1 Cor. 8. 1.
Ephes. 4. 12.

Now, as it hath pleased the infinite Wisdome of God to guide and moderate, by his owne immediate direction, the morions of necessarie agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the generall end, (which motion may therefore, as I before observed, be called the naturall Passion of things) so hath it given unto Man a reasonable Soule, to be as it were his Vice-gerent in all the motions of Mans little World.

To apply then these proportions in Nature to the affection of Love in Man, we shall finde first a Secret, which I will call Naturall; and next, a Manifest, which I call a Morall and more discursive attraction. The first of these, is that naturall sympathie wrought betweene the affection and the object, in the first meeting of them, without any suspension of the person, till further inquirie after the disposition of the object; which comes immediately from the outward, naturall, and sensitive Vertues thereof, whether in shape, feature, beaurie, motion, speech, behaviour; all which comming under the spheare

of Sense, I include under the name of Judicarie Physiognomie: Which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities, but a farther presumption of the Iudgement; concluding thence, a lovely disposition of that Soule, which animateth and quickneth those outward Graces.

Ethic. lib. 8.

And indeed, if it be true which *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* tells us, That similitude is the ground of Love; and if there be no naturall Love stronger than that which is betwene the Body and the Soule, we may well ground some good presumption of similitude in the qualities of the Soule with those lovely impressions of Nature which we finde in the Body, and may by the same reason collect a mutuall discoverie, by which we acknowledge a mutuall sympathie betwene them. And therefore it was no ill counsell (though not alwayes to be heeded) *Cave tibi ab iis quos natura signavit*, to take heed of such who like *Cain* have any marke of notorious deformitie set upon them by Nature. And therefore *Homer* speaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of *Thersites*, fits him with a Body answerable to such a Mind.

Iliad. B. 217.

— αἰόχρ' ὃ δὲ αἰὶρ ἔσσι' αἰὶδ' ἦλθε
 Φόλκ' ἔλυσεν δ' ἔπειτα ποδῶ, τὸ δὲ οἰώμα
 Κύρτω δ' ἔπειτα σὺν δ' οὐκ ἔχοντε· ὑπὲρ ὀπίσθε
 Φόζ' ἔνυ κατὰ πῶν φεδνὴ δ' ἐπὶ πρὸ δ' ἔσθ' ἔχοντε.

*The most ill-shapen man that to Troy came,
 With eye distorted, and in each foot lame,*

His

*His shoulders crooked, to his brest shrunk down,
A sharp wyre head, here and there patcht with down.*

But yet herein, though it be injurious for a man out of too much austeritie of Mind, to reject the judgement of sense, and to quarrell with this naturall instinct; yet it is fit, that in this case, considering the deceitfulnesse of things, and what a divers habit, Education or Hypocrisie hath wrought in many, betweene the out and inside of their Natures, that we should, I say, bring a fearefull judgement, like love of *Bias* the Philosopher, which may easily, upon good warrant and assurance, alter it selfe: otherwise, when a thing is thoroughly knowne to be lovely, our hearts may boldly quiet and repose themselves in it.

But here likewise we must observe that proportion of Nature, That if our affection cannot stand in private towards one particular, without damage and inconvenience to the publique Body, Politique or Ecclesiasticall, whereof we are members, the generall must ever be esteemed more deare and precious. A scandall to the body, and a Schisme from the whole, is more dangerous and unnaturall, then any private Divisions: for, if there be a wound or swelling in one part of the Body, the parts adjoyning will be content to submit themselves unto paine, for the recoverie of that; and rather than it shall perish, suffer any trouble which may conduce to the reliefe thereof.

And

And this is the Love of fellow members, among themselves. But then, if any part be so farre corrupted, as that it doth more easie derive its contagion upon others, than admit of any succour from them, so that by the continuance thereof in the Body, the whole is endangered; or, if the whole Body be readie to perish by Famine; then doth the Sense of Communitie so swallow up that other more private respect, as that the members will be even cruell amongst themselves, to the cutting and devouring each of other, that thereby the safetie of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the Fable of the Faction betweene the Belly and the Members, was wisely applyed by *Menenius Agrippa*, in a Rebellion amongst the people of *Rome*; to shew how unnaturall a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themselves, to nourish their owne private Discontents, when the Weale publique is together therewithall endangered.

CHAP.

CHAP. X

Of the Rule of true Love : the Love of God and our selves : similitude to these, the cause of Love in other things : of Love of Concupiscence : how Love begetteth Love ; and how presence with, and absence from the object, doth upon different respects exercise and increase Love.



From this generall and fundamentall cause of Love, proceed some others, speciall and particular, whereof, the first and principall is a *similitude* and resemblance betweene the thing loved, and that which is the Naturall Rule of Love.

Now, the Rule of all Love, is by divine Truth prescribed to be *God*, and a *Mans selfe* ; so that, what beareth similitude to these, is the proper and right Object of our Affection. To speake therefore a word or two of these.

The Master-Wheelc, or first Mover in all the Regular Motions of this Passion, is the *Love of God*, grounded on the right *knowledge* of Him ; whereby the Soule being ravished with the apprehension of his infinite *Goodness*, is earnestly drawne and * *called out*, as it were, to desire an *Union, Vision*, and participation of his Glory and Presence; yeelding up it selfe unto Him, (for

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by

*Arist. Probl.
sol. 10. scilicet. 51*

** Kallē & kōtē ē
exair.*

* *Amor non
nisi donum
amantis in
Amatū. Gui-
liel. Paris. de
Legibus, c. 19.*

by * *Love* a man giveth himselfe to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its Affections and Actions to his Will.

And this *Love* is then *Regular*, when it takes up all the *kinds* of *Love*, and all the *degrees* of *Love*. For we love God, *Amore amicitia*, for the Goodnesse and Excellency which is in himselfe, as being most lovely; and *Amore desiderii*, with a desire of being united unto him, as the Fountaine of all our blessednesse; and *Amore complacentia*, with a love of joy and delight in him; when the Soule goes to God, like *Noahs* Dove to the Arke, and with infinite sweetnesse and securitie reposeth it selfe in him; and lastly, *Amore Benevolentia*, with an endeavour (so farre as a poore Creature can to an infinite Creator; for our Good extendeth not unto him) to bring all praise, service, and honour unto him.

And thus we are to love him above all things; first, *Appresiativè*, setting an higher price upon his Glory and Command, than upon any other thing besides; all *Dung*, in comparison. Secondly, *Intensivè*, with the greatest force and intention of our Spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our Love of him: thirdly, *Adequatè*; as the compleat, perfect, and adequate object of all our Love, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the Wise-man speaking of the Love and Feare of God, tells us, that it is *Totum Hominis*, the *Whole of Man*. Other Objects are severally fitted, unto severall Faculties; Beautie to the Eye, Musick to the Eare, Meat to the Palate, Learn-

Learning to the Mind; none of these can satisfie the Facultie, unto which it belongs nor. And even to their proper Faculties, they bring *Vanitie* and *Vexation* with them: *Vanitie*, because they are *empty*, and doe *deceive*; and because they are *mortall*, and will *decay*: *Vexation*, in the Getting; for that is with Labour; in the keeping, for that is with Feare; in the Multipling, for that is with Care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surter, we are vexed with loathing it. God onely is *Totum Hominis*, fitted to all the wants of an immortall Soule: *Fulnesse*, to make us *perfectly* happy; *Immortality*, to make us *perpetually* happy: after whom we hunger with desire, and are not griped; on whom we feast with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be *loved*, not with a divided, but a *whole Heart*. To love any Creature, either *without God*, or *above God*, is *Cupiditas*, *Lust*: (which is the *formale* of every sinne, whereby we turne from God to other things) but to love the *Creatures under God*, in their right order; and *for God*, to their right end, (for hee made all things for himselfe) this is *Charitas*, true and regular Love.

Now, the Image and likenesse of God (not to speake of that Eternall and Essentiall Character of his Fathers brightnesse) is in his Word, and in his Workes; the one, being the Manifestation of his Will; and the other, of his Power and Wisdom. Our love to his Word, is our search of it; as being the onely Glasse, wherein we see the Won-

Matth. 22. 37.

Vid. August. de
Doct. Christi. l. 1
c. 22. & l. 3. c. 10
& de Trinitate.
l. 8. c. 3. & l. 9.
c. 8.

ders and deepe things of God : our *Beleeve* of it, *All*, and *Onely*; acknowledging in it, the fulnesse of its *Truth*, and of its *sufficiency* : and our *Obedience* to it, submitting our selves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the *Workes of God*, there are two chiefe things, whereunto the affection of Man is by the Creatures *attracted*, and wherewith it desires an *Vnion*, namely, the *Truth* and *Goodnesse* of them; for by these only, may all the diuerse Faculties of Mans Soule be exercised and delighted : The love of both which, is then only *Regular*, when it is *limited*, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act; *Humble*, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiosity : and lastly, *subordinate* unto that great Love of God, whose Image we can no further truly love in the Creature, then as we are thereby directed to a farther love of Him.

I come now unto that other *Rule of Love*, wherein *Aristotle* hath placed the Nature thereof, *A Mans selfe*, or that unity and proportion which the thing *loved* beareth unto the party *loving*; which in one place, he calleth *Ιονι*, *Equality*; in another, *Ιδιωτις*, *Identitie*; in another, *Ιμωτις*, *Similitude*; in another, *κοινωνια*, *Communion*; all Relative tearmes, which referre unto the party *loving*.

The Root of every mans love unto *himselfe*, is that *unity* and *identity* which he hath with *himselfe*; it being naturall to every thing, to take delight in the simplicity of its owne being : because
the

Εν τω αυτω :
philos. Arist.
lib. 9 cap. 9.
Ethic. lib. 3,
cap. 9. 12.
Lib. 9. cap. 3. 9.

the more *simple* and *One* it is, the more it is like the *Fountain* of its being; and therefore hath the more perfection in it. And this *love* of Man unto *himselfe*, if *subordinate* unto the *love* of God, and *governed* therby, is *Debitum Naturæ*, a necessary Debt; and such, as the neglect whereof, is a trespassse against Nature.

Now then, as we *love* our *selves*, for the *unity* which we have in our selves; so, wheresoever we find any *similitude* to our selves, or character of our selves, either in *Nature* or *Habits*, upon that also do the beames of this Affection extend. Now, a thing may represent our selves, first, in *Substance*, as the Husband and Wife are said to be *one* *flesh*, and Children are branches and portions of their Parents: Secondly, in *Qualities* or *Accidents*; as one *man* resembleth another in *Naturall*, and one *friend* another in *Habituall* Qualities; as *Face* answereth to *Face* in *Water*, so the heart of Man to Man.

With respect unto this double *Similitude*, there is a double *Love*; the one, *Naturall*; the other, acquired, or *Habituall*: the former is common with Men unto other Creatures: Thus in *Ælian*, *Plutarch*, and others, we read of the *Naturall* affection of Elephants; which seeing their young fallen into a deepe Pit, will leape downe after them, though it be present death; and of the marvelous *cunning* and *valour* which many other Birds and Beasts use to provide for the safety of their Brood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered:

*Aristot. Ethic.
lib. 9. cap. 4. 8.*

*Arist. Magnor.
Mor. l. 1. c. 34.*

*Ælian. lib. de
Anim. l. c. 40.
Lib. 1. c. 25.
Lib. 6. c. 50.
Lib. 9. c. 9.
Lib. 1. c. 38.
Plutarch. de
Selen. Animal.
c. de Amore.
Aristot. Hist.
Anim lib. 9.
c. 4. 8.*

Sophocles in
Electra, & ibi
Scholiast. p. 127
Thol. ff. de
Repub. lib. 8. c.
1. Sect. 19.

Yea, the *Pelican* (if wee believe the story) doth feed her young ones, when they have beene bitten with Serpents, with her owne blood to recover them againe: which Embleme *John* the second, King of *Portugall* is said to have chosen, whereby to expresse his *Love* to his Subjects: And *Homer* elegantly expresseth the care of a Bird feeding her young ones.

Iliad. x.
324.

ἔσθ' ἡν ὀρέσῃται σπέρματι
Μέγαν' ἔσθ' ἡν ὀρέσῃται, ἔσθ' ἡν ὀρέσῃται.

*She brings her young ones what meat she can find,
When she her selfe with hunger's almost pin'd.*

And the like affection, another Poet hath expressed in the most cruell of all the Beasts, the *Tyger*:

Statius. Theb.
lib. 10.

— — — *Sic Aspera Tygris*
Fætibus abreptis Scythico deserta sub Antro
Accubat, & lepidi lambit vestigia lecti.

— The *Tyger* (which most thirsts for blood) Seeing her selfe rob'd of her tender brood, Lies down lamenting in her *Scythian Den*, (lyen. And licks the prints where her lost whelps had

Ælian. l. de
animal. 2. cap.
40.

And this kind of *Pietie* wee find *Reciprocall*, returning from the young ones upward: so the young *Lyons* are said to feed and provide for their old ones; which is also observ'd of *Eagles*, *Storkes* and other creatures. And hence wee read

read of *ἄνθρωποι πατρῶναι*, *Laves*, which receive their denomination from the *Stork*, providing that children should nourish and take care of their Parents in their distresse. And for men, so great is the power of naturall affection, that Parents desire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vicious men (as *Seneca* somewhere speaketh) desire that their sonnes may be vertuous, and vertuous men that they may be more worthy and happy than themselves, as *He-ctor* prayed for his sonne.

Καὶ ποτὶ τίς ἴστανται πατρὸς αἵ' ὅγα πόλλοι ἀφίππων.

*Let it be said, here's a brave Son indeed,
Who doth his noble Father farre exceed.*

And *Aeneas* to *Ascanius*.

*Disce puer virtutem ex me, verosque labores,
Fortunam ex aliis,——*

Virtue and Patience learne my sonne of me,
But may thy fortunes better Patterns see.

And therefore *unnaturalnesse* of affection is reckoned up by the Apostle amongst the foulest of sinnes, when like *Ismael* the nature of men groweth wilde and brutish; as the Philosopher calleth such men *ἡμιάνθρωποι* men of savage and fierce dispositions. And therefore in the Scripture an unnaturall man is called *Onager homo*, a wilde-

Φ. lib. 3. c. 23.
Φ. lib. 9. c. 1.
Φ. lib. 10. c. 16.
Plutarch. de solert. animal.
Aristoph. in Avibm. *Plin.*
lib. 10. c. 23. Φ.
lib. 8. c. 57.

Iliad. 1. 480.

Aenead. lib. 12.

2 *Tim.* 3. 3.

Eccles. 13. 17.

ἄλφ' α' χροῖς
 χροῖς α' μωρ
 τιν. M. n. d.
 Thirstis vitia,
 non aliter in-
 dicat. Homerus
 quāvis quod ef-
 fet virus pra-
 fessissimus
 Achilli & V.
 lyssi inuisus.
 Iliad. 2.
 Vir. Aristot.
 Prov. §. 10. g. 5.
 τὴν δ' αὖτ' αὖτ'
 οὐκ ἔστι μὴ καὶ
 φησὶ, &c.
 Theod. Idil. 9.
 φησὶ αὖτ' αὖτ'
 αὖτ' αὖτ' αὖτ'
 αὖτ' αὖτ' αὖτ'
 Sioici apud
 Diog. Laert. in
 Xenox 17.
 Maxim. Tyrim
 differt. 4.

wildc-affe man, *Gen.* 16. 12. *Iob* 11. 12. but a meeke and tender-spirited man is called *Ovis homo*, a Sheepe-man, or a man of a sociable and calme disposition, *Ezek.* 36. 37, 38. And amongst the *Thibans* there was a Law made, which appointed a Capitall penalty upon those unnaturall men, who should cast out and expose their children unto ruine.

And as this kind of Love ariseth from *Proximity of Nature*, so another there is growing out of *Similitude of Manners*. All flesh, as *Hyracides* speakes, will *refers to their like, and every man will keepe company with such, as he is himselfe*; as we see learned men hold correspondency with those that are learned, and good with those that are good: no man that excelleth in any quality, shall ever want Friends; because every man, that either hath or liketh that Quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man by the study or pra^tice of any good things laboureth to commend himselfe to his owne judgement, and to the love of others; he is engaged (unlesse hee will be false to his owne grounds) to love any other whom he observeth to study and pra^tice the same thing: For how can I expect, that that in me should reape *Love* from others, which in others reapeth nothing but *Envie* from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit another to *love* that, which he himselfe hateth; because we are too apt to make our *Judgements* or *Passions* the rule of another mans, and to dislike that

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in him, which we do not allow in our selves :
Which unruly affection, the Poet hath excellently described in *Achilles*; when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and *Agamemnon* :

Οὐδ' ἔτι σὺ χεῖν
Τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μὴ μοι ἀπεχθῆαι φιλέοντι,
Καλὸν τοῖ σὺν ἑμοῖς ἔχῃσιν ὅς κε με κήδῃ.

Iliad. i. 610.

*It is not courteous, that where I hate, you
Should love, except you 'ld have me hate you too :
But take this rule, If you 'll be thought my friend,
The man that offends me, do you offend.*

So much naturally are men in love with their own *likenesse*, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated : and therefore, the chief art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey.

*Plutarch. de
Adulat. &
Amiciis.*

It is true, that in some cases, *similitude* is the cause of *Envie* ; but this is onely then, when *first* the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentions quality : in which case, the meeting of such men in one disposition, is but like the meeting of two rough Streams, which makes them run with the more noise : Therefore, a wife and a meek-tempered man shall sooner win and hold the *love* of an angry man, then he who is like unto him in that distemper ; because such a man (though indeed he be Conqueror, in regard of his Wisdom) yet by

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his

his Patience he seemeth to yeeld : and there is nothing which a mans Passion Loves so much as Victory. Whereas between Anger and Anger there must needs be fighting of affections, which is the remotest temper from *Love*.

Secondly, when by accident the quality wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them, either in point of credit, usefulness, or profit. For as the Stars, though they agree in light, yet *Validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur*, those that are small, suffer losse by the brightness of others : So amongst men agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth a prejudice and disadvantage unto the other, as the Poet said,

Plin. Panyg.

Hesiod.

Καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ χροῦσεν, καὶ τέκλωνι τέκλων.

*The Potter's often angry with his mates,
One neighbour-Architect the other hates.*

And therefore as the Sun and Moon agree best in their light when they are farthest asunder, so in these Arts which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one doth the lesse damage or darken the other.

Now this *Natural* and *Habitual Love* is then regular, when *subordinate* to that greater, our Love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly-informed *Reason*; which amongst many others, are these three :

First,

Δεῖ μὲν συμ-
μετέσθαι, ἅλλα
μὴ ἐξ ὀνόματος.
Vid. A. Gell.
lib. 1. cap. 3.

First, That our *Love* carry its right respect, and no sinister or by-end with it ; That we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, onely upon our own benefit : For, as the ^a Philosopher speaks, true *Love* is a *benevolent Affection*, willing good unto another for his own sake. *Hominum charitas*, saith *Cicero*, *gratuita est*. True *Love* is *free*, and without self-respects : whereas to shroud our own private aims under the name of Friendship, *Non est amicitia sed mercatura*, is onely to make a Trade and Merchandize of one another.

Secondly, That our *Love* be *serene*, not mudded with Error and Prejudice : * in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weaknesses, that they may the better know themselves, be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of *Polydamas* to *Hector* :

Οὐ γάρ τοι περὶ δόξα θεὸς πολέμῳ ἔργα,
τὸνε καὶ καὶ βέλῳ ἑδέλεις περὶ δόξῃαι ἄλλων ;
Ἄλλ' ἔ πως ἅμα πάντα δύνησαι, ὅτε.

Because thou canst in War all men out-do,
Wilt thou presume thou canst in Counsel too ?
One breast's too narrow to contain all Arts ;
God distributes his gifts in several parts.

In this case therefore our care must be, To discern between the abilities and infirmities of

a Rhet. l. 4. c. 4.

De Nat deor. l. 1

Senec. Epist. 9.

* Ἄλλ' ἔ δὲ ἔ-
δεις πάντ' ὀπ-
ταδαυ βροτῶν
πέρικαν. Ἄλλω
δ' ἄλλο σὺ
σκεῖται γέρος.
Τὸς μὲν μάχε-
σθαι, τοὺ δ' ἐν-
δομεν καλῶς.
Eurip. Rhes.
106.

Iliad. v. 700. de
Vid. Plutarch. de
Animi Tranquil.
Cicer. ad Atti-
cum, l. 14. ep. 13.

Quintil. 1.2.c.2.
& 1.10.c.2.

Plutarch. de
Adulat.

men, that our Honour and Love of the Person render not his *weaknesses* beautiful to us, nor work in us an unhappie diligence in the imitation of them. *Vix enim dici potest, quando libentius imitamur eos, quibus favemus*; Love is very apt to transport us so far, as to make us imitate the errors of whom we love. Like unskilful Painters, who not being able to reach the *beauty* of the face, expresse onely the *wrinkles* and blemishes of it.

Thirdly, that our Love keep in all the *kindes* thereof its due proportion, both for the *nature* of them, being towards some a *love of Reverence*, towards others of *friendship*, towards others of *Compassion*, towards others of *Counsel* and *Bounty*; as also for their several *degrees* of *intention*, which are to be more or lesse according to the *Natural*, *Moral*, or *Divine* obligations which we finde in the persons loved. For though we must love *All men as Our selves*, yet that infers not an *Equality*, but a *Fidelity* and *Sincerity* of love; Since even within Our selves, there is no man but loves his *Head*, and his *Heart*, and other vital parts, with a closer Affection then those which are but fleshly and integral, and more easily repairable. And therefore the Apostle limiteth the *μεγίστην*, the greatest degree of our Love upon two objects; those of our *own house*, and those of the *household of faith*; not excluding others, but preferring these.

1 Tim 5.8.
Gal. 6.10.

I shall end this particular with naming one *Species* of Love more (for all this hitherto hath been *Amer Amicitia*, a Love of a Person for him.

himself) and it is that which the Schools call *Amor Concupiscentia*, a love of *Concupiscentia*, or a *Circular love*, that which begins and ends in a *Man self*, when his Affections having gone forth to some object, doth again return home, and loves it not *directly* for any *absolute* goodnesse which it hath in it self, but as it is *conducible* and bears a relation of *Connivence* to him that loves it. For though all affection of *Love* (as *Aristotle* observed) be *Circular*, in as much as the *Object* first moves the *Appetite*, and then the *Appetite* moves to the *Object*, and so the motion ceaseth where it began (which is a Circle); (which also by the way shews us in an Embleme the firmnesse and strength which *Love* works amongst men; because, of all Forms and Fabricks, those which are *Circular* are the strongest; as we see in Arches, wherein every part doth mutually touch and clasp in that which is next it :) Yet in this *Love* which I here speak of, there is a greater *Circle*; in that, after all this, there is another Regresse from the *Object* to the *Appetite*, applying the goodnesse thereof unto the same, and loving it onely for the commodity and benefit, which the minde is likely to receive from it.

Another subordinate and lesse principal *cause* of *Love*, may be *Love* it self; I mean in another man: for as it is natural, according to *Aristotle*, to praise, so sure it is to love, φιλαίθεωπὺς, men of loving and good natures: and so he maketh just, beneficent and pleasant; Καὶ ὅλως τὸς σφοδρὰ φιλοφίλους, men that are true lovers of their own friends to

Et hic. l. 8. cap. 1.
et lib. 9. cap. 1.

be

be the proper objects of Love. And herein is that partly verified, that *Love is strong as death*. For as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise bury all his enemies (it being unnatural to *hate* the dead, whom we cannot *hurt* : for the utmost harm that malice can do, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of *Thebes*, *Æteocles* and *Polynices* ;

Statius Thebaid.

*Nec furiis post fata modus, flammaque rebelles
Seditione rogi.* —

Their furies were not bounded by their fate ;
Ones funeral-flame the others flame did hate.)

Even so likewise a mans *Love* hath a power to bury his enemies, and to draw unto it self the most backward and differing affections : for being of a transient nature, and carrying forth it self into the person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other natural Agents) worketh semblable and alike affections unto it self. For besides that hereby an Adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity, he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witness, his Conscience telling him that it is odious and inhumane to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this inducement, *Saul*, the patern of raging and unreasonable envie, was sometimes brought to relent, and accuse himself. And this is the occasion

*Pessimam causam meam hodierna pietas fecit;
propterea nocens,
quicumque visus
est bono fratri
est nocens. Senec.
in Thyeste.*

sion (as I take it) of that speech of Solomon; *If thine enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coles of fire upon his head.* Which, though perhaps with earthy and base mindes, it hath a property of hardning and confirming them in their hatred; yet, with mindes ingenuous and noble, it hath a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge them. And so the Apostle telleth us, that we love God, because he loved us first; and Mary Magdalene having had much forgiven her, did therefore love Christ much. And therefore the Poets counfel is good:

Στέρξετε τὸν φιλέοντες ἐν ᾧ φιλέετε φιλεῖτε.

*If for thy Love thy self wouldst loved be,
Shew love to those that do shew love to thee.*

The nexet two Causes which I conceive of Love, I will joyn in one; namely, the *absence* from, and contrarily, the *presence* with the thing loved; both which, in a different respect, do exercise Love. And therefore, first, I like not that speech of Aristotle, that though distance of place do not dissolve the *root* and *habis*, yet it doth the exercise and acts of Love; except he meant it (as I suppose he doth) of the *transient* acts thereof, whereby each friend doth the office of Love and *Beneficence* to another. For, as in natural bodies there is not onely a *Complacencie* or *Delight* in their proper place, when they enjoy it; but an in-

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Prov. 25. 21.

Nimis datus est animus, qui dilectionem, si noluit impendere, nolit rependere. Aug. de Catech. Rudib. c. 4.

1 Joh. 4. 19.
Luke 7. 47.

Theocrit.

Vin' ut ameris?
ama. Martial.

Ethic. lib. 8. c. 3.

a *Animus amare
refertur, sicut
corpus pendere.*
*Aug. de Civit.
Dei. l. 11. c. 28.*
*Pondus meum a-
mor meus, eo fe-
ror quocunque
feror. Confess.
lib. 13. cap. 9. &
Epist. 89.*
b *Plutarch. Sym-
pos. l. 5. q. 7.*
Æneid. l. 4.

Τὸ ἐκ τοῦ
διακινῶν ὁ
αὐτὸς συνάγει
τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἰς
in 1 Cor. 10. 30.

nate propension and *motion* thereunto, when they are *absent* from it ; so in the minde of man (whose ^a *Love* is his *Weight*) there is not onely a *Love* of *Delight* in the *fruition* , but a *Love* likewise of *De-
sire*, in the *privation* of a *Good* ; which, the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth it self upon it :
b as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the Poet expresth the love of *Dido* to *Æneas* :

Illum absens absentem auditque videtque.

When night had sever'd them apart,
She heard and saw him in her heart.

And it is the wonder of *Love* (as *Saint Chry-
sostome* speaketh) to collect and knit together in one, things far separated from each other : Wherein stands the *Mystery* of the *Communion* of the *Church* on Earth, both with it self, in all the disperfed members of it, and with *Christ* the Head, and that other part of it which triumpheth in Heaven. So that herein, *Divine* love hath the same kinde of vertue with *Divine Faith* ; that as this is the *being* and *subsisting* of things *to come* ; and distant in *Time* ; so that is the *Union* and knitting of things *absent*, and distant in *Place*.

But then, much more doth *Presence* to the goodnesse of an object *loved*, encrease and exercise our *Love* ; because it gives us a more compleat sight of it, and union unto it. And therefore *Saint John* speaks of a *Perfection*, and *Saint*

Paul

Paul of a Perpetuall of our Love unto God, grounded on the fulnesse of the *Beatificall Vision*, when we shall be for ever with the Lord; whereas now, seeing onely in a Glasse darkely, as we know, so likewise we love but in part onely. And Aristotle makes Mutuall Conversation and Societie one of the greatest bonds of Love; because thereby is a more immediate exercise; and from thence, a greater encrease of Affection.

As living * Creatures, so Affections are nourished, after the same manner as they are produced: Now it is necessarie, for the first working of Love, that the Object have some manner of Presence with the Affection, either by a Knowledge of Vision, or of Faith. And therefore Saint Paul saith, If they had knowne, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory; their Ignorance and Hatred of Him, went both together: *Simul ut desinunt ignorare, cessant & odire*; as soone, saith Tertullian, as they ceased to be ignorant of Christ, they ceased to hate Him: And usually, in the phrase of the Scripture, Knowledge and Love are identicall. So then, all Love proceeding from Knowledge, and all Knowledge presupposing some Presence of the thing knowne, it appeareth, that the Presence of the Object begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nourisheth this Affection.

The last Cause or inducement to this Passion, (which I will but name) is an Aggregate of diverse Beautifull and Amiable Qualities in the Object; as namely, Sympathie, Justice, Industrie, Temperance, Ingenuitie, Facilitie, Pleasantnesse and Inno-

1 Cor. 13. 8.

Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5.

* Plur. de Invidia & Odio.
Arist. Polit.
lib. 1. c. 7.

1 Cor. 2. 8.

Apolog. l. c. 1.

2 Tim. 2. 19.
Matth. 7. 23.
John 9. 21.
Psal. 1. 6. 37. 18.
Rom. 8. 29.

Rhetor. L. I. c. 4.

Innocency of Wit, Meeknesse, Yeeldingnesse, Patience, Sweetnesse of behaviour and disposition, without Closenesse, Suspicion, Intermedling, Inquisitivenesse, Morositie, Contempt, Dissention; in all which, men are either *Injusti* or *Pugnaces*, doe either wrong us, or crosse us: Which two the Philosopher makes the generall Opposites of *Love*: On which I shall forbear to insist, as also upon the circumstances of the Act of this *Passion* it selfe, in the Quantitie and Qualitie thereof, and shall proceed in-briefe to the *Consequents* or *Effects* of this *Passion*.

C H A P. XI.

Of the Effects of Love, Union to the Object, Stay and Immoracion of the Minde upon it, Rest in it, Zeale, Strength, and Tendernesse towards it, Condescention unto it, Liquefaction and Languishing for it.



He first which I shall observe, is *Union*, occasioned both by the *Love* which we have to a thing, for its *owne sake*, and likewise, for the *Love* of our selves, that there may be a greater mutuall interest each in other. Where-ever *Love* is, it stirreth up an endeavour, to carry the heart unto the thing which it loveth: *Where the Treasure is, there the heart will be.*

be. Hence, none are said to love God, but those that are some way united unto him. And therefore, as Gods first love to man, was in making man like himselfe; so his second great love, was in making himselfe like man. Hence we read so often of that mysticall inhabitation of Christ in his Church, of that more peculiar Union and presence with the people, of a Spirituall Implantation into him by Faith, of those neere relations of Filiation and Fraternitie, of mutuall interest each in other, *I am my beloveds, and my beloved is mine*; importing an inseparable Union of the Church to Christ. And this may be the reason of that order in Saint Pauls solemne Benediction, The Grace of Christ, the Love of God, and the Communion of the Spirit: for, as the Grace of Christ onely taketh away that enmitie which was between sinners and God, and is the onely meanes of our reconciliation unto him; so the Love of God is the onely Bond of that Communion, which we have with him and his holy Spirit.

Union is of diverse sorts. One, such whereby diverse things are made simply one, either by the conversion of one into the other, or by the composition, or constitution of a third out of the things united, as of mixt bodies out of united Elements, or of the whole substance out of the essentiall parts: Another, such whereby things united are made one after a sort, either by an accidentall aggregation, as diverse stones make one heape, or by an orderly and a rtificiall distribution, as diverse materials make one house. Or by either a naturall or morall

Arist. Rhetor.
lib. 2. cap. 4.
Diogen. Laert. in
Zenon lib. 7.

inclination and sympathy which one thing beareth unto another. And of this sort is that *union* which ariseth out of *love*, tending first unto a mutuall *similitude* and conformity in the same desires; and next unto a mutuall *possession*, fruition, and proprietic, whereby the minde loving, longeth to be seised of the thing which it loveth, and cannot endure to be deprived of it. So *Moses* prayed, *I beseech thee shew me thy glory*: for the vision of God is the possession of him; and so *David*, *My soule thirsteth for God, when shall I come and appear before him?* And this is the foundation of all sorrow, when the soule is dispossessed of that which it loved, and wherein it rested. And this desire of Possession is so great that Love contenteth it selfe not with the Presence, but even then putteth out its endeavour unto a neerer, and more *reall union*, as if it would become *really One* with the thing which it loveth; which is seene in *embracings*, kisses, in the exiliency and egress of the spirits, in the expansion of the heart, in the simplicity and naturalnesse of all mutuall carriages, as if a present friend were not yet present enough. Which kinde of expressions of love are thus elegantly described by *Homer* when *Eumens* saw *Telemachus* safely returned home from Sea.

Amor Hedera
Phuatach. de
Aud. Scal. de
subilitate.
Arist. Polit.
lib. 2. s. 4.
Vel presentem
desideramus.
Plin. Paneg.

Odys. II. v. 4.

Ταφών δ' ἀνδρὸς σελῶντις,
Ἐκ δ' ἄρ' ὅς τις χερῶν πῶν ἀγγέα, τοῖς ἐπὶ νῆπι
Κερνάς αἰθοπα εἶνον, ὃ δ' αὖτις ἤλυθ' ἀνακλῆ.
Κύδω δ' εἰ μιν κεφαλῇ τε χ' αἰμῶν φαέα γαλὰ
χρῆς τ' ἀμφοτέρωσσι δακρυὶν ὅς ἐρ' ἔκπῳ δαίχου.

ΕΥΜΕΝΙ

*Eumeus all amaz'd sprung to the dore.
The pots of wine which his hands mixt before
Did both fall from them : he ranne on to meet,
And with full welcomes his young master greet.
He kist his head, hands, eyes ; and his teares kept
Time with his kisses, as he kist he wept.*

The like elegant description wee have of the love of *Penelope*, when *Vlysses* after his returne was perfectly known unto her.

Δακρύματα δ' ἔπειτα ἰδὼς δαδῶν, ἀμυγρὰ δ' ὤμους
Δακρὴν βαλὼν Ὀδυσσεύς, χερσὶν δ' ἔκυσ'.

Odys. l. 208.

*She wept and ran straight on, her hands she spread
And claps'd about his neck, and kist his head.*

Love hath in morall and divine things the same effect which fire hath in naturall, to congregate homogeneous, or things of the same kinde, and to separate heterogeneous, or things differing : as we see in the Love of God, the deeper that is, the more is the spirituall part of man collected together, and raysed from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love shall be perfect, all things shall be harmonious and homogeneous, not in regard of naturall properties, but in a pure and unmixed spiritualnesse of affections in a perfect unity of minds and motions.

From the union of love proceeds another secret effect, namely, a resting of the mind in the thing loved

Gerson de myst
Theol.

loved. In which respect the Philosopher calleth knowledge the *rest* of the understanding. And this can onely be totall and perfect in the Union of the Soule with God, the chiefest good thereof. Whence some have made the threefold *Appetite* in man, Concupiscible, Rationall and Irascible, to have their finall perfection and quiet by a distinct union to the Three Persons in the Trinitie: for the *Concupiscible* power is carried *ad bonum* to good, which they say is the Attribute of the *holy Spirit*; the Rationall *ad verum*, to that which is true, which is the Attribute of the *Sonne*; and the Irascible *ad Arduum*, to Power, which is the Attribute of the *Father*. But to let that passe for a spiders web (curious, but thin) certaine it is that God onely is that *end*, who can fully accomplish the perfection and terminate the desires of those creatures, whom he made after a peculiar manner to know and enjoy him. But proportionably, there ariseth from the *Union* unto any other *Object* of *Love*, a *satiating* and *quieting* of the Facultie; which, in a word, is then onely, in *Objects* of inferiour order and goodnesse, regular, when the *Object* is *naturall*, and the *Action limited*. Disproportion and Enormitie are the two Corruptions in this particular.

A third Effect, which I shall observe of *Love*, is *Stay*, and Immoracion of the Mind upon the *Object* loved, and a *diverting* of it from all others: as we observed in *Eumæus*, when he saw *Telemachus*, he threw away the Businesse which he was about before: And the Woman of *Samaria*, being

ing transported with the *love* of Christ, left her Pitcher, which she had brought to the Well, that she might goe and call others unto his Doctrine : And *Mary* left the thoughts of entertaining Christ at the Table, out of an extraordinarie desire to entertaine him in her heart. And this effect the Poet hath excellently expressed in *Dido*, who having shewed before a marvellous Princely wisdom and sedulitie, in fortifying her new Kingdome and viewing the Works her selfe, (as he had before described) as soone as she was once transported by the *love* of *Aeneas*, then all stood still on a sudden.

*Non capta assurgunt turres, non arma iuventus
Exercet ; portusvè, aut propugnacula bello
Tuta parant ; pendens opera interrupta —*

Aenead. l. 4.

The Towers long since begun rose up no more,
And Arms did rust, which ere-while brave youth
No Ports, or Sconces, no defence went on, (wore.
But all their works hung broken, and halfe done.

Thus, as *Plutarch* hath observed, the Images of things in the fancies of other men are like words written in water, which suddenly vanish ; but the Impressions which *love* makes, are as it were, written with an hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the memory.

Love and *Knowledge* have mutuall sharpening and causalitye each on other : for as *Knowledge* doth generate *Love*, so *Love* doth nourish and exercise

ercise Knowledge. The reason whereof is that unseparable union, which is in all things between the *Truth* and *Good* of them : for it being the property of *Truth* to unite and apply *Goodnesse* (nothing being apprehended as *Good*, unlesse that *Goodnesse* be apprehended as *true*) the more Appetite enjoyeth of this, the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more compleat union doth it seeke with that : the Heart and the Treasure can seldome be severed ; the Eagles will alwayes resort to the body ; *Dauids* Love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.

And herein, methinks, may consist another proportion betweene the strength of *Love* and *Death* ; for as in *Death* nature doth collect and draw in those spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward parts, to guard and arme the heart in its greatest conflict ; uniting all those languishing forces which are left, to testifie the naturall love which each living creature beareth to its owne conservation : so doth *Love* draw and unite those Spirits which administer either to the Fancie or Appetite, to serve onely for the nourishing of that Affection, and for gazing upon that treasure whereunto the Heart is wholly attracted. Which Spirits, being of a limited power and influence, do therefore with the same force, whereby they carry the minde to the consideration of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are heterogeneous ; no determined power of the Soule being able to impart a sufficient activity unto diverse

verse independing operations, when the force of it is exhausted by one so strong; and there being a sympathy, and as it were a league between the faculties of the soule, all covenanting not to obscure or hinder the Predominant Impressions of one another. And therefore as in *Rome* when a Dictator was created, all other Authority was for that time suspended; so when any strong Love hath taken possession of the soule, it gives a Superfedas and stop unto all other employments. It is therefore prescribed as a Remedy against inordinate Love.

Plutarch in
Amatorio.

————— *Pabula Amoris*
Abstergere sibi, atque aliò convertere mentem.

Lucr. apud
Petr. Crinit.
lib. 16. cap. 4.

To draw away the fuell from this fire,
And turne the minde upon some new desire.

For Love is *Otioforum Negotium*, as *Diogenes* spake, the businesse oftentimes of men that want employments.

De Laet. apud
Diogenes
apud Laert. l. 6

Another effect of Love is Jealousie or Zeale. Whereby is not meant that suspitious, inquisitive, quick-sighted quality of finding out the blemishes, and discovering the Imperfections of one another (for it is the property of true Love to think none evill) but onely a provident and solicitous feare, lest some or other evill should either disturbe the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of *Job* towards his sons; and of the *Apostle* towards his Corinthians; I

Laert. lib. 6.

Job 1. 5.

2 Cor. 11. 2.

am jealous over you with a godly jealousie : So Penelope in the Poet was jealous of the safety of Ulysses.

Ovid. Epist.

*In te fugebam violentos Troas ituros,
Nimine in Hectoro pallida semper eram.*

*How oft my deare Ulysses did I see
In my sad thoughts proud Trojans rush on thee ?
And when great Hector's name but touch'd mine
My cheeks drew palenesse from my paler fears. (cares,*

Ioh. 2. 17.

Zeale is a compounded affection, or a mixture of Love and Anger ; so that it ever putteth forth it selfe to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love; as we see in Christ, whose zeale or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the Temple. In which respect it is said that the zeale of Gods house did consume him.

ἐπιθυμία

Cant. 1. 8.

As water when it boyleth, (from which metaphor the word Zeale is borrowed) doth in the boyling consume, or as the Candle wasteth it selfe with burning. In which respect likewise it is said, that much watch cannot quench Love. It is like Lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it growes. And therefore the sinne of Laodicea, which was contrary to zeale is compared unto luke-warm water, which doth not boyle, and so cannot work out the scum or corruption which is in it.

Rev. 3. 15.

Plutarch de amore proli.

And from hence it is that Love makes Weak things strong, & turneth Cowardice into Valour, and Meeknesse into Anger, and Shame into Bold.

Boldnesse, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearefull **Hen**, which hath nothing but flight to defend her selfe from the Dog, or the Serpent, will venture with courage against the strongest creatures to defend her little Chickens. Thus Zeale and love of God made *Moses* forget his meeknesse; and his Anger was so strong, that it brake the Tables of the Law, and made the people drink the Idol which they had made. And this is wittily expressed by *Seneca*, that *Magnus dolor iratus amor est*, a great griefe is nothing else but Love displeased, and made angrie. It transporteth Nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth such a force and vigour into it, as that it will venture on any difficulties; as *Mary Magdalen* would in the strength of her love undertake to carry away the dead body of Christ (as she conceived of him) not considering the weight of that, or her owne weaknesse. It hath a constraining vertue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power; as the *Corinthians*, when they were poore in estate, were yet rich in *Liberality*. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the estate of an absent friend, whom we therefore suspect not sufficiently guarded from danger, because destitute of the helpe which our presence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and stains of the thing loved to redound to the griefe and trouble of him that loveth it. He that is not jealous for the credit, security, and honour of what hee pretendeth affection to, loves nothing

*Numb. 12. 11.
Exod. 32. 19.*

*Senec. in Herc.
Oeta.*

*Vid. Plutarch.
Amatorium.*

*Non patiar me
quicquam ne-
scire de eo
quem amem.
Plin. Epist.*

— οὐδὲν τίς τῆ
 ἡδὴ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ
 οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ
 Eurip. Helen.

but himſelfe in thoſe pretenſes.

Another Effect of *Love* is *Condeſcenſion* to things below us, that wee may pleaſe or profit thoſe whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his owne judgement, and to doe that which a looker on might happily eſteeme weakneſſe or Indecencie; out of a fervent deſire to expreſſe affection to the thing beloved. Thus *David*s great *Love* to the *Arke* of Gods preſence did tranſport him to leaping and dancing, and other ſuch familiar expreſſions of joy (for which *Michall* out of pride deſpiſed him in her heart) and was contented by that, which ſhe eſteemed baſeneſſe, to honour God: herein expreſſing the *love* of him unto mankind, who was both his *Lord* and his *Sonne*; who emptied, and humbled, and denied himſelfe for our ſakes, not conſidering his owne worthineſſe, but our want; nor what was honourable for him to doe, but what was neceſſary for us to be done. *Quicquid Deo indignum, mihi expedit*, what ever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus Parents out of love to their children doe liſpe, and play, and fit their ſpeeches and dalliances to the Age and Infirmities of their children. Therefore *Themistoctes* being found playing and riding on a Reed with his little boy, deſired his friend not to cenſure him for it, till hee himſelfe was a father of Children.

Plutarch: Apo-
 thegm. Lacer.

Vid Plutarch.
 Symposiac. l. 5.
 9. 7.

The laſt Effect which I ſhall obſerve of this Paſſion is that which I call *Liquefaction* or *Languor*, a melting, as it were, of the heart to receive the

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the more easie impressions from the thing which it loveth, and a decay of the Spirits, by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon, and of the painfull and lingring expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmost and most viscerall affection. And therefore called by the Apostle, *Bowells of Love*. And we read of the *yearning of Iosephs Bowells* over Benjamin his mothers sonne, and of the true mother over her childe, *Incalnerunt viscera*, they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowells, which the more vehement it is, doth worke the more suddaine and sensible decay and languishing of Spirits. So *Ammon* out of wanton and incestuous *Love* is said to *grow leane from day to day*, and to have been *sick* with vexation for his sister *Thamar*.

And in spirituall love we find the like expression of the Spouse; *Stay me with flaggons, comfort me with apples, for I am sick with love*: Wine to exhilarate, apples to refresh those Spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and wasted by an extreame out-let of Love. And for this reason the Object of our Love is said to *Overcome us*, and to *Burne the heart*, as with *Coales of Iuniper*; and the like expressions of wounding and burning the Poet useth.

——— *Est mollis flamma medullas
Interea, & tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus.*

A welcome soft flame in her bones did rest,
And a close wound liv'd in her bleeding breast.

ὅς τῶτον τ' ἔ-
ργον ἔχει σὺν δα-
μῶνι τὰν ὁρετῶ-
νων ὡς ἰσχυρῶς.
Scc. Theocrit.
Idyll. 2.

Gen. 43.
1 Reg. 3. 26.

2 Sam. 13.

Cant. 2. 5.

Cant. 6. 5. 8. 6.

Antad.

Now the cause of this *Langor*, which love worketh, is in *Sensitive* Objects, an earnest desire to *enjoy* them; in *Spirituall* Objects, an earnest desire to *increase* them. In the former, Want kindleth love, but Fruition worketh wearinesse and satiety: In the other Fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things which when wee wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things the desire at a *distance* promiseth much pleasure, but taste and experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the *Appetite*, and the greater the experience, the stronger the desire: as the more acquaintance *Moses* had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions, Love, which is the fountaine and foundation of all the rest.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Passion of Hatred, the Fundamentall Cause or Object thereof Evill, how farre forth Evills are willed by God, may be declined by men, of Gods secret and revealed Will.



He next in order is *Hatred* : of which the Schoole-men make two kindes ; an *Hatred of Abomination* or loathing ; which consists in a *pure aversion* or flight of the Appetite from something apprehended as *Evil*, arising from a dissonancy & repugnancy between their Natures : and an *Hatred of enmity*, which is not a flying, but rather a *pursuing Hatred*, and hath ever some *Love* joyned with it, namely a Love of any Evill which we desire may befall the person or thing which wee hate.

I shall not distinctly handle these asunder, but shall observe the Dignities and Corruptions of the Passion in generall, as it implyes a common *disconvenience*, and naturall *Vnconformitie* between the Object and the Appetite.

The *Object* then of all *Hatred* is *Evill* ; and all evill implying an opposition to Good admits of so many severall respects as there are kinds of opposition.

And

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And there is first an *Evill* of *Contrariety*, such as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire, or a Wolfe unto a Sheep, occasioned by that *Defructive* Efficiency, which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an *Evill* of *Privation*, which we hate formally and for it selfe, as implying nothing bur a *Defect* and Absence of *Good*.

Thirdly, an *Evill* of *Contradiction* in the *not being* of any creature, oppos'd to its being. For *Being* and *Immortality* is that which *Aristotle* makes one of the principle objects of *Love*; Annihilation then, or Not being is the chiefeft *Evill* of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.

Lastly, an *Evill* of *Relation*; for as things in their own simple natures *Evill*, may have in them a *relative Goodnesse*, and so to be desired; as the killing of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security of men: so things in their absolute being *good* may have in them a *relative*, or *comparative evill*, and in that sense bee by consequence hated; as our Saviour intimates *He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me*: when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the Love of Christ, they are then to be undervalued in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the Law, if a mans dearest brother, or child, or wife, or friend, should entice him from God unto Idolatry, hee was not to conceale, pitty, or spare him, but his owne hand was to be first upon him. And thus the Poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of

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of *Aeneas* toward *Dido*, who being inflamed with Love of him, would have kept him from the expedition unto which by divine guidance hee supposed himselfe to be directed.

—— *Quaquam lenire dolorem
Solando cupit & dictis avertere curas,
(Multa gemens magnosq; animum labefactus amore)
Iussa tamen Divum exequitur*——

Though he desir'd with solace to appease,
And on her pensive soule to breath some ease,
(Himself with mutuall love made faint) yet still
His purposes were fixt to obey Gods will.

So then we see what qualification is required in the *Object* of a just *Hatred*, that it be evill, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature: and the *Passion* is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule.

But here, in as much as it is evident that the being of some evill comes under the *Will* of God; (*Is there any Evill in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?*) and our wil is to be conformable unto his; it may seem that it ought to fall under our *Will* too, and by consequence to bee rather loved than hated by us, since wee pray for the fulfilling of Gods *Will*.

For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those *Evills* which he thus *willeth*, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next we will observe how
Q farre

farre the Will of God is to bee the rule of our will ; whence will arise the cleare apprehension of that truth which is now set downe , that the unalterable *Object* of mans *Hatred* is all manner of *Evill*, not onely that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and miserie.

First then for the Will of God, we may boldly say what himselte hath sworne , that hee will not the death or destruction of a sinner : and by consequence neither any other evill of his Creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy; he is not delighted in the ruine , neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groanes of any thing which himselte created : But he is said to will those Evills as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious *Power* over all the Creatures, and of his glorious *Justice* on those who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left onely to the wisdom of God himselte to know and ordaine the best meanes for, glorifying of himselte in and by his creatures , wee are not here hence to assume any warrant for willing evill unto our selves or others , but then onely when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evill unto himselte, if thereby the glory of Gods mercy towards his Countrey-men the Jewes might be the more advanced.

Secondly, it is no good Argument, *God willerh* the inflicting of such an *evill*, therefore it is unlawfull for my will to decline it : for first the *VVill* of God, whereby he determineth to work that

this or that evill on particular Subjects, is a part of his *secret Counsell*. Now the *Revealed*, and not the *Hidden Will* of God is the rule of our VVills and Actions : whence it commeth to passe, that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God in our wishes or averfations to goe a crosse way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure in my sick bed it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken; yet for me herein to second the VVill of God by an execution thereof upon my selfe, or by a neglect of those Ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his mercy, that I might fulfill his VVill. Peradventure in my flight a sword will overtake me, yet I have the warrant of my Saviours example and precept to turne my back rather than my conscience in persecution: alwayes reserved, that though I will that, which God willeth, yet my will bee ever *subordinated* unto his. VVe owe *submission* to the will of Gods purpose and Counsell, and we owe *conformity* to the will of his Precept and Command; we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to worke himselfe, and wee must conforme to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore

Secondly, though the VVill of God were in this case knowne, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it bee to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the VVisedome and purpose of God hath made inevitable; for as the promises and de-

crees of Good things from God doe not warrant our slacknesse in neglecting, or our profanenesse in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidableenesse of a future evill (as death intended upon us by God) put any necessity on our nature to deny it selfe, or to love its owne distresses.

Of which that wee may be the more sure, we may observe it in him, who as hee was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same naturall inclinations and averfations with us; so was hee of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him, yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the Scripture saith, was by *the hand and Counsell of God before determined*) a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Divine Decree. He knew it was not his Fathers Will; and yet, *Father, if thou be willing, let this cup passe from me*: he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an *Oportet*, a necessity upon it, and yet a second and a third time againe, *Father, if it be possible, let this cup passe from me*. Consider it as the *Destruction* of his Temple, and *Anguish* of nature, which hee could (not being in all things like unto us) but love; and then *Transseat*, Let it passe: but consider it as the *necessary meanes* of procuring pretious blessings for mankinde, and of fulfilling the eternall Decree of his Fathers Love, and then, *Not as I, but as thou wilt*.

The same may be applyed in any manner of humane

mane evils, notwithstanding wee are with an armed *patience* to sustaine them, or with an obedient *submission* unto Divine pleasure to wait for them; yet in regard of that *pressure* of nature, which they bring with them (on which the God of nature hath imprinted a naturall desire of its owne quiet and integrity) so farre forth all *Evill*, not onely may, but must be hated by every Regular will, upon pain of violating the Law of its Creation.

And indeed in all this there is not any deviation from the *Will* of God, intending that which we abhorre: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himselfe, or any good thing of his owne making; so neither doth it stand with the goodnesse of God to hate his Creature, or to delight barely in the miserie or afflictions thereof; but onely in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousnesse, whereunto he in the dispensation of his Wisdome and Justice hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmur at the VVisedome of God in thus ordering evils unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertaine those naturall desires of a straightned minde after deliverance from those evils, were to be in *Solomons* phrase too *Righteous*; and out of a purpose to answer the ends of Gods VVisedome, to crosse the Law of his Creation.

So then it is evident that the *Object* and *fundamentals* all cause of *Hatred*, is all and onely *Evill*: vvhich (however in respect of the *Existence* of it, it bee

in some cases *Good*; for as it is in the *power* of *God* to educe out of confusion order, light out of darknesse, his owne honour out of mans shame; so is it his *providence* likewise to turne unto the great good of many men those things which in themselves doe onely hurt them.) Yet I say this notwithstanding, as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created *Law* and in-bred love, which each thing beareth to its owne perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated.

As on the other side, those ordinary and common goods, which we call, in respect of *God*, blessings, as health, peace, prosperity, good successe, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdom and sobriety, whereby they should bee moderated, occasions of much evill and dangers; so that their Table is become their snare (as the experience of those later Roman Ages proveth, wherein their victories over men hath made them in luxurie and vilenesse so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt warre with *God*.) Notwithstanding I say all this; yet for as much as these things are such as doe quiet, satisfie and beare convenience unto mans nature, they are therefore justly with thankfulness by our selves received, and out of love desired unto our friends.

I now proceed from the Object or General fundamentall cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which doe arise from it.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other Causes of Hatred, Secret Antipathy, Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, Injurie, Base Feares, Disparity of Desires, a Fixed lealous fancy.

THe first which I shall note is a secret and hidden Antipathy which is in the natures of some things one against another. As Vultures are killed with sweet smels, and Horseflies with oyntments; the Locust will dye at the sight of the Polypus, and the Serpent will rather flye into the fire, then come neare the boughes of a wilde Ash: some plants will not grow, nor the bloud of some Creatures mingle together; the feathers of the Eagle will not mixe with the feathers of other fowles. So *Homer* noteth of the Lyon, that hee seareth fire, and the Elephant nauseates his meat, if a Mousse have touched it. A world more of particulars there are which Naturalists have observed of this kinde: from which naturall Antipathy it commeth, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, doe yet at the very first sight flye from it, as from an enemy to their nature, nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. 9. c. 44. Sec Plin. Nat. Hist. l. 8. c. 4. 9. 10. l. 9. c. 62. l. 10. c. 37. 74. lib. 16. c. 13. l. 20. in proem. lib. 22. c. 20. lib. 24. c. 1. Alian. de Animal. l. 3. c. 7. l. 4. c. 5. l. 5. c. 48. 50. l. 6. c. 22. 45. 46. Plutarch Sympos. l. 2. 4. 7.

Plutarch de Odio & Inuid.

Iliad. A. 32.

Ὀὐκ ἔστι Μῆνιν ἢ ἀνέστιν ἔρως ἀνδρῶν,
 'Οὐδ' ἄνους τι, ἢ ἄριστος ἀνέστης θυμὸς ἔχων
 Ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν διαμνηστὴς ἀνδράων.

*Lions with men will we're make faith full truce,
 Nor can you any way the Wolfe induce
 To love the Lamb : they study with fixt hate,
 The one the other how to violate.*

And the like kind of strange *Hatred* wee may sometimes find amongst men ; one mans disposition so much disagreeing from anothers, that though there never passed any injuries or occasions of difference between them, yet they cannot but have mindes averse from one another, which the Epigrammatist hath wittily expressed.

Martiall.

*Non amo te Sabidi, nec possum dicerequare,
 Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non amo te.*

I love thee not, yet cannot say for what ;
 This onely I can say, I love thee not.

Another cause working *Hatred* of a thing in the mindes of men, is the *difficultie* and conceited impossibility of obtaining it, if it bee a good thing which wee either doe or ought to desire, which the Casuists call *Acedia*, being a griefe of the appetite looking on a *Difficult Good*, as if it were evill because difficult ; from whence ariseth
 a Torpor

and Faculties of the Soule.

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a Torpor and Supine neglect of all the meanes which might helpe us to it. Thus wicked & resolved sinners, conceiving happines as unacquirable by them, do grow to the hating of it, to entertaine rancorous affections against those which perswade them to seek it, to envy and maligne all such they finde carefull to obtaine it; to proceed unto licentious resolutions of rejecting all hopes or thoughts of it, and to divert their mindes towards such more obvious and easie delight, as will be gotten with lesse labour; thus *Difficulty* rendereth good things *hatefull*; as *Israel* in the wilderness despised the pleasant Land, because there were sons of *Anak* in it.

Vid. Arist. Ethic. lib. 9. c. 4.

And this is one great cause of the different affections of men towards severall courses of life; one man being of dull and sluggish apprehensions, hateth Learning: another by nature quicke, and of noble intellectualls, wholly applyeth himselfe unto it, the *difficulty* perswading the one to *despise* the *goodnesse*, and the *goodnesse* inducing the other to *conquer* the *difficulties* of it: so one man looking unto the *paine* of a vertuous life, condemnes the *reward*; and another looking unto the *Reward*, endures the *paine*. And we shall usually finde it true, that either *Lazinesse*, fearing disappointment, or *Love* being disappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, doth both beget a kinde of Hatred and dislike of that which did either *deterre* them from seeking it, or *deceive* them when they sought it. As shee, who while there was any Hope, did sollicite *E-*

R

nece

Amad. 4.

Arist. Politic.
lib. 7. c. 7.
Fratres pri-
mi maduerunt
sanguine muri.
Lucan. l. 1.

Plutarch: de
amore frat.

Eurip. Medea.

neas with her teares and importunities; when he was quite gone did follow him with her imprecations.

There is no *Malice* growes ranker then that which ariseth out of the corruption of Love; as no darknesse is more formidable, then that of an Eclipse, which assaults the very vessells of Light; nor any taste more unfavory then of sweet things when they are corrupted. The more naturall the *Union*, the more impossible the *Re-union*. Things joyned with them, being broken asunder may be glewed againe; but if a mans Arme be broken off, it can never be joyned on againe: So those hatreds are most incurable, which arise out of the greatest and most naturall Love.

Αντι πρὸς ἑστῶ, καὶ δριμύτος ὀδύνη,
Ὅττι φίλος φίλον ἐνυκάδου' ἔσθ'.

When Love of friends is turn'd to wrath, be sure
That wrath is deep, and scarce admits a Cure.

Another very usuall, but most evill cause of Hatred is *Injurie*, when a man because hee hath done wrong, doth from thence resolve to Hate him. Too many examples whereof there are in Writings both sacred and prophane: *Iosephs* Mistresse first *wronged* him in assaulting his chastity, and then *Hated* him, and caused him to be cast into prison. *Ammon* first abused his sister *Tamar*, and then *hated* her worse then before hee loved her. *Phadra* having solicited *Hippolitus* her

her husbands son unto incest ; being denied, did after accuse him to his father , and procure his ruine. And *Aristotle* propoeth it as a Probleme, Why they, who corrupt and violate the chastity of any, doe after hate them? and gives this reason of it, because they ever after look on them, as guilty of that shame and sadnesse, which in the sinne they contracted. This cause of Hatred *Seneca* and *Tacitus* have both observed as a thing usuall with proud and insolent men, first to hurt then to hate.

And the reason is first, because injury is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy ; & the proper affection, which respecteth an enemy is Hatred. Again, he who is wronged, if equall or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared : and *Oderunt quos metuntur*, it is usuall to hate those whom we feare : if inferiour, yet the memory and sight of him doth upbraid with guilt, & affect with an unwilling & unwelcome review of the sinne, whereby he was wronged ; and Pride scornes reproofe, and loves not to be under him in Guilt, whom it over-tops in Power : for Innocence doth alwayes give a kind of superiority unto the person that is wronged ; besides, Hatred is a kinde of Apology for wrong : For if a man can perswade himselfe to hate him whom hee hath injured, he will begin to beleieve that hee deserved the injury which was offered unto him ; every man being naturally willing to finde the first inducement unto his sinne, rather in another than himselfe.

*Probl. Sect. 4.
Sect. 11.*

*Proprium hu-
mani ingenii
odisse quos la-
seris. Tacit. vit.
Agri. & Senec.
de Ira. l. 2. c. 33*

The next cause (which I shall observe) is *Fear*, I mean slavish Fear : for as Love excludeth Fear, so Fear begetteth Hatred ; and it is ever seene, *Qui terribiles sunt, timent*, they that terrifie others doe feare them, as well knowing that they are themselves hated : for as *Aristotle* speaketh, *Nemo quem metuit, amat* ; no man loves him whom he feares : which is the same with that of Saint *Iohn*, Love casteth out *Fear* : not a Reverend, submissive, awfull feare ; not a cautelous, vigilant and obedient feare ; not a feare of *Admiration*, nor a feare of *Subjection* ; but a feare of slavery and of Rebellion, all flashes of horror, all the tossings and shipwracks of a torn mind, all the tremblings of a tormented spirit ; briefly, all evill and hurtfull feare. And this I believe is one principall reason of that malice and contempt of godlinesse, which shewes it selfe in the lives of Atheisticall and desperately wicked men, which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature, so is it marvelously enraged by the feareful expectation of that fiery vengeance, which their pale and guilty consciences do already preoccupate ; for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God ; so their stubbornnesse and malice concludes that they wil hate him again ; *Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we shall dye.*

There may be a double root of this *Fear*, outward and inward. The outward is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the Potent, and thereupon the esseavoydable malice of the person hated : (as it was the speech of *Caligula*, *Ode-*

rint dum metuant.) And herein our Averſation (if it obſerve that generall rule of goodneſſe in paſſions ſubordination to Reaſon and Piety) is not onely allowable, but naturall, while it extends it ſelfe no further then the Evil which we wrongfully ſuffer. For I cannot but think that the ſpittle and ſcourges, the thornes and buffets, the reed and knees of thoſe mocking and blaſphemous Jewes were ſo many drops of that full Cup, which He, who knew no ſinne, was ſo deeply deſirous to have paſſe from him.

But the next, the *inward* roote of Feare is the *guilt* and burthen of an uncleane and uncovered Conscience, for Pollution and weaknesse is naked, must needs bee fearefull. And therefore that inference of *Adam* had truth in it, *I was afraid, because I was naked*: for having disrobed himselfe of Originall righteousnesse, hee was thereupon afraid of the curse and summons of an offended justice. Now from this *feare* may arise a double hatred; an hatred of a mans owne Conscience: for an evill man *will weepe out for griefe*, as the Philosopher speakes, is not a friend unto himselfe, but flies and labours to run away from himselfe, and is never in so bad company, as when he is alone, because then hee keeps company with his owne Conscience.

Which is the reason why some mens hatred
of themselves hath proceeded so farre, as to make
themselves the Instruments of that small measure
of Annihilation, which they are capable of.
Wherein notwithstanding they discover, how
R 3 farre

Ethic. lib. 9.

cap. 4.

δι' αὐτοῦ ὅτι τὰς
 χάριτας μὴ μέσων
 ἐπὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀλάστον
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυ-
 τῷ μεταδώ.

Scholiast. in
Sophocl. œdip.
Tyr.

farre their fury should extend against themselves if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to desire it : for he that hates a thing, would if he were able, pursue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a naturall hatred of Toads, Serpents, Vipers, and the like venomous Creatures. And yet that man which hates them most, if his Conscience be naked and let loose to flye upon him, if that worme that never dies (unlesse killed with our Saviours blood) begin thorowly to sting and gnaw him, would thinke himselfe a wise Merchant, if he could exchange beeing with the worst of these. The Worme and Viper of Conscience is of all the Creatures the most ugly and hatefull. A wicked man, when he doth distinctly know himselfe, doth love every thing, save God, better than himselfe.

INVENAL.

————— *Diri conscia facti*
Mens habet attonitos & surdo verberecedit,
Occultum quasciente animo tortore flagellum.

The mind being conscious of some dire offence, Fils them with feares ; a Torturer from thence Shaketh, and with redoubled blowes doth urge The unheard lashes of an hidden scourge.

Nor can I esteeme this a corrupt, though it be a miserable passion ; for as a bad man is to himselfe the worst, so is he by consequence the hatefullest of all Creatures.

The second *Hatred*, which may arise from that

Fear

Feare which is caused by a secret *guilt* of minde, is of all other most corrupt and rancorous, namely an hatred of the Authors or Executioners of Justice; of the equity and justnesse of whose proceedings, we are from within convinced; such as is the malice and blasphemy of Malefactors against the Judge, and of Devills and damned men against God and his righteous judgements, which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they most worthily doe endure: for it is the nature of proud and stubborne creatures (as was before observed) *Odisse quos laferint*, first to wrong God, and then to hate him.

Another particular cause of this passion may be a *Disparity* of Affections and Desires: for notwithstanding there be many times *Hatred* where there is *Similitude* (as those beasts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the same common meat, as the Philosopher observeth) and sundry men hate their owne vices in others, as if they had not the trade of sin enough to themselves, except they begot a Monopoly, and might ingrosse it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehension of some ensuing inconveniences which are likely to follow there-from, as hath been formerly noted: So that in that very similitude of *Natures*, there is a disagreement of *ends*, each one respecting his owne private benefit.

Hib. Animal,

Now the *Corruptions* herein are to be attended according to the Nature of that *disparity* whereon the passion is grounded; which sometimes is

Morall,

Morall, wherein it is laudable to hate the virious courses, in which any man differs from us, or we our selves from the right rule of life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor breake out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruine, except it bee in such a case, when our owne dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unlesse prevented by such a speedy remedy. Sometimes this *Disparity* may bee in actions *Civill*, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition, which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things; *Opposition* of a mans *Hopes*, and of his *Parts* and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervaluing the other: so corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, *Ambition* and *Self-love*; the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced, that *Hatred*, which ariseth out of a *parity of Desire*, as amongst *Competitors* for the same Dignity, or *Corrivalls* for the same Love, or *Professors* of the same Art, either by reason of *Coverousnesse*, or *Envy*, or *Ambition*, a greedy desire of their owne, or a discontented sight of anothers good.

*Malem hic
primus esse,
quam Roma se-
cundus. Caesar
de oppidulo
quodam dum
Alpes transiret
Plutarch.*

*Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Caesarum priorem.
Pompeiusve, parem*—————

Thus two great Rulers doe each other hate,
Caesar no Better brooks, *Pompey* no mate.

And

And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devour the love which they owe unto their Country. More noble was the behaviour of *Themistocles* and *Aristides*, who when they were ever employed in the publick service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country, and did not resume them til they returned, and became private men again.

*Platarch. de
gerend. Rep.*

The last cause which I shall observe of *Hatred* may bee a *settled* and permanent *Intuition* of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because by this meanes a redoubled search and review doth generate a kind of habituall detestation; it being the nature of Evill commonly to shew worse at the second or third view. And that first, because the former Act doth worke a prejudice, and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked, but with a fore-stalled resolution of finding Evill therein: and next, because from a serious and fastened search into the Object, the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledge being a master and light unto the later. But light and wandering fancies, though they may be more sudden in the apprehension of Evill, and by consequence liable to an oftner Anger, yet by reason of the volubility of the minde joyned with an infirmity and unexercise of memory, they are for this cause the lesse subject to deep and rooted hatred.

a Zeph. 2. 14.
 If. 3. 15. 14. 15
 b Matth. 8. 28.
 c Herodot. de
 Newis in Mel-
 pom. Plin. l. 8.
 cap. 22.
 Virgil. Eclog. 8.
 Pompon. Mela
 de situ orbis l. 2.
 Wierus de pra-
 stig. daem. l. 3.
 c. 21.
 Aug. de Civ. Dei
 lib. 18. c. 17.
 Olaus mag. de
 Reg. Septentr.
 lib. 18. c. 45.
 46. 47.
 Lucian. in Asino.
 d Dan. 5. 21.
 e Cicer. de Ami-
 cit. & lib. 4.
 Tuscul. quest.
 Suid. in Timon.
 Plutarch. in Al-
 cibiade & An-
 tonio.
 Laert. in Timon.
 Turneb. Advers.
 lib. 24. cap. 33.
 f Soc. l. 4. c. 18.
 Theodoret. lib. 4.
 cap. 26.
 Sozom. lib. 5.
 c. 29.
 g Arist. polit.
 lib. 1. c. 2.

Unto this head may be referred that *Hatred* which ariseth from excessive *Melancholy*, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and haters of the light, delighting onely, like the ^a Shrike owl or the Bittern, in desolate places, and ^b monuments of the dead. This is that which is called ^c *λυκανθροπία*, when men fancie themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs, and accordingly hate all Humane society. Which seemeth to have been the distemper of ^d *Nebuchadnezzar*, when hee was thrust out from men, and did eat grasse with the beasts. ^e *Timon* the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of *μισάνθρωπος*, the *Man-hater*, because hee kept company with no man but onely with *Alcibiades*; whereof hee gave this onely account, because he thought that *man* was born to do a great deal of mischief. And we read even in the ^f Histories of the Church, of men so marvelously averse from all converse or correspondence with men; that they have for their whole lives long some of sixty, others of ninety yeers, immured themselves in Cels and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their neereſt kindred; when they travelled far to visit them. So far can the opinion of the minde, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of humane disposition, which the ^g Philosopher telleth us, is naturally a lover of Society; and therefore he saith, that such men are usually given to contention, the signe and the fruit of hatred.

C H A P. XIV.

Of the *Quality* and *Quantity* of Hatred, and how in either respects it is to be regulated.



Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the *Quantity* and *Quality* of its Acts; which must be observed according to the *Evill* of the Object: for if that be *unchangeable*, there is required a continuall *Permanency* of the Passion, in regard of the disposition of the Minde: or if it be *Importunate* and *Assaulting*, there is required a more frequent *repetition* of the Act. The same likewise is to be said of the *Quality* of it; for if the *Evill* be of an *Intense* and more *Invincible* nature, our Hatred must arm us the more: if more low and remisse, the Passion may be the more negligent.

Here then is a fourfold direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions, First the unalterableness of the *Evill* warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the importunity and insinuation of it warrants the reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness and the remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred.

We may instance for the three former in sin, so much the worst of Evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of Goods.

First then, *Sin* is in its own formall and abstracted nature *unchangeable*, though not in respect of the subject in whom it dwelleth; for a Creature now bad, may by the mercy of God be repaired and restored again; but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of Evill, by a removing of it, not by a new moulding it into another frame. Sinne then remaineth in its owne nature unchangeable and alwayes evill, and the reason is, because it is a Transgression of a *perpetuall Law*, and a Remotion from an *unalterable Will*: Sinne then is to be hated with a continuall and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils, required a conditionall and more flexible dislike, they being evils that have either some good annexed unto them; or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore we see, that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them, and so makes the passions thereabout conversant, alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages which they might receive by reasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly, for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And in *Morality* likewise much damage might be inferred, both to private persons, and to the publick, by nourishing such private enmities, and being peremptory in continuing those former

mer differences, which, though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmfull, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a grown and strong, then of a vanishing and lighter passion.

Secondly, Again, as no evill is altogether so unchangeable as *Sin*, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a *multiplicity* and reiteration of our hatred in regard of its *importunity* and insinuation; that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it. Some Evils there may be which require onely a present, and not a customary exercise of this passion: Present, I say, when the Object is offensive and not customary; because as the Object, so the Passion likewise may be unusuall. Sin only is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures, though best armed against such assaults; and therefore here only are necessary such reiterated acts as may keep us ever on our guard, that we be not unprepared for a surprize.

Thirdly, Then for the *Quantity* of an Evill, because that is not in any thing so *intense* as in *Sin*, whether wee consider it in its owne Nature, as a Rebellion against the highest good, or in its effects; either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution, or of the vastnesse of it, both in Guilt and Punishment: In these

these respects our *Hatred* of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their Nature, nor so diffusive in their Extension, nor so destructive in their Consequents; and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion, but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances.

And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first, when a man shall apply his *hatred of prosecution*, or ill willing against that Evil, which is the proper object onely of *Aversion*: for some things there are onely of conditionall evils, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence, which being offensive onely in their application require a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.

Μηδ' ἢ Γλαυκὸν
 ἠνδραμὶν πικρὸν
 οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦτον δ'
 μισθὸν ὡς τῆς
 δίκης ἀλλήλων
 Sophoc. Ajax.

Secondly, a Corruption in regard of intension is either when the Passion admits not of any admixtion of Love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against onely relative Evils. There is not any man betwixt whose naturall Faculties and some particular courses or objects there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion (it being the providence of divine dispensation so variously to frame and order mens fancies, as that no man shall have an Independance or self-sufficiency, nor say unto the other members, I have no need of you; but there should be such a mutuall ministry and assistance amongst them, as where-

whereby might be ever upheld those essentiall vertues of humane society, *Unity* and *Charity*, no man being able to live without the aide of others; nor to upbraid others with his owne service. Now in this case, if any man, who either out of the narrownesse or incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his own minde, is indisposed for some courses of life or studie, shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them, or to an undervaluing of persons, who with a more particular affection delight in them, or to a desire of the not being of them, as things utterly unusefull, because hee sees not what use himself can have of them, he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike, as a blinde man should doe in wishing the Sun put out, not considering that hee himself receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light, the beauty whereof he hath no immediate acquaintance withall.

For, as too excessively to doat on the fancie of any particular thing may prove harmfull; as appeareth in the Poeticall fable of *Midas*, whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touched turned to gold, starved him with hunger; and so what hee out of too excessive love made his Idoll, became his ruine (as many men need none other enemy to undoe them then their own desires): So on the other side, the extreme *Hatred* of any thing may be equally inconvenient; as we see intimated in that other fable of the servants, who when they had, out of an extreme malice against

gainst the poor Cock, at whose early crow, their covetous Master every day rowfed them unto their labour, killed him, and so (as they thought) gotten a good advantage to their laziness, were every day by the vigilancy of their Master, whose Covetousnesse now began to crow earlier then his Cock, called from their sleep sooner then they were before; till at length they began to wish for that, which the rashnesse and indiscretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when wee go about any thing out of the dictates of Passion, it is a great point of Wisdome first to consider whether wee our selves may not afterwards be the first men who shall wish it undone again.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

*Of the Good and Evil Effects of Hatred. Caute-
lousnesse and Wisdom to profit by that
we hate, with Confidence, Victory, Refor-
mation. Hatred is General against the
whole kinde. Cunning, Dissimulation, Cru-
elty, running over to Persons Innocent, vi-
olating Religion. Envie, Rejoycing at
Evil. Crooked Suspition. Contempt. Con-
tumely.*



Now proceed to the Conse-
quents or Effects of this Passi-
on : And first, for the useful
and profitable Effects thereof,
which may be these :

First, A *Caute-
lousnesse* and
fruitful *Wisdom* for our own
welfare, to prevent danger, &
to reap benefit from that which is at enmity
with us. For we shall observe in many evils, that
no man is brought within the danger, who is
not first drawn into the love of them. All inor-
dinate corruptions then most desperately wound
the Soul, when they beguile and entangle it.
But the greatest use of this *Caution*, is to learn
how to benefit by the *Hatred* of others ; and as
learned Physicians do, to make an Antidote of
Poyson. For as many venomous creatures are

T

by

*Quod de Cantha-
ride observavit,
Plutarch. lib. de
sera numinis
vindicta.*

Venum ali-
quando pro re-
medio fuit. Sen.
de Benef. l. 2.
c. 18.

Plutarch. de ca-
piend. ex hosti-
bis uilit. Cæſ.
Rhodigin. Antiq.
lib. 1. 5. cap. 17.

Florus, lib. 2.

1 Sam. 13. 20.

by Art used to cure the wounds, and repair the injuries which themselves had made (Natural Attraction, as it were, calling home that poison which injury and violence had misplaced) : So the malice and venome of an enemy may by wisdom be converted into a Medicine, and by managing, become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or to use the excellent similitude of *Plutarch* : As healthy and strong beasts do eat and concoct Serpents, whereas weak stomachs do nauseate at delicacies : so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fools are corrupted with the love of their friends ; and an *Injury* doth one man more good then a *Courtesie* doth another. As Winde and Thunder when they trouble the air, do withal purge it ; whereas a long Calm doth dispose it to putrefaction : or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it, so a wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy, to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when *Cato* advised that *Carthage* should be utterly destroyed, *Scipio Nasica* perswaded the contrary upon these reasons, That it was needful for *Rome* to have always some enemies, which by a kinde of *antiperistasis* might strengthen and keep alive its vertue, which otherwise by security might be in danger of languishing, and degenerate into luxury. For as the Israelites, when there was no *Smith* amongst them, did sharpen their instruments with the *Philistines* ; so indeed an enemy doth

doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those vertues, which by lying unexercised might contract rust and dulnesse ; and many times, when the reasons of the thing it self will not perswade, the fear of giving advantage to an enemy, or of gratifying him, will over-rule a man, lest hereby he give his foes matter of Insultation.

Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atrida.

*This makes our foes rejoyce : they would have bought
With a great price those crimes we do for nought.*

Thus as a Sink by an house, makes all the house the cleaner, because the *Sordes* are cast into that : Or as they observe that Roses and Violets are sweetest, which grow neer unto Garlick and other strong sented Herbs, because these draw away unto them any fetid or noxious nourishment : so the eye and neernesse of an enemy serveth, by exciting *Caution* and diligence, to make a mans life more fruitful and orderly then otherwise it would have been, that we may take away occasion from them that would speak reproachfully. And thus *Hector* sharply reproving the Cowardice of his brother *Paris* (who had been the onely cause of the War and Calamity) when he fled from *Memelaus*, draweth his rebuke from hence, and telleth him that he was

Παρις, μετὰ πικρὰ, πολλοῖσι παρὶν τοῖσι θεοῖς,
δορυμένον ἵκε Ζεφύρου, &c.

Iliad. γ. 51.

*To Father, City, People, losse and blame ;
Foy to his foes, and to himself a shame.*

Rhetor. l. 2. c. 4.

Secondly, Hatred worketh *Confidence* and some Presumption and good assurance of our own, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former : for *Cautelousnesse* or Furniture against the onset of evil, cannot but make the minde more resolute in its own defence, then if it were left naked without Assistance. Again, of all others, this is one of the most *confident Passions*, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backt with Reason, as the Philosopher observes ; and ever the more *Counsel*, the more *Confidence*. Besides, being a deep and severe Passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no Passion that intendeth so much evil to another, as *Hatred* : *Anger* would onely bring *Trouble* ; but *Hatred*, *Mischief* : *Anger* would onely *Punish* and retaliate, but *Hatred* would *destroy* : for as the Philosopher notes, it seeketh the *not being* of what it *hates*. A man may be *angry* with his Friend, but he *hates* none but an Enemy ; and no man can *will* so much hurt to his Friend, as to his Enemy. Now the more hurt a Passion doth *intend*, the more strength it must call out to *execute* that intention ; and ever the more *strength*, the more *confidence*.

Thirdly, it worketh some manner of *Victory* over the evil hated : For, *Odium semper sequitur ex animi*

animi elatione, as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed, It ever ariseth out of pride and height of minde, *ὑπερέχουσιν οἷονται ὑπερχοντες*. Injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kinde of Victory. For so far forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in moral and practick courses; wherein I think it is a general Rule, He in some measure loves an evil, who is overcome by it: for conquest in this nature is on the Will, which never chuseth an object till it love it. There onely we can have perfect conquest of sin, where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incomplete restauration of Gods Image: the body of nature and the body of sin are born, and must die together.

Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evil hated in Reasonable creatures, namely, the *reformation* of the person in whom the evil was. For as countenance and encouragement is the fosterer; so hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as Physick to purge out an evil. And the reason is, because a great part of that goodnesse, which is apprehended to be in sin, by those that pursue it, is other mens approbation. Opinion puts value upon many uncurrent Coins, which passe rather because they are received, then because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man naturally desirous of Credit, see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnature himself, as still to feed on those vanities which he seeth do provoke others unto loathing; though I confesse,

fesse, it is not a perswasion of mens, but of Gods hatred of sin, which doth work a genuine and thorow Reformation.

I now proceed to observe those Effects, which are corrupt and hurtful : and here we may observe,

First, the Rule of *Aristotle*, whose Maxime it is, that *Hatred* is always *αὐτῷ γενν* against the whole kinde of its object : so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not *general*, but admit of *private* Reservations and Indulgences. For since the nature and extent of the Passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniform nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, *Sin*. In which, though there is no man which findes not himself more obnoxious and open to one kinde then another (it being the long experienced policy of the devil to observe the divers conditions of mens Natures, Constitutions, Callings, and Employments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the Will) insomuch that a man may herein haply deceive himself with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing, disgrace in practising, or other prejudices perswade to a casual dislike thereof; yet I say it is certain, that if a mans hatred of *Sin* be not

not *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι* *γινώσκω*, an Universal and transcendent Hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privie exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his perswasions to himself what they will; this is rather a personated, then a true hatred; a meteor of the brain, then an affection of the Soul. For as in the good, so in the ill of things, notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes, (as *Seneca* saith) *Scelera dissident*, that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very Contrariety such an Agreement against God, (as in *Herod* and *Pilate* against *Christ*) as admits not of any, in order unto God; but a gathered and united Passion. And hence is that of *Saint James*, *He that offendeth in one, is guilty of all*; because in that one, he contemneth that Original Authority which forbid all. There are no terms of consistence between Love and Hatred divided upon the same uniform Object. It is not the material and blinde performance of some good work, or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law, that can any more argue either our true love to the Precept, or our hatred to the Sin, then a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgeon can prove, either that we delight in our own pain, or abhor our own flesh. It is not Gods Witnesse within us, but his Word without us; not the tyranny of Conscience, but the goodnesse of the Law, that doth kindly and genuinely

Plutarch. Ap-
olog. Laon.

genuinely restrain the violence, and stop the eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps Fear may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sin. A *Lacedemonian* endeavouring to make a dead carcase stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded that outward means would avail little, except there were something *within* to support it. It is certainly so in Actions as it is in Bodies: *Fear*, as an outward prop, may help a while to keep them up; but *Love* is the inward form and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall again.

Vide Senec.
Epist. 103.

Secondly, Another evil effect of Hatred is, a close and cunning *Dissimulation* in suppressing of it, and palliating it with pretences of fairnesse and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth it self. For by this means is the Passion *strengthened*, and the Person whom it respects, *weakened*: this by incautelousnesse and *Credulity*; (for common Charity, when it sees no signes of malice, will not easily suspect it) that by Restraint and Suppression; for any thing, the more united, the more weighty it is: and as Winde, so Passions, the closer it is pent, the more strength it gathereth. *Plutarch* compareth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved until another day, when we have some use of it. Which disposition the Historian hath often observed in *Tiberius* (whose principal vertue was *Dissimulation*) who being offended in the Senate with some words

words spoken by *Hatevius* and *Scaurus* ; the Historians observation upon it is this : *In Hatevium statim inuēctus , Scaurum , cui implacabilis irascebatur , silentio tramisit.* The one he rebuked ; but the other, whom he more implacably hated, he passed by with silence. Ann elsewhere upon occasion , *Qua in prasens civiliter habuit , sed in animo revolvente iras , etiamsi impetus affectionis languerat , memoria valebat.* Though he seemed to take what was spoken, courteously ; yet he laid it up in his minde : and though the heat of Passion, by being suppressed, did languish, the memory and grudge remained strong still. In which words, the Historian hath expressed that excellent description of the same quality in *Homer.*

Κρείων γὰρ βασιλεὺς ὅτε χόσεται ἀνδρὶ χεῖρι,
Εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ χεῖλον γὰρ καὶ αὐτῶν καταπέμψῃ,
Ἀλλὰ ὃ καὶ μετὰ τὸν χρόνον ὅρα τέλειαν
ἐν στήθεσιν εἶσιν.

*Low men with a Kings wrath are quite oppress'd :
For though he seem the same day to digest
The heat of 's Passion ; yet he still reserves
Close Anger in his brest , till fit time serves.*

Whereunto agreeth that of the Tragœdian.

*Ira qua tegitur , nocet.
Professa perdunt odia vindictæ locum.*

Tac. Annal. l. i.

*Annal. l. 4.
Statuit reponere
odium donec im-
petus fame &
favor exercitus
langueret. de
Domitian. in vi-
ta. Agric.*

*Iliad. χ. 81.
Diog. Laert. l. 7.
Μῆνις ὀργῆς
ἐπικροτῇ.
Δεῖνὰ πλεον-
ον λήματα.*

*Senec. Traged.
Medea.*

*Anger that's hid, gives surer blowes ;
But profest hate doth revenge lose.*

And therefore *Hannibal* was wont to say, that he was more afraid of *Fabius* when he did nothing, then of *Marcellus* when he did fight ; of the one mans closenesse, then of the others boldnes.

And the reason why of all the Passions this of *Hatred* can thus smother and suppress it self, is, because it doth not affect the heart with trouble or sadnesse (which Affection the soul loves not long to hold fast) but with a perverse joy and delight in pondring the contrivances of Revenge (which the Philosopher and the Poet have placed among the Objects of Delight.)

Now of all the ways whereby this Passion is suppress, the most hateful to God and man is, when men do palliate and shrowd their malice under pretences of Love, and praise men unto ruine. Like the Panthar, which with his sweet breath allureth other Creatures to come unto him, and when they are come, devoureth them. *Pestimum inimicorum genus laudantes* ; of all kinde of enemies those are the worst, which as the Prophet speaks, *do break mens heads with oil*, and make a poison of their own merits to kill them with praises, as *Achilles* spake in the Poet.

*Aristot. & Juvenal.
Vindicta malum
quo non iucundus ullum.*

Ælian. de Animal. li. 5. c. 40.

*Tacit. vit. Agri.
Εχθρῶν ἑδω-
ρα δῶρα κ' ἐν
ὀνήσιμα.
Soph. in Ajax.*

*Iliad. 1. 313.
Salust. in Caxil.*

*Εχθρὸς γὰρ μοι κείνῳ ὁ μῶς αἰδέομαι πύλασιν,
ὅς κ' ἔτερον ἰδὼ κινδὲν ἐνὶ στήθεσιν, ἄλλο δ' ἑλθ' εἰ.*

That

*That man's as odious to me as hell gates,
Who with his mouth speaks fair, with his heart hates.*

And it was wicked counsel which *Theognis* gave to his *Cyrnus*, amongst so many sage and moral precepts, like a dead flye in a pot of ointment.

Εὖ καὶ πῶς ἔχ' ἄρ' ὅταν δ' ὑποχρήσῃτο ἔλθῃ,
κτεῖται νῦν, ἀέρισσιν μηδ' ἐμὴν δ' ἔλθῃ.

*Fawn on thy Fo, till he be in thy will,
Then, without Reasons, give revenge her fill.*

It is a quality of all others most distant from nobleneſſe and ingenuity of minde; for generous ſpirits will acknowledge with honour and love the vertues of their enemies; as *Fabritius Lucinus*, when many were competitours for the Conſulſhip, gave his ſuffrage to *Cornelius Rufſinus*, the worthieſt of the Company, though he were his bitter enemy: and *Cæſar* cauſed the demolifhed ſtatues of *Pompey* to be erected again, not ſuffering the honor of ſo brave a Commander (though his enemy) to bleed and languish under his eye. Whereupon *Cicero* told him, that in reſtoring the ſtatues of *Pompey*, he had ſtaned and made ſure his own. And *Publius Scipio* made none other uſe of his enmity with *Tiberius Gracchus*, than to diſpoſe his daughter unto him in Marriage, becauſe at that time when he was ſure to judge with leaſt favour and partiality, he found him to be a

Ε'χ' ἄρ' ὅς δ'
Ἄνθ' ἄλλα γερ-
ναῖος. *Soph. ib.*

A. Gellius, lib.
4. cap. 8.

Plutarch. de ca-
piend. ex hoſti-
bis util.
Homer. Il. a. 48.
Οὐδ' ἐν αὖτῃ
ἐχ' ἄρ' ἂν κομμή-
σαι ἐδ' ἄρ'
εὐντα. *Theogn.*

Aul. Gell. lib.
12. cap. 8.
Liv. lib. 38.

Elius Spartian.
in Hadrian.

* μῖσος ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κακοῦ εἶναι τινὶ μετὰ ἀρεσκότητος τινος καὶ ἀφροσύνης.
Diog. Laert. l. 7.
* Clem. Alex. Pedag. l. 1. c. 8.
Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 5.
C lib. 1.

Iliad. χ. 346.

Sueton. Tiber.
c. 19.

vertuous and deserving man. And the Emperour *Adrian*, to shew that he esteemed *Hatred* retained a base and un-Princely disposition, as soon as he came to the Empire, he laid aside all his former enmities, insomuch as then meeting one who had been his capital enemy, he said unto him, *Evasisti*, thou art now escaped from my displeasure.

Thirdly, another evil effect of Hatred is *Cruelty*; for it * seeketh (as I noted out of the Philosopher) the *Not-being* of that which it hates; and therefore among the Egyptians, a * Fish was the Hieroglyphick of Hatred, because of all creatures, they do most devour one another. And thus *Achilles* in the Poet expresseth his hatred of *Hector*, when he besought him to bestow upon his dead body an honourable burial.

* Ἄν γὰρ πῶς αὐτὸν με μόνον καὶ σερπὸς ἐνέειν οὐκ ἀπαραμύνητον κρείας ἐδύναται.

*I would my mind would give me leave to gnaw
Thy flesh in morsels, and to eat it raw.*

And the like expressions we finde of the cruelty of *Tiberius*, a man full of rancour.

*Fastidit vinum, quia jam fuit iste Cruore,
Tam bibit hunc avidè, quam bibit antè merum.*

He loaths all Wine for Blood, & now with more Greedy delight drinks this, then that before.

Hatred

Hatred contenteth not it self with the death of an Enemy, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after out-lives that which it hateth, insulting with pride and indignities over the dead body which cannot complain, nor otherwise, but by its own loathsomnesse, revenge it self. *Caligula*, that monster of men, when he commanded any to be slain, gave this charge with it, *Ita feri ut se mori sentiat*, that he should perish with such lingring blowes, as that he might feel himself to die. And he often commanded aged men to stand by and look upon the slaughter of their children, and after would force them unto mirth and feasting, for fear of their others which were left alive: for, to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing which more frequently occurreth. The Philistines cut off the head of *Saul*, and sent it in Triumph up and down their Country. And the Historian notes of *Otho*, that he never looked with more insatiable delight upon any spectacle, then the head of *Piso* his enemy. So when the Grecians saw the dead body of *Hector*, every man (as the Poet describes it) did bestow a stab and a contempt upon it. But above all, most hateful was the cruelty of *Marc. Antonius* and his wife *Fulvia*, shewed on the dead body of *Cicero* the glory of the Romane eloquence: they cut off his head and his hands, setting them, in contempt, where he was wont to deliver those excellent Orations; from whence they took it to their Table, and

Ful-

*Sueton. de Calig.
& in Tiber.
cap. 61.*

Id. in Calig.

*Senec. de Ira.
lib. 2. cap. 33.*

*Οὐ δίστατον, ἐν
δύοις. Εὐαγγελ.
τὸ ἐλάττω ἔδ'
ἐάν μισὸν κυ-
πῆς. Soph. Ajax.
Tacit. hist. lib. 1.*

*Capita hostium
in conto præfigi
solita. Apud
Just. lib. 14.
Virg. Aeneid.
Εἰς ἡδονὰς
δυνάστων ἀνὰ
ἐκσπῆς. Gr.
Eurip.
Hercul. furens.*

Pet. Grin. l. 1.
c. 8.

Plutarch. in
Cicerone.

Sed. Titius
quod habuit
imaginem L. Sa-
turnini domi sue
condemnavit.
Cic. pro Rabinio.

Tacit. Annal.
lib. 5. 6.

Suet. Tib. c. 61.
Annal. l. 15.
Plutarch. de
cap. ex host. mil.
Q. Curt. l. 7.

Plutarch. de A-
dulat. & Amic.
Plutarch. in
Aristid.

Fulvia cursing it, and spitting upon it, pulled out the tongue (which all ages have admired) out of the mouth, and pricked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin; to shew that malice would ever do mischief to a man in his noblest and highest treasure: as we see in that desperate Italian, who having his enemy in his mercy, first made him (in hope to escape) to renounce his Religion and Salvation, and then presently slew him; that, as far as was in his power, he might kill his soul, as well as his body.

But yet further: *Hatred* doth not content it self to be *Cruel* to the person hated, but runneth over from him unto others that have any relation to him, though never so innocent: As we see in *Haman*, who though onely displeased with the neglect of *Mordecai*, thought scorn to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruine of all the Jews. And it is noted by Historians, that when *Sejanus* fell, the storm lighted on his Family and friends, as well as on himself: as is also observed in the punishment of the Conspiracy against *Nero*, detected by *Millicus*. And *Themistocles* (though innocent) was like to have suffered in a crimination of Treason, onely for being a friend unto *Pausanias*. Yea, so overflowing is this Quality, that it will sometimes strike a friend rather then not reach an enemy. It was a wicked profession of *Darius*, *Pereat cum inimico amicus*, Let my friend rather perish with mine enemy, then mine enemy escape by my friend. And hence it is observed of *Aristides*, that he was wont to propose

pose such advices as he knew did conduce unto
publike weal by some other men, and not from
himself, lest *Themistocles*, out of hatred of his
person, should have withstood and impeded
a general good. But *Ajax* in the Poet went
yet higher.

Εὐχόμενος ὀλέσσει
τέλος θάνομι κ' αὐτός.

*So I may slay mine Enemy,
Let the same ruine swallow me.*

Sophoc. in Ajax.

And the principal reasons of this overflowing
of *Hatred*, are *Fear* and *Cowardice*: for he who ha-
teth the Father, and sheweth cruelty unto him,
doth usually fear the Son, lest he rise up in his
Father's quarrel: And hence is that Maxime of
cruel policy:

*Forsan futurus
ulcor exinēdi
patris. Senec.
Tross.*

Νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κλέων, παῖδας καταλέπει.

*That man's unwise, who doth the Father slay,
And leaves the Sons, his quarrel to repay.*

*Stasianus apud
Clem. Alex.
Strom. 6.*

For we know *Orestes* revenged his Father's
quarrel and blood upon *Aegisthus*.

*Hom. Odysf. γ.
307.
Odiū etiam ti-
mor spirat. Terr.
Apol. c. 26.
Ulcus animi ex
mollitie nasci
consuetum.
Ann. Marc. l. 27.
Et Arist. Rhet.
lib. 2.*

And besides, *Cruelty* doth usually proceed
from *Cowardice*, as *Amianus Marcellinus* hath ob-
served; and fearful men, when they have any ad-
vantage to be cruel, do seldom hold any mea-
sure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave
any

Senec. de Ira,
lib. 1. c. 13.

Maxime mori-
feri esse solent
morsus morien-
tium bestiarum.
Florus, l. 2. c. 15

Suet. Tiber. c. 61

Tacit. Annal. l. 5.

Pet. Crinit.
lib. 7. c. 13.

any fire unquenched, that themselves shall be burned with it. And therefore we never read of any Emperours which were more cruel, then those who were most fearful and effeminate; as *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, &c. As they say that wounded beasts, when they die, bite hardest; their fear and despair making them furious: So there is no Wrath or Cruelty to that which proceeds from *Weaknesse*, when it hath either jealousy, or advantage, or despair, to set it on. Yea, so violent it is, that it hath transported men unto *profanesse*, and made them violate Nature and Religion. As we see in the cruelty of *Tiberius* towards the family of *Sejanus*, who, because it was an unheard and prodigious thing for a little tender Virgin to be strangled, gave command that the daughter of that late Favourite, should first be deflowred, that so she might be the fitter to be slain. And *Boniface* the eighth Pope of that name, being, according to the Ceremony of that Church, on Ashwednesday to sprinkle ashes on the heads of such Bishops as kneeled at his feet, and in some serious manner to minde them of their mortalities; when *Prochetus* Bishop of *Geneva*, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himself at his feet to receive this Ceremony, he threw the Ashes in his eyes, with this benediction, *A Gibelline thou art, and as a Gibelline thou shalt die: so powerful was his malice, to profane the rites of his Religion! Yea, so far wil hatred proceed in this desperate contempt of God, that, if we may believe so prodigious a villany,*

lany, it hath somtimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a cup of poyson: as it is reported of Pope *Victor* the third, that he was poysoned in the Chalice at the Communion. Neither have there been wanting Examples of desperate men, who have made the most holy parts of Religion, Vowes, and Sacraments, the Seales and Pledges of their conspiracies in Malice: as once *Cataline* and his associates did animate themselves in their bloody purposes, with drinking the blood of a slaine Childe.

Now of all *Hatreds*, there are none more furious and unnaturall then those which arise out of contrarieties in *Religion*; because as a Stone, the higher the place is from whence it falls, doth give the more dangerous blow: no wound's somortall, as that of a Thunderbolt: so of all other those *Hatreds* which make pretences unto Heaven, and which arise from motives of the highest Nature, are ever most desperate and mortall. And therefore our Saviour tels us, that in this case men would forget all the bonds or naturall Obligati on; insomuch that the *Father would deliver his owne Childe, and the Children their Parents unto death.* As we finde that the bloody Hatred of *Cain* against *Abel* arose from the different acceptance of their Sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow excessive, which hath Zeale to kindle it, and pretence of *Religion* to warrant it: For when that which should restraine and set limits to a Passion, is made a party to ingage it and fewell to foment it, no wonder if a Passion

X

which

*Martin. apud
Florin. in vit.
Pont. 3.*

*Salust in Cat.
Florus lib. 4.
Dien. lib. 37.
Plut. in licen.
& in Publicola.*

*Modum tenere
in eo difficile est
quod bonum
esse crediderunt.
Senec. Ep. 23.
Plut. de Isid. &
Osiod. Invenal.*

which hath no bounds from Religion, do impose none upon it selfe. And this occasion of mutuall *Hatred*, we finde observed even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one Towne would kill and eat the flesh of another in zeale to the Sheep, or Calves, or Dragons, which they did severally worship.

— *Summus utriq;
Inde furor vulgo quod Numina vicinorum
Od: d uterq; locus.*

bate :

This caus'd their rage, this made their great de-
One Towne did worship what the next did hate.

*Arist. Rhetor.
lib. 2. cap. 10.
Plut. de Odio
& Invidia.*

*Ælian. de Ani-
mal. lib. 3. c. 7.
lib. 4. c. 18.*

Another dangerous effect of *Hatred* is *Envy* and *Malignitie* at the sight of anothers happinesse; and therefore *Envy* is called an *Evill Eye*, because all the diseases of the *Eye* make it offended with any thing that is light and shineth; as Vermine doe ever devour the purest Corne, and Moaths eat into the finest Cloth, and the Cantharides blast the sweetest Flowrs; So doth *Envy* ever gnaw that which is most beautifull in another whom it hateth; and as the Vulture, draweth sicknesse from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rankorous Nature, as of a raw and angry wound, which feelles as great paine in the good of a Chirurgions, as in the ill offices of an Enemies hand; it can equally draw nourishment unto this Passion from the good and ill of whom it hates; yea and commonly greater too from the good then from the ill: For, *Odiorum acrioris causa*

causa quando inique: When *Hatred* is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiseth it self the higher. And the reason is, because in Passions of this Nature, the lesse we have from the Object, the more we have from our selves; and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom we hate, is supplied by the rising of our own stomacke: as we see in the body that thin and empty nourishment will more often swell it then that which is substantiall.

And therefore I thinke there are not any Examples of more implacable *Hatred*, then those that are by *Envy* grounded on *Merit*. As *Tacitus* observes between the passages of *Domitian* and *Agricola*, that nothing did so much strengthen the Emperours hatred against that worthy Man, as the generall report of his honorable behaviour and actions in those military services, wherein he had been employed. And the same likewise he intimates in the affections of *Tiberius* and *Piso* towards *Germanicus*.

Tacitus.

It is wisely therefore observed by the Historian, That men of vast and various employments, have usually the unhappinesse of *Envy* attending them, which therefore they have sometimes declined by retyring and withdrawing themselves from continuall addresses, as a wise mariner, who (as he spake) doth *aliquantulum remittere Clavum ob magnam fluctus vim*. And thus we finde the honour which *David* merits procured him, was the foundation of that implacable *Hatred* of *Saul* towards him. for as in naturall mo-

Plutar. lib. de Rep. gerenda.

tion, that which comes from the farthest extreme, is most swift and violent: so in the motions of the Minde, the further off we fetch the reason of our *Hatred*, the more venomous and implacable it is.

And here we may observe the mutuall and interchangeable services, which corrupt affections exercise amongst themselves: For as Philosophy observes in the generation of those cold Meteors which are drawne to the middle region of the Aire, they are first by the coldnesse of the place congealed, and afterward doe by the like impressions fortify and intend the same quality in the Region: so here *Hatred* first generates *Envy*; and this againe doth reciprocally encrease *Hatred* and both joyne in mischeife. So much the more hurtful to the Soule, wherein they are, then to the Enemy whom they respect, by how much they are more near and inward thereunto: for certainly a malignant humour doth most hurt where it harbourerh.

From this followeth another evill Effect, which I will but name, being of the same Nature with *Envy*; and it is that which Philosophers call *Επιχαρεια*, a rejoycing at the calamity of him whom wee hate, a quality like that of those who are reported to have * been nourished with poyson. For as in Love there is a mutuall partaking of the same Ioyes and Sorrowes (for where the will and affections are one, the senses are in some sort likewise) so *Hatred* ever worketh contrarietie of affections: That which worketh

Griefe

Επιχαρεια
ἡδονὴ ἐν ἀλ-

λοποιῶν κακοῖς.

Laer. in Zen.

lib. 7.

Plutarch. de

Curiosit.

Arist. Ethic.

lib. 2. cap. 7.

Mag. Mor.

cap. 28.

Prov. 17. 5.

24. 17.

* Caelius Rhod.

Antiq. lell.

lib. 6. cap. 35.

Griefe unto the one, doth worke Joy unto the other. And therefore *Thales* being asked how a Man might be cheerfull and beare up in afflictions, answered: If he can see his enemies in worse case then himselfe. The Poet hath given us the Character of such kinde of Men :

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

Pectora felle virent, Lingua est suffusa veneno :
Risus abest, nisi quem visi fecere Doloris.

(nome flow :

Their breasts with gall, their tongues with ve-
 They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.

And therefore they are elegantly compared by the Philosopher unto Cupping Glasses, which draw only the vicious humors of the body unto them; and unto Flies that are overcome with the spirits of Wine, but nourished with the froth. Like thote Wormes which receive their Life from the corruption of the Dead; and surely, the Prince of Devils may well have his Name given him from * Flies, because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of Men, as Flies ever resort unto Sores.

* Beelzebub.
Math. 12. 14.
Beelzebub unus
venit 70.
2. Reg. 1. 3.
A. 1. 1. 1.
apud Pausan.
lib. 5. & Clem.
Alex. in Pro-
trept.
Myiodem vo-
cat Plin. l. 29.
cap. 6.

Another corrupt Effect of *Hatred* is a sinister and crooked suspition, whereby with an envious and criticall Eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpnesse of our owne wits, or the course of our owne behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends as were haply never framed but in the forge of our owne braines: Evill men
 being

being herein like Vultures, which can receive none but a foule Sent. It is attributed amongst one of the noble Attributes of Love, that it *Thinketh none Evill*; and certainly, there is not a fouler quality against Brotherly Love, then that which (for the satisfying of it selfe in but the Imaginary Evill of him whom it disliketh) will venture to finde out in every action some close impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart: like him in the Philosopher, who thought where ever he went, that he saw his owne Picture walk before him. And therefore we see how *Agrippina* when she would not discover any shew of *Feare* or *Hatred* towards her Sonne *Nero*, who had at the first plotted her death on the Sea; and that fayling, sent the second time *Anicetus* the Centurion to make sure worke, did in both these practices decline all shew of suspicion, and not acknowledge either the Engine or the Murther to be directed by him. *Solum Insidiarum remedium aspiciens, si non intelligerentur.* Supposing the onely remedies of these plots to be, if she seemed not to understand them. For ill meanings do not love to be found out; As the same Historian telleth us of *Tiberius*, *Acrius accipit recludi quæ premeret*: He hated that man who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked *Suspition* which is not rooted in *Hatred*. For as to thinke the worst of our owne Actions, is a signe of *Hatred* to our sinnes (for I thinke no man loves his sinnes who dares search them:) so

con.

*Tacit. Annal.
lib. 34.*

contrariwise to have an humour of casting the worst glosses upon the Actions of another Man, where there is no palpable dissimulation, argues as great a want of Love. We search for Evill in our selves to *expell* it; but we search for evill in another to *finde* it. There is scarce a more hatefull quality in the eyes of God or Man, then that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuse him.

Another Effect which proceedeth from corrupt *Hatred*, is proud and insolent carriage, whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilifie the Merit of a person. For though the Apostle hath in this respect of Pride and Swelling, opposed Knowledge unto Love: *Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth*; yet the opposition holdeth not there onely: For there is *Tumor Cordis*, as well as *Tumor Cerebri*; as well a stubborne as a learned Pride; a Pride against the Person; as against the weaknesse of our Brother; a Pride whereby we will not stoope to a yeelding and reconciliation with him, as whereby we will not stoope to the Capacitie and Edification of him; that is the swelling of Malice, and this of Knowledge. And hence it is that *Hatred* (as *Aristotle* hath excellently observed) when it is simple and alone (though that seldome fall out) is without the admixtion of any Griefe. And the reason I take it is, because Griefe is either for the Evill of another, and so it is ever the Effect of Love; or for the Evill which lyeth upon our selves, and so is the cause of Humi-

Rhet. l. 2. c. 4.

Humilitie; neither of which are agreeable with Hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in it selfe some worth and excellency, by which it is drawn to a Contempt and Insolence towards another Man. And therefore as it was Pride in Men and Angels, which wrought the first Hatred between God and them; so the most proper and unseparable Effect of this hatred ever since is Pride.

Prot. 10, 12.

The last Corruption of this Passion is *Impatience*, *Contention* and *Fury*, as the wise Man telleth us, *Hatred stirrth up strife*. And therefore that worthy Effect of Love, which is contrary to this of Hatred, is called *Μακροθυμία*, and *Longanimitas*, Long suffering, to signifie some length, distance, and remotion between a Mans Mind and his Passion. But Hatred, being of a fierce Nature, is so farre from admitting any Peace, or yeelding to conditions of parley, that (as hath been observed out of *Aristotle*) it rests not satisfied with the Misery, but desires (if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an Enemy.

CHAP.

C H A P. XVI.

Of the Affection of Desire. What it is. The severall kinds of it, Naturall, Rationall, Spirituall. Intemperate, Unnaturall, Morbid Desires. The Object of them Good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most Generall Internall cause Vacuity, Indigence. Other Causes, Admiration, Greatnesse of minde, Curiosity.



THE next Passions in order of Nature to these two are *Desire* and *Abomination*, which because they differ not much otherwise from Love and Hatred, then the Act from the Habit, or then a man sitting from himselfe walking, Desire being but the motion, and exercise, as delight is the Quiet and Repose of our Love, I shall therefore the more breifly passe it over. *Desire* is the wing of the soule whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the *Eagle to the Carkeise* in the Scripture proves, to feed it selfe upon it, and to be satisfied with it. For as the Appetite of the Eagle is attended with sharpnesse of sight to discover its prey, with swiftnesse of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon

Y

it :

*Joh. 39.30.
Matth. 24.28.
Habac. 1.8.*

Plutar. Nat.
Quest. cap. 26.

Rom. 7. 18, 19.
Josh. 21. 17.

Neh. 1. 11.
Isa. 26. 8.
Phil. 3. 20.

it : So according to the proportion of the Soule's love unto its object, doth it command and call together both the Wisedome and Powers of the whole man to direct unto, and to promote the procuring of it. And the very best characters and truest lineaments which can be drawne of the mindes of men, are to be taken from their *Desires*, rather then from their *Practices*. As Physitians often judge of the Diseases of sick men by their Appetites. Ill men dare not doe so much evill as they desire, for feare of shame or punishment : Good men cannot doe so much good as they desire, for want of Power and Provisions of vertue. Besides, *Practises* may be over-ruled by ends, but *Desires* are alwayes genuine and naturall ; for no man can be constrained to will that which hee doth not love : And therefore in the Scripture good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections, and the inward longings of their soules after him, as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of Love. and such as have least Proximity and danger of infection from forreigne and secular ends. Saint Paul himselfe was much better at *willing*, then at *performing* ; and Saint Peter, who failed in his promise of *Doing*, dares appeale to Christs owne Omiscience for the truth of his *Loving*. What ever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soule, that it *desires to feare God's Name*, and according to the prevalency of that Affection, hath its conversation in heaven too. In which regard *Christ* is called

led the *Desire of all Nations*, both because where he is he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth by his grace most fully answer and satisfie all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Roman Emperours, *Neminem unquam dimisit tristem*, he never sends any discontented out of his presence.

The desires of the Soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection which belong unto man, *Naturall, Rationall, Spirituall*.

Naturall Desires respect τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, things of simple *Necessity* to the Being, Preservation, and integrity of Nature, as the *desires* which things have to their proper nourishment and place, *ad conservationem individui*, for preserving themselves, and to propagation, and increase *ad conservationem speciei*, for preserving of their kind.

Rationall Desires are such as respect ἀρετὰ καὶ αὐτὰ, such things as are *Elegible* in themselves, and the proper objects of *right Reason*; such as *Felicity*, the common *End* of all rational Appetitions; *Virtue*, the *Way*; and *Externall good things*, as Health, Strength, Credit, Dignity, Prosperity, the *Ornaments* of humane life.

Spirituall Desires respect τὰ ἑπερῶνα, τὰ πνευματικά, τὰ εἰς τὸ θεῖον, heavenly and spirituall things, the *things of God*, *Things which are above*, The knowledge whereof we have not by Philosophicall, but by Apostolicall discovery, by the *Spirit of God*, who only searcheth the deep things of God.

Hag. 2. 9.
John 12. 32.
Psal. 107. 6.

Arist. Ethic.
lib. 7. cap. 6.

Heb. 9. 23.
1 Cor. 3. 13.
Col. 3. 1.

Pro. 31. 6.
 1 Tim. 5. 23.
 Psal. 104. 15.
 * Vid. voc. lib.
 4. cap. 18.
 Euseb. l. 4. c. 38.
 lib. 5. c. 17.
 Iren. l. 1. cap. 34.
 Tertul. advers.
 Psychic. c. 15.
 Epph. To. 2. l. 1.
 Vid. Gub. Sinc.
 Antiq. Comm.
 lib. 3. cap. 7. 8.
 Clem. Al. pad.
 lib. 2. c. 1. 2.
 Hieron. l. 2. adv.
 Jovinian.

Megareses ob.
 sonant, quasi cra-
 stina die moritu-
 ri, Tert. Apol.
 cap. 39.

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

The *Corrupt Desires* contrary unto these are ei-
 ther *Vitious* or *Morbid*. *Vitious* are againe of two
 sorts: First, *Intemperate* and incontinent Desires,
 which erre not in the substance or nature of the
 thing desired; but only *εν τη ποσὶ*, as the Philosopher
 speaks, in the *measure* and *manner* of desiring
 them. It is Lawfull to drinke Wine, and a Man
 may erre (as *Timothy* did) in an over * rigorous se-
 verity to Nature, when health or needfull refresh-
 ment requireth it: For our flesh is to be subdued
 to reason, not to *infirmities*, that it may be a *servant*
 to the Soule, but not a *burden*. But if we let Wine
 bee *ἐν ὁσέως*, as the Heathen called it, to take a
 freedome against us, like *Cham* to mocke us, and
 discover our nakednes, and make us servants unto
 it; If we doe not only *eat* Hony, but *surfet* on it;
 If we must have meat like Israel in the Wilder-
 nesse, not only for our *Need* but for our *Lust*; If
 we eat and drink so long that we are good for no-
 thing, but either to lye down and sleep, or to rise
 up and play, to live to day and to dye to morrow;
 If we make our belly the grave of our Soule, and
 the dungeon of our Reason, and let our *Intestina* as
 well morally as naturally farre exceed the length
 of the whole Man besides; This is in the Apo-
 stles phrase to be *lovers of pleasure rather then lo-
 vers of God*, and it is an intemperate excesse a-
 gainst natural desires which will ever end in pain.
 It was a witty speech of *Anacharsis* the Philoso-
 pher, that the Vine beareth three sorts of Grapes:
 The first of *Delight*: The second of *Excesse*: The
 third of *Sorrow*. If we let our *Delights* steale us
 into

into *Excesse*, and become a mocker, our *Excesse* will quickly betray us unto *Sorrow* (as *Dalilah* did *Samson* to the *Philistines*) and let us know that after Wine hath mocked it can rage too. Like the head of the *Polypus*, which is sweet to the Palate, but after causeth troublesome sleeps and frightfull dreames.

Prov. 20. 1.
Plut. de Audi-
tione.

Secondly there are brutish and *unnaturall Desires*, which the Philosopher calleth *συνεστικαι*, *ferine* and inhumane, instancing in those barbarous Countries, where they use to eat mens flesh and raw meat; and in the Woman who ripped up Women with child that shee might eat their youngones: Unto which head I refer those which the Apostles calls *παιδις ἀνθρώπων*, and *παιδις ἐμπορίας*, *vile and dishonorable Affections and Passions of Lust* wherein forsaking the guidance of Nature, they dishonored their bodies amongst themselves, and gave themselves over, as *S. Iude* speaketh unto *strange flesh*; also incestuous and promiscuous Lusts, going with naked and painted Bodies, as the antient Brittaines offering of men and children in sacrifices, eating of the bodies of Friends that dyed, burning of the living with the dead, and other like savage and barbarous practices, wherein we finde how farre naturall corruption improved with ignorance and want of Education or Religion, can embase the manners of Men.

Ethic. 1. 7. c. 6.

Rom. 1. 26.
1 Thess. 4. 5.
Jud. ver. 7.
Vid. Euseb. de
prep. Evang.
lib. 1. c. 4.
Hieron. lib. 2.
cont. Iovin.

Theod. Serm. 9.
de Legib.
Cael. Rodigin.
Amig. lib. 10.
cap. 21. 28.
Plin. l. 5. c. 17,
30. & l. 7. c. 2.

Lastly, there are *morbid Desires*, growing out of some distemper of Mind or Body, called by the Philosopher *νοσηρια καὶ ἀσθενήματα* as those of children, which

Ethic. l. 7. c. 6.

Cael. Rodig. lib.

3. cap. 15.

Vid. Stephan. &

Gorream in vo-

ce κλαρα.

De bono & ju-

cundo, vid. Phi-

losoph. Rhet. l. 1.

Gen. 3. 6.

ἡ πορνεία ὅτι

καλὰ τῷ ὁμι-

ζεύματι κινεῖ.

Damascen de or-

thodox. Fæd. l. 2.

cap. 22.

eat coales or dirt, and the strange and depraved longings of women with child, called *κλαρα*, or *Pica*, from the Bird of that name, because the inconstant and various appetences of Nature, so misguided by vitious humours, is well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers in that Bird.

Having considered the severall kindes both of regular and corrupt *Desires*: I shall content myself with a very brief inquiry into the causes and effects of this Passion.

The causes moving it are *Externall*, *ex parte objecti*, in the object; or *Internall*, *ex parte subjecti*, in the minde. The *Object* is any thing apprehended *sub ratione Boni & Fucundi*, as good and pleasant. For upon those inducements did Satan first stirre the desire of Eve towards the forbidden fruit. *Shee saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye.*

Now the Qualification of these to distinguish the formall reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are objects of our love, is first that they be *possible*: For *Desire* being the motion and indeavour of the Soule towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would be *motus in Vacuo*, like that of *Noah's Dove*, that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whet-stone, and wheele of industry; if that faile, how ever a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty *Velleities*, and imaginary wishes, he can never put forth

to improvement, and further degrees of them : as many times a man hath a better stomach to his meat after he hath begun to eat, then when he first sate down unto it. Againe, things *present* may be the Object of our *Desires* unto *Continuance*, as he that delighteth in a good which he hath, desireth the continuance of that Delight. And therefore *Life*, even while it is possessed it is desired, because the possession of it doth not cause the Appetite to nauseate or surfet upon it. Few men there are who desire not old Age, not as it is old Age, and importeth decay, decrepidnesse, and defects of Nature : For a young man doth not desire to be old now ; but as it implyeth the longer and fuller possession of Life : For a man being conscious to himself, first of his own insufficiency to make himself happy from and within himself ; and next of the immortality of his Nature : as upon the former reason he is busied in sending abroad his *Desires* (as the Purveyors and Caterers of the Soule) to bring in such things as may promote *perfection* : so those very *Desires* having succeeded do far her endeavour the satisfaction of Nature, by moving towards the *Perpetuity* of what they have procured. It was a fordid and brutish wish of *Philoenus* in the Philosopher, who wished that he had the throat of a Crane or Vulture, that the pleasure of his taste might last the longer (it being the wisdom of Nature, intending the chiefe perfections of Man to his Soule, to make his bodily Pleasures the shorter.) But surely the Soule of Man having a reach

Arist. Ethic.
lib. 3. cap. 13.
Idem lib. 3. c. 3.
Problem.
¶ 28. quest. 7.
Suidas in *Phil-*
loenum.
Ælian. var. hist.
lib. 10. cap. 9.
Τοιαῦτα δὲ
ποτεῖσθαι ἐφύ-
δια ἂν καὶ ψα-
γύρας ἐν γυ-
ναίκεσσι.
Dlog. Laert. in
Anuipben. l. 6.

as farre as Immortality may justly desire, as well the *Perpetuity* as the presence of those good things wherein standeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counsell of *An-tisthenes* the Philosopher, That a man should lay up such provisions, as in a Shipwracke might swimme out with him such treasure as will passe and bee currant in another World, and will follow us thither, which as the Apostle speaks, *is to lay up a good foundation against the time to come.*

The *Internall Causes* moving *Desire*, in regard of the subject or minde of man, may be different according to the different kinds of Desires spoken of before. The most generall which respecteth them all is a *Facuity*, *Indigence*, and self-insufficiency of the Soule: For having not within it selfe enough either to preserve it or to content it, it is forced to goe out of it selfe for supplies, for wheresoever God hath implanted sensitive and ratiōall affections, he hath been pleased to carry them from themselves, and to direct them abroad for their satisfaction: by that means preserving the Soule in humility, and leading it as by Degrees up unto himselfe. Every creature though it have its life in its own possession; yet the preservation of it, it fetcheth from some things without. The excellentest Creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nourishment, and for their knowledge. And therefore of all graces, God hath chosen *faith & repentance*, and the chief means of carrying us to him, because these two doe most

Z

carry

διανοητικὴ τῆς
ἐνδοτικῆς φύσεως
ἐνδοτικὴ.
Arist. Ethic.
lib. 3. cap. 11.
ἐκ τῆς ἐνδοτικῆς
ἐνδοτικὴ.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. 1. 17.

Si quid deerit
id nobis petie-
rimus. Sen. Epi.
119. Vid. Plut.
de Curiosit.
Cælius Rhodig.
lib. 14. cap. 7.

Judg. 9. 9. 15.

Job. 7. 1. 2. 3.

and desire
to know
the things
of the
world
Arifi. de Gene-
ratio Anima.
lib. 4. cap. 4.

carry us out of our selves, and most acquaint us with our insufficiencies, *Repentance* teaching a man to abhor himself; & *Faith* to deny himselfe.

Now because *Emptinesse* is the cause of *Appetence*, we shall hereupon finde, that the fullest and most contented men, are ever freest from vaste desires. The more the mind of any man is in *weight*, the more it is in *rest* too. As they say that in Rivers, ships goe slower in the Winter, but withall they carry the greater burdens: So many times men of lesse urgent and importunate Appetitions and motions of minde, are more furnished and better ballanced within. In *Forham's* Parable the Bramble was more ambitious than the Vine, or the Olive. And the Vine we see which is of all other *Arbor Desiderii*, the Tree of Desire, is weakest and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore wee shall finde that mens Desires are strongest when their constitutions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as wee see in servants that labour, women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and miscellany of Desires. Thus wee see little children will reach at every thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of internall furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavie things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming Appetitions are usually the signes either of a childish or a sicke Temper of minde; as the Naturalists observe that the least creatures are the greatest breeders, a Mouse bringeth

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bringeth more young ones than an Elephant.

Onely here wee must distinguish both of contentment and of Desires. There may bee a double *Contentment*, the one arising out of *sluggishnesse* and narrownesse of minde; when men out of an unwillingnesse to put themselves to the paines of gaining more, rest satisfied with what they have, and had rather have a poore quiet than a Treasure with labour. As they say of the Fig-tree, though it be least beautifull of other Trees (for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withall it is free from Thunder. And as the Historian said of some men that they are *solâ socordia Innocentes*, doe men no hurt only because it would cost them paines to doe it: so may wee of these, that they are beholding to their torpid and sluggish constitution, for the contentment which they profess to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate desires, but onely lay them asleepe, as even an hungry man when he sleepeth, hath his hunger sleepe with him.

Another contentment there is arising out of *Wisedome* and practicall learning (as the Apostle tells us, that it is a matter of learning to be contented) when the heart being established and made steady with grace and solid materials within, as a Ship with ballast, is lesse tossed with lower affections: as *Saul* cared not for his Asses when he heard of a Kingdome.

— *Grata post munus arista*
Contingunt homines veteris fastidia quersus.

Z 2

When

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*Vitam, non
quomodo volu-
sed quomodo
Caperunt. Sen-
de Tran. cap. 2.
Plus. Sympos. lib
5. quest. 9.*

Tacit.

*Phil. 4. 11. 12.
Heb. 13. 9.
Nauis, labens
curuae iusto sine
pondere naues;
Perq, mare in-
stabiles nimis
levitate ferun-
tur.
Ov. Met. lib. 3.
Juven. Sat. 14.
Plin. L. 7. c. 16.
Stuck. J. 2. c. 8.
fol. 165.*

When men had once discover'd better corne,
They loath'd their maske & soakeh bread did scorn.

And this kinde of contentment doth not stupifie
loose Desires, but change them, as the Cats *Vnum*
magnum was more worth to her than all the vari-
ety of shifts which the Foxe did boast of, and one
Sunne doth more comfort us in the day, than ma-
ny thousand Starres in the night.

Againe, Desires are either of things *excellent*,
as the vertuous and spirituall desires of the Soule
whereby men move towards God; and these doe
neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much ra-
ther open and enlarge it for more. No man was
so well acquainted with God as *Moses*, who yet
was the more importunate to know him better, *I*
beseech thee shew me thy glory, nor any man more
acquainted with Christ than Saint *Paul*, who yet
desired *to be dissolved and to be with Christ* neerer.

Other Desires are of *middle things* *in medio* as
the Philosopher calls them; such as Wealth,
Profit, Victory, Honour, which are not good in
themselves, but as they are managed. And these
Desires though not extinguished, yet are very
much asswaged, and moderated by the weight
and wisdom of solid contentment. He was the
wisest man then alive, and who knew all the
quintessence, and what ever was desireable in the
Creature, who said *Da mihi panem Statuti mei*,
Give me the Bread of my Allowance; *ut in me sit* *ut in me*
ut in me so much as the quality of my place
and

Plut. de Solert.
Animal.

Sapiens est di-
vitiarum natu-
ralium Quali-
tor accetrimus
Sen. Epist. 119.

Exo. l. 33. 18.

Phil. 1. 23.

Arist. Ethic.
lib. 7. cap. 6.

Prov. 30. 8.

Theophylact.

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and state requireth, which is that which our Saviour limiteth our desires unto, *αἰσος, ὀρέσος & ὀμνισμένη* our portion and *dimensum*, *ἰσχυρὸς & ἰσχυρὸς* in Saint James, *dayly food*, and was pleased to answer that wise King in that his request, and to give us a record and Catalogue of his dayly bread.

Another cause of Desire may bee *Admiration*; A strange thing though monstrous and deformed calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a marvellous *Lenocinium*, and inticer of Desire, *αἰσθητικὴ νύξ, ὑβερνα ροσά* as the Panegyrist spake, Snow in the Summer and Roses in Winter; the Birds of this Country, and the Roots of another; dainties hardly procured without the shipwracks of men, to feed the gluttony rather of the eye than of the belly; these are the delights of the curiosities of men. The same fruits when they are worse but rarer, have a farre greater value set upon them, then when expos'd by their commonnes unto every mans purchase, And it was a wise complaint of old *Cato*; That it went ill with the City when a Fish was sold for more then an Oxe. We see Desires do not put forth themselves more freely in any then in Children, I thinke the chiefe Reason of it is the same which the Philosopher giveth of their memories, because every thing to them is new and strange, for strange things as they make stronger impressions upon the *Receptive*, so they doe upon the *Appetitive* faculties. And therefore we find *Herod* who cared nothing at all for the Doctrine of Christ, because it was holy and divine, had yet a great

ἰσχυρὸς ἰσχυρὸς
Suidas.

Luke 12.42.

James 2.15.

Job.23.12.

1 Reg.4.22.

Vide *Waler*.

de mensura;

lib.2. cap. 3.

& Angel *Cani-*

nium de pane

quotid. ad cal-

cem instir.

Syria. Stuck.

Convival.

lib.1. cap. 22.

Plut. *Apoth.*

Rhet. lib.2.

Luke 23.8.

Aristippus Athe-
nas navigavit
Socratem inu-
sum *Plut.* de
Curios. 1. Reg.
 10. *Plato* *Egyp-*
tum *Italiam*,
Siciliam petijt
Philosophia
caus. *Vid.*
Theod. *Orat.* 1.
De fide. 2. 1. 8
Gracia *Ipseus*.
Aristid. *Tom.* 3.
Orat. de pace
poster. *Gracia*,
Grecia.
Thucydides
vide *Cat.* *Rhod.*
 1. 10. c. 27.
Acts 17. 21.

Plut. in *Solon*,
& de Curios.
& lib. 1. *Cod.*
que res *expor-*
tari *non* *debet.*

Aristid. *Tom.* 3.
Orat. 2.
Alins *Spart.*
in *piscen.* *Nig.*

Desire to have seene his miracles, because they were wonderfull. And Men have travelled farre to see those persons and things, the same whereof they have before admired, strange Learning, strange Birds and Beasts, strange Flowres and Roots, strange Fashions; yea, strange Sinnes too (which is the curiositie and corruption of Nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation among Men. *Nero* gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even *Solomons* ships, besides substantiall Treasure, did bring home Apes and Peacocks. Athens which was the eye, the floure, and Epitome of Greece (to shew that this curiosity is the disease as well of Wits, as of Childhood) spent all their time and study in inquiring after new things. And for this cause it is (as I conceive) That wise Men have made Lawes to interdict the transporting of their country Fruites into other places, least the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to bee Masters of the Countries where they grew, as we see the Grapes and Figges of *Canaan* were used as Incentives unto the expedition of *Israel*. and hence *Plutarch* telleth us that the Word Sy-cophant is derived to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figges into other Countries. As on the other side we read that the Athenians set up a Pillar, wherein they published him to bee an Enemy of the City, who should bring Gold out of *Media*, as an Instrument to corrupt them. And the *Romane* Governour commanded his souldiers

souldiers that they should not carry any Gold or Silver into the Field with them, lest thereby they should be looked on by the Adversary, as the Persians by Alexander, rather as a prey than a foe.

A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting Desires, is *height and greatnesse of minde*, which cannot well set bounds of measure unto it selfe. as Seneca said in another sence, *Magnitudo non habet certum modum*. Great minds have great ends, and those can never be advanced but with vast and various Desires. A great Ship will not be carried with the Saile of a Lyter. Nor can an Eagle fle with the wings of a Sparrow. Alexander was not so great in his Victories as in his Desires, whom one World could not satisfie: nor Pompey in his Triumphs, as in his Ambition, to whom it was not enough to be Great, except he might be the Greatest.

Another cause of Desires may be Curiosity, which is nothing else but a desire of prying into, and listning after the businesses of other Men, which is called by Solomon, *Ambulatio Anima*: The walking up and downe of the Soule, as he elswhere telleth us, that the *Eyes of a Foole are in the ends of the Earth*: Such a Man being like the Witches which Plutarch speaks of, that weare Eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home: Or like the Falconers Hawkes that are hooded in the House, and never suffered to use their Eyes but to the hurt of other Birds: like

Epist. 43.

Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi. Vt Gyara inclusus scopulis, &c. Juv. Satyr. 10. Sen. de Benefic. l. 7. c. 2. p. 94. & 119. Eccles. 6. 9. Prov. 17. 24.

Plut. de Cur.

Hoc se quisq. modo semper fugit. Lucet. apud Sen. de tranquill. 6. 3.

Non horam te-
cum esse potes,
non ora recte
ponere, &c. |
Horat.

1. Reg. 6. 4.

like a man in a Dungeon, that sees nothing where he is; but can see a great deale of light abroad at a little passage. So these kind of Men have vast desires of Forreigne knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves. As they say of a Swine, that he looks every way but *upward*: so we may of Pragmatists, that their Eyes looke all wayes but *inward*. Whereas the mindes of prudent Men are like the Windowes of *Solomons* Temple, broader inward than outward. As the Pillar that went before Israel in the Sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the darke towards *Pharaoh*: Or as the Sunne in an Eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it be darkned. A wise mans Eyes are in his head, whereas a Foole hath *in imaginis*: as it is in the *Proverbs*, his minde in his heeles only to wander and gad abroad.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of other causes of Desire, Infirmary, Temerity, Mutability of Mind, Knowledge, Repentance, Hope. Of the effects of it in general, Labour, Languor. In special, of Rational Desires, Bounty, Grief, Weariness, Indignation against that which withstands it. Of Vicious Desires, Deception, Ingratitude, Envy, Greedinesse, Baseness of Resolution.



Ther causes of desires are *Infirmary*, *Rashnes*, and *Mutability of Mind*. Which three I put in one, as having a neer Relation & dependance within themselves. For commonly impotent Appetitions as those of Children, of sick, of incontinent Persons, are both *Temerarious* in precipitating the Mind, and anticipating the dictates of reason which should regulate or restrain them: as also mutable and wandering like the Bee from one flower to another: *Infirmary* not suffering a man to hold fast his decrees, and *Temerity* not suffering him to resolve on any: & lastly, *Mutability* making him weary of those things which weaknes and rashnesse had unad-

A a

visedly

Ἀκροαίης τὸ
μεν ἀποπτεῖν
τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατα οἱ
ἰδοὺ τὸ βουλευσά-
μενοι οὐκ ἐμμε-
νουν οἷς ἐβουλευ-
σαντο διὰ τὸ
παθόντες οἱ δὲ διὰ
τὸ μηδὲν βουλευσάδει,
ἀγωντα ὑπὸ τοῖς
παθεῖς. *Arist.*
Ethic. lib. 7. c. 8.

Maximum in-
diciu est male
mentis fluctua-
tio Sen. Ep. 120.
vid ep. 10. & de
Tranq. cap. 2.
ὡς ποτὶ πῦρος
καίεται, ἐπ' ὕ-
δατος, ἀεὶ χει-
ρὸς δὲ κατὰ ἐξ-
πύρρος.
Aristid. Tom 2.
Orat. 1.
Vid. etiam Pla-
tarch. de Tran-
quillit. Iliad. ω.

Lucret. lib. 3.
Factor, Crucior,
agitor, stimulo,
versor in amoris
rota, miser exa-
nimor, feror, dif-
feror, distrahor,
deripior, ita nul-
lam mentem ani-
mi habeo. Ubi
sum, ibi non sum,
ubi non sum ibi
est Animus. Ita
mihi ingenta
sunt, quod luter
non luter jam id
continuo, &c.
Plaut. Cissellar.

visedly transported him unto. *Omnia Imperio-
rum animus in lubrico est*: Weak minds have ever
wavering and unfixed resolutions. Like sickle
and nauseating stomachs, which long for many
things, and can eat none. Like sick bodies, *qua
mutationibus ut remediis utuntur*, as Seneca speaks,
which tossle from side to side, and think by
changing of their place, they can leave their
pain behind them. Like Achilles in the Poet :

Ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλάγας κατὰκείμενος ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
ἵμι & ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνὴς τότε δ' ὄρθεις ἀνίστας.

Now he leans on his side, now supine lies,
Then grow'leth on his face, and strait doth rise.

This sicknesse and Inconstancy of Desires is
thus elegantly described by the old Poet Lu-
cretius :

— *Ut nunc plerumq; videmus;
Quid sibi quisq; velit nescire & querere semper.
Commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit,
Exit saepe foras magnis ex adibus ille,
Esse domi quam pertaesum est subitoq; revertit.
Currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter
Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instet.
Oscitat extemplo tetigit cum limina Villa,
Aut abit in somnum gravis, atque obliuia quarit :
Aut etiam properans Urbem petit, atq; revisit.
Hoc se quisq; modo fugit. At, quod scilicet ut fit,
Effugere hand potis est, ingratis haeret & anget.*

We see how troubled Mortals still enquire,
Yet ne'r can find what 'tis which they desire.

One changeth place, as if he could unload
And leave his weights behind him, runs abroad
Weary of a great Palace; strait turns back,
And hath not found the thing which he did
lack.

Wearied both here and there he mounts his
Scead,
And runs to th' neighbour Town with swifter
speed

Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set,
He gapes and sleeps, and studies to forget
Why he came thither; haply turns his rain,
And to the City posteth back again.
Thus guilty Man doth study how to shun,
And scape himself, but ne' can get it done.
He bears the thing he flies, what he would leave
Unwelcom self unto it self doth cleave,
And cleaving doth torment.——

The more simple, One, and perfect Nature is
(as the Philosopher divinely noteth) the more
it delighteth in one and the same uniform ope-
ration. *Mutability* is not pleasant in it self; but
the delight of it ariseth out of the *pravity* and
defect of Nature.

I might here insist on other more obvious
causes of desire: As,

1. *Knowledge* and experience of the goodnes
of that which we desire: As the Apostle also
telleth us, *That Experience worketh hope*: And we
use to say, *Ignoti nulla Cupido*. A man cannot de-
sire that of which he hath no Apprehension.
Knowledge is Appetites Taster.

A a 2

2. *Sorrow*

*Nihil tam occu-
patum tam mul-
tiforme, tot ac
tam variis moti-
bus concisum ac
laceratum quam
mala mens.*

Quintil. lib. 12.

*c. 1. Non horam
tecum esse potes,
non otia recte*

*Ponere, neque
ipsum vitas su-
gitivus & erro.*
*Horat. Vid. Plu-
tarch de Tranq.*

*ἢ ἡ φύσις ἀπλή-
ρειν, αὐτὴ ἡ αὐτῇ
ἀρετῇ ἡδίστη
ἐστίν. διὸ ὁ θεός
αἰεὶ μέγαν καὶ
ἀπλήν χαίρει
ἡδονῶν.*

*Arist. Ethic.
lib. 7. c. ult.*

Tum denique
omnes nostrā in-
telligimus bona.
Quum quæ in
potestate habui-
mus ea a mis-
mus. *Plant.*

captiv. c. 7. 1. 2.

2 Cor. 7. 11.

αὐτοὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπο-
μενωσὶν ἐν ἐν-
τῇ δαλῶσιν.
Aristipp. apud.
Laert. lib. 2.

2. *Sorrow* and *Repentance* for the Evils we feel, the contrary whereunto we are the more induced to desire. We never desire health so eagerly as when sickness teacheth us to value it: For as in Colours, so in Actions or Affections: contraries do set forth and sharpen one another. And as *Labour Natural* makes a man earnestly desire the shadow, as *Job* speaks: so *Sorrow* which is *Labour Mental*, doth make a man earnestly thirst after that which can remove the thing which begets that sorrow. The Apostle telleth us, *That desire and zeal are the fruits of godly Sorrow.* *David* never panted so earnestly after Gods favour and presence, as when he felt what a griefe it was to be without it: For in this case there is an Apprehension of a double goodnes in the thing we desire, both as perfective unto Nature Indigent, and as medicinal unto Nature wronged.

Lastly, *Hope of speeding in our Desires*: For the stronger any mans persuasions are, the more cheerful and vigorous will be his endeavours to succeed. But I shall content my self with the intimation of these things. And in the next, very briefly to run over some *Effects* and *Consequents* of this Affection: Which are,

1. In regard of *Desires* at large, *Labour* and *Paines*: For they are onely Velleities and not Volitions: half and broken wishes, not whole desires, which are not industrious, but waste away in sluggish and empty speculations. * The Fisherman that will take the Fish, must be contented

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tented to be dashed with the Water. ^b And he that will expect to have his desires answered, must put as well his hands as his prayers unto them :

Ἀφ' οὗτος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐχρὺν αἶμα σῶσαι,
Βίον δ' αὖτ' αἶν ζυγίζον ἀνὰ πόντον.

*Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no pain,
By devout sloth shall never gather gain.*

It was the just reproof of him in the Poet who was upbraided with comming to feasts, but withdrew himself from the labour of other Men. Nature hath often made the roots of those plants bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to teach us that delight is the fruit of labour. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *Desire* is usually accompanied with *Sorrow*.

Again, *Desires* do commonly work a *Languor* and fainting towards the thing desired, if they be either strong or hasty : For Hope deferred maketh the heart sick. As *Ahabs* eager desire of *Naboths* Vineyard, cast him upon his bed. And *David* expresseth his longings towards Gods Law, by the breaking and fainting of his Soul. *Cum expectatio longior est consenescit animus, & debilitatur mens*: Delayed expectation weakeneth and withereth the minds of Men. And therefore the Apostle expresseth strength of Desire by groaning, which is the language of sickness.

2. In regard of *Reasonable* and *Spiritual* Desires. The effects of this affection are :

A 3

I. Large-

b Eurip. Ele-
tra. Plutarch.
Instit. Lacon.
ἐπι μὲν τ' ἐμὸν
ἐντυχέει Νῆψι καὶ
ζῆλῳ ὡς ἡμῶν
&c. Eurip. Rhes.

c Homer. Iliad.
δ 341. 348.
Eurip. Rhes. 325
d Aristot. apud
Laert. lib. 5.

e Arist. Eudem.
lib. 2. cap. 10.
f Prov. 13. 12.
1 Reg. 21. 4.
Pf. 119. 20. 81.
Usque ad agri-
tudinem deside-
ravit. El. Lam-
prid. in Com.
Rom. 8. 22.
2 Cor. 5. 2.

Phil. 3. 8. 9, 10.
 Matth. 13. 45.
 Hag. 2. 6, 7.
 Matth. 2. 11.
 Isa. 60. 5. 17.
 Psal. 68. 29.

Plutarch. in
 Anton.

Nazar. Orat.
 Panegy.

Senec. Epist. 75.
 Ab obice seutor
 ibit. Plutarch.
 Sympof. l. 4.
 A. Gell. l. 3. c. 6.

Tertul. Apolog.
 cap. ult.

1 *Large-heartednes and Liberality.* That which a man earnestly desireth he will give much for, and bestow much upon. As when Christ became the desire of all Nations, they did dedicate all their desireable things unto him, as the *αράματα* and trophies of his merciful triumph over them. One man adorns the Gospel with his power, another with his wit, another with his wealth, another with his wisdom.

Those Abilities of Nature, Art, or Industry, which were before the armour of sin, are then become the spoils of Christ. *Antonius* out of the strength of his desires towards *Cleopatra*, bestowed many Countries upon her.

2. *Grief* for any losse or hazard of the thing desired. As the Sea-mans needle which is jogged and troubled, never leaves moving till it find the North point again. *Flagrantia sunt animi desideria cum solatia perdiderunt*, as the Orator spake. Desires burn hottest when they are in danger of disappointment.

3. *Wearines and Indignation* against any thing which standeth between desire and the fruition of that which is desired. *Rebementior per metus & pericula exhibit* : That which resisteth increaseth it. As a River goes with more strength where it is hindred and withstood. The Church did venture blowes when she sought her Love, and like the Palme-Tree rose up above her pressures : *plures efficimur quoties metimur a vobis*, as *Tertullian* speaks to the Heathen. The more you mow us down, the thicker we grow : the more

more we suffer for him, the more we love and desire him. Saint *Paul* careth not for a dissolution, that he may go to Christ; as a stone is contented to be broken in pieces, that it may move to its place.

Thirdly, For *Corrupt* and *vitious Desires*; their *Effects* are first, *Deception*, and haling of Reason as it were captive from determining, advising, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knows in *thesi*, and at large, in *hypothesi* and as to his owne particular interest or inconvenience he doth not at all attend. He can say them, he cannot apply them. As he who acteth a part on a Stage, knows the things which he speaks, but is not a whit affected with them. And the Philosopher giveth the reason of it, the very same with St. *James*, δει γην συμφῶναι, That Reason which overcoms lust, must be λογὸς ἐμφυτός, Reason ingrafted; or to use the phrase of another Apostle, συγκεκραμένος, immixed and contempered with the soul, and not onely extrinsically irradiating it. And these kind of men are elegantly called by *Julius Pollux*, ἐχέλοδ'όλοι, men willingly slavish, and ἡττημένοι subdued and brought under by their own affections. As *Plutarch* saith of *Agessilaus*, that he was ruled by *Lyfander* his servant, he having onely the name; but the other the execution of his power. This slavery of mens mindes under the tyranny of lustful desires is thus described by the *Satyrist*.

Jam. 1. 14.
ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς
λογισμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ
ὅτι τὰ κατὰ τὴν
τῆς διὰ τὴν
Et hic 1. 7. c. 2.
ἐκλεφερόν.
1h. c. 7. ut.
Hof. 4. 11.
συνέλαβεν ὡς αἶψα
αὐτὸς τὸ δόκον.
c. 2. vid. c. 5. 9.
Vid. Plaur. Asi-
nar. A. H. 1. Scen.
3. Cicer. de Sen.
Jam. 1. 21.
Heb. 4. 2.

Onomast. 1. 3. c. 7.
Plutarch. in Ly-
sandro.

Persius Sat. 5.
Vid. Arrian.
Epist. l. 3. c. 24.

*Mane piger stertis ? surge, inquit Avaritia, eja
Surge : negas ? Instat, surge inquit, non quæo surge.
Ecquid agam rogitas ? En saperdam adveho ponis,
Castoreum, stupas, hebenum, thus, lubrica Coa.*

What sluggard snore so long? saies lust, up rise,
Awake, get out. Darst thou say nay ? it cries
The same again, up rise. I cannot. No ?
Rise though you cannot, when Ile have it so.
What must I do? what do? up, wipe your eyes,
See, here's a goodly Ship of merchandise ;
Shell-fish, Castoreum, Flax, black Indian woods
Frankincense, wines of Coos and other goods.

Thus sordidly do vain men sell themselves,
and as it were render up their Reason into the
hands of vitious and greedy Affections, giving
leave to their soules to suffer a shipwrack in
that vessel which bringeth goods into their
Cellars, and traffiquing their owne judgement
in exchange for a ship of wares.

Sen. de Benef.
l. 3. c. 3. & l. 2.
c. 27.

Secondly, These kind of *Desires* make men
ungrateful and *forgetful* of any kindnesse which
hath already been done them. *Memoria minimum
tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum.* As in Buckets at a
Well, the longer the line of the one is which
moves downward, the shorter is the line of the
other which riseth upward ; so the larger our
desirs are toward the future, the narrower our
memories are of things past, and usually mens
valuations of things are more in the perform-
ance, then

then when they are performed. And the reason, is because as nature hath set our eyes forward, and not behinde us : so the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principall factors, looke naturally before them, not to what they *Have*, but to what they *Hope*. The eye whereby we looke backward into our lives is the eye of *Repentance*, we there either see our selves bad, or little. And a man is an unwelcome object unto himselfe in both these Relations. But the eye whereby we looke forward, is an eye of *Hope*, and *Desire*, and by that we are represented to our selves better and greater then we are already. Iron moves not upward except the Loadstone be very neere it ; But it moveth downward, though the Center be never so remote. So much stronger are the motions of *Desire*, then those of acknowledgement and retribution.

Besides the apprehensions of *Goodnesse* in a thing are much other in the *Desire* then in the *Review*, as usually the Sunne and the Moone looke bigger at their rising, then when they are come over our heads. *Desires* lookes on nothing in them but that which pleaseth, *Review* findes that in them which displeaseth. When we desire Wine we thinke onely on the sweetnesse, when we review it, we remember the head-ach. Besides what we desire is apprehended as the matter of our life ; what is past, men apprehend as in the hand of death. *Quicquid retro est mors tenet*. As in our life, so in our delights, so much of them is dead as is over and gone. We love our food

Bb

when

Nam fere pessimi movent hunc hominem habent, quod sibi volunt, Dum id impetrant Boni sunt, sed id ubi jam penes sese habent, ex bonis pessimum et fraudulentissimum Plauti. Captiv. nihil eque est gratum adeptis et concupiscentibus Plin. l. 2. Ep. 15.

Senec. de Brevit. vitæ et Ep. 120.

when it is meate, we loathe it when it is excrement. When it goes into us we desire it, when it passeth thorow us we despise it. And the secret worke of concoction, (which is as it were the Review of our meat) doth distinguish that in them which the first Appetite tooke in a lump, and together.

And in truth in all secular and sublunary desires we shall ever finde that they are like the Apples of Sodomes, *Quæ contacta cinerescunt*. which have ashes hidden within their beauty, and death lurking under them. All the matter of our secular or sensitive Desires are just like the meates we eate, which goe much more into excrement then into nourishment and substance. Like the Cyprus tree which they say is very faire, but beares no fruit. Like the Egyptian Temples which are beautifull in *frontispicio*, but ridiculous in *penetrati*. And if we looke well on them, we shall finde, that as they are mortall themselves, so they come to us through mortality. It was a bold, but true *μῦθος* of Seneca, *Mortibus vivimus*. Wee live by the deaths of other things. Our fullest Tables furnished with death, nothing but *feretra*, the *biers* of birds and beasts. Our richest garments the bowels and Skinns of other creatures, which worke out their own lives to preserve ours. Silke is a grave to the worme that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. Our Offices and Honours seldome comes to us but by the mortality of those that prepossessed them, And our mortality makes them the fitter objects of other mens Desires.

3 These

Tertul. Apol.
cap. 40.

Phocion apud
Plutarch. A-
popht. Clem.
Alex. Ped.
l. b 3. cap. 3.

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3 These *Desires* as they are forgetfull, so they are *envious*, and looke with an evill eye upon others condition, accounting their successe our owne damage. If a man should draw the genealogie of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we should finde the Roote of that great Tree to be nothing but lust. It was Desire and inordinate appetite by which the devill perswaded our first parents to picke a quarrell with their Maker, *Whence come Warres and fightings*, saith Saint James, *but from lusts which warre in your members*? When a man hath warre within, no wonder if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himselfe, will disagree with all the world besides. The sea tosseth enything which comes into it, not because it is wronged, but because it is unquiet. And a lustfull man will contend with every innocent man that prospers, not because this man doth him injury, but because he grudgeth this mans prosperity. As the sea representeth every strait thing that is put into it crooked, so lust every harmlesse thing peruerse, and as *Seneca* speakes hath *Odium sine inimico*, hatred without an enemy. Greedy Desires are like a swollen and envious spleene, which sucks away substance from all the rest of the body.

4 These *Desires* are *Hidropticall*, and like a * *Βαλμυζ* in the stomacke which is not quenched, but enraged with that which feeds it. *Unnatural Desires* being herein very like to *natural motions*, the further they proceed, the stronger and

B b 2

saister

Vid. Senec. de I a. lib. 3. c. 31. Ali. nis gemitibus l. benier Emolumenta conquir. Ammian. Marcell. lib. 31. Egregium Exemplum invidia etiam Ecclesiastica ex cupiditatibus oritur apud eundem Marcellinum inter Damascus, & Viciusinan. lib. 27.

Epist. 105.

* *Calius Phodrig. lib. c. 39. lib. 14 cap. 1.*

*Laert. in Ana-
charsi. lib. 1.
Senec. de Ben.
lib. 2. cap. 27.
Nihil Satis
morituris,
Imo morienti-
bus ep. cap.
120.
Plin. lib. 15.
cap. 12.*

swifter they are. Like winde in a bladder they never fill the heart; but enlarge it. The Grecians began their drinkings in little Cups, but proceeded unto Flagons: and many times those Appetitions which begin in modesty goe on unto impudence, and the more our lives hastens to leave the world, the more our lust hastens to possesse it. As it is noted of the *Parthians*, that the more they drinke, the more they thirst. And which is a marvellous illogical stupidity, the more continuall experience men have of the vanity of the world, the more greedy experiments they make to finde our solidity in it. Like your melancholy searchers after the Philosophers Stone, that never dote so much upon their project as then when it hath deluded them, and never flatter themselves with stronger hopes to be enriched by their Art, then when it hath brought them unto beggery.

Lastly, from hence it comes to passe that these kindes of Desires are *Base*, and Deject the minde unto sordid and ignoble Resolutions. For *cui nihil satis, nihil turpe*. He that hath never enough will count nothing base whereby he may get more. As the *Historian* saith of *Otho*, that he did *adorare vulgus, jacere oscula, & omnia serviliter pro Imperio*. Adore the people, dispencc and scatter abroad his curtseys, crouch unto any servile expressions, to advance his Ambitious designs. Like *Autans* in the Poets, fall to the earth, so hee may grow the stronger by it. As *Zopyrus* and *Pyrristratus* who wounded, mangled, de-
formed

Taoit. Hist. l. 1.

*Horador. The-
lia.
Plutarch. in
Salone.*

and Faculties of the Soule.

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formed themselves, that they might thereby insinuate and gaine their ends; As the Scripture noteth of *Abfolom*, and the Historian of *Julian*, that out of affectation of popularity, they stouped and delighted to converse with the lowest of the people. Which cunning humility, or rather sordidnesse of Ambition, *Menelaus* in the Tragedian, hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto *Agamemnon*.

Ammon. Mar.
cel. lib. 25.

Οἷός' ἐτ' ἰσώδης ἀρχὴν Δαναΐδας πρὸς Ἴλιον,
τῷ δεκνὶ μὲν ἔχῃ χρέζον, τῷ δὲ βίλειδαι δῖλον.
Ὡς τείνεται ἡς, ἀπασις δὲ ἔξῃς προδύχαιον,
καὶ θυρὰς ἔχον ἀκλείους τῷ δῖλοντι θυμῶν.
καὶ δίδως πρόσρητον ἑῷς πῶς, κ' εἴ μὴ τις θέλοι,
τοῖς τρόποις ζητῶν πριάσθαι τὸ τελέπμεν ἐκ μίσου, &c.

Eurip. Iphig.

*You know how you the Rule o're Gretians got,
In shew declining what in truth you sought :
How low, how plausible you apprehend
The hands of meanest men : How then you bended
To all you met : How your gates open flew,
And spake large welcome to the pop'lar Crew :
What sweetned words you gave even unto those
Who did decline, and hate to see you gloze.
How thus with Serpentine and guilefull Arts
You screw'd and wound your selves into the hearts
O'th vulgar: And thus bought the power, which now
Makes you forget how then you us'd to bow.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Rules touching our Desires. Desires of lower Objects must not be either hastie, or unbounded, such are unnaturall, turbid, unfruitfull, unthankfull: Desires of heavenly Objects fixed, permanent, industrious: Connexion of vertues, sluggish Desires.



Nto the things already delivered touching this affection, I shall here add two or three Rules pertaining to the morall use, and managing of it. And they are, First, concerning Objects of an *Inferiour* and *Transitory* nature, that our *Desires* be neither *Hastie* and precipitate, nor *Vaste*, and unlimited. And in matters more *High* and *Noble*, that they be not either *wavering* and interrupted *Desires*, or *Lazie* and negligent *Desires*.

I For the first of these, we have a rule in *Solomon*, concerning *Riches*, which will hold in all other Objects of an immoderate desire: *He that maketh haste to be rich, shall not be without sinne*; I may add. *Not without cares neither*: for we know the nature of all earthly things, they have something of the *Serpent* in them, to *Deceive*. The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way; the way

way of Honour and Ambition, a slippery and giddy way; the way of carnall pleasures, a deep and a fowle way, the way of learning it selfe (the noblest of all sublunary things) an involved and intricate way. And certa inly he had need have better eyes then a blinde Passion, who in so ill ground will make good haste and good speed together. *In Labyrintho properantes ipsa velocitas implicat.* He is the likeliest man to get first out of a Maze, who runnes fastest. An over nimble *Desire* is like the stomacke of a sicke man newly recovered, more greedy then strong, and fuller of Appetite then Digestion. Whence arise immature and unconcocted counsels, blinde and ungoverned Resolutions: like those monstrous people, which *Plinie* speakes of, whose feet goes backward, and behinde their eyes. For when the minde of man is once possessed with conceit of *Contentment* to be found in worldly glories, when the insinuations and sweet enchantments of Honour, Profit, Pleasure, Power, & Satans, *Hæc omnia*, hath once crept upon the affection, and lulled reason asleep; it is then sufficient that we know the end, which we desire; we have not the patience to enquire after the right way unto it: because it is the suspicion of our greedy *Desires*, that the true means are commonly the most tedious, and that honesty for the most part goes the farthest way about. And hence withall it usually commeth to passe that these hasty and preposterous Appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept Advantages which slownesse with maturity might have made use of.

As

ἐν ἐδῶ μὴ
σπεύδεις.
Chilo apud
Laert. l. b. i.

Plutarch. in
Laculle.

As the Romane Souldiers by their greedinesse on their prey, missed of taking Mithridates, who otherwise could not have escaped them. And therefore it was wise counsell of Nestor in the Poet.

Iliad. 370.

Μή τις γυνὴν ἄνδρα ὑπερβαλλόμενον, μετόπισθεν
μιμνέτω, ὡς κερπλοῖσα φέρον ἐπὶ νῆας ἱκίται.
Ἀλλ' ἀνδρᾶς κτεῖνω μὲν ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔλλατα
νεκρὰ; ἀμπαρῖον συλίσουτε περὶ νῆας.

Let none goe lingring after spoile and stay
To lead himself with a too hasty prey.
But first let's kill : W' are sure after such fight,
Carcaffes being rifled cannot bite.

Senec. de
Tranq. lib. 2.
Arian. Epiſt.
lib. 1. c. 26.

2 The next Rule to keepe this Passion in, order with reference unto inferiour Objects is, that it be not an *Infinite* and unlimited *Desire* Appetite should answere our power to procure, and not strength to beare and to digest. Wee should not goe about to swallow a Camell, when a Gnat doth make us shraine. Immoderate *Desires* can neither be satisfied, nor concocted. And this unboundednesse of Desires we are to take heed off; for these reasons.

Arist. Polic.
lib. 2. cap. 6.
Senec. Ep. 16.
39. de benefic.
lib. 2. cap. 27.

1 First, for the *unnaturalnesse* of it; for all *unnaturall* and unnecessary *Desires* are *infinite*, as the Philosopher hath observed; As he that is out of his way may wander infinitely. An unlimited *Desire* is onely there requisite; where the Object

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OF

object thereof is infinite, & ordained to perfect Mans nature; but not where it is onely a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein he ought therefore then to enjoy his contentment, when it is sufficient not to fill his mind which is immortal; and therefore not able to be replenished with any perishing happinesse nor to outreach the vastnes of his opinion, which being erronious is likewise infinite (For *Omnis Error immensus*, as *Seneca* speaks; but then onely when it affords such conveniences, as where-withall the seasonable and vertuous employments of nature may with content be exercised. It is then a corrupt *Desire* which proceeds not from our want, but from our vice. As that is not a natural thirst, but a disease and distemper of the body which can never be satisfied.

Now the miseries of *unnatural Desires* are first, that they corrupt and expel those which are natural: as multitudes of strangers in a City do eat out the Natives; thus in luxurious men, strange Love doth extinguish that which is Conjugal.

Secondly, they ever bring vexation to the mind with them. As immoderate laughter, so immoderate lusts are never without paine and convulsions of Nature. Morbid *desires* of the mind are like an itch or ulcer in the body, which is with the same nays both angred and delighted, and hath no pleasure but with vexation.

Thirdly, They are ever attended with repentance, both because in promises they disap-

C c

point,

*Extranea non
augent bonum,
sed conduunt.
Senec. Epist. 66.*

*Nunquam finem
invenit libido.
Cicer. Tusc.
Malum infinitum.
Arist. Ethic.
lib. 2. cap. 6.
Polit. l. 2. c. 6.
Exiguam naturam
opinio immensa-
rium Epic. apud
Sen.*

I.

*Plutarch. in
Gryllo, & de
Sanit. tuenda.*

2.

*Plut. de Sanit.
tuenda.
Sen. de Tranq.
cap. 2.*

3.

*Alterna inter
Cupiditatem
nostram & Pa-
nitentiam vices
sunt. Sen. de Oric.
sap. cap. 27.*

4.
*Sen. de Benef.
l. 3. c. 3.
Quod Ministe-
rium fuerat, Ars
habet capta.
Liv. l. 39.
Αὐτῶν δὲ τὰ
ἴδια ὄψεσθαι.
Ethic. l. 3. c. 12.*

5.
*Plut. Annal.
lib. 16.*

Plut. de Tranq.

*Favorinus apud
Ælium Spart.
in Ader.*

point, and in performances they deceive; and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains; as those delicacies which are sweet in the mouth, are many time heavie in the stomach; and after they have pleased the Palat, do torment the bowels. The Mind surfeits on nothing sooner than on unnatural Desires.

Fourthly, for this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments; as weak and wanton stomachs, which are presently cloyed with an uniform dyet, and must have not onely a painful but a witty Cook, whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratifie and humour the niceness of their appetite. As *Nero* had an officer who was called *Elegantia Arbitr*, the Inventor of new Lusts for him.

Lastly, unlimited desires are for the most part envious and malignant: For he who desires every thing, cannot chuse but repine to see another have that which himself wanteth. And therefore *Dionysius* the Tyrant did punish *Philo-xenus* the Musitian, because he could sing, and *Plato* the Philosopher, because he could dispute better than himself. In which respect he did wisely, who was contented not to be esteemed a better Oratour than he who could command thirty legions.

Secondly, *Unbounded desires* do work *Anxiety* and *Perturbation* of Mind; and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto; namely, to be a means of obtaining some further good; whereas those

those desires which are in their executions turbid, or in their continuance permanent, are no more likely to lead unto some farther end, than either a misty and dark, or a winding and circular way is to bring a man at last unto his journey's end; whereof the one is dangerous, the other vain. And together with these they do distract our noble cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires. *Martina her Many things, and Marie's One thing* will very hardly consist together.

Lastly, there is one corruption more in these unmitted desires, they make a man unthankful for former benefits: as first, because *Caduca memoria futuro imminetium*. It is a strong presumption that he seldom looks back upon what is past, who is earnest in pursuing something to come. It is *S. Paul's* profession and argument in a matter of greater consequence, *I forget those things which are behind, and reach forth unto those things which are before*. And secondly, though a man should look back; yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but sleight and vanishing, because the mind finding present content in the liberty of a roving desire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment to thoughts of another nature, which likewise (were they entertained) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankfulness: every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small, than to acknowledge the vice and vastness of his own Desires.

Sen. de Benef.
lib. 3.

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The next rule which I observed for the government of these passions, do respect those *Higher* and more glorious Objects of Mans Felicity : And herein

I Our *Desires* are not to be wavering and inconstant, but resolute and full of quicknes and perseverance: First, because though we be poor and shallow vessels; yet so narrow & almost shut up are those passages by which we should give admittance unto the matter of our true happiness; yea so full are we already of contrary qualities, as that our greatest vehemency will not be enough either to empty our selves of the one, or to fill our selves with the other. And therefore the true *desires* of this nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most pathological and strong similitudes of *hunger* and *thirst*; and those not common neither, but by the *panting* of a *tyred Hart* after the rivers of water, and the *gaping* of the dry ground after a seasonable showre. Secondly, every desireable object the higher it goes, is ever the more united within it self, and drives the faster unto an unity : It is the property of errors to be at variance; whereas *Truth* is *One*, and all the parts thereof do mutually strengthen and give light unto each other : So likewise in things *good*, the more noble, the more knit they are, *Scelera* *disident*: It is for sins to be at variance amongst themselves. And those lower goods of riches, pleasure, nobility, beauty, though they are not incomparable; yet they have no natural Connexion to each other; and have therefore the

Εὐμαλαβολίς ὁ.
 πονηρῶ.
 Esic. l. 7. c. 14.

the little power to draw a constant and continued desire. But for nobler and immaterial goods we see how the Philosopher hath observed a connexion between all his moral vertues, whereby a man that hath one, is naturally drawn to a desire of all the rest : for the mind being once acquainted with the sweetnes of one, doth not onely apprehend the same sweetnesse in the others, but besides, findeth it self not sufficiently possesst of that which it hath, unlesse it be thereby drawn to procure the rest: all whose properties it is by an excellent mutual service to give light and lustre, strength and validity, and in some sort greater Unity unto each other.

And lastly for the highest and divinest good : the truth of Religion, that is in it self most of all other one, as being a beam of that light, and revelation of that will, which is Unity it self. And therefore though we distinguish the Creed into twelve Articles, yet S. Paul calleth them all but *μια τικ* one faith, as having but one Lord for the object and end of them. Now then where the parts of good are so united, as that the one draweth on the other, there is manifestly required united desire to carry the soul thereunto.

Eph. 4. 5.

2 The last rule which I observed was that our desires ought not to be faint and sluggish, but industrious and painful, both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties which we are every where likely to meet withall in the pursuit of our happines; and also for the wise and discreet applying of the severall

furtherances requisite thereunto. And indeed that is no true, which is not an operative desire: a velleity it may be, but a will it is not. For what ever a man will have, he will seek in the use of such means, as are proper to procure it. Children may wish for mountains of gold, & *Balaam* may wish for an happy death, and an Atheist may wish for a soul as earthly in substance as in affection; but these are all the ejaculations rather of a speculative fancy, than of an industrious affection. True desires as they are right in regard of their object, so are they laborious in respect of their motion. And therefore those which are idle and impatient of any paines, which stand like the Carman in the fable, crying to *Hercules* when his waine stuck in the mud to help it out, without stretching out his own hands to touch it, are first unnatural desires, it being the formal property of this passion to put the soule upon some motion or other. And therefore we see wheresoever Nature hath given it, she hath given likewise some manner of motion or other to serve it. And secondly they are by consequence undutiful & disobedient desires, in that they submit not themselves unto that Law, which requireth that we manifest the life and strength of our love by the quicknes and operation of it in our desires. And lastly, such desires are unuseful & fruitles: for how can an object, which standeth in a fixed distance from the Nature, which it should perfect, be procured by idle and standing affections? The desires of the
 sluggard

Iuggard (saith *Salomon*) slay him, becaute his hands refuse to labour. These affections must have life in them, which bring life after them : dead desires are deadly desires.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Affection of Joy or Delight. The several Objects thereof, Corporal, Moral, Intellectual, Divine.

THe next Passions in order belonging to the Concupiscible Faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the Presence of, and Union to an Object; and that is, when either we by our desires have reached the object, which worketh *Joy* and *Delights* : or when in our flight the object hath overtaken us, which worketh *Grief* and *Sorrow*. And these two do bear the most inward relation unto and influence upon all our actions. Whereupon *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* hath made them the foundation of our vertues, and rules of our working. And the reason is natural, because the end of our motion is to attain rest, and avoid perturbation. Now *Delight* is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet tranquility of mind, which we receive from the presence & fruition of that good, whereunto our desires have carried us. And therefore the Philosopher in one place call it a motion of the Soul with a sensible

καρὸν ζαυδῶν καὶ
τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡδονῆς
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.
Ethic. l. 2. c. 3

Cicer. Tusc. l. 4.
εὐδοκίαν ὡς ἀπαρ-
ται. *Zeno apud*
Laert. l. 7.
Clem. Alex.
strom. l. 2. αὐτὴν
τῆς ψυχῆς.
Rhetor. l. 1. c. 11.

ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν
ἡρεμίᾳ ἔστιν ἢ ἐν
κίνησιν. Elijc.
l. 7. c. ult.

Gaudere in Sinu
Cic.

ἐν βύβλιν χαίρειν
Iliad. 6.

Qui sapit in sa-
cino gaudeat ille
Sinu Titul. Via
Eamasiē. de
Orthodox. fide,
lib. 2. cap. 13;
Cy Nemf. de
Anima. c. 18.

Arbores necet
omnem succum
auferendo, &c.
Plin. l. 16. c. 34.

sensible and felt insaturation of nature, yet else-where he as truly telleth us that it standeth rather in * rest than motion, as on the other side Griefe is the straightning and anguish of our minds wrought out of the sence and burden of some present evil oppressing our Nature. Now these passions are divers, according to the diversity of the objects: which are either *sensitive* and bodily: and then delight is called *voluptas*, pleasure, being a medicine & supply against bodily indigence and defects; or *Intellectual* and Divine, and then it is called *Gaudium* Joy, being a sweet and delightful tranquility of mind, resting in the fruition and possession of a good. So also is the other passion of *Sadnes* considered: which in respect of the body is called a Sence of *Pain*; in respect of the Soul, a Sence of *Grief*.

First then for the *Object* of our *Delight*; it is onely that which can yeeld some manner of satisfaction unto our Nature, not as it is a corrupt and erring, but as it is an empty and perfectible Nature. Whatsoever then is either *Medicinal* for the Repairing, or *Natural* for the Conserving, or any way helpfull for the advancing of a Creature, is the onely true and allowable object of its delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine Nature, as water which by little and little insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beateth, or as * Ivie which seemeth to adorn the Tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap thereof, may haply yeeld some

some measure of vanishing content to mindes, which tast every thing with a corrupted palate; but certainly such sophistical premises can never infer in the conclusion any other than a perfunctory and tottering content. And therefore *Seneca* is bold to find an impropriety in *Virgils* Epithite, *Mala Gaudia*, Joyes which issue from a polluted fountain; as not having in them that inseparable attribute of absolute delight; which is to be unvariable. For how can a mind (unlesse blinded with its own impostures, and intangled in the errors of a mis-led affection) receive any nourishing and solid content in that, which is in it self vanishing, and unto its Subject destructive? Whatsoever then may be delighted in, must have some one of the forenamed conditions, tending either to the *Restitution* of decayed nature, to the *preservation* of entire nature, or to the *perfection* of empty nature. And to the former and imperfecter sort of these, *Aristotle* referreth all corporeal and sensitive Pleasures (unto which he therefore granteth a secondary and accidental goodnes) which he calleth *ιατραι* the Medicines of an indigent nature, whereby the defects thereof are made up, and it self disburdened of those cares, which for the most part use to follow the want of them.

Herein then I observe a double corruption; an unnatural, and unlimited delight. *Unnatural*, I mean those cursed pleasures, which were exercised by men given over to vile affections, and greedy in the pursuing of lusts, whose very

D d

names

Epist. 59.
Aug. de Civit.
Dei. l. 14. c. 8.

Α' αναλήψεως τῆς
καὶ ἰατρικῆς τῆς
σωματικῆς
ἐνδείας.

Ethic. l. 7. c. 14.
ἰατρικῆς καὶ μέγιστον

* Unde factum
ut quæ ad funera
pertinerent in
Templo Veneris
venderentur. vid.
Plutarch. quæst.
Rom. 9. 23.

Ethic. 1. 10. c. 7.

names abhorre the light. *Unlimited* delights are those which exceed the bounds of Nature, and the prime Institution of lawful and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repair not and strengthen nature, * they weaken and disfigure it; as in the body Luxury breeds diseases, and in the mind Curiosity breeds Errors.

Other objects there are of a wider nature than those which concern the Body; and they are both the *Moral and Contemplative* Actions of the Mind; To both which *Aristotle* hath attributed principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure, and whose Acts lesse laborious, as residing in that part of the soul which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest, simplest and unmixed delights. Now every thing is the more free, clear, independent, spiritual, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choicest perfections, whereby the Soule may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the mind have annexed unto them both Grief and Anxiety; but this is never natural to the act of knowledge, which is alwaies in its own vertue an impression of pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazleth the power; or out of the weaknes and doubtings of the understanding, which hath not a clear light thereof; or out of the admixtion and steeping them in the humours of the affections, whereby men minister

minister unto themselves desperate thoughts, or weak fears, or guilty griefs, or unlimited desires, according as is the property of the object joyned with their own private distempers: thus we see the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is natural unto it to produce, but doubtings, terrors and disquietings of Conscience; it being the property of the works of darknes to be afraid of the word of light. But of all these former objects of mans delight (because they are amongst *Salomons* Catalogue of things under the Sun) none are here without vexation and vanities: for to let passe the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is inadnes and not joy, For *Seneca* telleth us that *true joy* is a *serious* and *severe* thing: and not to meddle with riches and other secular delights, which have *wings* to flye from us, and *thorns* to prick us, even that highest natural delight of the mind, knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the sun, and therefore not obnoxious to *Salomons* vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noise, yeelding rather a windy pleasure then a true delight: the properties whereof is not to puffe up, but to replenish. And therefore it is the prayer of *S. Paul*, *The God of Peace fill you with all joy*. True heavenly Joy is a *filling*, a *fatiating* joy, a *joy unspeakable*, with *S. Peter*; a *peace past understanding*, with *S. Paul*. Nor doth this property of overflowing and swal-

Joh. 3. 20.
Job. 21. 11.
Isa. 30. 11.
2 Pet. 3. 5.

Eccles. 2. 2.
לֹא יֵרָאֵה הַנֶּפֶשׁ
רֹגֶזוֹ אֲחֵרִים
הִשְׁתַּדֵּשׁ בְּיָמָיו
בְּעֵינָיו
Sopbor. Ajax.
Senec. Epist. 23.

Rom. 15. 13.

lowing the Mind add any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto : for it is not the weaknes of the soul, as it is of the body, to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in, nor doth the mind desire to subdue or conquer, but onely to be united with its object.

And here the only corruption of our delight is, the deficiency and imperfections of it. For though this blessed light leaves not any man in the shadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the shadow of sin, by the darknes whereof he is without much of that lustre and glory, which he shall then have, when the righteous shall shine like the Sun in the Firmament. Yet at the least our endeavors must be, that though our *Foyes* cannot be here a *replenishing Foy*, yet it may be an *operative Foy*, and so worke out the measure of its own fulnes. I have done with the severall objects of mans delight, Corporeal, Moral, Intellectual and Divine.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Causes of Joy. The union of the Object to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, Changes by accident a cause of Delight.



Now proceed to speak of the more particular causes and effects of this Passion. Touching the former; not to meddle with those which are unnatural, belluine, and morbid (which the Philosopher hath given some Instances of) the general cause is the natural *goodnes* of the Object, and the particulars under that. Any thing which hath a power to *unite* and make present the Object with the Faculty. And that is done (to speak onely of intellectual Powers) three manner of waies: by *Contemplation*, by *Confidence*, and by *Fruition*: by thinking of it in the Mind, by expecting of it in the Heart, and by enjoying it in the whole Man.

Contemplation addes unto the Soule a double delight: First, from its owne property, it being the proper and natural agitation of mans mind; insomuch that those things which we abhor to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature desires to know speculatively.

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And

*Arist. Ethic. lib.
7. cap. 6.*

*Arist. Rhet. l. 1.
cap. 1.*

And therefore the devils first temptation was drawne from the knowledge as well of evil as good; for he knew that the mind of man would receive content in the understanding of that, which in its own nature had no perfection in it.

But then secondly, in the object of true delight, Contemplation ministreth a farther joy, in that it doth in some sort preunite our souls and our blessednes together: and this is partly the reason why *Aristotle* so much advanceth his contemplative before his practique felicity: For though this in regard of its immediat reference unto communion, be of a more spreading and diffusive Nature; yet certainly, in that sweetnes of content, that serenity of soul, that exaltation of thoughts which we receive from those noble motions of the higher mind, the other doth far in pleasure and satisfaction surpasse all active happines. And hence we see in the parts of mans body, those which are (if I may so speak) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practique. The parts of Vision are before the parts of Action, the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himself (notwithstanding in him there can be neither accession nor intermission of delight) yet by way of expression to us ward, he did not in the creation of the world so much joy in his *fat*, as in his *vidit*; not so much when he gave his creatures their *nature*, as when he *saw* their *goodnes*: Nature being the object of Power: but *goodnes* the object of *Delight*; and therefore the

the day of his rest was more holy than the days of his working, that being appointed for the Contemplation, as these were for the production of his creatures.

And as Contemplation by way of *Prescience*, when it looketh forward on good things hoped: So also by way of *memory*, when it looketh backward and receiveth evil things escaped, doth minister matter of renewed Joy. No Man looketh on the Sea with more comfort, than he who hath escaped a shipwrack. And therefore when Israel saw the Egyptians dead on the Sea shore, the fear of whom had so much affrighted them before, they then sang a song of Triumph. Past troubles do season, and as it were ballast present Comforts, as the Snow in Winter increaseth the beauty of the Spring.

But in this particular of *Contemplation*, notwithstanding the excellency of it, there may be corruption in the excess (For in those matters of delight, except they be such as are disproportioned to our corrupt Nature, I mean divine things, we seldom erre in the other extreme.) And that is, when we do not divide our selves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function, so to attend upon meere mental notions, as to neglect the practical part of our life, and withdraw our selves from the fellowship and regard of humane society, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monstrous to see a fire burne without light, or shine without heat (aberrations from the supreme

Arist. Rhet. l. 1.
c. 10.

preme Law being in divine things impious, as they are in natural prodigious.)

And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of Hermits and Votaries from humane society, under pretence of devoting themselves to Contemplation, and afore-enjoying of the light of God, is towards him as unpleasing, as it is in it self uncomfortable, for their very pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not onely a burning lamp by the heat of his owne Contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his owne comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of delight is the sure Confidence of the mind. Wherby upon strong and unerring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of its desires: so that what ever doth encourage our *Hope*, doth therewithall strengthen and enlarge our *Delight*. *Spe gaudent* saith S. Paul, and *Sperantes gaudent* saith the Philosopher, *Hope* and *Foy* go both together: For where *Hope* is strong, it doth first divert and take of the Mind from poring upon our present wants, and withall ministreth tranquillity unto it from the evidence of a future better estate.

But here we must take heed of a deep corruption: For though I incline not to that opinion which denieth *hope*, all asswaging and mitigating force, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating mind; yet to have an ungrounded confidence, and either out of presumption or security to resolve upon uncertain and casual events, there:

Rom. 12. 12.

Ari. Rhet. l. 1.
c. 11, 12.

there-hence to reduce Arguments of Comfort,
works but an empty and imaginary Delight, like
his in the Poet :

— *Petit ille dapes sub imagine somni,
Oraq; vana movet, dentemq; in dente fatigat.*

Who dreaming that he was a Guest
At his Imaginary Feast,
Did vainely glut upon a Thought,
Tyring each Jaw and Tooth for naught :
And when he fanci'd dainty meat,
Had nothing but a dreame to eat.

*Ovid. Met.
lfa. 29. 8.
μη ου θάψης λαι-
μα χείρ' Ιου γυ-
ναικιν άνελεγισ.*

Plur. de Audit.

Or like the Musitian in *Plutarch*, who having
pleased *Dionysius* with a little vanishing Musick,
was rewarded with a short and deceived Hope of
a great Reward. A presumptuous Delight though
it seeme for the time to minister as good content
as that which is raised on a sounder bottom; yet
in the end will work such inconveniences as shall
altogether countervail and overweight the de-
ceipt of its former Ioyes : For the Mind being
mollified and puffed up with a windy and unnou-
rishing comfort, is quite disabled to beare the as-
sault of some sudden evill, as having its forces
scattered by Security, which caution and feare
would have collected. For we know in Bodies, *Pro-
pion* strengthneth naturall motion, and weakneth
violent ; and in the Mind the collecting and uni-
ting of it doth both inable it for prosecution of
its owne ends, and for resisting all opposite force.

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It is therefore no comforting but a weakening Confidence, which is not provident and operative.

The third and most effectually cause of *Delight* is the *Fruition* of Good, and the *reall Vnion* thereof unto the Mind: for all other things work delight no further, then either as they looke towards, or worke towards this. And therefore if we marke it in all matter of Pleasure and Joy, the more the *Vnion* is, the more is the *Delight* (And *Vnion* is the highest degree of *Fruition* that can be) thus wee see the presence of a Friend, yeelds more content then the absence, and the imbraces more then the presence: so in other outward Delights, those of *Incorporation*, are greater then those of *Adhesion*. As it is more naturall to delight in our meats then in our garments, the one being for an union inward to increase our *strength*; the other outward only to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most cleer, are most pleasant, and perspicuity argues the perfecter union of the Object to the Faculty. And therefore we have *Speculum & Enigma* put together by S. Paul, *We see as in a glasse darkly*, where the weaknesse of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the *glasse* of *Nature* and of *Faith* (both which are in their kinde *evidences of things not seen*) we shall only there have a perfection of Joy, where we shall have a consummate union; *in his presence only is the fullnesse of Joy.*

Now

Now three things there are which belong unto a perfect fruition of a good thing: First, *Propriety* unto it: for a sick man doth not feel the joy of a sound mans health, nor a poor man of a rich mans money; *propriety* is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongst men, one man being agrieved to see another to have that which he either claimeth or coveteth. Secondly, *Possession*: For a man can reap little comfort from that which is his owne, if it be any way detained and withheld from him, which was the cause of that great contention between *Agamemnon* & *Achilles*, and between the Greeks and Trojans, because the one tooke away and detained that which was the others. Thirdly *Accommodation*, to the end for which a thing was appointed: For a man may have any thing in his custody, and yet receive no comfort nor real delight from it, except he apply it unto those purposes for which it was instituted. It is not then the having of a good, but the using of it which makes it beneficiall.

Now besides those naturall causes of *Delight*, there is by accident one more; to wit the *Change* and *Variety* of good things, which the diversity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptiness of such things as wee seeke Delight from, doth occasion: where Nature is simple and uncompounded, there one, and the same operation is always pleasant; but where there is a mix'd and various Nature, and diversity of Faculties, unto which doe belong diversity of inclinations, there changes doe minister Delight: as amongst lear-

Τὰ αὐτῶν πᾶσι
ἡδέα, δὲ καὶ φι-
λοτιμία.
Arist. Rhet. l. 1.
Pol. l. 3. c. 3.
Ethic. l. 8. c. 12.

Arrian. Epist.
l. 1. c. 22.

Ethic. l. 7. c. ult.
l. 10. c. 4.

Gustata magis
quam Potata
delectant. Cic.
Tusc. l. 2.
Prob. sect. 5.
quæst. 1.
Vid. Senec. de
Tranq. c. 2. 3.

* Quod etiam
de Tiberio no-
tauit Sueton.
cap. 43.
Qui hoc offi-
cioungeban-
tur diſſi (ut
videtur) ab
Ælio Lampri-
dio Voluptarii
in Alex. Sever.
* Κοινὸν τι χα-
ρὰ καὶ λύπη δι-
κρυα.
Xenoph. Helle-
nic. lib. 7.
Est quadam
etiam fendi
voluptas.
Plin. & Cic.
de sine, l. 1.
Arist. Rhet.
1. 1. c. 11.

ned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

And this the rather, because there are no subhu-
nary contentments, which bring not a * *Satiety*
along with them, as hath been before observed.
And therefore the same resolution which the
Philosopher gives for the walking of the Body,
when he enquireth the reason why in a journey
the inequality of the ways does less weary a man
then when they are all plaine and alike. We may
give for the walking and wandring of the Desire
(as *Solomon* calls it) to wit, that change and variety
doe refresh Nature, and are in stead of a rest unto
it. * And therefore as I have before observed of
Nero, the same hath *Tully* observed of *Xerxes*, that
he propounded rewards to the inventors of new
and changeable pleasures.

Hereunto may be added as a further cause of
Pleasure, Whatsoever serveth to let out and to
lessen Griefe, as *Words*, * *Tears*, *Anger*, *Revenge*,
because all these are a kind of victory, then which
nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore
Homer, saith of *Revenge*, that it is sweeter then
the dropping honey.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of other Causes of Delight. Unexpectednesse of a Good. Strength of Desire. Imagination. Imitation. Finesse and Accommodation. Of the effects of this Passion. Reparation of Nature. Dilatation. Thirst in noble Objects, satiety in Baser. Whetting of industry. A timorous unbelieve.



Unto these more principall Causes of this Affection I shall briefly adde these few which follow.

I The suddennesse and unexpectednesse of a good thing causeth the greater Delight in it. For Expectation of a thing makes the Mind feed upon it before hand, as young Gallants who spend upon their estates before they come to them, and by that meanes make them the lesse when they come. As sometimes it happeneth with choise and delicate stomackes, That the sight and smell of their meate doth halfe cloy and satiate them before they have at all tasted any of it: so the long gazing upon that which we Desire by Expectation doth as it were deflowre the Delight of it before fruition. Whereas on the other side, as the Poet expresseth it.

*Vix sum apud
me ita anixus
commotus est
metu spe, g. u-
dio, mirando
hoc tanto tam-
que repentino
bono. Terrens.
Andr. Al. 5. 4.
Tacitus hanc
tam animo meo
tam repenti-
num tamque
magnum non
conciplane
Gaudium A-
pul. A fin. Aur.
lib 11.*

Sophocl. Antig.

— ἡ εὐτυχία καὶ τὰ ἐλπίδας ἔχει.
 Ἐοικὼν ἄλλῃ μῦθος ἔδειν ἰδοῖν.

No joy in greatnesse can compare with that
 Which doth our hopes and thoughts anticipate.

a Multis mor-
 tem annuit
 gaudium in-
 gens inpera-
 rum interlusa
 anima, & vim
 magni novi-
 que motus non
 sustinente. A.

Gell. lib. 3. c. 1.
 & cap. 15.

b Sueton. in
 Aug. cap. 99.
 c Arist. Eth.
 104.

d Delectat
 quidquid est
 admirabile.
 Cic. partit.
 Orat.

a Proximorum
 incuriosi lon-
 ginq̃ua festi-
 mur. Plin.
 lib. 8. Epist. 20.
 b Vid. Clem.
 Alex. Pedag.
 1. 2. s. 1.

Plin. l. 9. c. 34.
 & lib. 22. c. 2.
 Plutarch. De
 munda sani-
 tate.

c Vid. Ciceron.
 Tuscul. qu. l. 5.

So strong and violent hath been the immuta-
 tion which *Sudden Joy* hath wrought in the Bo-
 dy, a that many (as I have formerly noted) have
 been quite overwhelmed by it, and been made
 partakers of *Augustus* his wish to enjoy an
 b εὐδαιμονία, and to die presently. And for this Rea-
 son it is that c new things, and such as we d ad-
 mire, and were a not before acquainted withal,
 do usually Delight us, because they surprize us,
 representing a kinde of strangenesse unto the
 minde, whereby it is enlarged and enriched. For
 Strange and New things have ever the greatest
 price set upon them: As I noted before of the
 Romane Luxury, That it gloried in no Deli-
 cates but those which were brought out of
 b strange Countries, and did first pose Nature, be-
 fore either feed or adorn it.

2. *Strength of Desire* doth on the other side
 enlarge the pleasure of fruition, because Nature
 ever delighteth most in those things which cost
 us dearest, and strong desires are ever painful.
 When c *Darius* in his flight drank muddy water,
 and *Ptolomy* did eat dry bread, they both professed
 that they never felt greater pleasure: strength
 of Appetite marvellously encreasing the De-
 light in that which satisfied it. For Want and
 Difficulty

Difficultie are great Preparations to a more feeling fruition,^a as Bees gather excellent Honey out of the bitterest Herbes. And as we say, *Nulla sunt firmitiora quàm quæ ex dubiis facta sunt certa.* Those evidences are surest which were made cleare out of doubtfull. So those pleasures are sweetest, *Quæ suaves sunt ex tristibus,* which have had wants and feares and Difficulties to provide to welcome for them. And therefore ^b Wrestlers and Fencers, and such like Masters of game, were wont to use their hands unto hea-vie weights, that when in their Games they were to use them empty and naked, they might doe it with the more expeditenesse and pleasure.

3 *Imagination* and fancy, either in our selves or other Men, is many times, the foundation of Delight. *Diogenes* his fullen and Melancholy fancy tooke as much pleasure in his Tubbe and Staffe, and water, as other men in their Palaces, and amplest provisions: And he in the Poet,

*Qui se credebat miros audire Tragedios
In vacuo latus sessor planusquæ Theatro,
Cum redit ad sese, pol me occidistis Amici,
Non servastis, ait, cui sic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.*

Who thought he heard rare Tragedies of wit,
And in an empty Theater did sit,
And give Applauses: but being heal'd complains,
Friends I'm not fav'd by this your love, but slain,
Rob'd

a *Plutarch de Tranquill.*
b *Quintil. lib. 5. cap. 12.*
Quintil. lib. 11. cap. 2.
Si mihi tranquillæ & placatæ omnia fuissent, incredibili quæ nunc fuor lætitiæ voluptate caruisssem. Cic. Orat. post Redi-tum. Max. Ty-rinus Dissert. 33.
Plutarch. de profest. virtutum.

Horat. Epist. lib. 2. Ep.

Robb'd of that sweet Delight I then did finde,
In the so gratefull error of my Minde.

*Fittas fabulas
cum volupta-
te Legimus
Cic. de fin. l. 3.*

*Vid. Plutarch.
de Aud. Poet.
et Quinil.
lib. 2 cap. 13.*

*Hinc encomia
fultitia, pedi-
culi, februum,
Cyc.
Plaut. in Au-
lul. Horat. l. 1.
Sat. 9.*

*Ethic. lib. 10.
cap. 7.
Plutarch. de
Aud. Poet.*

Hence likewise it is that Men are delighted with Mythologies and Poeticall Fables, with Elegancies, Iests, Urbanitie, and Flowers of wit, with Pageants pompes, Triumphes, and publik Celebrities, because all these and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the Imagination.

4. Upon the same Reason we are marvelously Delighted with lively *Imitation*, as with those Arts which doe curiously expresse the works and lineaments of Nature; Insomuch that the similitudes of these things doe wonderfully content us whose naturall Deformities we abhorre. We are well pleas'd with *Homers* Description of *Thersites*, and with *Sophocles* his expresseion of the Ulcer of *Philoctetes*, with *Parmeno* his Imitation of the grunting of a Hog, and *Theodorus* his of the ratling of wheeles, with *Plautus* his description of a chargeable Wife, and *Horace* his of a garrulous companion, though the things themselves we should willingly decline.

5 Those things Delight every man which are *mixta et in doses*, as the Philosopher speakes, *Sutable* fisted, and *accommodated* to his Genius and frame of Nature; as in the same plant, the Bee feedeth on the Flower, the Bird on the Seed, the Sheepe on the Blade, the Swine on the Roote. So in the same Author one man observeth the Rationall, another the Historicall, a third the Elegant and more Rhetoricall passages, with speciall De-
light

light, according as they are best accommodated unto the Complexion of each minde. And I finde it observed out of *Hipocrates*, that even in the Body many times that kinde of meat which Nature receiveth with Complacency, and with a more particular Delight, though in it selfe it may be worse; yet proveth better nourishment unto that Body then such, as though better in it selfe, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardnesse of Nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay; nor the same imployments of minde for men of various and different Constitutions. Nor is there I beleve any thing which would more conduce to the generall advancement of Arts and Learning, then if every Mans Abilities were fixed and limited to that proper course, which his naturall sufficiencies did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double Delight, and by consequence improvement (for every thing growes most when it is best pleased :) The one from *Nature*, the other from *Custom* and acquaintance, which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more naturall unto us. And therefore the Philosopher reckoning up many things that are pleasant to the mind, putteth these two in the first place. Those things that are *Naturall*, and those that we are *accustomed* unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of Nature.

Touching the *Effects* of this Passion, I shall

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name

Cael. Rhodig.
lib. 5. cap. 34.
ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ δόξα
ἡ δόξα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ φύσις
ἡ φύσις.
Nemes. ex
Arist. c. 18.

Ethic. 1. 10. c. 9.

ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ δόξα
ἡ δόξα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ φύσις
ἡ φύσις.
Rhet. 1. 1. c. 11.

name but these few : First, the effects of *Corporall Delights* are only (as I observed out of *Aristotle*) *medicinal*; for repairing the breaches and ruines of our decayed Natures ; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits ; for preserving our selves in a good ability to execute Offices of a higher Nature ; for furnishing the World with a succession of men, which otherwise the greedines of mortality would in short time devour. These are true and intended ends of those Delights, and when they once transgresse these bounds, they begin to * oppress Nature, weaken and distemper the body, clog the minde, and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing, which is the reason (as was even now noted) why men too violently carried away with them, are presently over-cloyed with one kind, and must have variety to keep out loathing : which *Tacitus* observes in that monster of women, *Messalina*, *facilitate adulterorum in fastidium versa ad incognitas libidines profluebat*, that loathing more easie and common sins, she betook her selfe to unnaturall lusts, and I verily think is particularly intended by *St. Paul*, *Rom. 1. 26.*

A second effect of Joy is *Opening and Dilatation* of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the minde, whence it hath the name of *Laetitia*, as it were a broad and spreading passion. Now the reason of this motion occasioned by Joy, is the naturall desire, which man hath to be united to the thing wherein he delights to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence we finde in this Passion an exultation and egressive

* τις γὰρ ἡδονὰς
ὅτις ἀποδίδωκεν
ἀνδρὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
ἐν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ
ἐνέργειᾳ ὡς ἀποδίδωκεν
τῇ φύσει.
Sophoc. Antig.

Plut. in Gryllo.
Annal. l. 11.

Laetitia amen-
tes laetitudine

egresse of the spirits, discovering a kind of loosenesse of Nature in her security, doing many things not out of resolution, but instinct and power transporting both mind and body to sudden and unpremeditated expressions of its owne content: For of all Passions Joy can be the least dissembled or suppressed, *nam gaudio Cogendi vis inest*, saith *Pliny*, it exerciseth a kind of welcome violence and tyranny upon a man, as we see in *Dauids* dancing before the Ark; and the lame mans walking, and leaping, and praising God, after hee had been cured of his lameness. And this diffusion of the spirits sheweth both the haste and forwardnesse of Nature, in striving as it were to meet her Object, & make large room for its entertainment, as also to dispell and scatter all aduersive humours that would hinder the ingresse of it, and lastly to send forth newes as it were through the whole Province of nature, that all the parts might beare a share in the common Comfort.

Thirdly, those noble delights which arise from heavenly causes, doe withall cause a sweet thirst and longing in the Soule after more, as some colours doe both delight the sight and strengthen it: For while *God* is the object, there cannot be either the satiety to cloy the Soule, nor such a full comprehension as will leave no roome for more.

Thus they who delight in the fruition of God by Grace, doe desire a more plentifull fruition of him in glory; and they that delight in the sight of Gods Glory, doe still desire to be for ever so delighted. So that their Desire is without Anxiety;

Panigir. ad Trajan.

**Plut. in Peric.*

because they are *satiated* with the thing which they doe desire, and their *satiety* is without *loathing*; because still they desire the thing wherwith they are *satiated*; they desire without Griefe, because they are replenished; and they are replenished without wearinesse, because they desire still: they see God, and still they desire to see him: they enjoy God, and still they desire for ever to enjoy him: they love and prayse God, and make it their immortall businesse still to love and praise him:

Et quem semper habent, semper habere volunt.

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher
To have for ever, they do still desire.

* *Aristid.*
Tom. 1. Orat. in
Puteo. Ascul.

* Divine Joy is like the water of *Asculapius* his Well, which they say is not capable of putrefaction.

Arist. Ethic.
l. 10. c. 3.
Polit. l. 2. c. 5.

* *Plut. de Rom.*
A. Scell. l. 1. c. 11

Fourthly, Delight whetteth and intenderth the actions of the Soule towards the thing wherein it delighteth; it putteth forth more force, and more exactnesse in the doing of them, because it exonerateth the mind of all those dulling Indispositions which unfitted it for Action. And for this reason happily it is, that the Lacedemonians used * Musick in their Warres to refresh and delight Nature: For Joy is in stead of recreation to the Soule, it wonderfully disposeth for busines. And those Actions which nature hath made necessary, it hath put pleasure in them, that thereby Men might be quickned and excited unto them; and

* and therefore Wise men have told us that pleasure is, *Sal & condimentum vitæ*. The Sawce which seasoneth the Actions of men.

Lastly, because the Nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrowes, then with pleasures, therefore whether out of *Conscience* of guilt, which deserves no joy, or out of *experience*, which useth to finde but little joy in the world, or out of *fear* of our owne aptnesse to mistake, or out of a *provident care*, not to close or feed upon a Delight, till we are fully assured of our possession of it, and because usually the minde after shaking is more settled, whether for these or any other reasons, wee see it usually come to passe, that vehement joy doth breed a kinde of jealousie and unbelieve, that sure the thing we have is too good to bee true? and that then when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they doe but dazle and deceive us, as *Quod nimis volumus haud facile credimus*:

*The things which we desire should be,
We scarce believe when we doe see.*

So *Iacob* when hee heard that his sonne *Ioseph* was alive; fainted, being astonished at so good newes, and could not believe it. And when God restored the Jewes out of Captivity, they could thinke no otherwise of it then as a dreame. And *Peter* when he was by the Angel delivered out of Prison, took it for a vision onely, and an apparition, and not for a truth.

* *cleer. offe.*
lib. 1.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. l. 2.
Plant. Caph.
Act. 2. Sc. 4.
Quintil. lib. 5.
cap. 14.

Gen. 45. 26.
Psalm. 126. 1.

Acts 12. 9.
Luke 24. 41.

A Treatise of the Passions

And lastly, of the Disciples after Christs resurrection, when he manifested himselfe to them, it is said, *That for very joy they beleevved not*, their feares keeping back, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joyes, *Omnia tuta timens*, not suffering them too hastily to believe what their eyes did see.

As in the Sea when a storme is over, there remains still an inward working and volutation, which the Poet thus expresseth,

*Vt si quando ruit, debellataeque reliquit
Eurus aquas, pax ipsa tumet, pontumque jacentem,
Exanimis jam voluit hyems*——

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease,
To tesse the roaring Billowes, even that peace
Doth swell and murmure, and the dying Wind
On the calm'd Sea leaves his owne Prints behind.

Even so in the Minde of man, when it's feares are blowne over, and there is a calme upon it, there is still *à motus trepidationis*, and a kinde of sollicitous jealousie of what it enjoyes.

And this *unbelieve* of joy is admirably set forth in the Carriages of *Penelope*, when her Nurse and her Sonne endeavoured to assure her of the truth of *Vlysses* his returne after so many yeares absence by the Poet, in which doubting she still persisted, till by certaine signes *Vlysses* himselfe made it appeare unto her, whereupon shee excused it after this manner.

*Aeneid. 4.
Mains gaudi-
um quam quod
universum ho-
mines caperent
vix satia cre-
dere se quisque
audisse velut
sonni vnam
speciem, Liv.
lib. 33.
Odiss. x 213.*

Autip pui id pui modigant puiat regiam, &c.

*My deare Ulysses let it not offend,
That when I saw you first, I did suspend
My love with my beliefe, since my faint breast
When first with those glad tidings it was blest,
Trembled with doubts, lest by such forged lies
Some crafty false-pretender might devise
To have ensnar'd me, and with these false sounds,
Defil'd my love, and multiply'd my wounds.*

CHAP. XXII.

*Of the Affection of Sorrow, the Object of it
evill, sensitive, intellectuall, as present in
it selfe, or to the mind, by memorie, or suspi-
tion, particular causes, effects of it. Feare,
Care, Experience, Erudition, Irresoluti-
on, Despaire, Execration, Distempers of
Body.*



HE opposite Passion to this of
Delight, is Griefe and Sorrow,
which is nothing but a per-
turbation and unquietnesse,
wrought by the pressure of
some present evill, which the
minde in vaine struggleth with,
as finding it selfe alone too impotent for the con-
flict.

flit. Evill I say either formerly, as in sinne, or paine, present, or feared : or privatively, such as is any good thing which we have lost, or whereof we doe despaire, or have been disappoynted. And this is in respect of its object as the former Passion, either *Sensitive* or *Intellectuall*. Sensitive is that anguish and distresse of Nature which lyeth upon the body. A passion in this sense little conducing to the advancement of Nature, being alwayes joyned with some measure of its decay, but onely as it serves sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evils, it being the condition as of corporall delights, by custome to grow burdensome and distastefull, so of paines to become easie and familiar.

The other and greater Grief is *Intellectuall*, which in *Solomons* phrase is, *A wounded spirit*; so much certainly the more quick and piercing, by how much a spirit is more vitall then a body, besides the anguish of the soule, findes alwayes, or works the same sympathy in the body, but outward sorrowes reach not ever so farre, as the spirituall and higher part of the soule. And therefore we see many men out of a mistake, that the distresse of their soules hath been wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily spoiled this, to deliver and quiet that.

The causes of this Passion, are as in the former, whatsoever hath in it power to disturbe the minde by its union thereunto. There are then two *Conditions* in respect of the *Object*, that it be *Evill* and *Present*. *Evill* first, & that not onely *formally* in it selfe;

selfe; but apprehensively to the understanding. And therefore wee see that many things which are in their Nature *Evill*; yet out of the particular distemper of the Mind, and deceitfulnesse in them, may prove pleasant thereunto. And this is the chiefe Corruption of this Passion, I meane the misplacing, or the undue suspending of it: For although strictly in its owne property, it be not an advancement of Nature, nor addes any perfection; but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference which it beares either to a superior Law, as testifying our Love unto the Obedience, by our griefe for the breach thereof: or to our consequent Carriage and Actions, as governing them with greater Wisedome and Providence, it may bee said to adde much perfection to the mind of man because it serves as an inducement to more cautious living.

The next Condition in respect of the Object, is, that it be *Present*, which may fall out either by *Memory*. and then our *Griefe* is called *Repentance*: or *Fancy* and *Suspition*, and so it may be called *Anxiety* of Mind: or by *Sense* and present union, which is the principal kind, and so I call it *Anguish*.

For the first, nothing can properly and truly work *Griefe*, by ministry of *Memory*, when the Object or *Evill* is long since past; but those things which doe withall staine our Nature, and worke impressions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exercise pleasant, prove after in their operations offensive and burdensome: so on the other side many things

Heb. 12. 17.

which for the time of their continuance are irksome and heavy, prove yet after occasions of greater Joy. Whether they be means used for the procuring of further good.

*Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi, &c.*

Ænead. 1. 1.
Iliad 4.

Through various great mishaps & dangers store,
We hasten to our home and wished shore:
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives,
Only reserve your selves for better lives.

Or whether they be Evils which by our Wisdom we have broken through and avoided;

— *sed & hæc olim meminisse juvabit.*

When we are arrived at ease,
Remembrance of a storme both please.

The Objects then of *Repentance* are not our passive, but our active Evils: nor the Evils of suffering, but the Evils of doing; for the memory of *afflictions* past, represents untoward Nature loosed and delivered, and should so much the more increase our Joy, by how much redemption is for the most part a more felt blessing than Immunity; but the memory of *sinnes* past represents Nature obliged, guilty, and imprisoned. And so leaves a double ground for *Griefe*, the staine or pollution, and the guilt or malediction a deformity to the Law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here

here to wander into a digression touching *Repentance*, only in a word it is then a *Godly Sermon*, when it proceeds from the memory of Evil; not so much in respect of the *punishment* as of the *staine*. When we grieve more because our sin hath made us *unholy*, then because it hath made us *unhappy*; and not only because we are runne into the danger of the *Law*, but because we are run out of the way of the *Law*. When it teacheth us to cry, not only with *Pharaoh*, take away this *Plague*, but with *Israel* in the *Prophet*, take away *Iniquity*.

Concerning *Grief of Preoccupation*, arising out of a suspicious *Fear* and expectation of Evil, I know not what worth it can have in it, unless haply thus, that by fore-accustoming the Minde to Evil, it is the better strengthened to stand under it: for Evils by premeditation, are either prevented or mitigated, the Mind gathering strength and wisdom together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent advise of *Plutarch*, that we should have a prepared Mind, which when any Evil falleth out, might not be surprised by it. To say as *Anaxagoras* did when he heard of the death of his Son, *Scio me genuisse mortalem*, I know that I begat a mortall Sonne. I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. Preparednesse composeth the Minde to patience. *Ulysses* wept when he saw his Dogge, which he did not when he saw his Wife: he came prepared for the one, but was surprised by the other.

*Precoꝑitati
malis mollis
ictus. Sen.
Epist. 77.
Vid. Cic. Tuscu-
qu. l. 3.*

Plut. de Tranq.

*Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,
Et perferre solum potero.*

Had I foreseen this Grief, or could but fear it,
I then should have compos'd my self to bear it.

Which is the reason why Philosophers prescribe the whole course of Mans Life, to be only a meditation upon Death; because that being so great an Evill in it selfe, and so sure to us, it ought to be expected, as that it may not come sudden, and find us unprepared to meet the King of Terror. For it is in the property of custome and acquaintance, not only to alleviate and assuage evils (to which purpose *Seneca* speaks, *perdidisti tot mala si nondum misera esse didicisti*, thou hast lost thy afflictions if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable; but further as *Aristotle* notes, to work some manner of delight in things, at first troublesome and tedious; and therefore hee reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things, and teares are by Nature made the witnesses as well of Joy as of Griefe.

*Consolatio ad
Helviam.*

Rhet. L. 1.

Odiss. § 422.

*Καὶ κῦμα δὲ πῦρ ἔμεινε καὶ παρὰ τὰ ὦτα δ' αὖτ' ὄψετο
δάκρυα δὲ πρὸς ἔσθ' ἐμὴν ἀνασάσκοντα ἰδὲ γαῖαν.*

*He kist the shore, fast teares ran from his eyes,
when he his native Countrey first espies.*

And *Seneca* (whither Philosophically or Rehero-
rically) observes, that obstinacy and resolvednesse
in

ingrerie, doth to alter the nature of it, *ut patet ex
dem infelicitis animi prava voluptas dolor.* That at
length it turnes into a kind of pleasant paine, sure
I am the Apostle biddeth us count it *Joy, when wee
fall into temptations.*

The last presence of Grief was *Reall*, when some
ponderous evill either of Affliction or of Sinne,
the losse of some good wherein we delighted, the
disappointment of some hope wheron we relied
meeting with impotency in our selves, o remove
what we suffer, to recover what wee lose, to supply
what we want, doth bruise and lie with a heavy
weight upon the tenderest part of Man, his Soule
and Spirit. And in this I cannot find considered
meerely in it selfe any worth at all (it being no-
thing else but the violation and wounding of Na-
ture) but in order the effects which it produ-
ceth, it may have sundry denomination, either of
a serviceable, or of a corrupt affection. I shal but
briefly name them, and passe over to the next.

The profitable effects are principally these:
First, as it is an instrument of publick administra-
tion & discipline. It as is it were both a School-
master and a Phisitian, to teach and to cure: so the
Philosopher telleth us that by pleasure and pain,
Children are trained up unto Arts and Sciences,
the Rod being unto the Mind, as a Rudder unto a
Ship: so the Prophet David putteth chastisement
and instruction together: *Blessed is the man whom
thou chastenest, and teachest out of thy Law,* and again,
*It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I
might learnethy Commandements.* Therefore God

*Et quædam
etiam dolendi
volupt.*
Plin. l. 8. ep. c. 6.

*Clem. Alex.
Pædag. l. 1. c. 8.
Ethic. l. 10. c. 1.
Calamitates
remedia
Sen. de Tranq.
l. 1. c. 9.
Psal. 94. 12.
Psal. 119. 71.
Ier. 22. 21.*

Grande doloris
Ingenium mi-
serisq; venit
solertia rebus.

Ethic 1.2.c.3.

Sen. de otio,
Sap. c. 4.

Epist. 67.

Ethic 3. c.8.

ὁ δὲ ἐσθλὸς
ἐσθλὸς καὶ
συμφορῆς ὕπο
φύων ἡσυχίας,
&c.

Enrip. Hec.
Vid. Plut. l. de
Adu'at. &
Amic. Consol.
ad Apollonium
Plut. de Aud.

the Law in the *wilderneffe*, where the people were in want and under discipline: to note that *Grief* is a good instrument unto learning; for after in their prosperity they would not hear.

And as it is a means to *teach*, so it is a means to *cure* too; for therefore paine is usually made the matter of punishment, that as Men offend by sinfull pleasure, so they may be amended by wholesome sorrow. Αἱ γὰρ ἰατρικαὶ διατὰ τῶν ἐν αἰτίῳ; Cures are usually wrought by contraries.

Again, it doth by *Experience* strengthen and harden, making both wise and able, for enduring further calamities, *quos Deus amat, indurat & exercet*. God exerciseth and traineth those whom he loves, bringing them up *non in deliciis sed in castris*, not in Paradise, but in a *Wilderneffe*. Now as the Philosopher speaketh, δυνάμει ἡ ἐμπειρία πρὸς ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἰσχυρίαν ἔστιν. Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour, whereby a man contemneth, τὰ κατὰ τῶν ἁλίων many things which are indeed, but *terriculamenta*, skar-crowes to ignorant and weak minds. VWhereas many pains have wrought patience, and patience experience of an issue and escape, that experience armes the Soule unto more patience in new assaults. For if God were a rationall creature, having past through the fire and kept his own Nature unviolated, it would never after be the lesse afraid of the fire. And as *Plutarch* excellently speaketh, A wise Man should be like gold to keep his Nature in the fire. Strangers dislike many things in a place, which those, that are home-born, and used unto, do easily digest: thus the Apostle argueth,

and Faculties of the Soul.

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arguerh, Gód hath delivered, and doth deliver ;
therefore he will deliver. So *Vlysses* in *Homer*.

2 Cor. I. 9, 10.

Τάισμαι ἐσθλῶσιν ἔχον ταραπνῆστα θυμῶν,
Ἦν γάρ μάλα πλῆλ' ἔπαυον.

Odyss. ε 222.

*I'll beare with a firm minde what ere comes more,
Having endur'd so many Griefes before,*

And else where on the same manner he incou-
raged his companions on the Sea.

Ὁ φίλοις οὐ γάρ ποτε κενὸν ἀδελφόνος ἔμην, &c.

Odyss. μ 268.

*Sirs, w'are not now to learne what sorrowes are,
Having felt so many; and this now by fayre
Comes short of that which we endured then,
When the proud Cyclops shut us in his den :
Yet that we scapt, he of his prey did misse,
Hereafter we shall joy to think of this .*

* *Plut. de Ad.
& Amic. & de
Sanit. tuenda.
Ut Crudum ad-
huc vulnus me-
dentium manus
reformidat, de-
inde patitur,
atq; ultro re-
quirit.
Sic Recens ani-
mi Dolor conso-
lationes rejicit
atq; refugit,
mox desiderat
& clementer
admotis acqui-
escit. Plin. Ep.
I. 5. c. 16.
Vid. Plut. Conf.
ad Apoll.*

* Thus as Iron which hath passed through the
fire, being quenched, is harder than it was before:
so the Mind having passed through troubles, is
the more hardened to endure them againe. And
therefore it is wise advice which learned Men
give, to let Griefes have a time to breath, and not
to endeavour the stopping of them, while they
are in *Impetu*, and in their first rising. As Phisit-
zans suffer humours to ripen. and gather to some
head before they apply medicines unto them.
When time hath a little concocted Griefe, and
experience hardened and instructed Nature to
stand

stand under it. It doth then willingly admit of those remedies, which being unreasonably applyed it rejecteth and resisteth.

Ovid. de Re-
med. Amor. l. i.

Ἐστὶ τὸ λίποντος
εἰ φίλος λέγει
"Ὅρ' ἐμὴ παῖδα.
γῶσ' ἐδὲν εἰ;
πλέον πῶ.
Sophoc. edip.
Tyr.

*Quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati
Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loca est.
Cum dederit lachrymas animumque expleverit agrum,
Ille dolor vel bis emoderandus erit.*

Who would forbid a Mother then to mourne,
When her Sons ashes are warme in his urne?
But when she's cloyd with tears, & sorrow's rage
Is over, Counsell then may Griefe asswage.

* Τὸν γὰρ εἶνον
τοῖς θεοῖς πῶν ἢ
γ' ἀναίσκηται
τὸν ἀνέρα ἴσο
ζέου ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ
ἀπαίρειται καὶ
ἀπαρτῆται, &c
Alexis.

Of this medi-
cine we read
in Homer.

Whereas before it doth rather exasperate than allay it. For of all Passions, this of Griefe doth least admit of a simple cure from the dictates of Reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may like unto * new Wine, *deservescere*, slack, and come to its just temper again.

The last profitable effect is *fear* and suspition, care or sollicitousnesse to avoid those evils which oppresse our Nature; a cautelous discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evils which Experience hath taught it to decline, as a burnt child the fire. For all Passions so long as they collect reason, and set that on work, are of good use in the minds of Men; and indeed, the counsels and communion of right reason alone, grounded on and guided by religion, are only that *Nepenthe* and medicine against Griefe, which who so mixeth
and

and Faculties of the Soule.

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and applyeth aright, shall not spend nor load himself with unuseful sorrow. Thus as Bees do poise themselves with little gravel stones, that they may not be carried away with the wind, which the Poet hath elegantly expressed :

— *sæpe Lapillo;*
Ut Cyruæ instabiles fluctu jactante saburram
Tollunt, his sese per inania nubila librant.

As ships with ballace, so the little Bee
With gravel's pois'd, that he may steady flee.

So patience and wisdom in the bearing of one sorrow, doth keep the mind in a stable condition against any other. A man doth never over grieve, that keeps his ears open to counsel, and his reason to judgement above his Passion.

The evil effects of grief commonly followe the excessse of it, and they respect the *Reason*, the *Will*, and the *Body*; in the *Reason*, it workes distractions, irresolution, and weaknesse, by drawing the main strain of it, rather to a fearful contemplation of its own misery, then to a fruitful discourse how to avoid it; for as the motions of a wounded Body, so the discourses of a wounded Mind are faint, uncertain, and tottering.

Secondly, in the *Will*, it worketh first *Despair*, for it being the property of *Grief* to condense, and as it were on all sides besiege the Mind, the more violent the Passion is, the lesse apparent are the Passages out of it. So that in an extre-

H h

mity

Odys. 8. 221.
Plin. L. 21. c. 21.
Plutarch.
Sympos. l. 1. c. 1.
Macrobi. l. 7. c. 1.
Clem. Alex. in
Protrept. Na-
zian. *Carmin.*
in nob. pa-
tris ad filium.

Georg. l. 4.
Plutarch. lib.
de solert. Ani-
mal.

Iliad τ 65.

Οὐκ ὁδ' εἰς ὅ π
βλέτω κακῶν
πολλῶν παρῶν
τῶν δὲ δ' αὖτε
μακρῶν, τὰ δ' ἔτι
ἔτι μὲν, ὅτι
λεῖ δ' ἐμείδων
αὐτὸν ἴσ' αὖ-
τιν, &c. Eurip.
Hecub.

mity of anguish where the passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weak to find them out, the Mind is constrained having no Object but its owne paine to reflect upon, to fall into a dark and fearful contemplation of its own sad estate, and marvellous high and pathetical aggravations of it, as if it were the greatest which any man felt. Not considering that it feels its own sorrow, but knows not the weight of other mens. Whereas if all the calamities of mortal men were heaped into one Storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equal portion, *Socrates* was wont to say that each man would rather chuse to goe away with his owne pain.

And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinful wishes and execrations both against it self and any thing that concurred to its being in misery; as we see in *Israel* in the wilcernes, and that mirror of Patience *Job* himself; and thus *Homer* bringeth in *Ulysses* in despair under a fore tempest bewailing himself.

Numb. 14. 2.
Iob 3. 1. and
Ier. 20. 14.
Isai. 8. 21.

Odisse 306:

Τεῖς μάλιστα Δαναοὶ καὶ πέτραις ἢ τι πύλλοντο, &c.

Thrice four times happy *Grecians* who did fall
To gratifie their friends under *Troy Wall* :
Oh that I there had rendred my last breath,
When *Trojan* darts made me a mark for death,
Then glorious Rites my Funeral had attended,
But now my life will be ignobly ended.

Another evil effect is to *indispose* and disable
for

and Faculties of the Soule.

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for *Duty*, both because *Grief* doth refrigerate (as the Philosopher telleth us) and that is the worst temper for Action; and also diverts the Mind from any thing but that which feeds it, and therefore *David* in his sorrow forgot to eat his bread, because eating and refreshing of Nature is a mitigating of Grief, as *Pliny* telleth us. And lastly, because it weakneth, distracteth and discourageth the Mind, making it soft and timorous, apt to bode evils unto it self.

— *Crudelis ubique luctus, ubique pavor.*

Grief and fear goe usually together.

And therefore when *Aeneas* was to encourage his friends unto Patience and Action, he was forced to dissemble his owne sorrow.

— *Curisq; ingentibus ager
Spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.*

Although with heavy cares and doubts distrest,
His looks fain'd hopes, and his heart griefs sup-
(prest.

And it is an excellent description in *Homer* of the fidelity of *Antilochus* when he was commanded to relate unto *Achilles* the sad news of *Patroclus* death.

— *Ἀντιλοχὸς ὁ Νηϊτιάδης μῦθον ἀνείρεται, &c.*

When Menelaus gave him this command,
Antilochus astonish'd did stand.

H h 2

Smitten

Arist. Prob.
Serl. 11.
Quest. 13.
liad. ω 130.
Μεγαμήνεος ὁδὸς
π' ὄφρα εἴη ἐν-
νῆς.

*Dolor Cibo
lenitur. Plin.*
l. 22. c. 14.

Ænead. 2.

Ænead. 1.
Consilium vul-
tu regit &c
spem fronte
serenat.
Ænead. 4.

In Naufragio
Rector laudan-
dus quem obrui-
it mare Gla-
vum tenentem.
Seneca ad Pe-
til. c. 6.

Arist. To. 2.
Orat. Rhodiaca.
Vide Odyss. 8
703. 716.

Iliad. x. 460.
Damascen. de
Orthodox. fid.
l. 2. c. 14.

* Εμπειρία
ἀπὸ τοῦ πόντου
ἐκείνου καὶ τῆς
ἐκείνου θύρας
ἐκείνης τῆς
ἐκείνης θύρας
ἐκείνης τῆς
ἐκείνης θύρας

Sophoc. Ajax.
a Sed videri in-
gratos inabes-
ciq; videndo
successus homi-
num; carpiq;
et carpiunt
una, supplici-
umq; suum est.

Ovid Met. 2.
Insitum est
mortalibus
natura recen-
tem alicorum
felicitatem
agris oculis
introspectere
Tac. Hist. l. 2.
Aut tibi ma-
lum quid aut
alteri Bonum
Evenit. Bion.

*Smitten with druncknesse through his griefe and feares.
His voyce was stopt, and his eyes swamme in teares.
Yet none of all this greife did duty stay,
He left his Armes whose weight might cause delay.
And went, and wept, and ran, with dolefull word,
That great Patroclus fell by Hectors sword.*

* In a tempest saith *Seneca*, that *Pilot* is to be commended, whom the shipwracke swalloweth up at the Sterne, with the Rudder in his hand.

And it was the greatest honour of *Mary Magdalen*, that when above all other, she wept for the losse of Christ, yet then of all other she was most diligent to seeke him.

Lastly, in the body there is no other Passion that doth produce stronger, or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of spirit, wasting of strength, drynesse of bones, exhausting of Nature. Griefe in the heart, is like a Moath in a garment, which biteth asunder, as it werethe strings and the strength thereof, stoppeth the voyce, looseth the joynts; withereth the flesh, shrivelleth the skin, dimmeth the eyes, cloudeth the countenance, defloureth the beauty, troubleth the bowels, in one word, disordereth the whole frame.

Now this Passion of grief is distributed into many inferiour kindes, as *Griefe of Sympathy* for the evils and calamities of other men, *as if they were our owne, considering that they may likewise befall us or ours which is called *mercy*, greif of *repining* at the good of another man, as if his happiness

happineſſe were our miſery : As that Pillar which was light unto Iſrael to guide them, was darkneſſe unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them; which is called *Envie*. Griefe of *Freſfullneſſe* at the proſperity of evill and unworthy men, which is called *Indignation*; griefe of *Indigence* when we finde our ſelves want thoſe good things which others enjoy, which we envy not unto them, but deſire to enjoy them our ſelves too, which is called *Emulation*; griefe of *Guilt* for evill committed, which is called *Repentance*; and griefe of *Fear* for evill expected, which is called *Deſpaire*; of which to diſcourſe would be over tedious, and many of them are moſt learnedly handled by *Ariſtoile* in his *Rhetoricks*. And therefore I ſhall here put an end to this Paſſion.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of the affections of Hope, the Object of it, Good Future, Poſſible, Difficult; of Regular and Inordinate deſpaire.



He next Ranks and Series, is of *Iraſcible Paſſions*, namely thoſe which reſpect their Object, as annexed unto ſome degree of *Difficulty*, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it, the firſt of which is *Hope*, whereby I underſtand an earneſt and ſtrong inclination

ad malevolum
quendam quæ-
riſtem aſpex.
it, Apud. Laert.
b Prov. 30. 21.
22. Pſal. 73. 12.
13. Job. 21. 7.
Eccleſ. 10. 5.
6. 7.
Marmoreo Li-
cinius Tumulo
jacet, & Cato
parvo, Paupei-
us nullo.
Patricios omnes
opibus cum pro-
vocet unus quo
ſondente gravis
iuveni mihi bar-
ba ſonabat, &c.
difficile eſt Sa-
tyram non ſcri-
bere. Iuvenal.
Satyr. 1. Vid.
Ariſtot.
Et hic lib. 2.
& Mag. Mo-
ral. l. 1.
Vid. Suidam
in Voc. Zupoc.

Iliad 2. 794.
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ
 αἰσχροῦ.
 Suid.
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἰσχροῦ.
 Clem. Alex.
 Strom. lib. 2.
 Spes quasi pes
 animi. I fid.
 Hispal. Orig.
 lib. 7. c. 2.

Contemplatio
 est spei in hoc
 spatio per si-
 dem, non Re-
 presentatio.
 Nec possessio
 sed expectatio.
 Tertull. de Re-
 sur. cap. 23.
 Rom. 8. 24.

Hebr. 11.

clination and expectation of some great good apprehended as *possible* to be obtained, though not by our own strength, nor without some intervenient *Difficulties*. I shall not collect those prayes which are commonly bestowed upon it, nor examine the contrary extreames of those who declame against it, making it a meanes either of augmenting an unexpected evill, before not sufficiently prevented, or of deflowring a future good too hastily pre-occupied, but shall onely touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it, with reference to it's Objects, Causes, and Effects.

Concerning the *Object* or fundamentall cause of *Hope*, It hath these three conditions in it, That it be a *Future*, a *Possible*, a *Difficuli Good*.

First, *Future*; for good present is the Object of our sense, but *Hope* is of things not seen; for herein is one principall difference betweene divine *Faith*, and divine *Hope*, that Faith being *ἐπιστάσις* *ἐπὶ ἐλπιζομένων*, The substance of things hoped for, hath ever respect to it's Object, as in some manner present and subsisting in the promises and first fruits which we have of it, so that the first effect of *Faith* is a present Interest and Title; but the operation of *Hope* is waiting and expectation; but yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the presence of an Object, the lesse he hath of *Hope* towards it, for though Hope be swallowed up in the compleat presence of it's Object, yet it is not at all diminished but increased

encreased rather by a partiall presence; and as in *massie Bodias* though violent motions be in the end weakest, as being furthest from the strength that impelled them, yet naturall are ever swiftest towards the Center, as nearest approaching unto the place that drawes them; so in the *Hopes* of men, though such as are violent and groundlesse prove weaker and weaker, and so break out at last into emptinesse and vapour: in which respect *Philosophers have called *Hope* the dreams of waking men; like that of the Musitian whom *Dionysius* deceived with an empty promise, of which I spake before: yet those that are stayed and naturall, are evermore strong, when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their Object, *Quo propius accedimus ad spem fruendi eo impatientius caremus.* The nearer wee come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it.

And the reason is because *Goodnesse* is better known, when it is in a nearer view of the understanding, and more united thereunto. And the more we have of the knowledge of goodness, the more we have of the Desire of it, if any part be absent. Besides all greedinesse is attractive, and therefore the more we know of it, the faster we hasten to it. And it is the nature of good to encrease the sense of the remainders of evill. So that though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good we have attained unto, yet the burthen and molestation of them

*Arist. apud La-
ertium l. 5.
Plato apud Cal.
Rhod. l. 12.
c. 2.
Arist Ethic.
lib 9^o & Plu-
tarch. de Au-
dit.
Plin. Epist.
lib. 6.
Epist. 1.
μεγαλοθυμίας
αυτοδυναμίας
2 Pet. 3. 12.*

them is increased, and therefore the more possession we have of good, the greater is our weariness of evill, and the more Nature feeleth her defects, the more doth shee desire her restauration.

The next condition in the Object of our *Hope* is *possibility*; for through the will sometimes being inordinate may be tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicate condition if they were not so, yet no hope whether regular or corrupt, can respect it's object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, hatred and despaire, the one being a proud opposition, the other a dreadfull flight from that good in which the mind perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but, a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true *meanes* unto an end hoped, and the *strength* of those *powers* which are to worke or bestow them; or if they be such ends as are wrought without any such meanes, by the bare and immediate hand of the worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the *will* and *power* of him that bestoweth it.

Here then because I finde not any arguments of large discourse in the opposite passion, (unlesse we would passe from natural or moral unto theologicall handling thereof) we may observe what manner of *despair* is only regular and allowable, I mean that which in matters of importance drives us out

out of our selves, or any presumption & opinion of our own sufficiency. But that despaire which riseth out of a groundlesse unbelieve of the Power, or distrust of the *goodnesse* of a superiour Agent (especially in those things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruines Nature: *defiles*, in that it conceives basely of God himself, in making our guilt more omnipotent then his Power, and sinne more hurtfull than he is good: *ruines*, in that the minde is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper meanes of recovery.

Of this kind of *Despaire*, there are three sorts: The one *Sensuall*, arising out of an excessive love of Good, Carnall, and Present; and out of a secure contempt of Good, Spirituall, and Future: like that of the Epicures, *Let us eat and drink while we may, To morrow we shall dye*: The other *Sluggish*, which disheartneth and indisposeth for Action, causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherein they conclude before hand that they shall not succeed: The third *Sorrowfull*, arising from deep and strong apprehensions of Feare, which betrayeth and hideth the succours upon which Hope should be sustained: as in the great Tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwrack; when the Sun and Stars were hid, and nothing but Terrour to be seen; *All Hope that they should be saved was taken away.*

The last condition in the object of Hope, was *Difficulty*, I mean in respect of our own abilities,

I Cor. 15.

*Desperatione
debilitati, ex-
periri nolunt
quod se assequi
posse diffidunt.
Cic. in Orat. ad
Brutum.]*

Al 27. 20.

*Spes perficiendi,
fi vires, pecu-
niâ, consilium,
scientiâ, appa-
ratiô. Cic. de
Invent. ad
Herenn.*

*Job 31. 24.
Jer. 17. 5.
Psal. 62. 9.
Rom. 3. 4.
Job 6. 15, 16.*

for the procuring of the Good we hope for; and therefore Hope hath not onely an eye to *Bonum*, the good desired; but to *Auxilium* too, the help which conferres it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his owne power to bestow upon himselfe; *Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco*, all Hope is an attendant Passion, and doth ever rely upon the *Wil* and *Power* of some superiour causes, by dependance whereupon it hath some good warrant to attaine its desires.

And thus in Divine Hope, God is in both respects the object of it, both *per modum Boni*, as the Good desired, & *per modum Auxilii*, as the *Ayde* whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt & foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the *Power* to help in some assistants; or concerning the *Wil* in others (as indeed generally a blind and mis-led judgement doth nourish Passion;) Of the former sort, are the Hopes of base & degenerate minds in their dependance upon second and subordinate meanes, without having recourse to the first supreme Cause; w^{ch} is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a lyar, either by Impotency, whereby he may faile us; or by Imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Of the other sort, are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground & warrant of such a confidence; whence ariseth a sluggish and carelesse securiry, blindly reposing it selfe upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them to our selves.

And this is the difference between Despaire and

and Presumption: Hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in it selfe; but withall as difficult to us, & not to be procured but by industry and labour. Now Despaire leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh onely on the hardnesse: on the other side, Presumption never regardeth the hardnesse, but buildeth onely upon the possibility. And this is *spes mortua*, that dead Hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of Hope, spoken of by St. Peter: For a lively Hope worketh such a tranquillity of minde, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is *Pax Luminosa*, a Peace springing out of Light; but dead Hope worketh a rest grounded onely on ignorance, such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather senselesnesse than peace: and this is *Tenebrosa Pax*, a peace springing out of Darknesse; for a true Peace is *quies ex fide*, a believing rest; but counterfeit is onely *quies ex somno*, a sleeping or dreaming rest: The Peace which comes from a living Hope must have these two properties in it, tranquillity and serenitty: otherwise it is but like the rest of *mare mortuum*, whose unmoveableness is not Nature but a curse.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the causes of Hope, Want, and Weaknesse together, Experience and Knowledge. In what sence Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and Knowledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more then Precept. Provision of Ayds: the uncertainty of outward means, to establish Hope, Goodnesse of Nature, Faith and Credulity, wise Confidence.

THe next things to be considered, are the *causes* of this Passion: the first impulsive cause of *Hope* is our *Want*, & our *Weaknesse* put together, the one driving us *ad Bonum*, to the *Object*; the other *ad Auxilium*, to the *Aid* (and wheresoever there is *Indigence*, there is *Impotence* likewise.) Now in what man soever we finde these two unsupplied, there is the root and fundamentall ground of *Hope*; notwithstanding for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite opposite passion, out of an apprehension of an inevitable subjection unto evil, and utter banishment from the fountaine of good. So then of those three estates of man; the estate of *Fruition*, which is their *Sabbath* and rest; the estate of *Travell*, which is the day of

of worke; and the estate of *damnation*, which is the *night* of despaire: in the first we have the accomplishment; in the third the finall overthrow; in the second the exercise of our Hopes: because in that alone our *Indigence* may by Gods fulnesse be filled, & our *Impotence* by his Will and Power supplied. In which respect, all men have roome for hope to enjoy God their last Good; though not a hope of *Confidence*, assurance, and *Expectation*, which is peculiar onely to the godly (who alone have a present interest in his promises;) yet such a generall Hope as may well suffice to stop the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are solicited to undervalue the Power, or to conclude the unwillingnesse of God to helpe us.

The next cause of Hope is *Experience* and knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the meanes conducing to the attainment thereof. For notwithstanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not tryall of our strength or others opposition, or of the difficulties of the Object, may with hot and eager mindes, worke presumptions of successe, and an empty and ungrounded Hope (which is the reason why young men and drunken men are both observed by *Aristotle* to be *indomitable*, men of strong Hopes) being naturally or by dis temper bold and opinionative: even as on the other side, strength and acutenesse of understanding; because it sees so farre into the Object, works often diffidence, slownesse and irresolution in our Hopes: as *Pliny* out of *Thucydides* observes; and the Philosoph^r er

Rhet. 1. 2. c. 12
Ethic. 1. 3. c. 8.

Lib. 4. Ep. 7.
Rhet. 1. 2. c. 23.

likewise of old men, that they are *σοφισμοῦ δια τὴν ἡλικίαν*, *men* slow in their Hopes; because of great experience; yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledg, as the later doth from some opinion of ignorance: For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, *Aristotle* saith, they are therefore confident, *quia se putant superiores*, because they believe much in their owne strength. And of a young man he saith in the same place of his Rhetoricks, *παῖς ὁδῶν*, *he* is *διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν*, they are peremptorie in the opinion of their own knowledge; whereas on the other side, as a lame man placed upon some high Tower, can over-view with his eyes more ground, than he hath hope to overrun with his feet in a whole day: so men that have attained unto some good pitch of knowledge, & are withall not insensible of their owne weaknes, out of the vastnes of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, doe easily frame unto themselves as narrow Hopes, as they doe large desires; but then this proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly; but onely it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.

So then properly *knowledge* and *experience* is the cause of *Hope*; experience I say, either of the conquerableness of the Object by our own meanes: or of the sufficiency of the Power, and readinesse of the Will of him from whom wee expect further assistance: For as there is lesse casualty, and by consequence more presumption to be had of

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an event of Art then of Fortune (the one proceeding from a govern'd, the other from a blinde and contingent cause) so consequently there is greater hope & confidence to be given to the successe of an enterprife, grounded on experience, than of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on. *Experience*, being as the Philosopher observeth, the Root of Art, as unexperience is of Fortune.

Now this *Experience* may be such, either as our selves have had, or such as we have observed other men to have; that which we have from our selves is the most forcible to induce this affection, because every man is the best measure of his owne abilities. And it is that which puts forth influence and force into all our actions; nothing could more assure the hopes of *David* in his encounter with *Goliath*, than an experience formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a Lion and a Beare, wherein notwithstanding they were the sheep of *Iesse*, and not of *God* that were endangered. Thus the eye of Faith and Hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprises: For though in some cases it be requisite with Saint *Paul* to forget that which is past, when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloath, wearinesse, and distrust; yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former successfull resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, & sharpen our languishing and sluggish Hopes. *O passi graviora*, was the least

Πένυ δὲ μᾶλλον
τοῖς ἀπειρημένοις
διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν
ἐκ γὰρ τούτου.
*Chilo apud La-
ert. l. 1.*

Met. l. 1. c. 1.

best Argument which hee could have used to put his fellowes in confidence of that which hee added :

—— *Dabit Deus his quoq; finem.*

Since that in greater griefes you have found ease, Doubt not, but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battell between *Scipio* and *Hanniball*, *ad amnem Ticinā*, though the victory by reason of the excellency of the Generall, fell to the adverse part ; yet the Roman Generall could not have used a more effectuell perswasion unto *Hope*, than when he told his Souldiers that they were to enter on a war with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome; *Cum ijs est vobis pugnandum quos priore bello terrā mariq; vicistis*: You are to joyne battell with those whom in the former Warre you conquered both by Land and Sea. A strong inducement ; though that in such a case, the *fear* of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, than the *hope* of a second victory perswade the other to courage and resolution. As we see in the hot battell between the Greeks and the Trojans, when *Hector* had driven the Grecians into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by *Homer*.

Τοῖσι δὲ μαρναμένοισιν ὁ δ' ἰὼ νῆος ἦτορ Ἀχαιοῖς
Οὐκ ἔρασαν θούζεσθαι ἔτι ἐν νηυσὶ, ἀλλ' ὀλέεσθαι
Τρώων δ' ἠλπίσιν ὀυμος, &c.

*These were the mutual motions did engage
The mindes of Greeks and Trojans on this rage.
The Grecians all despair'd i' escape the blow,
Deeming themselves neer to an overthrow :
But former Victory in those of Troy,
Kindled a hope another to enjoy :
They boldly promis'd to themselves the day,
The Grecians Ships to burn, and Them to slay.
Thus Hope of Victory enflam'd the one ;
Th' other were more enflam'd, 'cause they had none.*

That *Experience* from others, which may enliven and perfect our *Hope*, in the applying their examples and successes to our own encouragements. For since the nature of most men is like that of flocks, to tread in one anothers steps (Precedents having the same precedence to Reason in vulgar judgements, which a living and accompanying guide hath to a Mercuries finger in a Travellers conceit ; the one onely pointing to, but the other leading in the way). And as I finde it observed, that running Metal will sooner melt other of its own kinde, then fire alone: so the examples of Vertue will sooner allure and prevail with the mindes of men, to frame them to the like resolutions, then a naked and empty Speculation of Precepts. It hath pleas'd Nature to make man, not onely a Moral, but a Sociable creature, that

K k

so

Iliad. 9. 704.

*Quondam etiam
victis redit in
Præcordia vir-
tus, Victoresque
cadant. Ænei. 2*

*Forſan miſeros
meliora ſequen-
tur. Æneid. 12
Etiam ſi ſpero
non ſubeſſet, ne-
ceſſitas tamen
ſtimulare debe-
ret. Qu. Cur. l. 4*

so when his *Hopes* towards good should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the reason of *Precepts*, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious sense of *examples*.

Horace.

Magnas viros,
non Schola Epicuri,
sed consubermium fecit.
Sen. Ep. 6.

*Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam quæ sunt oculis commissa fidelibus* —

Those things more sluggishly our mindes excite,
Which enter at the ears, then at the sight.

Sight, which is the Sense of Example, is oftner employed in the government of our Passions, then *Hearing*, which is the Sense of *Precept*. And therefore when the Poet would fit an advice for the person of *Ascanius*, he doth not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble Natures.

— *Te animo repentem exempla tuorum,
Et pater Æneas & Avunculus excitet Hector.*

Recount the brave examples of thy blood,
And what thou hast in them seen great and good,
Let be thy Patern, that the World may see
Father and Uncle both alive in thee.

For though an Argument from Example, to prop a fainting Hope, be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect

respect of moral and perswasive insinuation , as inferring greater discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were brave instructions which *Agamemnon* gave unto *Menelaus* , when he commanded him to go into the Army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the Battel.

Φέρτερόν δ' ἵκνεν ἰν' αὖ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ἀνέχθαι
Πατρῶδ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ὀνομαζέων ἀνδρῶν ἔργων,
Ταῦτάς κ' αὖ δαίμων, &c.

*Run thorow the Army, cry, encourage all,
Minde them of their Progenitors, and call
Each by his Name ; praise them, and let us too
What we command to others, our selves do.*

It is true indeed that some men are blessed with a greater excellency of gifts then others; yet we are not to think that any man was ever made, as *Seneca* speaks of *Cato* , *In convivium humani generis*, for a reproach of mens weaknesse, rather then for an example and encouragement of their actions ; or for astonishment rather then emulation unto others : This being one end of Nature, in framing men of great vertues, not onely that we might wonder and believe , and know that the same things which for the greatnesse of them are the objects of our admiration , may as well for their possibility be the objects of our Hope, and the encouragements of our industry.

The third cause of *Hope*, may be large furniture with, or strong depédance upon the *assistant means*

*Non comenis
qui illum ad la-
borem impule-
rim, nunc me ip-
sum fugere. Te-
rent. Heaut.*

*Quo major fue-
ro, tanto plus
laborabo.*

*Maximius apud
Jul. Capitolinum.
Iliad. x. 67.*

*Si quid injunge-
re inferiori velis,
id prius in te ac-
tuos si ipse statu-
eris, facilius om-
nes obediētes
habeas. Liv. l. 26*

of what is hoped for. Helps in any enterprise, are in stead of head and hands, to advance a mans designe, which likewise is elegantly exprest by *Dionides* and *Saperton* in *Homer*.

Iliad. x. 222.
επε.

— Αἶψ' εἰ τις μετ' ἀνδρ' αἰδ' ἔποισιν καὶ ἀλλοῖς
Μᾶλλον θαλαπῶρην καὶ θαρσύνειν ἔσται
Σιωπῶν δ' ἐρχομένῳ, &c.

μ. 410.

*If any Second would accompany,
My hopes and courage would the greater be :
For when two joyn, the one may haply note
What th' other over-pass'd : or if he know 't,
His counsel would be weak, and his minde slow,
When he should execute what he does know.*

And according as these means which we relie upon, have more or lesse power or certainty in them, they are foundations of a more regular or corrupt *Hope*, such are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like : All which can be causes onely of a *hope of probability*, but not of *certainty*: because they are all means which are subject to miscarriage, and are also subject to the Providence of God, who onely can establish and give final security to our Hopes, as being such an Assistant in whom there is neither weaknesse nor mutability, which should move him to disappoint us.

2 Chron. 18.

20, 21.

Ezek. 29. 6, 7.

All other aids have two ill qualities in them : they have *wings*, and therefore can easily forsake us ; and they have *thorns*, and therefore if we lean too hard on them, they may chance, in stead of helping, to hurt us. The best promises which earthly

earthly aids can make, are bounded by a double condition.

Εἰ δύναμαι τὸ ἐν ἐπιτέλειαν ἔχει.

Iliad. ζ 391.

*If the thing lie within thy power to do,
And divine Providence permits it too.*

Here then we may discover Corruption in this Passion, when the minde ready upon every present apprehension to play the Prophet in forecasting future events, shall out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those means which it hath, so build unto it self peremptory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in it self light and opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which by a wise intermixture of fear and caution, might have been retained.

And as there is an error in the trust and assistance, so there may be in the use of those means: For though divine *Hope* hath but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced; yet those *lower Hopes*, of which I speak, do always depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdom of combining their aids, and of fitting them unto casual occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of lightnesse

Horat.

lightnesse and uncertainties, *Leves spes & certamina*, as the Poet calleth them; because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance; the not timeing or placing our actions right; the not accommodating our means to the variety of occasions; the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony; the having of our mindes either too light and voluble, or too fixed and constant; or too spread and wandring; or too narrow and contracted; or too credulous and facile; or too diffident and suspitious; or too peremptory, resolute, or hasty; or too slow, anxious, and discursive; or too witty and facetious; or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weakneses (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often, notwithstanding the good store of other aids, endanger and shipwrack the successe of our endeavours: so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something a like industry to be used, as in the trial of Mathematical Conclusions, the Mediums whereunto are so coupled and dependant upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vain, and to have all to do again.

Εἰς ἅπας οὖν πείσ-
ως συνήθησαν.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. l. 2.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 12.

A fourth cause of *Hope*, may be *Goodnesse and facility of Nature*, whereby we finde a disposition in our selves of readinesse to further any mans purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others; for it is the observation of *Aristotle* touching young men, *Sua ipsorum innocentia ceteros metuantur*. Their own goodnesse makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every mans prejudice

prejudice loves to finde his own will and opinion: so doth his charity to finde his own goodnesse in another man. They therefore who are soft and facile to yeeld, are likewise to believe, and dare trust them whom they are willing to pleasure. And this indeed is the Rule of Nature, which makes a mans self the *Patern* of what it makes his Neighbour the *Object*.

Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cause of *Hope*; to wit, *Faith* and *Credulity*, in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof: For promises are obligations, and men use to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their estate: so that the promises of an able friend, I esteem as part of my substance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of *Hope*, which according as the Authority whereon it relies, is more or lesse sufficient & constant, is likewise more or lesse evident & certain.

And in these two, the Corruption chiefly is not to let Judgement come between them and our Hopes.

For as he said of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oftentimes *sibi omnia fingunt*, they build more upon Imagination then Reality. And then if what *Tacitus* speaks in another sense, *fingunt, creduntque*, if our faculty feign assistances, and our credulity rely upon them, there wil issue no other then Ixions Hope, a Cloud for *Juno*. And therefore *Aristotle* out of an easinesse to Hope, collects in young men, an easinesse to be deceived: credulity very often meets with Impostures. And he
else-

Rhet. I. 1.

elsewhere placeth credulous, modest, quiet and friendly men amongst those who are obnoxious to injuries and abuses. Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others: and as once *Apelles*, to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtain for a Picture.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of *Hope*, is *wise confidence*, or a happie mixture of *Boldness*, *Constancie* and *Prudence* together; the one to put on upon an enterprize; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occur; and the third, to guide and manage our selves amidst those difficulties: For, as he said in Studies, so we may in Actions likewise (when thus swayed and balanced) *Alius ibunt, qui ad summa nituntur*: The further we set our aims, the more ground we shall get; and then,

— *Possunt quia posse videntur.*

When a man thinks, This he can do,
By thinking, he gets power too.

*Quintil. I. 1. in
Proem.
Magna indolis
signum est spe-
rare semper.
Flor. I. 4.*

Liv. I. 19.

* Liv. I. 25.
Τολμᾶν ἀνακλῆ
τύχην καὶ κῆν
μὴ τυχεῖν.
Eurip. Hec.

And unto this doth the Historian attribute all the successe of *Alexander's* great Victories, *Nihil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere*, his confidence judging them feasible, did by that means get thorow them. And though it was venterous; yet as the case might be, it was wise counsel which we finde in the same Historian; * *Audeamus quod credi non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficilissimum videtur,*

videtur, facillimum erit. Let us shew our courage in adventuring on some difficult enterprize, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted; and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easie: For our enemies will conclude that our strength is more than they discover when they see our attempts greater then they could suspect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy shooes, that they may begin to conquer the difficulty in the learning of the Art. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *dyōtēs iudōndos* bold men, are men of Hope; for boldnesse suffers not a man to be wanting to himself: and there are two Principles which encourage such men upon adventures; the one, *audentes fortuna jurat*; That resolution is usually favoured with successe; or if it misse of that * *Magnis tamen exidit ausis*; yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more than discredit of miscarriage in it.

Difficiliora debent esse que exercent, quod sit levius ipsū illud in quod exercent.

Quintil. l. 11.

cap. 2.

Arist. Ethic.

l. 3 c. 7.

Anead. 10.

* *Ovid Met. l. 2*

Tullius certe

per plana, sed

humilius &

depressius itur,

frequentior

currentibus,

quam reptan-

tibus lapsus, sed

bu non laben-

tibus nulla

laves, illis

nonnulla la ves

etiā si labatur.

Plin. l. 9. ep. 26.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the effects of Hope, Stability of Mind, Wearinesse, arising not out of Weaknesse, Impatience, Suspition, Curiosity; but out of Want, Contention, and forth-putting of the Mind. Patience under the Want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good desires, Waiting upon Ayde expected.



THE Effects of *Hope* follow, which I will but name: The first is to free the minde from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating, Instability, and Fearefulnesse thereof: For as the Philosopher telleth us, Fearefull men are *σουλόμενοι*, hard of *Hope*: and in this property, *Hope* is well compared unto an Anchor; because it keeps the minde in a firme and constant temper, without tottering and instability: for though there be but one *Hope* joyned with Certainty, as depending upon an immutable promise all other having ground of feare in them; yet this should be onely a feare of *Caution*, not of *Jealousie* and *Distrust*; because where there is *Distrust* in the meanes, there is for the most part Weaknesse in the use of them; and he who suspects the Ayde which he relies on, gives it just reason.

Philosophi quidam erant, qui a spe dicti sunt, Elpiciſti qui nihil eſſe pronunciarunt quod vitam magis contineretq; ſpes. Vid. Plut. Sympoſ. l. 4. q. 4

reason to faile and to neglect him. And therefore *Aristotle* hath set Hope and Confidence together, as was before noted, *ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν* a Good Hope is grounded on a Beliefe, and alwayes worketh some measure of Affiance in the meanes unto it.

A second Effect of *Hope*, is to work some kinde of Distaste and *Wearinesse* in our present condition, which according as it is good or evill, doth qualifie the Hope from whence it ariseth: for there is a distaste that ariseth out of *Weaknes*; like that of *Iob*, *My soule is weary of my life; I am a burthen unto my selfe*. Another that ariseth out of *Want*; That which ariseth upon *Weaknes* is a fickle and unconstant mutability of the Mind, whereby it desireth a continuall change of condition: which affection is wrought either out of *Impatience* of opposition; whence the mind upon the first difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and discouraged; or out of a *Sharpnesse of apprehension*, discovering Insufficiency in that wherein it desired content; or out of an *Error* and too high Estimation fore-conceived, which in the tryall disappoynting our *Hopes*, and not answering that Opinion, begins to be neglected as weak and deceitfull: or lastly out of *Curiosity* and Search, when wee suppose that those things which cannot in their nature, may at least in their varieties, number, yeeld some content: and as Sands, which are the smallest things asunder; yet being united, grow great & heavie: so these pleasures, which are alone light and worthlesse, may by their multi-

Iob 1. 6. 7. 20

*Spes inanes
quæ in medio
spatio frangū-
tur & corrumpū-
& ante in ipso
cursu obruantur
quam portum
conspicere
possunt. Cicer.
de Orat. l. 3.*

tude bring weight and satisfaction with them. Although herein the minde is likely most of all to finde *Solomons* Vanity; the union of things subordinate, and which have no Cognation each to other (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather Distraction than Tranquility in the minde; this *Wearinesse* then which springeth from the Unstaidnesse and Impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the effect of a proper *Hope* (as being an opposite rather to true contentment of minde, a vertue established, and not overthrowne by Hope) the *Wearinesse* then, which is wrought by the fore-cast & providence of a minde possessed with Hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptinesse and wants, which therefore we long to have removed, like that of *David*, *Wo is me that I am constrained to dwell in Mesech*; whereupon followeth,

The third Effect of *Hope*, which is an earnest contention of the minde, in the pursuit of that Good, which should perfect our Natures, and supply our wants. And this desire *Saint Paul* calleth *Gemitus Creatura*, the groaning of the Creature: which is set downe as a Consequence of the *Barneist Expectation of the Creature*: and indeed there is not any Passion, which doth so much imploy, and so little violate Reason, as this of *Hope* doth, it being an exciting Passion, which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the minde so earnestly breaths after; & the want whereof doth work such weaknes in it.

The

Psal. 120. 5.

*"Hant wae n
idm b ianora
nide.*

Etymolog.

Studium cum

se senescit.

Patet ul. l. i.

Acuit

industriam

cum spes

infecta est, &c.

Cic. ad Hier. l. 4

Etiam wphoriz tui

Davidu cu mha: r-

nos epho apay-

phor: u p aipon

pupitron xaxo

Max. Tyr.

dissert. 33.

The last effect of Hope, is a *Contented Repose* and *Patience* of the minde, resting it selfe in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this *Patience* is three-fold; a *Patience* under the *Want*; a *Patience* under the *Distance*; and a *Patience* under the difficulties of our desired Good; which holds especially in these *Hopes* (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will and disposition of another, whose pleasure it behooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, than by murmuring and discontent to provcke him, and disappoynt our selves. Hasty therefore and running *Hopes* are as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vaine and empty in their successe. He that Believes, and must by Faith depend upon Externall help, must not make haste, but be content to have his Expectations regulated, not by his owne greedinesse, but by anothers will.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Affection of 'Boldnesse. What it is. The Causes of it, strong Desires, strong Hopes, Aydes, Supplyes, Reall, or in Opinion. Despaire and Extremities, Experience, Ignorance, Religion, Innocency, Impudence, Shame, Immunitie from danger, Dexterity of Wit, strength of Love, Pride, or greatnesse of Minde and Abilities. The Effects of it, Execution of things advised, Temerity. &c.



O little in love have I ever bin with this affection of *Boldnes* (as I finde it managed by many, who make no other use of it, then children do of straw, with which they stuffe empty clothes, that they may look like men) as that when first I writ this Tractate, I passed it over rather as a Vice, then an Affection of the Soule, and said nothing of it. And being no more friends with it now then I was then, I should be contented to have left it out still; But that I would not have the Treatise defective in such a member, whereof there may be so good and so ill use made, as experience sheweth us there is of this. For as **Plutarch*

Plut. in Neria.
Πολὴν μανθία
πολλὴν δὲ λυγρὰ
Hom. γ.

notes

notes of Egypt, that it bringeth forth *multa venena, & multa salubria*, many good things, and many bad: like those Creatures, some parts whereof are poison, and others restorative: so may we say of the men in whom this Affection is predominant, that they are usually instruments either of much Good, or of much Evil to the places that nourish them: as once *Themistocles* his Tutor said of him. The best mixture that I can call to minde of this Passion, was in *Hannibal*, of whom the Historian tels us, that he was marvellous *Bold* to put upon Dangers; and yet marvellous *Wise* in managing of them: His courage not working Temerity, nor precipitating his resolutions: And his Counsell not working slownesse, nor retarding his courage.

Plut. in Themistoc. In Hannibale plurimum audacie ad capeffenda pericula plurimū Consilii inter ipsa pericula erat. Liv. l. 21.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Boldnesse then or Confidence, is (as the Philosopher describes it) a Hope joyned with fancy and opinion, that those things which are safe for us, are neare at hand; and those which are hurtfull, either are not at all, or are a far off, and cannot suddenly reach us: Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect Danger for the procuring of some difficult and Good thing, which we earnestly desire and hope for, in confidence to overcome and breakthrough that danger: For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldly to prosecute the Danger which opposeth him in his Hopes of Good. So that two things belong unto the formality of this passion. 1. *Vehemency of Hope*, whatsoever strengthneth that, causeth this, as Power, Experience, Friends, nearnesse of Ayds, and

Vid. Aquin. 12. 2. quest. 45. art. 3.

and the like. 2. *Exclusion of Feare*, whatsoever removeth that, increaseth this: As Distance from Danger, Freeneffe from Enemies, Cleannes from Injuries, &c.

The *Object* of this Passion is two fold. The Primary and Principall Object is some difficult worke under the Relation of a needfull Medium, to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Desired and hoped for. The *secondarie* Object, is some Evil and Danger, which standing between our Hope, and the Good for which we Hope, is by the vehemency of our Hope, as it were removed & despised in our Eyes. *Good earnestly desired*, and *Evill confidently despised*, are the things about which this Affection is conversant.

The Causes of this Affection are so many the more, because it is apt to be excited by cleane contrary Reasons.

The *fundamentall* and *principall* Cause of it, is *strength of Desire*, working vehemency of Hope. and impatency of Resistance, or Restraint from the thing desired: For Lust when it hath once conceived, will at last bring forth and finish, and rush forward to that after which it longeth, which the Philosopher calleth *πρόθυμα*, and Saint *Peter* *ἐκπόρευσις*, a pouring out of Passion, and the Prophet a *Breaking forth* and violent Eruption, a rash and Head-strong præcipitancy, which like a Torrent ventures upon any thing that withstands it. The Philosopher instanceth for this particular in adulterers, *ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἐκπορεύειν τὴν ἀμωρετικὴν ἐρῶν*. Who adventure on many bold Attempts for the satisfaction of their Lust.

But

Iam. 1. 14, 15.

Arist. Eth.

l. 7. c. 8.

1 Pet. 4. 4.

See my Treatise on the sinfulness of sin. p. 167.

Hos. 4. 2.

Ier. 6. 7.

8. 6.

Eth. 1. 3. c. 11

But because where there are strong Desires, there may bee weak Hopes, and great Feares, The one Discouraging, the other Deterring from the Prosecution of them, therefore to the emboldening of those Desires, other particular Causes doe usually concurre. Some whereof I shall enquire after.

I Then *strong Hopes*, and Ready, Present *Aydes*, and supplies proper to the End, which we would advance are Excellent meanes to generate Boldnesse. Great Aydes as the Catts *Vnum magnum*, or *many* Aydes, that if one faile, another may Hold. As greatnesse of wealth, friends, power, strength. And these in a Readinesse, and *neare* at hand. *ταὐτὰ ὑπὸ ἀλῆα ἔγλυς*, as the Philosopher expresseth it, as the Trojans being besieged when *Æneas* with his Armie drew neare, gathered courage above their feares.

Aux. { magna.
ilia. multa.
vicina.

Rhet. 1. 2. c. 5.

— *Clamorem ad sydera tollunt*
Dardanide e muris, spes addita suscitatur Iras,
Tela manu faciunt.

Æneid. 10.

joyes.
They all climd'd up the wals, thence fill'd with
Shouted as loud, as if they meant the noyse
Should wake the Stars; hopes added, stir'd up Ire;
And their Darts flew as swift as any fire.

And in Scriptures we are often quickened unto courage against the Difficulties of our Christian Warfare by the *Greatnesse*, and the *nearenesse* of the *Aydes*, and the *Reward* which we Hope

1 Tob. 4. 4.
Heb. 10. 36, 37.
1 am. 5. 8.
Revel. 22. 12.

Θαρσάλλοι οὐ-
μεθυσοῦντες
οὐκ ἐλπίδες γαί-
Ethic l. 3. c. 11.
Prov. 23 34.

Ἰσχυροτάτους
οἱ ἰσχυροτάτους
καὶ ἀμαθείας.
Ethic l. 7. c. 10.

Pradam vri-
us quam Ho-
stem incruen-
tus devicit.
Liv. lib. 9.
Iliad. β 873.
Plurach. lib.
de Homero.
Quam mini-
mum sis incor-
pore tuo spoli-
orum plures
computant
quam egerunt.
Senec. Epist. 14.

for. Yea, so strong a power hath Hope over the Resolutions of men that even the froth, and dreame and fancy of it in drunken men, maketh them as the Philosopher noteth, marvellous ventrous upon dangers, which Reason and sobriety would have taught them to feare. Solomon tells us of a Drunkard lying on the Top of a Mast, and I have my selfe seene a Drunken man climbe to the Top of a Steeple. Which boldnesse proceedeth in such men from weaknesse and wilfulnesse of selfe-conceit, and Opinion; for commonly that strength, which a Drunken man loseth in his Reason, he gathers in his Fancy: and as his judgment weakens, his Opinion encreaseth. And we shall never finde men more confident in their affirming, then when they know not what they affirme.

Now upon this Ground, that Hope is the great Quickner unto Courage, it was, that Alexander used it as an Argument to his Souldiers against the Persians, when he saw them come into the field cloathed so richly, that their Armes were much rather a Prey to the Greekes, then a Defence unto themselves, in which respect Homer thus derides *Amphimachus*.

Ὅς καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχει πολέμῳ δ' ἔνν ἤντε κέρη

Νίπτε ὅδε πῶς πύγ' ἀπέρχεται χρυσὸν ἄλεσπον.

Inglistering Gold, like a faire Damsell, clad

He came to fight: Vaine man why art so mad

To thinke that Iron is kept backe by gold?
Thou bring'st the price, for which thy selfe art sold.

And yet upon a contrary Reason, I finde one of the greatest and wisest Commanders of the world, *Iulius Caesar*, requiring of his Souldiers to carry Gold about them that the feare of losing that, might make them the more constant to their Resolutions.

Contrary unto this we shall often observe, that *Despaire* and *Extremities* doe put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more desperately then Cowards when they cannot flie, as the Historian noteth ^a of *Cn. Piso* a Confederate of *Cataline*, that by poverty he became desperate, and thereby emboldened unto that attempt, wherein he might either rise by the ruine of others (having neither merit nor Hope to rise by their favours) or at least not be ruined without company. ^b As that which shakes a Tree, doth often serve to settle and fasten it: So many times dangers and ^c extremities doe excite strength, as in the height of a Fever or Frenzie, men shew more strength and agility of body, then in their perfectest Health. And as they say of ^d Beasts, they bite with more venome and indignation when they are wounded, and ready to die. And therefore *Homer* expresseth the Dying of wounded Enemies by biting of the Ground; so utmost extremities of miseries make men put out the more boldnesse either in Revenge or new Attempts, because they may be better, but they

Mm 2

cannot

Sueton. in Iulio 97.

a Summa Audacia egens, factiosius quem ad perturbandam remp. Inopia, ac mali mores stimulant. Salust. b Plutarch. in Numa. c Sape contentus hostis cruentum certamen edidit. Liv. lib. 21. Spes desperatione quasita Patere. lib. 1. Ignavia necesse acuit, & spei saepe desperatio causa est Q. Cur. l. 5.

Dant animum ad loquendum libere ultime miseriae Liv. lib. 29. d Maxime mortiferi esse solent morsus morientium Animantium. Florus Iul. Capitol. in Maximo.

a Impunitatis
genus est non
habere pœna
lœcum. Senec.

cannot be worfe. a And it is a kind of Impunity to be so low as that a man hath not a condition to fall from.

b *Morieturque recepit. Quas nollet victurus aquas.*

In a famine a man will eat and drinke that which in plenty he could not have the courage to looke on. And this cause of boldnesse is thus exprest by the poet when he sheweth how the Youth of Troy, seeing their Citie burnt and sacked, grow unto a Desperate Resolution.

b Lucan.
Ænead 1.
c... fortuna
miserrima. ut
is est; nam timor
eventus
deterioris abest.
Ovid. de
Fon. l. 2.
Eleg. 2.

Vide Viget. de
re militar. l. 3.
c. 21.

*Sic Animis Iuvenum furor additus : Inde Lupi ceu
Raptores atra in Nebula quos improba ventris
Exegit Cacos rabies, catulq; relict
Faucibus expectant siccis, per Tela per hostes
Vadimus haud dubiam in mortem——*

*Thus youth did rage despairing of their lives,
Like Wolves of Prey, whom extreame hunger drives
From their yong thirsty whelps, through darke stormes;
Through darts and foes we rush on our owne harmes,
And being sure to die, dare that which feare
With Hope of Life would force us to forbear.*

Διὰ τὸ πολλὰ
κινῶντος τοῦ
πυρρός. Διὰ
τὸν, Εὐβίο. l. 3.
cap. 22.

Another cause of Boldnesse is Experience, when a man hath often done a thing with successe, often seen Dangers and escaped them, as Mariners at sea, found oher men, upon as small hopes as he himself hath, to go through the like matters without doubt or hesitation. For examples doe

and Faculties of the Soule.

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doe put Life, Hope, and Emulation into men, as we noted before, and we are incouraged sometimes rather to erre in good company, then to goe right alone, and this Argument *Æneas* used in the Poet.

*Vos & Scilleam rabiem, penitusq; sonantes
Accestis scopulos, Vos & Cyclopea saxa
Experti: revocate Animos, mastrumq; timorem
Mittite*——

You by Charibdis, and by Scylla say'd, (vail'd
Where waves through rocks did sound, nor hath pre-
'Gainst you that worser Rocks the Cyclops denne.
Then cast off feares, and shew your selves brave men.

And as Experience, so on the contrary side Ignorance is as usuall a cause of Confidence, as we see Children will put their fingers in the fire, and play with Serpents, as not acquainted with any hurt they can do for them. We may too often meet with men like waters or vessels, which the shallower and emptier they be, doe make the lowder noyse, and make use of other mens Ignorance to gaine Boldnesse and Credit to their own. To which purpose it is a grave expression of the Poet.

Οἱ γὰρ αἱ σοφῆς
θαυροὶ, καὶ ὅλ' αἱ μεσηκότες λέγειν.

Those whome wise men know for Dull;

With vulgar cares are wondrous Musick.

M m 3

And

* Vel error honestus est
magnos
duces sequen-
tibus. Quint.
lib. 1. cap. 6.

Ἡμῶν δὲ ἰδ' ἰσθ-
λαὶ ἔδ' ἰσθ-
μα. *Laert. in Arist.
Ethic. l. 3. c. 8.
& 10.
Plin. l. 4. Ep. 7.
Quo moritur
vix majoraque
viribus aude?
fallit te incau-
tum pietas sua.
Æn. 16
De Audacia
puerili vid.
Val. Max. l. 3.
c. 1.
Eurip. Hyppol.*

Iliad. p 638.

Quintil.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Q. Curt. lib. 4.
De impetu A-
nimorum di-
vinitus exci-
tato vid. Plu-
tarch. in. Corio.
Iudg. 6. 36.
Isai. 7. 11. 12.
2 Reg. 19. 29.
2 Sam. 5. 24.
Psal. 74. 9.
Exod. 17. 11.
1 Sam. 4. 7. 8.

And as Flies are esteemed very Bold Creatures, because they often returne to the same place: so the boldnesse of these kind of Speakers is usually discovered in vaine and emptie Tautologies, which is the reason why (as the O-rator noteth) they are usually more copious then far Learnedner men, *Quia doctis est electio & modus*, because able Speakers use choice and Iudgement in what they produce.

Another cause of Boldnesse in attempts may be *Religion*, and a Confidence of Divine Direction unto what we doe. *Iehu* his pretence unto zeale, was that which caused him to walke furiously. And in this case as the Historian speakes, *Melius vatibus quam Ducibus parent*. Men are apter to be led by their *Prophets* then by their *Captaines*. And we finde when God would encourage his People in their warres, he gave them signes and assurances for their faith to relie upon above their feares, that where *Reason* saw cause of Doubting, *Faith* might see all Defects suppli-ed in God; so to *Gideon*, to *Ahaʒ*, to *Hezekiah*, and others: and the Church complains of the want of them in their times of Calamity. We see not our signes, neither is there amongst us any Prophet or any one that knoweth how long. When *Iofuah* did fight, *Moses* did pray, and *Israel* was more encouraged by the intercession of the one, then by the valour of the other. And the *Philistines* were never more affrighted, then when *Israel* brought forth the Arke of God against them; for as *Aiax* said in the Poet,

and Faculties of the Soule.

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Εἰ τις θεῶν
βλαπτεῖ, φύσει αὐτὸ ὁ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα.

— If God will fight,
He can make weak men put the strong to flight.

And therefore *Tolumnius* the Soothsayer having received happy *Auguria*, doth thereupon grow to Resolutions of courage,

*Hec erat, Hoc votis, inquit, quod sepe petivi,
Accipio, agnosceq; Deos; me, me duce ferrum
Corripite ô Rutili.*

*This, This is that which in my secret thought
I still desir'd, and now finde what I sought;
The Divine Tokens I embrace and see;
Come Souldiers, Take your swords and follow me.*

Unto this Head of Religion belongeth *Innocency*, as a most excellent cause of *Boldnesse*; for the *Righteous* is bold as a *Lion*, which careth not though a multitude of shepherds come out against him. And the Philosopher tels us that they who have done no wrong unto others, are confident of successe in their Attempts, beleeving that they shall finde no Enemies, because they have provok'd none. A notable Example whereof wee have in *M. Publius Furius* the Roman Consul, who was so confident of his owne Integrity in publike Administration, that being deputed by lot to governe the Province of Spaine, hee chose the two bitterest Enemies that

*Sephoel, Ajax
vid. Ezek. 21.*

*Aeneid. 12.
— Priscum
de more Latini
Auspicium;
tum bella parant
mentesque deorum
Explorant
super Evenus,
&c.
Sil. Ital. lib. 5.*

*Prov. 21. 21.
Isai. 31. 4.
Vid. Iliad.
γ 23.
Rhet. 1. 2. c. 5.*

*Val. Max. 1. 3.
c. 7. vid. haud
dissimile Exem-
plum Catonis.
Plutarch. de
util. ex Hostib.
capiend.*

that he had in the City to be Coadjutors with him in that Dispensation. Whereunto may be added the Answer which *Drusus* gave to him who would have contrived his house for secrecie, when he told him that he would wish his house were pervious and transparent that privatest Actions might be seen in publick.

And as Religion and Innocencie, so on the other side *Debusshnesse* and *Desperatenesse* of living doth implant a marvellous Boldnesse in the Mindes and faces of men, when they have no Modesty or shame to restrain them. As we see in Gypies, Parasites, Jugglers, *δαμναστοι*, *neurospastæ*, and such like. And therefore such kind of men both in Scripture and in other writings, are said to have faces of brasse, and necks of Iron, whorish and impudent foreheads that cannot blush nor be ashamed; and these words, *σπένια ἀνδροῦν*, *εὐτολμία*, we shall finde for synonymies and of equall signification, whereof the former signifie Despaire, Impudence; and the other Boldnesse.

Againe, as Impudence, so *Shame* and feare of Disgrace is a great Cause of *Boldnesse*, in vertuous and honourable Attempts; for there is no Man of generous principles, but will much rather chuse an honorable danger then a fardid safety, and adventure his *Person* before hee will shipwrack his honesty or *good name*, choosing ever to regulate his Behaviour rather by a *morall* then a *naturall* feare, to give an account of himselfe rather to those that love his *vertues*, then to those who love his *fortunes*. In one word stand-

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Κυράντις apud
Homerum.

Jer 3.3.

Isai. 48.4.

Ezek 16.30.

Os ferreum. Cic
in Pisonem. Iul.

Pollux. l. 3. c. 28

Plutarch in

Alcibiad.

Theophrast.

ἐπὶ ἀπειθείας.

Arist. Ethic. l. 3.

cap 9.

Πολυδαμίας
μοὶ πρὸς ἑ-
λεγκτὴν ἀν-
δρῆν.

ding more in awe of mens *Hearts* then of their *Hands*, and shunning more a *Iust Reprehension* then an *Unjust Injury*. And to this purpose it is gravely observed by the Historian, that the dishonour which the Romans suffred *ad furcas Candidas*, was that which procured their adversaries a bloody overthrow afterward, *quia Ignominia nec Amicos parat, nec Inimicos tollit*. Their saving of the lives of the Romans to bring Ignominy upon them, being esteemed not a benefit, but a scorne: a very like example we have hereunto in the servants of *David*, abused and put to shame by *Hannun* the sonne of *Ammon*. And thus the Poet expresseth the courage of *Dares* revived by the fall which he had from *Entillus*:

*At non tardatus casu, nec territuss heros,
Acrior ad pugnam redit, & vim suscitatur ira,
Tum pudor incendit vires & conscia Virtus.*

Dares no whit dismay'd, renewes the fight
With a more eager force, wrath doth excite
The stouter courage, Shame with Valour met,
Inflam'd his minde, and did his weapon whet.

Another cause of Boldnesse, is *Immunity* from Danger, or at least a *Ferfaiiousnesse* and *Dexterity* of wit to evade it, or shift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not always second their contrivances with Execution, nor let their hand goe in Equipage with their wit; yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are so far in love

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with

2. Sam. 10.
Mixtus dolor
& pudor ar-
mat in Hostes.
Ænead. 10.
Tu ne cede ma-
lis, sed contra
audentior iso.
Ænead. l. 5.
Arist. Eth.
l. 3. c. 11.

Qui ad fraudem
callidi sunt, non
tantum audens
quantum ex-
cogitant. Cic.
pro Cluentio.

Plut. Apoph.

Plut. in Sylla.
Consilium in
arena. Seneca.
ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αἵματι
τοῦ ἐν τῷ θυμῷ
τοῦ γὰρ.
Soph. Antig.

Audacem faci-
ebat Amor.
Ovid Met. 4.

A. Gell. 1. 3. c. 7.

A. Gell. 1. 6. c. 8.
Vile est corpus
his qui magnam
gloriam querunt.
Liv. 1. 2.

with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards, to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of danger, which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as *Darius* was wont to say of himselfe, that in a pinch and extremity of perill he was ever wisest: and *Sylla* gave the same judgment of himselfe, that he came off best in those businesies, which he was most suddenly put upon; which also I finde observed in the Character of our *Henry* the seventh (who hath had the felicity above all his prædecessors, to have his lineaments drawne by the ablest pen that hath imployed it self in our Story) that his wit was ever sharpened by Danger, and that he had a greater *Dexterity* to evade, then providence to prevent them.

Another cause of Boldnesse (as I have formerly noted on that Passion) is *strength of Love*, as we see weake Creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong; and the Tribune in *A. Gellius*, out of Love either of his Country, or of Glory, did not only advice, but himself undertake the executing of a service wherein he was before-hand certain to perish. And the same Author telleth us of *Euclide*, a Disciple of *Socrates*, who ventured in a disguise upon the evident danger of his Life to enjoy the Discourses and Counsels of his Master.

Lastly *Pride*, *greatnesse of Minde* or Parts, and opinion of Merit; especially if it meet with discontentednesse and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new Attempts :

Attempts : For it is a very hard thing when great *Abilities* and vast *Hopes* meet together, to governe them with moderation : Private Ends being in that case very apt to engage a mans parts, and to take them off from publicke service unto particular advantage. And therefore I take it there is no temper of Minde that will with an evennesse and uniformity of proceeding, or felicity of successe, promote publicke and honourable Ends, as cause in that case a man can never stand in his own *Height of Abilities*, with *moderation of Desires* ; be- light, nor have any mist or obstacle between his Eye and his End.

Now from this ground I beleve did arise that *Maxime* of some of the Sates of Greece noted by *Tully*, and at large debated by the Philosophers, *Nemo de vobis unus excellat*, that they would not have one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest, and thereupon instituted *Ostracisme*, or an honourable Banishment, as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men: or to satisfie and assuage the Envy which others might conceive against them, who are apt to hate the vertues which they can onely admire : or lastly, to prevent the dangers which greatnesse of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause, might haply venture to bring upon things. Vpon this ground the Ephesians expelled *Hermodorus* ; and the Athenians *Aristides*, because he was too just for the rest of the people. As one Voice in a Confort, which is loud above the proportion of the rest, doth not adorn,

Cic. Tusc. 9 l. 5.
Arist. Polit.
l. 3. c. 13.
Plus in Alcib.
& Aristid. ex
Nicia.
Eandem virtu-
tem & oderant
& mirabantur.
Liv. l. 5,

Tacit. vit. Agr.
Ammian. l. 15.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
ἀμφοτέρωθεν
μαστὶς εἰ δ' αὖ-
τὸν ἀποτρίβου-
μαχόμενοι.

Iliad. v. 170.
Φίλοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐν
ὄψεσιν αὐτῶν
ἀλλ' ἐν θυμῷ.
Sapo. Elektr.
Liv. l. 22.

Semper in pra-
lio in maximum
est periculum
que maxime
timeant. Audacia.
pro muro est. Sa-
lust. eat Cat.

Theoc. Idyll. 15.
a Malo se sapi-
ent hostis me-
tuit quam stulti
Cives laudent
omnia audentem
contemnet tian-
nibal. Liv. l. 22

Arist. Eth.
l. 3. c. 7.

Novi ego istos
in pace leones,
in praelio Cer-
vos. Tertull. de
Coron.

but disturbe the Harmony, and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under *Envy* or *Jealousie*. Mens minds out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good, which might be abused unto Evill, which *Tacitus* noted to have been the quality of *Domitian*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* of *Constantinus* towards men of the greatest worth.

Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men, so it worketh two different Effects.

1 There is a *Happy* and *Discreet* boldnesse, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the minde, and doth first call out and stirre up it selfe by wisdom, before it proceed unto Action or Execution: like the Boldnesse of the Lyon, which is *Slow*, but at last prospers in what it undertakes. For after Counsell hath ripened Resolutions, Boldnesse is then the best Instrument to accomplish them, and in that case, *quo minus timoris, minus ferme periculi*, as the Historian speaks. The lesse feares are, the lesse also are their dangers, and the greater their Confidence, the surer their successe:

— 'Ες Τρώας περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἡλδον Ἀχαιοί.

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy
Their ten yeares wish, and gained Troy.

2 There is a *hasty* and *rash* Boldnesse, which beginning too speedily without Counsell doth usually end too Cowardly, without Courage; for rash men

men whom the Philosopher calls *degeneros*, men made up of confidence and feare, are bold and boasting before a Danger; but in it very timorous, or at least inconstant. *Lyons* in peace, but *Harts* in warre, as *Tertullians* proverb hath it. ^a Like those of whom *Livy* and *Florus* tell us, That they were more then men in the onset, and lesse then women in the issue, melting away from their Resolutions like Snow.

And another ill property of the Rashnesse of this Passion, is, That it will expose a man to more danger than the successe which it aimes at can compensate: as he that fishes for a Gudgeon with a golden hooke: or as *Vlysses* who went backe to the Cyclops his denne to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men *Overvalue themselves* and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like ^b *Menelams* in the poet, who would venture to fight with *Hector*; or *Aristoxenus* in *Tully*, who being a Musitian, would needs determine in questions of Philosophy.

Lastly it hath a property as we say, to *breake the Ice*, and to give the first onset upon dangerous Attempts, which is a thing of very perillous consequence, not only to the Author, but many times to the publick peace too, ^c forward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.

^a Liv. l. 10. c. 1. 38. Flor. l. 2. c. 4. Temeritas ubi primum impetum effudit, velut quadam animalia amisso aculeo torpet. Q. Curtius. l. 4. Cum ultimi discriminis tempus advenit in sollicitudinem versa fiducia est. ih. c. 3.

^b Plut in Cat. c. lliad. n. 97. l. 12. Tusc. q. l. 1.

^c Propere sequi quæ piger inchoare. Tacit. Magis enim Author ad seditionem quam Animus deerat. Liv. l. 26.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Passion of Feare: the Causes of it; Impotency, Obnoxiousnesse, Suddenness, Neernesse, Newnesse, Conscience, Ignorance of an Evill.

*Vide Laert. in.
Zenon. l. 7.*



He opposite Passion to this of Hope is *Feare*: which being an Equivocall Passion, and admitting of many different kinds, can scarce have any whole and simple definition to explaine it. There is a Vertuous Feare; a Feare of Sinne and Shame; an intellectuall Feare of *Admiration*, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye; a Feare of *Reverence*; an *Astonishing* Feare, by reason of the *Newnesse*; and an *Oppressing* Feare, by reason of the *Neernesse* and Inavoydableness of the Evill feared. It is a Griefe, Trouble, Flight, Averfation of some approaching Evill apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthensome to our nature, and not easily resistable by our strength: For the qualification of the Object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope (save in the Evill of it) I shall therefore forbear to touch it, and shall onely in briebe consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects.

Fear is an humbling & debasing Passion, which
always

always importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth : So then as in the former Passion of *Hope* I noted the fundamentall cause thereof to be *Weaknesse* and *Want* : so likewise in this of *Feare*, the Root and first Principle is *Weaknesse* and *Subjection* ; whereof the one implies a disability in us to rest ; the other a necessity to undergoe an evill.

Hence it is that wee feare the displeasure of Great men ; or the Power of Vnjust men ; or the Competition of Popular and Plausible men ; or the Cunning of Close and Malitious men ; or the Revenge of Provoked men ; or the guilt of Injurious men that have wronged us already : because in all these cases there is some notice of Weaknesse and Subjection in us : so that Feare is of all other a naked Passion : For as Nakednesse hath three evill properties ; to disable for defence ; to expose to Injury ; and from both to work shame in the conscioussnesse of our dejected condition : So likewise *Feare* hath three properties ; to make us *Impotent* and *Obnoxious* ; and from both these to beget *Shame*. For though his speech was true, *Rubor est virtutis color*, that Shame and Vertue have the same colour (which makes it seeme a companion rather of Perfection then of Weaknesse ;) yet indeed it is rather a signe of a mind vertuoussly disposed in testifying the quick apprehensivenesse of its own defects, then any Adjunct of Vertue it selfe.

So then the Roots of this Passion are *Weaknesse* and *Subjection* both together ; so that where either condition

Rhet. 1. 2. c. 5.

Diogenes apud
Laert. l. 6.
Πᾶς ἐπιθυμίας
καὶ φόβου εἶναι
τοὺς δόκους.
Alexander.

condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of *Feare*, and therefore wee see sundry times strength takes off the yoke of Obedience, not only in the civill government of men, but in the naturall government of creatures by men, to whom by the law of Creation they are all made subject; yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their originall Subjection, and in stead of Fearing, to terrifie man their lord; and when ever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition, this is not so much an act of our *Dominion*, whereby we awe them, as our *Reason*, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholden more therein to the working of our Wit, then to the prerogative of our Nature; and usually every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its owne abilities, the more it hath of *Strength*, the lesse it hath of *Feare*; that which *Solomon* makes the strongest, the Apostle the fittest to expell Feare, to wit, Love.

So likewise on the other side, *Immunity from Subjection* in the midst of Weaknesse removes *Feare*. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their Weaknesse, yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary or mercy of their Iudge they are free from the obligation of the law, though not from the Offence, their former Feares doe presently turne into Joy and Gratulations: and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnesse, Confidence, and Courage, that they can bid defiance unto Death; because though they be not quite delivered from
the

the Corruption, yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of Sinne; though by reason of their weaknesse they are not delivered from the mouth; yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death; though not from the Earth of the Grave, yet from the Hell of the Grave; though not from Sinne; yet from the Strength and Malediction of Sinne: the Law our Adversary must be strong, as well as our selves weak, if he look for Feare.

The corruption then of this passion, as it dependeth upon these Causes, is when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our owne, or too high of anothers strength; the one proceeding from an error of Humility, in undervaluing our selves; the other from an error of Judgement or suspicion in mistaking of others. There are some men who, as the Orator speaks of despairing Wits, *De viribus suis pessimè merentur*, who are too unthankfull unto Nature in a slight esteeme of the abilities shee hath given them, and deserve that Weaknesse which they unjustly complaine of: the sight of whose Judgment is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses, the two ends whereof have a double representation; the one fuller and nearer the truth; the other smaller and at a farre greater distance: So it is with men of this temper, they look on themselves & others with a double prejudice; on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing Judgement, which presents every thing remote and small; on Others with an over-valuing and Admiring Judgement, which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect. And by this

meanes between a self-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever fals to the ground, and for revenge of her selfe, leaves the party thus distempered, alwayes timorous. For as Errour hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about: so principally this present Passion; because Errour it self is a kinde of *Formido intellectus*, a Fear of the Understanding: and it is no great wonder for one Fear to beget another. And therefore when Christ would take away the Feare of his Disciples, he first removes their prejudice: Fear not those that can kill the Body onely, and can doe no more. Where the over-flowing of their Fears seems to have been grounded on the over-judging of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and Essentiall cause of Fear: these which follow are more casuall and upon occasion.

Whereof the first may be the *Suddenesse of an Evill*, when it ceiseth upon (as it were) in the dark: for all darknesse is comfortlesse: and therefore the last terrible Judgement is described unto us by the Blacknesse and Unexpectednesse of it, by the Darknesse of Night, and the suddennesse of Lightning. All Unacquaintance then and Ignorance of an approaching Evill, must needs work Amazement & Terrour: as contrarily a foresight thereof worketh Patience to undergoe, and Boldnesse to encounter it: as *Tacitus* speaks of *Cacina*, *Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoque intrepidus*, that he was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore not

*Præ ceteris
Hostibus ti-
mentur Repen-
tini. Ammian.
Marc. l. 28.*

*Mala prævisa
sunt Leviora.
Cic. Tusc. q. 1. 3.
Annal. l. 1.*

not fearefull of them. And there is good reason for this, because in a sudden daunt and onset of an unexpected evill, the spirits which were before orderly carryed by their severall due motions unto their naturall works, are upon this strange appearance and instant Oppression of danger so disordered, mixed, and stilled, that there is no power left either in the Soule for Counsell, or in the Body for Execution: For as it is in the wars of men, so of Passions, those are more terrible, which are by way of Invasion, then of Battell, which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed; then those which finde them prepared for resistance: and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the Suddenesse of the one side, and the Ignorance of the other:

Invadunt urbem somno vinoq; sepultam.

They doe invade a City all at rest,
Which ryot had with sleep and Wine opprest.

And this is one reason why men inclinable to this passion, are commonly more fearefull in the Night then at other times; because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on, when the spirits which should strengthen, are more retired, and Reason lesse guarded.

And yet there are Evills too, which on the other side more affright with their long expectation and train, then if they were more contracted

*Dum ea parte
qua murus di-
rutus erat sta-
tiones armatas
opponunt.*

*Quintius vo-
ca ab ea par-
te, qua minime
suspecta erat
impetu facto
scatis cepit.
Liv. l. 32.*

Sen. Ep. 14.

and speedy. Some set upon us by stealth, affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze: others with a traine and pompe like a *Comet* which is ushered in with a streame of fire, and like Thunder, which hurts not onely with its danger, but with its noise: and therefore *Aristotle* reckoneth *ομιλία τῆς φοβῆς*, the signes of an approaching evill amongst the Objects of Feare.

Another cause of Fear may be the *Neerenesse* of an *Evill*, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us: For as it is with Objects of Sence, in a distance of place, so it is with the Objects of Passion, in a distance of Time; *Remotion* in either, the greater it is, the lesse present it makes the Object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression there-from upon the faculty: and this reason *Aristotle* gives why Death, which else-where hee makes the most terrible evill unto Nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, worke such terroure and amazement, nor so stifle Reason and the Spirits, as Objects farre lesse in themselves injurious to Nature, but yet presented with a determined *Neerenesse*. And the reason is plaine, because no Evill hurts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature, but of its *Vnion*: and all *Proximity* is a degree of *Vnion*. For although *Futurity* be a necessary condition required in the Object, which must inferre *Feare*; yet all Evill, the lesse it hath *de Futuro*, the more it hath *de Terribili*: which is the reason why that Caruall Security,

curity, which is opposed to the feare of God, is described in the Scripture, by putting the Evill Day farre from us, vi. v. as in a Landskip and at a great distance the terrour of that Day. And if here the ~~Atheists~~ Argument be objected, Let us eate and drink, for to morrow we shall dye; Where the propinquity of Ruine is made an inducement unto Ryot: We must answer, that an Atheist is herein both right and vaine, in that he conceiveth Annihilation, or never more to be, the best close of a wicked life; and therefore most earnestly (though most vainly) desireth that it may be the issue of his Epicurisme and Sensuality. And here briefly the corruption of Feare in this particuler is, when it takes advantage by the approach of Evill, to swell so high as to sink Reason, and to grow bigger then the Evill which it is afraid of.

— — — *propiusq; periclo*
It Timor, & major Martis jam apparet imago.

Their Feare gets closer then the thing it feares,
Warres Image bigger then it selfe appears.

For as it is a signe of distemper in the Body, when the unequall distribution of nourishment and humours causeth some parts to exceed their due proportion of greatnesse: so is it likewise in the faculties of the Mind, when the Inferiour grow high and strong; if Reason raise not it selfe to such a proportion, as still to maintaine and

Enead. 8.
In metu & pe-
riculo plura &
majora viden-
tur metuentibus
cum creduntur
facilins, tum
inguntur im-
punitus. Cic. de
Divinat. l. 2.

manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed onely of the Rising and Strength, not of the Humility and Descent of Reason: For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keep it selfe up above rebellion; yet is it not necessary that it should stoup and sink according to the lownesse or sordidnesse of any Passion. As in the Body, though we would have all parts increase alike; yet if one part by distemper grow weak, we require in the rest a fellow-feeling, not a fellow-languishing; yea indeed in both cases, where the inferiour part is weaker, it is the course of Nature and Art to fortifie the higher; because in a Superiour there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth, as to suppress and keep under that which rebelleth.

Another cause of Feare may be * *Newnesse of Evill*: When it is such, wherewith neither the Minde it selfe hath had any preceeding encounter, whereby to judge of its own Strength; nor any example of some other mans prosperous issue to confirme its hopes in the like successe: For as before I noted out of the Philosopher, Experience is in stead of Armour, and is a kind of Fortitude, enabling both to judge and to beare troubles: for there are some things which he elegantly calleth them, τὰ κενὰ κινδύνη, *Emptie Dangers*: Epictetus calleth them, μαρμαλάκια καὶ περισπῆσις, Scar-crowes, and Vizors, which children feare onely out of Ignorance: as soon as they are known, they cease to be terrible. As the log of timber which was cast

* Ne fama aut
rem in majus
extolleret aut
militū animos
verū novitate
terreret.

Iustin. l. 14.
* Β' πολλὰς τῶν φόβος
ἐν φασίας
ἀσυνείδως ἵτα
ἀποροδὲ καὶ φαν-
τασίου.

Clem. Alex.

Strom. l. 2.

Eth. l. 3. c. 7.

Arrian. Epist.

l. 2. c. 1.

Nam veluti
pueri trepidant,
atq; omnia
caecis in tene-
bris metuntur:
ita nos in luce
timemus. Lucr.

cast into the pond, did with the first noise exceedingly affright the Frogs, which afterwards when it lay quietly, they securely swam about. And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cause that a man can set no bounds to his Fear. I grieve for so much Evill as *hath* befallen me; but I feare so much as *may* befall me; and the more strong and working my *Fancy*, the greater my *Feare*; because what I cannot measure by *Knowledge*, I measure by *Imagination*; the figments of *Fancy* doe usually exceed Truth.

And from this *Ignorance* likewise it is, that Timorous men are usually *Inquisitive*, as the Philosopher notes; and so the Prophet expresseth the feare of the Idumeans in Warre, *Watchman! What of the night? Watchman! What of the Night?* Feare usually doubleth the same questions, as Griefe doth the same Complaints. Therefore men in a fright and amazement, looke one another in the face; one mans countenance, as it were asking counsell of another: and once more from hence grow the *Irresolutions* of Timorous men, because they know not what to doe, nor which way to flye the things they feare: in which respect they are said to flie from an Enemy *seven wayes*, as ever suspecting they are in the worst. *Pavidi semper Consilia in incerto*, they never can have fixed and composed Counsels: and it is the usuall voice of Men in their Feares, I know not what to doe, I know not which way to turne my selfe; *Trembling of Heart*, and *Failing of Eyes*, Blindnesse and Astonishment, *Ignorance* and

Feare

Plin. l. 8. ep. 18.
Veror omnia,
imaginor om-
nia queq; na-
tura metuen-
tiū est, ea max-
imè mihi que
maximè abo-
minor, fingo.
Plin. l. 6. ep. 4.
Vid. Sen. ep. 13
Prob. Sest. 14.
q. 15.

Isa. 13. 8. 21. 11
Ier. 51. 31.
Gen. 42. 1.
Μαθρ σκαυτε
λιτοι εγω η γαλα
ρεισται η λαω
μου η α' α' ποριε
Sibol. in Soph.
Deut. 28. 25.
la magnis dif-
ficultatibus
semper presen-
tia fugimus
tanquam max-
ime periculo.
Plat. in Mario.
Deut. 28. 28.
95.

Laert in Zenon. l. 7.

Feare, doe thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the Stoicks make *timor* and *depressio*, a sluggish Affection of Mind, whereby a man shrinketh back, and declineth businesse, because of difficulty of danger which he observeth in it; and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Mind, not knowing which way to take, to be amongst the kindes of this Passion of feare. The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgins, whom the Roman youth snatched away, and took to them for wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of Feare.

Ovid. de Arte Amandi. l. 1.

*Vt fugiunt aquilas timidissima turba Columbae,
Vtq; fugit visos agna novella lupos:
Sic illa timere viros sine lege ruentes,
Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Color.
Nam Timor unus erat, facies non una timoris,
Pars laniat Crines, pars sine mente sedet.
Altera mæsta silet, frustra vocat altera matrem,
Hæc queritur, stupet hæc, hæc fugit, illa manet.*

As weak and fearefull Doves the Eagle flye,
And tender Lambs when they the Wolfe espie:
So the affrighted Sabine Virgins runne
Pale and discolour'd, Roman youth to shunne.
Their Fear was One, but Fear had not One look,
Part here sit reav'd of sence, part there doth pluck
And teare their hairs, One silent mourns, another
With a successele Outcry calls her mother.
One moans, the fright another doth amaze:
One flies for Fear, for Fear another stayes.

Now

Now the reasons why *newness* of evil doth thus work *fear*, may be many. For first, all *Admiration* is a kinde of *fear*; it being the property of man, not onely to fear that which is *against*, but that also which is *above* our Nature, either in regard of *natural and civil dignity*, which worketh a *fear of Reverence*; as to parents, governors, masters; or in regard of *Moral Excellency* and *Excesses* above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a *Fear of Admiration*. Now then it is the property of every thing that brings novelty with it, to work, more or lesse, some manner of *admiration*, which (as the Honour of this ages Learning calls it) is a *broken knowledge*, and commonly the first step which we make in each particular *Science*: & therefore *children* are most given to *wonder*, because every thing appeareth *new* unto them. Now then when any evil shall at once fright our *nature*, and pose our *understanding*, the more our *Ignorance* doth *weaken* our *Reason*, the more doth it *strengthen* our *Passion*.

Again, though such evils may haply be in themselves but *sleight*, yet the very *strangeness* of them will work an opinion of their *greatness*: for as that of *Seneca* is true, *Magnitudinem rerum consuetudo subducit*: that use makes small esteem of great things: so it will follow on the contrary side, that *Novelty* makes evil appear greater; as the way which a man is least acquainted with, seems the longest. * And therefore the *Romans* did use themselves unto their *gladiatory fights* and *bloodie spectacles*, that acquaintance with *wounds* & *blood* might make them the lesse fear it in the *Wars*.

P p

And

Advancement
of Learning.

Σοφός ὁ δὲν
ἐκμάχεται τὴν δό-
ξαν τῶν ἀδελ-
φῶν. Laert. in
Zenon. l. 7.
Plur. de Aud.
Ὁ σοφὸς οὐ
θαυμάζειν δεῖται
ἀνθρώπων. Metap.
l. 1. c. 2.

Nat. Quest.
l. 7. c. 1.

* Jul. Capitol. in
Maximo & Bal-
bino. Vide Lip-
sij Saturn.

And lastly, such is the inbred cautelousnesse of Nature in declining all noxious things, and such is the common suspicion of the Minde, whereby out of a tendering of its own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make experiment of any, and thereby it is made naturally fearful even of harmlesse and inoffensive things, (*Omnia tuta timens*) much more then of those which bring with them the noise and face of evil.

Now the corruption of this passion herein is, when it falleth too soon upon the Object, and snatcheth it from the Understanding before that it hath duely weighed the nature of it; when as *Aristotle* speaks of *Anger*, that it runs away from reason with an *half message*, so the Object shall be pluckt away from the Understanding with an *half judgement*. For when a man hath but an half and broken sight, like him in the Gospel, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as trees, and to passe a false sentence upon any thing which he fears.

Another cause of *Fear*, may be *Conscience* of evil, and guiltinesse of minde, which like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more foul and thicken: *For wickednesse, when it is condemned of its own witnesse, is exceeding timorous; and being pressed with Conscience, always forecasteth terrible things*: and as the Historian speaketh of Tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, *Si recludantur mentes, posse aspici laniatus & ictus*; their mindes with lust, cruelty and unclean resolution, being no lesse torn and made raw, then the body
flea'd

Wisd. 17. 11.

*Tacit. Annal.
lib. 6.*

flea'd with scourges : Every vicious man hath a double flight from God ; a flight from the Holiness, and a flight from the Justice of his Will. Adam first eats, and next he hides : as soon as he hath transgressed the Covenant, he expects the Curse : and therefore we shall still observe that men are afraid of those whom they have injured.

* Alcibiades having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to trust them, saying, It is a foolish thing for a man when he may flee, to betray himself into their hands from whom he cannot flee. And therefore they who would have us fear them, desire nothing more then to be privie to our guilts, and to know such crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamie or losse upon us.

Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde Timeri.

Into our secret crimes they pry, that so
We may fear them, when they our vices know.

And therefore Innocency is the best Armour that any man can put on against other mens malice, or his own fears : for the righteous are bold as a Lion.

Other causes of Fear might here be observed, which I shall but intimate. As we fear active and busie men, because if they be provoked, they will stir and look about to revenge themselves.

We fear likewise Dilators, because they are inquisitive and pry into the secrets of others. Plutarch compares them unto Cupping-glasses,

P p 2 which

* *Ælian. Var. Hist. l. 13. c. 38.*

*Juven. Satyr.
Chorus eris Ver-
ri qui Verrem
tempore quo vult
accusare potest,
&c.*

Prov. 28. 1.

*Minus timebant
Epaminondam.
Διά φιλοσοφίαν
ὡς ἀπεργυμο-
να. Plutarch.*

which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates thorow which none passed but condemned and piacular persons. We may liken them unto flies, which resort onely to the raw and corrupt parts of the body; or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrefaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make others appear worse then they are, that they themselves, though they be the worst of men, may not appear so.

We fear also abusive and Satyirical wits, which make use of other mens names, as of Whetstones to sharpen themselves upon.

Horac. l. i.
Sat. 4.

*Omnes hi metunt versus, odere poetas,
Fenum habet in cornu, longe fuge; dummodo risum
Excusiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parset amico.
Et, quodcunque semel Charitas ille verit, omnes
Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire, lacque,
Et pueros, & anus——*

These all hate Poets, fear to suffer scorn
From those curst wits, which carry hay in horn.
Shun them; they will not spare their dearest friend
to make themselves sport: then what they have pend
Th'are big with, till old old wives & boys that go
From ovens and from washpools, know it too.

Οἱ μετῶν καὶ
ἐρῶν καὶ παινῶν
τοὶ ἀδύνατοι γὰρ.
Arist. Rhet. l. 2.

Lastly, we fear, close, cunning, and suppressed
malice, which like a skinn'd wound doth wrangle
inwardly: Crafty, insinuating, plausible men,
that

that can shrowd and palliate their revengeful purposes under pretexts of love. I formerly noted it of *Tiberius*, and ^a *Ælius Spartianus* observeth it of *Antoninus Geta*, that men were more afraid of his kindnesse then of his anger, because his use was to shew much courtesie there where he intended mischief.

And ^b *Cæsar* was wont to say, that he was not afraid of *Antony* and *Dolabella*, bold adversaries, but of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, his pale and lean enemies, who were able to smother their passion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they say) have a Proverb wherein they promise to take heed themselves of their enemy, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend. And this, as it is of all other the most dangerous and the most unchristian, so it is the most unworthy and sordid disposition of minde, (I cannot finde words bad enough to character it ^c by) which at the same time can both flatter and hate, and with the same breath praise a man, and undo him. And therefore the ^d Philosopher telleth us that that a magnanimous man is φανερόμισος & φανερόφιλος, such an one as doth boldly professie as well his displeasure as his love, esteeming it timorousnesse to trifle and conceal his affections.

Of all Christs enemies, *Judas* when he kissed him, the *Herodians* when they praised him, and the devil when he confessed him, were the worst and ill-favouredst. A Leprosie was ever uncleaneft when it was whitest, and Satan is never more wicked

a Fuit ejus Immanitatis Antoninus ut in præcipue blandiretur quos ad nocem destinabat, ut ejus magis blandementum timeretur quam Iracundia. part. in Geta.

b Plutarch. in Cæfare.

Ira quæ regitur nocet. Sen. Med. Psal. 62. 4. 55. 21. 10. 8, 9, 10.

c Pessimum inimicorum genus Laudantes. Tac. Turpe est odisse quem Laudes. Sen. de Ira, lib. 3. cap. 29.

d Arist. Ethic. lib. 4. c. 8. Τοῦτος λανθάνειν φοβούμενος.

wicked or more ugly then when he puts on *Samuels* Mantle. Hatred when it flatters, is the most mishapen monster. Like those poisons which kill men with laughing, or like the Philistines Trespasse-offering, Mice and Emeralds made of gold.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of the Effects of Fear, Suspicion, Circumspection, Superstition, Betraying the succours of Reason, Fear generative, Reflecting, Inward weakning the faculties of the Minde, Base Suspicion, Wise Caution.



Proceed to consider some of the *Effects* of this Passion, whereof the first may be *Suspicion* and *Credulity*, which either other mens rumours, or our own working Imagination frameth unto it self. Which effect of Fear the

Tacit. lib. 4.

Historian hath wisely observed, *Retineri comعات dum Timet, Credit*; what he feared that he believed. And in another place speaking of the strange relations which had been made of Monsters, his Judgement upon the report is, *Visa sive ex metu credita*. It was uncertain whether they had been really

Annal. lib. 2.

really seen or beleevd out of Feare. For as timorous men are by their own suspicion ready to frame unto themselves new terrors, and to feare where no feare is, which the Poet hath observed,

Quæ fixère Timent.

— they are affraid
Of fancies which themselves have made ;

So are they ready likewise to beleev the apparition of their owne braine for reall terrors : For *Tacitus* his speech is here likewise true : *Fingunt Creduntque*, first they feigne, and then they beleev.

Now the Reason hereof may be First, the generall Impression of Nature, which being subject unto Infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wisdom of providence, and circumspection, to foresee those evils, which cannot by dexterity be so easily shirtd off, as they may at a distance be prevented ; so that we finde even in the most cleare and undisturbed order of our operations toward any new thing (though not apprehended as noxious and offensive to our Nature) untill it be better understood, a secret drawing back and feare lest it should prove hurtfull unto us ; how much more then when it is once prepossessed with passion ? For as cloth once died from it's naturall white, will take no other but a darker colour : So minds once steeped in the bitter humours of this melancholique passion, will fel-

dome

Ἡ αὖτις ὁ γὰρ εἰς
τὸ ἀναρχαῖον
κακῶν
Αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐ-
τῶν ἐτερον πρὸς
αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔχουσιν.
Menand.

Quorum in alterius manu vita posita est, sapius illud cogitant quid possit in eorum in diuine sunt quam quid debeat facere. Cic. pro Quinto.

a De timore isto melancholico.
Vide quadam apud Gal. 8. lib. 19. c. 26.

a Quod de Con-
stantio observit
Ammian.
Marcell. l. x6. de
Artaxarche Plu-
tarchus de Me-
dea Euripid. in
Medea. De Do-
mitiano Tacitus
quidam nunquam
magis quam cum
erubuerunt Ti-
mendi sunt. Se-
nec. Ep. 11.
c Tacit. Annal.
lib. 1.
Vide Plutarch.
de superstitione ;
Et lib. contra
Epicur. Max.
Tyrius differat.
4. Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 7. p.
512. Hist. lib. 2.

dom admit of any, but more black and fear-
ful conceits. ^a And from this suspicion of fear
it is, that timorous men are usually cruel, when
they gain any advantage : Their jealousy teach-
ing them to do that unto others which they fear
from them.

A second Reason may be, because in fear the
minde of man is drawn to a neerer sense of its
weakness, and to a more prejudicate apprehen-
sion of the adverse power : and therefore it is a
true observation, ^b *Promæ ad Religionem percussa se-
mel mentes, &c.* Mindes once possest with fear-
ful conceits, are most forward in Sacrifices, and
Religious Ceremonies, to avert the evils which
they expect. So that as Tacitus on another oc-
casion speaks, *Inclinatis ad credendum* : so I may
say, *Inclinatis ad timendum animis loco omnium, etiam
Fortuna.* When the minde is once drooping,
things which before passed away as matters of
course and casualty, are now drawn within the
compass of Presages and Emphatical evils.

But here by the way we are to remember that
this *credulity of fear* is to be understood with re-
spect to its own suspicion, otherwise in regard
of those strengthening helps which are given
against it, it is ever *incredulous* : O thou of little
faith ! why dost thou fear ?

Now this effect of Fear is generally in it
self a corruption of it : For though I would have
a mans dangers make him provident and so-
licitous in the forecasting future evils out of a
sound and sober conjecture, according as are
the

the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himselfe in a carelesse security, nor divert his Mind from such unwelcome and pensive thoughts, like *Vitellius* in *Tacitus*, who in the neere approach of his fatall ruine, was *Trepidus*, *dein Temulentus*, one hour Fearfull, and the next Drunken, smothering in himselfe every thought of ensuing danger, and enduring nothing but *Jucundum & Lasivum*; that which was pleasing, though harmefull to him; yet I would not have the mind tormented with ungrounded Fancies, and pre-occupate Evils to be no further effected than in our braine, because hereby it is made soft and irresolute, tumultuary and confused, and both wayes much indisposed and disabled for Action.

Another ill Effect of Feare, is a *Dislike* of whatever means Reason presents for the freeing of us, whence issue Inconstancy and continuall Change of Resolutions, hating all Counsels when they are present, and recalling them when they are too farre past: which Effect is elegantly described by the Author of the Booke of *Wisedome*, who saith that *Feare is a betraying of the Succours which reason offereth*; a submitting of them to the false interpretations of a crooked and prejudicate suspition, which overcuriously discovering Weaknesse in all means, and making use of none, doth thereby betray Nature into the hands of Danger. *They say of a certaine Fish, that it hath a Sword, but it hath not a Heart: a perfect Embleme of Feare, which though you put into Armor, yet you cannot give it Courage. And

*Themistocles
apud Plut.
Apoprob.

Qq

† there

† Chabrias ib.
 es. Orat. 2. de
 fortit.
 Alex. Arist.
 O'ud'v' t'v' n' n'
 m'p'p'os v' n' n' n'
 i'p'p'os d'v' p'p' n' n'
 Saph. adip. Tyr.
 Tac. Anl. 3.
 Q. Cur.
 Omnia tuta ti-
 mens. Non mi-
 nus presidium
 suum quā hostes
 metuerunt dis-
 crimine tanto.
 Liv. 1.
 Anecd. 2.

Πῶς τὸ τὸ χῆρ
 ἀπ' αὐτῶν
 ἀντιπῶν.
 Iniquum sed usu
 receptum, quod
 honesta consilia
 vel turpia, prout
 male aut prospe-
 re cediunt, ita vel
 probantur, vel
 reprehenduntur.
 Plin. l. 5. Ep. 21.
 Arrian. Epist.
 l. 2. c. 1.

† therefore as he said, an army of Lyons led by a Hart, would doe lesse service then an army of Harts led by a Lyon, because in that case Feare would betray her owne succours. And this I finde a frequent observation, that *Pavidis consilia in incerto*. Feare ever dazleth the Eye, and blindeth the Mind in all her Counsels: and *Timor etiam auxilia reformidat*. It is afraid of the very succors that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of *Vlysses* over his feares, that he could thinke and wilely advise what to do.

— — — *Nec talia passus Vlysses,
 oblitusq; sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto.*

Although with feares oppressed; yet he had not The Cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.

Now the reason of this may bee first, because Feare is a Multiplying and Generative Passion, ever producing motions of its owne Nature. Hee which feares danger from anothers power, will easily feare Errours or Impotency in his owne ayds: and it is * common with men to thinke themselves *Vnwise*, when they feele themselves *Vnhappy*, & this very thought that they are so, doth I know not by what Fascination, make them so. So that as a chased Buck, when he flies from the Dogges, doth many times fly into the Net which was spread for him, so when our Feares drive us from one mischife, they often hamper and intangle us in another.

Againe

Againe it is the property of *Feare*, to make us ever reflect upon our owne Weaknes, & (as I laid) not only to present it, but to worke it: as the Sun when it discloseth unto us the Glorious Lights of the one part, is commonly it selfe hid in the other part of the Heavens: as contrarily, when it thineth on the Earth, it hides the Starres: so it is in those two Offices of Reason; the Transient and Reflexive act, that whereby we looke Outward on others, or Inward on our selves, specially where there is Passion to withdraw and pervert it, as the one is stronger, so commonly the other is weaker: which is true most of all in this Passion of Feare, wherein the more we see of dangers from outward oppositions, the lesse we see of inward strength for resistance. Insomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes staggered, as the Poet intimates, when *Ajax* came forth to battell:

Τρῶας δὲ πρόσωπε αἰνὸς ὑπὸ λυθῶν γὰρ ἔκειτο.
Ἐὶ δὲ τοι δὲ αὐτοῖς θυμὸς ἐστὶ σπ' ὀδύσας παύσασθαι

Iliad. v. 262.

*Feare had the other Trojans all oppress;
Yea Hectors heart panted within his breast.*

A third Effect may be a Weaknesse of the Faculties of the Minde, and the Spirits in the Body; whereby the one is made unfit for Search or Counsell, the other for Service or Execution. And hence (as *Plutarch* noteth) it imports in the Greek, a Binding or shutting up, and so withdrawing and indisposing the Soule for Action.

Plut. de Sup.

And such Actions, as Feare forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weake and unnaturall, that it is a Maxime in the Law, *Per metum gesta pro non ratis habentur*: Those things which wee doe in Feare, are void and invalide to binde, when the Feare which forceth them is removed. And as it is in the Civill State, so it is in the Morall Common-wealth of the Soule, there are three principall wayes to inferre Weaknesse, Forreign Incurfions, Intestine Tumults, and an Emptying of the parts, all which are to be seen in the Extremity of Feare. Where first two things are to bee granted, one concerning the Body, and the other the Mind. The first is, that the Spirits being of the most strong, subtile, and quick motion, are the principall Instruments of Entercourse, either in Negotiation to, or Service from Reason: the other, that the Mind being of a Spirituall and Elevating Nature, retaines then the perfectest power of Operation, when it least of all suffers the Incurfion of grosser Passions, which yet I understand not of all manner of Ministry and Admixture of Appetite with Reason (as if the Regular motions of inferior powers did not serve to sharpen the Counsels of the higher) but onely of Invasion and Tyranny.

Which granted, we may observe all the three former causes of Weaknesse in an Extremity of Feare. For first there is a Confused and Unserviceable mixture of *Passion* and *Reason*: The *Passion* with too much outrage and assault breaking in, and distracting the advices of *Reason*, which is
Forreigne

Forreigne Incurſion : For, though theſe two are not parts of a different *Regiment* ; yet they are of a different Nation (if I may ſo ſpeake) the one belonging to the higher, the other to the lower parts or Region of the ſoule. Secondly, there is *Tumult* and Disorder amongſt the Spirits, which is *Civill Diſſention*. Thirdly, there is a Retyring of them to the principall Caſtle or Fort, the Heart, whereby the Outward Quarters are left Naked and Vngarrifon'd ; which though it be a ſtrengthening of the Better, yet it is a Weakening of the Major part, and this answereth unto Emptying or Vacuity. By all which, both Reason is made unfit to Counſell (all the Concepts thereof being choaked and ſtified with a diſorderly throng of Spirits and Paſſions) and the Body likewise is ſo benumbed, that though our diſcourſe were entire, yet it could not be there ſeconded with any ſucceſſfull ſervice. And hence are thoſe many ill Effects of Feare upon the Body, whitenesse of Haire, Trembling, Silence, Thirſt, Pale- nesse, Horroure, Gnashing of Teeth, Emission of Excrements. The Outward parts being over- cooled, and the Inward melted by the ſtrength of the Spirits retyring thither. Which *Homer* hath thus deſcribed, ſpeaking of a Coward.

Cal. Rhodig.
l. 7. c. 47.
Plut. de Hom.
Ariſt. Prob.
ſect. 27. Q. 1. 2. 3

*His Colour comes and goes, nor doth he ſet
Long in one place ; he croucheth to his feet ;
His Heart pants ſtrong, and intercepts his breath,
His Teeth do gnaſh wiſh, but the thoughts of Death.*

Iliad. N. 280.
Colorem mutat
Polypus, quia
Timidū anim.
Plut. l. 9. n. 9. 19.

*Brave men are still the same, not much agast,
When the first brunt of their Attempts is past.*

Where by the way we may observe what *Seneca* also tells us, that *Feare* doth usually attend *the beginnings of great enterprizes, even in the worthiest men. Which mindeth me of one more, (and that a usefull and profitable) Effect of this Passion, I meane * *Care, Wisedome, and Caution*, which ever proceeds from a Moderate *Feare*, which is a Dictate of Nature; And therefore the weakest Fishes swim together in shoales, and the weakest Birds build in the smallest and outermost boughes, which are hardest to come unto. And we may observe that Nature hath made the weakest Creatures swiftest: as the Dove, the Hare, the Hart: and they † say that the Hare is very quicke at hearing, and sleepeeth with his Eyes open, every way fitted to discover danger before it surprize him. For as in Religion, a *Feare* that is governed by the Word of God; so proportionably in Morality, a *Feare* grounded by the Word of Reason, is the Principle of Wisedome. As Security and Supinenesse is the Root of Folly, which *Tiberius* replied to the petition of *Hortulus*, wherein he requested of the Senate a Contribution from the publicke Treasury to recover the honour of his Family, which now was sunke and began to wither. Industry saith hee will languish, Idleness will increase, if no man have *Feare* or Hope in himselfe: but all will securely expect a supply from others; in thewselfes lazy and burthen some

* *Arist. Prob.*

27.9.3.

Vid. Sen de

ira. l. 2. c. 3

Plut. in Arato.

* *Βολητικὸς ποιεῖ*

Arist. Rhet. l. 2.

Vid. Pol. l. 5. c. 8

† *Θυμὸν ἰσχυρὸν*

τὸν σοφὸν ἰσχυρὸν

διπλασθέντιος δ.

Laert. in Zenon.

Alien. de An-

im. l. 8. c. 18.

l. 4. c. 8.

† *Plut. Sympo.*

l. 4. g. 5.

Homerus vivos

fortissimos sem-

per in pugna

describit arma-

tos. Et Hanibal

in tot pugnis ni-

quam vulnera-

tus.

Plut. in Pelopi-

da, & in Mar-

cello,

Languescit in-

dustria, intendi-

tur Socordia, se

vullus ex se me-

tus aut spes: Se-

curi omnes alie-

na subsidia ex-

pectabunt, sibi

ignari, nobis

graves. Annal.

l. 2.

then some unto us : and it is the judgement of *Tacitus* upon one of the wisest Policies, which ever that Emperour practised, I meane his writing to the Legions abroad, *Tanquam adepto principatu*, as if he were already Emperour, when at home in the Senate he used on'y Modesty and Refusals, That he did it out of *Feare*, so wise a Counsellor was his Passion unto him. And we find that some * great Commanders have caused their Scout-watches to be unarmed, that Feare might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this Passion is the Instrument of Discipline, seasoning the Minde, as ground-Colours doe a Table, to receive those beauties and perfections, which are to bee super-induced.

*Paulus Amil.
apud Plut.
Aposb. l. 44.*

*Vide Clem.
Alex. Pedag.
l. 1. c. 9.
Plin. l. 6. ep. 17.*

CHAP.

Of that particular Affection of Feare, which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus feare. The ground of it, Evill of Turpitude, Iniustice, Intemperance, Sordidnesse, Softnesse, Pusillanimity, Flattery, Vaine-glory, Misfortune, Ignorance, Pragmaticalnesse, Deformity, Greatnesse of Minde, Unworthy Correspondencies, &c. Shame, Vicious and Vertuous.

Θύβος αδοξίας
Arist. Eth. l. I.
c. 15.
Αδυνάμις ἢ ἁπα-
ρτία τοῦ εἶναι
ἀδόξου, &c.
Arist. Rhet. l. 2.
c. 6.
Θύβος ἰσχυροῦ
δοξίας ἢ γῆρας.
Damasceen.
de Orthod. fid.
l. 2. c. 13.
Ὁ γὰρ δὴ οὗτος ἔστι
πρόσωπον ὃν οὐκ ἔστιν
ἰλιθιά. 2 214.



Esides this generall Consideration of the Passion of *Feare*, there is one particular thereof, which calleth for some little observation; namely, *Shame*, which is a *Feare of just Disgrace*, & Reproof in the Minds of those, whose good opinion wee doe or ought to value, as hee said in the Poet,
Πολυδάμης μὲν ἀφ' ὧσιν ἐπὶ γῆρας ἀναδίδεται.

Now those whom we thus feare, are *wise men*, (for so *Polydamas* is said to looke behind and before him.) *Aged men*, and all whose presence wee reverence as Parents, Rulers, Counsellers, Friends: Any whom we our selves *Admire*, or who *Admire* us. We feare disgrace with those whom we *Admire*, because their judgement of us, is in our own Apprehension, a kind of Touch-stone, which if we

we cannot suffer the triall off, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrant Mettall. And we feare it with those who admire us, because as every man is willing to see his face when it is cleane, in that Glasse which represents it fairest : so when it is soule, of all other he shunneth that most. In the former case we are in danger to misse what we desired; in the other, wee are in danger to shipwrack what we before enjoyed.

We are apt to be ashamed with our *Friends*, because their opinion wee value, and with our *Enemies*, because theirs we feares; with our friends, because they are grieved; with our Enemies, because they are delighted with that which shames us.

Again we feare in this Regard, Rigid, and *Severe Men*, who are not ready to forgive, nor to put Candide and Charitable Constructions upon what we doe. Therefore when *Cato* was present, (who was *virrigida Innocentia*, a sterne and severe Cenfor of the manners of Men) none durst call for the obscœne spectacles of their *Floralia*, being more awed by the Authority of the man, then allured by the pleasure of the playes.

Likewise busie and *Garrulous* men, because they enquire into our Crimes, and having disclosed, do divulge them. For which cause we feare in this case the *Multitude*, because an ill name is like an ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appeares the more deformed. As a little Gold beaten into thin Leaves : a little Water drawn into a thin steeme and vapor, seems

R r

wider

*Liv. l. 39. Val.
Max. l. 2. c. 10.
Vid. etiam lib.
4. cap. 5.*

*Andronicus
non Pompeium
modo sed
etiam etiam
l. Ep. Ar-
tic. l. 7. c. 1.*

Sen. Ep. 11. &

25.]

Cydias orator
Atheniensis
apud Aristote-

lem.

Rhes. 1.2. esp. 6.

Et Perse adu-

co naso predi-

tos in pretio

habent quod

Cyrus talia

esset Plutarch.

Apoph.

Aristid. orat. de

Parabibeg-

mate,

wider then it was at first: so even lesser crimes be-
ing multiply'd through the mouthes of many, do
grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a mans
name. For he is presumed to bee voyd either of
wisdome or modesty, that doth not feare many
Eyes. We feare *Innocent* and *Virtuous* men, their
presence aweth us from liberty of sinning, and
maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, be-
cause *Examples* have a proportionable Authority
over the heart of man, as *Laws* have, which we
doe not trespasse without Feare. And therefore
the Philosopher adviseth to live alwayes so, as if
some grave, and serious and severe person were
ever before us, to behave our selves *sub Custode, &*
Pedagogo, as under the eye of a Keeper, because
such a mans conversation will either regulate
ours, or disgrace it. Varios men do the lesse feare
one another, by how much they stand in need of
mutuall pardon, as we find *Stertorism* (if I forget
not) giving those souldiers of the Enemies army
their lives, who had but one eye, he being himselve
Monophthalmus.

Againe we feare *Envious* and malevolent per-
sons, because such look upon our Actions with
prejudice; and as *Momus*, when he could nor find
fault with the face in the Picture of *Venus*, picked
a quarrell at her Slipper: so these men will ever
have something either in Substance or Circum-
stances of our Actions, to misreport and expose
to scandall.

Lastly wee feare those in this respect, whose
Company we shall most be used unto; because that
leaves

leaves us not time wherein to forget our Errours, or to fortifie our selves against them. It makes a man live ever under the sense of his Guilt. In which respect *Cato major* was wont to say, That a man should most of all reverence himselfe, because he is ever in his own sight and company.

Plutarch A-
poph.

Amia.

The Fundamentall ground of this affection, is any evill that hath either *Guilt*, or any kinde of *Turpitude* in it, or any signes or suspitions thereof, reflecting either on our selves, or any of ours, whose reputation we are tender of. And thus the Apostle telleth us, that all *Sin* is the matter of *Shame*, when it is revived with a right judgement. *What fruit had you then in those things whereof you are now ashamed.* That which hath *Empriness* in the Beginning, and *Death* in the End, must needs have *Shame* in the middle. But though all sin with respect to Gods Eye and Judgement doth cause *Shame*, yet in the eye of men, those cause it most which have any notable & more odious *Turpitude* adhering unto them. As either obscene or subdalous, and dishonest actions when they are detected, forging of Deeds, defacing Records, counterfeiting of Names or Seales, suborning of Witnesses, making use of ingenious Professions, as Cloaks to palliate, and Instruments to provoke Abusive and Illiberall practises.

a Sueton in
Vesp. c. 23. vid.
Quadam apud
Cassan. in
Theophr.
vid. Orat.
Sundnice apud
Dion. l. 62.
Alxandria
vid. de ea
Theophrast.

Such are all kinde of *Sordid Actions* or Behaviours, as gain raised out of despicable commodities, (as (a) *Vespasian* set a vestigall or excise upon Pisse) and the Philosopher tels us of some that made a (b) gain of the dead. Such are also the

a Vid. Desd.
Herald. digres.
l. 1. c. 31.
b Vid. Plin.
Paneg. Tacit. 4.
Annal. 4.

c Horat. l. 1.
Sat. 1. Vid.
Plant. Aulul.
Act. 2.
Theophrast.
de Misp. 1. 1.

μυνηται αρωρη

Iliaid. a. 97.

O vere Phry-
gia neq; enim
phryges anc.
ad. 9.

Living which by sordid Ministers, Panders,
Bawdes, Curtezans, (a) Parasites, Juglers, (b) De-
lators, Cheaters, Sharks, and shifting Compani-
ons make unto themselves, such the Poets miser.

—— * *Populus me sibilat at mihi plando*
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca.

The people hisse me all abroad,
But I at home my selfe applaud.
When in my Coffers I behold,
That which none hisse at, heaps of Gold.

Many particular Causes there are which are
apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall
briefely name: as,

First *Sloth*, and shrinking from such labour,
which those that are better, older, weaker, more
delicate then our selves doe willingly undergoe.
Thus *Menelaus* in the Poet seeing the Grecians as
fearefull to undertake a single combat with *He-
ctor*, as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus up-
braid their Cowardize.

ὅποις ἀνδράσιν, Ἀχίλλεϊ δουρὶ Ἀχαιο, &c.

What Grecian soldiers turn'd to Grecian dames?
That can digest so great, so many shames?
What wot a man of Greece (O fowle disgrace)
Dare meet or look proud Hector in the face?
Well, sit you downe Inglorious, beardless men,
Turn'd to your first water and earth: yet then

and Faculties of the Soule.

*He take up Armes; for victories last End,
Dost not on Our, But Divine will depend.*

In like manner *Hector* rebuketh the basenesse of *Paris* in flying from *Meneleus*.

Οἷόν τι καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀνδρείῳ, μὴ δὲ ἄγχι τῷ, &c.

*Trim Warriour, tell me what thy Lute can doe,
What Venus Graces, comely haire, sweet hew,
When thou shalt mallow in the dust? Th' art far,
Fitter to wear Stone-coat, then Coat of War.*

Againe, any thing which argueth pusillanimity or littlenesse of mind is a just ground of shame, as to recount curtesies & upbraid them, & therefore he said in *Seneca*, *Non tanti est vixisse*. That his life was lesse worth, then to bee so valued to him, in dayly Exprobrations, and that his blood with lesse trouble to him might have been let out at his veines then to be every day disordered, and called up into his face. To receive continuall gifts, and be ever craving from our Inferiours, burthen-some to those who can lesse beare it.

Heretunto referre all *Light* ludicrous and *ridiculous* behaviour, wherein if a Grave or serious man be reprehended, it rendreth him suspected of a minde that can flag and lessen, and therefore *Agessilas* being so taken playing with his childe made his Apologie for it, and desired his friend not to think light of him, till he had children of his owne, for love will teach greatnesse of minde to descend.

Also all sordid Arts of *Flatterie*, which prai-

Rr 3

seth

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*Iliad. 7. 55.
καὶ τὸν γένειαν
Ποτὶ λίπιδες
quibus Adul-
ter ex Anti-
quo more o-
brui debuisset.
Muperge.
Quam inique
comparatum
estis qui minus
habent, ut
semper aliquid
addant distri-
buis. Terent.
Phorm.*

*Plutarch. A-
poph. Lacon.
καὶ τὸν γένειαν
Vid. Plutarch.
& Theophrast.
Terent. Eunu-
chum. Act. 2.
Scen. 2. Act. 1.
scen. 7.
& Plaut. A-
strotrogum in
milit. Glor.*

seth, imitateth, creepeth, changeth, complyeth, transformeth it selfe to all shapcs to get a living, and like Crowes pulleth out mens eyes with prayes, that it may after more securely make a prey of them, *Fedum crimen servitutis*, as the Historian well calls it, A servile and filthy Crime.

Anything which argueth *vanity*, and windynesse of mind, as (a) Arrogance, and vain-glorious Ostentation, ascribing to our selves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning, lands, activements of other men, as he who called all the ships in the harbour at Athens his owne. *Labore alieno magnam partem gloriam verbis sape in se transmovet*. Whereunto belong Absurd and unusuall Affectations in words or fashions, mimickall and fantastickall gesticulations, frothy and superficiall Complements, Strange and exoticke Habits, which are usually the scum of Light, and unserted mindes, and ever expose them to contempt. In somuch that *Alexander*. himself escaped not the Imputation of Levity, when hee followed the fashions of those Countreyes which he had subdued.

Misfortune and decay in the outward Ornaments of Life, for it is not in mens fortunes as in their monuments, where in (b) Ruine doth many times conciliate Reverence.

Nil habet infelix Paupertas durius in se

Quam quodridiculos homines facit

a Vid. Theoph.
de Desolatione
Plauti m. l. i.
Glor. Arist.
Ethic. l. 4. c. 13.
Val. Max. l. 9.
c. 15.
Plutarch. l. De
Alex. fortuna
in qua.

b Curios jam
dimidiat na-
sum; mine-
rem Corvini
& Galbam au-
riculis, nasos;
cervicem in-
venit.

Un-

Unhappy Poverty hath nothing worse,
Then that it maketh men ridiculous.

And therefore men of sunk and broken estates
are ashamed to live there, where they have beene
formerly in Credit and Estimation, as *Hecuba*
complaining in the Tragedy.

Ὅτι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας αἰσχύνη μὲν ἔστι

Ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἀπορίας τῇ αἰσχύνην ἵσ' οἷον τὴν, &c.

In this my broken and dejected case,
Pardon me, if I shame to shew my face
To Polymestor, whose Eyes once have seen
Me, a now spoiled Captive, then a Queen.

Againe, Ignorance and Ineptitude in our owne
proper functions, and miscarriage in our owne
Arts and professions, is an Exprobration, either
of indiligence, or weaknesse. As want of pro-
ficiency in a Student, of Elocution in an Orator,
of Military wisdom in a Souldier, &c. And
therefore a Physitian will seldome stay to see
his Patient buried, he usually departs before the
sick man, because Funerals are *Convictis Medi-*
corum. Yet all Ignorance is not matter of dis-
grace, for some things there are below the inqui-
ry, or Studies of some men. And therefore
though *Tully* tells us that when *Themistocles* de-
clined the Lute, hee was esteemed more ignorant
then became a person of quality, yet it was a
brave Apology which hee made for himselfe,

That,

Euripid. in
Hec.

Magnum do-
lorem habet
unde cum vo-
nore desesseris
eodem cum ig-
nominia ve-
verti Cic. pro
l. Mura. &c.

Ἀπορίας γὰρ ἀπὸ
τῆς ἀπορίας τοῦ
πολύμestor, αἰσχύνην
μὲν ἔστι, &c.

Iliad. B.
Artium pecca-
ta artificibus
pudori sunt
&c. — Sen.
Ep. 97.

Cic. Tusc. qu.
lib. 1.

Plutarch. na
aliter iſticra-
tes apud Plu-
tarch.

Sparsian in
Adrian.

Plutarch.

ωιδωτος μωριον.

Dignitas in
indigno, orna-
mentum in
Laso Saluian.
de Gub. lib. 4.

Sidon. Apoll. 3.
Ep. 13.
Iliad. A.
Vid. Voss. Rhet.
part. 1. p. 78, 79
Odyſſ. A.
Senec. de Ira.
lib. 3. c. 17. 29.

That though he knew not to handle a Lute, yet hee knew to conquer a City. And *Gelo* when others after a Feast sang to an instrument, called for his great Horse, and did excellently manage that. And as it was a cautelous Answer which *Favorinus* gave touching *Adrian* the Emperour, who had censured him in his owne profession of Grammer. That he durst not be learneded then hee who commanded thirty legions; so it was a truer answer which another Artificer gave in the like case unto a Prince: God forbid Sir, that you should know things of so meane a quality, better then I who owe my subsistence unto them.

And as Ignorance in our owne, so *Intrusion* and *Usurpation* of other mens offices, is a ground of shame, especially if they be such as wherein wee descend below the Dignity of our places or professions, as when men of liberall condition apply themselves unto the businesse of sordid persons. For every man is intrusted with the Dignity of his place; he is to be not onely the possessor, but the Protector of it, which when he betrayes, it doth justly Revenge it selfe upon him with contempt and disgrace.

Againe, any notorious externall *Deformities*, and *Debonistaments* of the body, especially if there be any thing of our owne, either guilt or servility in them. The Grecians taking notice of the ill shape and worse conditions of *Thersites*, are said to looke on him with derision and laughter, then when they had other occasions of sadnesse. And when *Plyſſes* his companions were, by *Circe*

trans-

and Faculties of the Soule.

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transformed into shape of Swine, they wept and were ashamed of their owne deformities. And the Poet describeth *Deiophebus* whom *Menelaus* had dismembred:

— *Pavitatione & dira regentem
Supplicia.*

Æneid. 6.

Afraid of being known, carefull to hide
His mangled wounds, that they might not be
(spide.

And we finde how carefull men were to cover any of these notes and prints of infamy, or servility, which persons either extremely vicious, or in bondage were marked withall, for infamous or servile persons were wont so to be branded.

*Vid. Aibene-
um lib. 6. Val.
Max. 1. 6. c. 8.
Scal. 7.
Sueton. Calig.
c. 27.
Lips. 1. 2. Elect.
c. 15.*

Many times *Greatnesse of Mind* is a cause of Shame, either for something which such a man suffereth in himselfe, or in those that are neare unto him, such was that of the Romanes, *Adfurcas Candinas*, of which the Historian giveth this observation.

*Silentium ob-
stinatum fixi
in terram oculi
lurda ad om-
nia solatia au-
res & pudor
intus delusi
ingentem mole
stiarum ex alto
animo silentis
iudicis erant.
Liv. 1. 9. Capit.
1. 2. Max.*

Their obstinate silence, Eyes fastened to the Earth, Eares refusing all comfort, Faces ashamed to behold the light, were certaine Evidences of a minde deeply resolved upon Revenge. And of *Maximinus*, of whom the Historian telleth us, that out of a Desire to conceale his Ignoble birth, he slew all, even the best of his friends, which were Conscious unto it. So poverty meeting with Pride doth often suffer conflicts with this

S f

Passion

A Treatise of the Passions

Passion of shame, when penury denies th at which
Luxury and Pride demands.

Juvenal.

— *Quid enim majore Cachinno
Excipitur vulgi quam pauper Apicius ?*

Who without much irrision can endure,
To see a Beggar a proud Epicure ?

Pet. Victor. in
Artis Rhet. 1. 2

Plutarch. l. de
capiend. ex
Hostib. utili-
tate.
Tacit. Annal.
1. 5. c. 6.

Againe, Acquaintance and Intimacy with In-
famous persons is noted by the Philosopher a-
mongst the Grounds of shame, and therefore it
was upbraided unto *Plato*, that *Calippus* the Mur-
therer of his hoste had been bread in his Schoole.
And to *Socrates*, that he was. resorted unto by *Al-
cibiades*, a factious and turbulent Citizen; and to
Themistocles that he held correspondence, and in-
telligence with *Pausanias* a Traitor; and we
finde how fatall the favour of *Seianus* after his
fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if
every man not only out of Indignation, but out
of feare too cryed out.

Juvenal.
Sat. 10.

— *Nunquam si quid mihi credis amari
Hunc ominem.*

Such being the impotent and immoderate
Passions of many men to trample on the same
persons in their calamity, whom in their great-
nesse they almost adored, as he said,

Απὸς πένθους οὐκ ἀνὰ ζυγαίῃς.

When

*When the Oake is fallen that stood,
Then every man will gather wood.*

*Teren. A-
delph.*

Lastly, not only things shamefull in themselves, but such as are signes, and Intimations of them do usually beget this Affection. As *Æschinus* in the Comedian, blushed when he saw his Father knock at the doore of an infamous woman, because it was a token of a vicious intention. And therefore *Cæsar* was wont to say, That hee would have those that belonged unto him free, as well from *Suspition*, as from *Crimes*; for we shall never finde that a man who is tender of his *Conscience* will be prodigall of his *Credit*; and he who is truly fearefull of incurring censure from himselfe by the Guilt of a *Crime*, will in some proportion be fearefull of incurring censure from others by the shew and suspition of it; for as a Good Conscience is a Feast to give a man a cheerfull heart; so a good name is an Oyntment to give him a cheerefull Countenance.

*Sueton. in Cæ-
sar.*

There is a Twofold shame, The one *Vertuous*, as *Diogenes* was wont to say, That Blushing was the colour of Vertue, The other *Vicious*, and that either out of *Crueltie*, as *Tacitus* and *Seneca* observe of *Domitian*, that he was never more to be feared then when he blushed, Or else out of *Cowardize*, when a man hath not strength enough of Countenance, to out-face and withstand a Vicious solicitation, as it was said of the men of Asia, that they had out of tenderneffe of face, exposed them-

*Tacitus in h
apud hunc
Laert. in Dange-
ne.
Sevus ille vul-
tus & rubor
quo se constan-
tiam pudorem mu-
niebat. Tacit.
in Agric.*

Quidam nun-
quam magis
quam cum cru-
buerint omnes
de sunt, quos
omnem vere-
cundiam effu-
derunt. Sylla
tunc erat vio-
lentissimus in
faciem ejus
sanguis in-
vaserat. Sen.
Epist. 11.
Plut. de vit.
Pudore.

selves to much inconvenience, because they could not pronounce that one Syllable, *No*. It was a better Resolution, that of *Zenophanes*, who being provoked unto some vitious practice, confessed himselfe a Coward at such a Challenge, as not daring to do dishonestly.

I will conclude this matter with that Excellent Similitude wherewith *Plutarch* beginneth it, in that golden book of his touching the same Argument. That as *Thistles*, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signes of an Excellent Ground wherein they grow: so shamefastnesse thought many times a weaknesse, and betrayer of the Mind, is yet generally an Argument of a soule, ingenuously and vertuously disposed.

CHAP. XXX.

Of the Affection of Anger. The Distinctions of it. The Fundamentall Cause thereof, Contempt. Three kinde of Contempt, Dis-estimation, Disappointment, Calumnie.



Now proceed to the last of the Passions, *Anger*, whereof, in it self a subject of large Discourse, yet being every where obvious, I shall not speake much. I intend not therefore distinctly to handle the severall kinde of this Passion, which *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* hath given us; *a* which are a sharp Anger, and an hard or Knotty Anger. And *Saint Paul* who likewise gives us Three kinde of it: Whereof the first I may call a *b* close and buried anger, which he names bitternesse, the other a violent *c* burning Anger, which he calls *Wrath*, and the last a Desiring and pursuing Anger, which seemeth to have it's *d* derivation from a word which signifies to Desire, and therefore is defined by *Aristotle* to be *inens*, & by the *b* Stoicks *involuntaria*, words of prosecution and pursuite. For these differ not Essentially or formerly amongst themselves, but onely in diversitie of Degrees, and in order to the diverse constitutions of the

a *Eth. l. 4. c. 11.*
b *Opprobriosa*
passio animi.
Vid. Damasc. de
Oribod. fol. l. 2.
c. 16. cap. Rhod.
l. 12. c. 57.
Est autem passio
memoria Ira
autem Ira inve-
terata plum-
bea, alta mens
expolla vindi-
cta occasione
facile expectat
indignitatem
etiam si non
minime, illud e.
c *Non vultis*
alienatis non
verbis commo-
tor, adeo iram
consideras.
Tacit. de Tibe.
Annal. l. 2.
d *Severus com-*
motione animi
Stomachi. Cui-
leram et ome-
re solebat. Al-
lius Lampri-
us Severo.

a *Iliad* v. 259.

unde *Crabro-*

nes *ir. itare*

apud *Plaut.*

Amphis.

b *Nunc in Fer-*

mento tota est,

ita turgent mi-

hi. Plaut. Cas-

sin.

c *Pectora qui*

frémittu ple-

rumq; gemen-

tes nec capere

lirarum fluctus

in pectore pos-

sunt. Lucr. l. 3.

d Iliad. v. 167.

a *Dolor Exli-*

tat Iras. Æ.

neid. 2.

Immani; ocu-

los infecerat

Irâ. Claud.

Multa in Ira

terribilia &

Ridicula. Plut.

Subject wherein they lodge, and of the habits wherewith they are joyned.

In which respects we might observe severall other shapés of this Affection. For there is the (a) Anger of a Waspe, which is an Hasty, Pettish, and Fretfull Anger, proceeding from a Nature (b) Leavened and habituated with Choler, which is presently stirred and provoked. And there is the Anger of a (c) Lion, which is slow, but strong and severe, thus Elegantly described by (d) Homer.

Ο δὲ σφῆτορ μὴν ἀτίστον

ἔρχεται, εἰμ' ὅτι καὶ πρὶ ἀντιθέου, ἀνδρῶν

σφόδρ' ὀλοήσας ἰαλὰ τε χαλῶν, σφοδ' ἀπὸρρος ἰδὼτας

ῥέχεται, &c.

He first walks by with skorne, but when swift youth,
Vge him with Darts, then with devouring mouth
He turnes againe, and at his lips is seene
A boyling foame, while his stout heart within
Ronseth it selfe with (a) groanes: and round about
His Tayle, beating his sides and loynes, cals out
And wakeneth proud Revenge. Thus stir'd he flies
Right on with red and fiery sparkling eyes
To kill or so be kill'd

There is further a Cowardly verball and ridiculous Anger, like that of Whelps, which barke aloud, but run away from the thing which Angers them. Which spendeth it selfe only in stormes of empty Expressions, rather pleasing then punishing those whom they light on, and rendring the person that useth it a very

and Faculties of the Soule.

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or Skarre Crow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous, like *Geta* in the Comedian.

Ruerem, agerem, raperem, sunderem, posternerem.

There is a grave and serious Anger, like that of *Agamemnon*. An insolent and boasting Anger, like that of *Achilles*. A fullen and stubborne Anger, like that of the (a) Roman Army disgracefully used by the Samnitians. A cruell and raging Anger, like that of *Scylla*, who in an excessse of fury, vomited up bloud & dyed. And thus *Saul* is said to (b) have breathed out threatnings, and bin exceeding mad against the Church. A Revengefull and impatient Anger, as that of (c) *Cambises*, who being reprov'd by *Prexaspes* for his Drunkenesse, confuted the reproote with this act of Cruelty, he shot the sonne of his Reproover thro row the heart, to prove the steaddinesse of his hand. An Anger of Indignation at the honour and prosperity of unworthy persons, as that of the Roman Nobility, who seeing *Cn. Flavius*, a man of meane Condition, advanced to the Prætorship, threw away their golden Rings, (the signes of their honour) to testifie their just Indignation. The Poet thus Elegantly expresseth the like against *Menas*, made of a Slave a Freeman by *Pompey*.

Terent. A-
delph. Act. 3.
Scen. 2.

Iliad. 9.

a Liv. lib. 9.
Val. Max. l. 9.
cap. 3.

Ag. 9. l. 26. u.

b Ira spirat
sanguinem. Se-
nec. Thyest.
deus si ira
divas minor.

Homer.
ij iaci spira
xela xoli pui x
Sunt.

Theocrit.

Idyl. 1.

Ira cadat naso
rugosq; Sanna

Pers. Satyr. 5.

c Herodot.

Thalia.

Val Max l. 9.

c. 3. S. l. 3.

l. lin. lib. 33.

cap. 1.

Horat. Epod.

Ol. 4.

Vide sue Sacram metiente te viam

Cum bis ter ulnarum togâ

Pi Ora vertas huc & huc euntium

Liberrima Indignatio?

Secus

*Sectus flagellis hic triumphalibus
Praconis ad fastidium,
Arat falerni mille fundi iugera
Et appiam mannis teris.*

When thou pacest up and downe
In thy long Gowne,
Seest thou how the people fret
To see thee let :
How with Indignation bold,
They cannot hold
To see a man, so lately plow'd
With scourges low'd,
Untill at length the weary Cryer,
Began to Tyre,
Dressing a thousand Acres now
With Horse and Plow ?

Plut. Apotheg.

Plut. in Caesar.

*Snidas in
Thucydide.*

Lastly, an Anger of Emulation, or a displeasure against our selves for comming short by our negligence of the perfections of other men whom haply by industry we might have equalled. As *Themistocles* professed that the Trophis of *Miltiades* would not suffer him to sleep. And *Caesar* wept when he read the atchievements of *Alexander*, as having not at his age done any memorable thing. And *Thucydides* hearing *Herodotus* recite a History which he had written, brake forth into a strang passion of weeping which the Historian espying thus comforted his Father, you are a happy man to be the Father of such a Son, *ὅς ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ σου* *ὅς ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ σου*. Who is carried with such a vehement affection unto Learning.

But to passe over these particulars, I shall in the generall content my selfe with a brieve Consideration of the Causes and Effects of this Passion.

The Fundamentall and Essentiall Cause of Anger, is Contempt from others meeting with the love of our selves. Whether it be disestimation and undervaluing of a mans person, or disappointment of his purposes, or slandering his good name or any other way of casting injury on him, or any of these particulars being impaired (it by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge) doe worke not only Anxiety and Griefe (which is a motion of flight) but hope also and desire to ease it selfe, if not in the recovery of its own losse, yet in the comfort of another mans: For Calamity (as the Historian speaks) is ever either querulous or malignant, *Cum suo malo torquetur, quiescit alieno.* When it feels it selfe wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds either by justice or revenge to please it selfe in † retaliation.

For the former of these, as it is the common property of Man with all other Creatures to love himselfe: so it is his particular desire also, being *Animal Sociale & Politicum*, to be loved by others; because hereby that love of himselfe, which proceedeth from Judgement and Reason, is confirmed. For every man doth more willingly beleieve that, whereunto he hath farther authority to perswade him. And therefore though Love be not sinisterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a Mans owne, or a Friends actions and behaviour; yet that Love, which is not blind and furi-

*Despectus tibi
sum, nec quis
sum quæris
Alexi.
At Ego quæ
Divum incedo
Regina, Jovisq.
Et Soror &
Conjux, unâ
cum gente tot
annos
Bella gero &
quisquam nu-
men Junonis
adoret, Præte-
rea Amæq. 1.*

*Q. Cur.
Kai jui dōxūmav
Dpavlis av hōdūm-
De six dōxūmav
dōxūm av autōm-
mōdō
Sophoc. Ajax,
E' dē xavō ēō
mōi xavō ēō
dōxūm av hōdūm-
mōi Hesiod. apy
lib. 2.*

*Si mihi pergit,
quæ vult dicere,
ea quæ non vult
audire. Terent.
Andr.*

ous, will be ever ready to submit it selfe unto the opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements because it is conscious to it selfe, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its own censure, wherein Reason, Affection, and Prejudice are mixed together.

Now then when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his owne or his friends person or parts, shall find either of them by others sleighted and despised; from whose joynt-respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement; therehence ariseth not onely a † *Griefe* to see his Expectation deceived, and his Opinion undervalued; but withall a * *Desire* to make knowne unto the persons, who thus contemne him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head, *Revenge*, (for all these may be the instruments of our *Anger*) that there is in him more courage, power and worth than deserves so to be neglected. Which Passion in a word, so long as it submits it selfe to the government of Reason, is then alwaies allowable and right, when it is grounded on the Pride and Insolency of others, who unjustly contemne us. And then Irregular and Corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of Pride and ambition in our selves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements or our owne worth suffers them to afford us,

To this branch of Contempt may be referred *Forgetfulness* of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection: For

Omnia

† Ignoscunt Iras
duris dolor of-
sibus ardet.

Aenead. 9.

Affectus nun-
quam sine tor-
mento sui vio-
lentus, quia do-
lorem cum in-
ferre vult, pati-
tur, &c.

Val. Max.

l. 9. c. 3.

Dolor addidit

Iram. *Ovid.*

Met. 12.

* Spes addita

suscitat Iras.

Aenead. 10.

Omnia qua curant, meminerunt, saith Tully: and Aristotle to the same purpose. Those things which wee doe respect, doe not lye hid and out of our sight.

Next, hither may be referred all *Vngratefull* persons, who sleight those favours which they have received from other mens bounties, and out of a swelling and height of stomacke, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations; but desire to receive benefits, as Corrupt men take Bribes in the darke, and behinde their backs, that so neither others, nor (if it were possible) their owne eyes might be witnesses unto it: For as Tacitus speaks, *Gratia oneri habetur*, such is the pride of some men, that they disdaine not to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindnesse. And therefore *Vbi multum beneficiâ anteverere, pro gratia odium redditur*, saith the same Author, When they finde themselves overloaden with Love, the best requitall which their high minds can afford, is hatred: which cannot but worke a double Anger; an Anger against our selves and our owne weaknesse in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits; and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which so basely entertained them.

Hither also we may referre those Locked and Close men, who even to their friends, are so reserved, and keepe every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose Judgment or Trust they might commit themselves.

Hitherto likewise are referred Acceptation of persons in equallity of merit with unequall respect,

*Ejellii, linore
egenem
Excepi, & reg-
ni demens in
parte locavi;
Amiffam clas-
sem, Socios a
morte reduxi:
Heu furis in-
censa feror, &c.
Antea. 4.*

spect, negligence of outward ceremony and behaviour; and generally what ever else may worke an opinion that we are undervalued.

The second branch of this first Fundamentall Cause was an *Hindering* of the projects and purposes of another, which is not only a *Privative* (as the former) but a *Positive* and reall Injury, which includes that other, and addes unto it, as being not only a sleighting, but an assault upon us; not an Opinion only, but an Expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to incense nature, and make it swell, by how much violence and opposition is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former Injuries, I thinke I may well compare to a Banke, and to a Bridge; or some other stop to a River in his course: Whereof the former doth *Confine* the River, and not *oppose* it, as not hindering it in its direct and naturall motion (which it rather helpeth by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion Laterall and indirect, which nature intended not; and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not into outrage and violence: But the Later resisting the naturall course of the streame in its owne Chanell, and standing directly crosse, where the Water should passe, makes it not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the meane time works in it great tumult and noise.

Spumens, & fervens, & ab Obice savioribit.

It foames and boyles and with a raging force,
Fights with all Obstacles, that stop its course.

So of these two Degrees of *Contempt* in *Anger*, the former as being onely a *Confining* and *Limiting* *Contempt*, which shuts up a mans worth within too narrow and strait a judgement, works indeed a secret swelling of the Heart with *Indignation* at the concept of such disesteeme; b. t this breaks not out into that clamour (as *S. Paul* calls it) that noise of anger, as the other doth, which ariseth out of a direct opposition against our counsels or actions.

Vnto which opposition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceeding, which tends to the prejudice and disappointing of any mans ends; whether it be by closenes and undermining, as cheats and couzenages in the preventing of lawfull, or by other politicke wisdom in hindering unlawfull ends; or whether by open and professed Opposition, as in matters of Emulation, Competition, Commodity, and the like; or lastly, whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers ends which desired to be undiscerned. And therefore *Tacitus* reckoning the ambiguous and close speeches of the Emperour *Tiberius*, sayes that it was *Vnicus Patrum metus si intelligere viderentur*, the Senate feared nothing more than to discover that they understood him; which is the same with his judgement after: *Eò acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret*, nothing did more exasperate him than to

Quem ego credo manibus, pedibusq. obnixè omnia facturum magis id adeo nisi ut incommodet quæ, &c. Terent. And. Act. 1. Sc. 1.

Annal. l. 1.

see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppress and dissemble. Both which were true in *SCANNUS*, one of the Senatours, who adventuring to Collect *Tiberius* his willingnesse of accepting the Empire, in that he did not forbid by his Tribunitiall Authority the relation thereof by the Consuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But of all Contempts, the last of the three is greatest; that I meane, which immediately violates our *Reputation* and Good name; because it is a derivative and spreading injury, not only dishonouring a Man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and Eares of the World; nor only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double Desire; the one of *Perfecting*; the other of *Perpetuating* himselfe: which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first Father; the honour of *Integrity* in Goodnes; and the honour of *Immunity* from Corruption: so there may bee from the violation of these sundry degrees of Anger, or any other burthensome Passion wrought in us. But when in injury we find them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalued; but our name and memory (which belong to our preservation) tainted likewise, we cannot but be so much the more incensed, by how much perpetuity accumulates, either to weaknesse or perfection: But of this Fundamentall cause of anger enough.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of other Causes of Anger : first in regard of him that suffers Wrong : Excellency, Weaknesse, Strong Desires, Suspition. Next in regard of him who doth it ; Basenesse, Impudence, Neernesse, Freedome of Speech, Contention, Ability. The Effect of Anger, the Immutation of the Body, impulsion of Reason, Expedition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Passion.



Those which follow, are more Accidentall : whereof some may be considered *ex parte Patientis*, on the part of him that suffers; and some *ex parte Inferentis Injuriam*, on the part of him that doth the Injury.

Touching the patient or subject of an Injury, there are three Qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to Anger, upon supposition of the Fundamentall Cause, Contempt : and the first of these is Excellency, whether Inward from Nature, or Accidentall from Fortune: For hereby men are made more jealous of their Credit, and impatient of Abuse, as well perceiving that all Injury implies some degree both of Impotency in the

Αἰσχρολογία δὲ
τῆς ἰσχυρίας.
Αἰσχρολογία.
Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ
ἀσχετολογία ἡ
ἀσχετολογία. Αἰσχρολογία.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 2.

the *Patient*, and of *Excellency* (at least conceited) in the Agent. As *Aristotle* speaks, ὁτι τινες ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ἀνιδίκατοι, that Injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their owne *Excellency*, which cannot well stand with the height and distance of that minde which is possessed with his own good opinion: and this cause the Poet intimates in those words:

Æneid. 1.

————— *Maerit altā mente repositum*
Judicium Paridis, Spretaq; injuria formæ.

A deep and lasting Discontent is bred
To see their Beauties undervalued
By a weake wanton Judgement.

It wrought a deep Indignation in the Minds of *Power* and *Wisdom*e to see a weake and wanton Judgement give Beauty the precedence in their emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possess a man with Griefe and Fury, the one example of *Achitophel* alone may discover, who upon the rejection of his counsell, when he was too low to revenge himself on *Abalon*, executed his Anger on his own neck.

The second Qualification of the subject is *Weaknesse* and Defect, when the mind finds it selfe assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all Deficient: which *Aristotle* hath observed, when he tels us, that † *Sicke* men, *Poore* men and *Lovers* are commonly most subject to this Passion: It being as great a paine, and a greater contempt to rub and provoke an old wound, than to make a new.

† *Arist. Rh. l. 2.*
Plin. nat. hist. 1.
l. 2 c. 24.
Εντι γεραιότεροι καὶ
οἱ ἥσυχος ἀνθρώποι
καὶ οἱ πτωχοὶ
καὶ οἱ ἐρωτικοί.
De pane fess.
Theocrit. Idyl. 1.

new. That injury which proceeds against men of high and eminent quality, cannot possibly pierce so deep as that which is exercised upon open and naked weaknesse: because the former proceeds only from strife and emulation; but the other from insultation and pride: the one is only a disesteeme; but the other a contumely and exprobration: the one is a conflict of judgements, but the other a conflict of passions; and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unlesse, as sometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from Basenesse and Ignorance,) is an injury from Worth also: but a Neglect, and despising men already downe, is an injury from stomacke and height of mind; wherein the party offended cannot labour so much to cleere it selfe from the Imputation, as to revenge it selfe for it.

Another reason why *Weaknesse* the better disposeth a man to Anger, may be, because such men are most *Tender* to feele an injury, most *Suspicious* to feare it, and most *Interpreting* to over-judge it. All which being circumstances of aggravation to increase a wrong, are likewise good means to adde degrees and heat unto our Passion.

Lastly, to give a reason of both these two former causes together, it may be a Disappointment and Frustrating of Expectation: For men of eminency and worth, expect rather Approbation and Imitation than Contempt. And men weake and defectiue, expect Compassion to cover, and not Pride to mocke, and so double their wounds: and both these are in some sort debts of Nature,

U u

Omne quibus res sunt minus secunde, magis sunt, ne, si quomodo infirmitas, ad contumeliam omnia accipiant, magis propter suam infirmitatem se sepeper credunt negligere.

Ter. Adolpb.

Ad. 4. Sc. 3.

Pueri inter se quam pro leuibus noxiis irascuntur? quapropter? quia enim qui eos gubernant, etiam infirmum gerunt. Ide. Hecyr. Ad. 3. Sc. 1.

Minuti

semper, et infirmi est animi exiguae voluptas ulio.

Juven. Sat. 13.

Iracundiores sunt Incolambus languidis,

semine maribus, &c.

Amm. Mar.

lb. 27.

Vid. caus. de Eloquent.

lb. c. 29.

Plutarch.

Itaque apparet quod apparet quod apparet.

Sophoc. Ajax.

Sen. de Ira.

lb. c. 27.

it

it being the Law of Reason to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy to cover Nakednesse : and for both I am sure it is the Law of Charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in our selves ; so neither to rejoyce or thinke evill of another : and we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks it selfe lawfull.

Unto this particular of *Weaknesse* we may also reduce that which the Grammarian hath observed on *Virgil*, *Plus Irarū advenit, cum in manus non potest venire, cui irascimur*, Anger is increased when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry. And therefore the chaining up of Woolves and Mastives enrageth them, because it restraineth them; which the Poet hath excellently described.

Amad. 9.

*Ac veluti pleno Lupus insidiatus ovili,
Cum fremit ad caulos, ventos perpeffus & imbres
Nocte super media : tuti sub matribus agni
Balatum exercent. Ille asper & improbus ira
Savit in absentes, collecta fatigat edendi
Ex longorabies, & sicca sanguine fauces.
Haud aliter Rutilo muros & castratuenti
Ignescenti Ira, & durus dolor ossibus ardet.*

(whet,
As a fierce Woolf with winds, storms, midnight,
When in close folds the secure lambs do bleat,
Barks at his absent prey with the more Ire,
When rag'd and deceiv'd Hunger doth him tyre.
So *Rutilus* seeing his foes all safe,
Doth vex and boyle with the more burning chafe.

For

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For it is a great torment to an Enemy, when he can finde no in-let nor advantage against him, whom he hates.

*Vid. Plut. de
captiv. ex
host. utilitat.*

*O'Euagor. i.
Amilic.
Lucian.*

Rhet. l. 10.

De Ira. lib.

Another cause of Anger may be *strong Desires*: For alwaies the vaster and exacter our desires are, it is so much the harder for them to be pleased or satisfied. And therefore as the Philosopher notes, Luxurious men are usually transported with Anger, because men love not to be stopped in their pleasures: and hence as *Plutarch* observes, men are usually most angry there, where their desires are most conversant: as a Country-man with his Bayliffe; or an Epicure with his Cooke; or a Lover with his Corrivall; because all these crosse men in that which they most love. Now strength when it is opposed, is collected and gathered into the more excesse; as we see in Winds or Rivers, when they meet with any thing which crosseth their full passage.

The last Qualification of the Subject, whereby he is made more inclinable to this Passion, is a suspicious, apprehensive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out injury where it cannot be justly found; and (that its Anger may be employed) to frame occasions unto it selfe. And therefore tis wise advise of *Seneca*, *Non vis esse Iracundus; ne sis Curiosus*. He which is too wise in his judgement on other mens Errours, will be easily too foolish in the nourishing of his owne Passion: and its commonly seen in matters of censure and suspicion, the more sight and reason goes out, the lesse useth to abide within. Now is it hard for a man,

*Sen. de Ira.
l. 3. c. 11.*

if he be peremptorily possessed with this opinion; yet he is a common subject of others contempt, to find out, either in defects of Nature, or rudenes of custome, habit, education, temper, humour or the like, some probable ground or other for exception; which yet when it is further inquired into, will prove rather strangeness than injury.

And this is generally a Corruption of Anger: First, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fastning it selfe there where it was justly neglected: for we may ever observe that Suspicion proceeds from Guilt, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it: as it is observed of some reproachfull speeches, which a Senatour was accused to have uttered against the honor of *Tiberius*: *Quia vera erant, dicta credebantur*, His suspicious mind was perswaded that they had been spoken, because he was conscious that they had been acted; and therefore (as was before noted) it was the custome under such men to avoid all manner of Curiosities, and search into things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgement; and rather to affect Ignorance with Security, than to be ruined with wisdom. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasty, being led by a halfe judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind Passion.

The next degree of causes is of those which qualifie the *Agent*, or him that worketh the injury, and there may be amongst many other, which cannot be reckoned, these generall ones.

First

First *Basenesse*, which workes a double cause of Anger: One for an injury of Omission, in neglecting those respects which are required in men of meane and inferiour ranke towards their superiours: Another for a positive enquiry in the evill exercised against them. And many times the former alone is a cause of Anger, without the latter: For this distance of persons doth quite alter the nature of our Actions, insomuch that those demeanors, which are commendable and plausible toward our equals, are rude and irreverend toward those that are above us: and this is that which makes the wrath of God in the Scripture to be set out so terrible unto us; because of the infinite distance between the Unmeasurable Glory of the Maker of the World, and the basenesse of sinners. And therefore the comparison which useth to be made for the defence of Veniall sins, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitely more mercifull than men, should yet be offended at that which a mans neighbour would pardon him for, as a foolish angry word, or the stealing of a Farthing, or the like, is without reason: because between man and man there is a Community both in nature and weaknesse; and therefore,

Hanc veniam petimusq; damusq; vicissim.

Because we both our Errours have,
VVe pardon give, and pardon crave.

But it is an Argument of infinite Insolence

in a vile Creature for feeding it own Corruption and selfe-love in a matter of no value, to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into Hell, or into nothing.

The next Quality in the Injurer, which may raise this Passion, is Impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reasons hereof may be:

First, because as *Aristotle* observes, all Impudence is joyned with some Contempt, which is the Fundamentall and Essentiall Cause of Anger.

Secondly, because all Impudence is bold, stiffe and contentious, which are all incitements to this Passion. For as Shame being a degree of Feare works an acknowledgment of our owne weaknesse; and therefore a submission to the power wee have provoked, which (as *Aristotle* observes) procureth from beasts themselves lenity and mercy: So Impudence in all other things being contrary to it, must likewise produce a contrary Effect.

Thirdly, those things which we Impudently doe, we doe willingly likewise. And therefore we shall observe in the Scripture, how reigning sins, that is, those which are done with greedinesse of the appetite, and full consent of the will, are set forth by the names of Stubbornnesse, Rebellion, whorish Fore-head, Brasse, and Yron. Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong then this, that it proceeded from the will of man. And the reasons are,

First, because a mans *Power* is in his *Will*: but
Passions

Rhet. l. 2 c. 3.
Corpora magnanimo satis est prostare Leon.

Pugna sum finem, cum jaces hostis habet
Ovid. Trist.
lib 3. Elig 5.

Passions and other blind Agents, when they worke ungoverned, are our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore the easier borne withall.

Secondly, to a Plenary, Spontaneous Action, (such as I take most of Impudence to be) there are required *Antecedenter*, Deliberation, Approbation, and Assent, and *Consequenter*, Resolution, Perseverance, and Constancy. All which, as they take away the two principall conditions required unto Lenity, Confession and Repentance; so likewise doe they adde much to the weight of an injury: because an action which is thus exercised, is a work of the whole Man, and imployes, as a perfect consent thereunto; so a perfect and compleat enmity toward the person offendeth thereby: Whereas others are but the wrongs of some part, such as are those of the will, led by an ignorant; or those of Passion, led by a traduced Understanding; and they too not of a part regular, but of an Unjoined and Paralyticke part, which followes not the motion of a stayed reason; and therefore as they proceed from more disorder in our selves, so doe they worke lesse in the party offended.

Another thing which may raise and nourish this Passion, is any degree of *near Relation* between the parties; whether it be Naturall by Consanguinity; or Morall, by Society, Liberality, or any other friendship. For as it is prodigious in the Body Naturall to see one member wrong and provoke another: so in Unions Civill or Morall, it is strangely offensive to make a divulsion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us
by

*See de ira
lib. 2. c. 1.*

* Job 19. 19.
Zach. 13. 6.
Psal. 41. 9
55. 12.

by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or * strangers. No wounds go so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.

And the reason why this difference between men nearly referring each other should worke a greater Anger between them, is : First, because herein we may find that which before I observed as a furtherance to this Passion, Disappointment, and frustrating of expectation : For in this case, we expect Sympathy and not Division. Secondly, because all Anger is a kind of dis-joyning or Divulsion of things before joyned : there therefore, where is the greatest Union, must needs be the strongest and most violent separation : as in the Body, the Divulsion of Soule is more horrible than of an Arme, or some other member ; because the one is an Essentiall, the other only an Integrall Union ; and so it is with those who are by blood or friendship made one ; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger Passion.

Another cause of this Passion in respect of the Injurer, may be a too great Freedome and indiscreet use of speech ; especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke : For as *Solomons* speech is true, *Mollis responsio frangit iram*, a soft answer pacifies wrath : so on the contrary it is true likewise, *Dura Correptio unit iram* ; that an harth rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourished than by much speaking, though not in the party that speaketh ; because Speech is to Anger, like Teares

to Griete, a spending and venting of it, yet alwayes in another, unto whom we minister farther matter of offence. To which purpose, is that speech of *Syracides*. *Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heape not wood upon his fire.*

Another Cause which I shall observe, is contention and Difference, whether it be in Opinions or in Inclinations: because this must needs be ever joyned with some undervaluing of another mans choice and judgement; which if it be not seasoned with much sobriety, will easily induce a man to beleieve, that it proceeds not from Zeale to Truth, but from a humour of Opposition; Wherewith many men are so farre possessed, that one must hardly dare to speake the truth in their company for feare of endangering it and them. Like *Chrysippus* in *Laertius*, who used to boast that he often wanted Opinions, but those once gotten, he never wanted Arguments and Sophismes to defend them.

The last cause which I shall note of this Passion is in him, who offends us, his very Abilities, when we see them neglected: for this provokes to more displeasure, then naked impotency. Weaknesse, when it miscarries, is the object of Pity: but strength, when it miscarries, is the object of Anger.

ἡδὺν ἔχοντα
ἀνδρὶ μαχησάμην ὅστις πολέμῳ μὴ
ἀνδρὶ ἰσθι, ὅμῳ δὲ τιμωμένῳ περὶ κλέος

Illud. 117.

*I should not blame unworthy and base spirits
To slug and shrink from Battle: but for merits
So to forget themselves, for you to be
Unlike the men you are, What man can see
such weaknesse, and not wonder, chide, debate;
Till you your selves doe your owne Errours hate!*

σιγῆται ὁδὸν ἄγ-
γελου καὶ τὸ ἴδιον
Vid. quæ de
hac re habet
Nuncius apud
Sophoc. Antig.

Dion. lib. 44.

Vnto all these wee might adde some others which the Philosopher toucheth, as neglect of our Calamities, or rejoycing at them, or divulging them, or bringing readily the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleasure. Or lastly, representing the Signes which may bring into minde the memory of any injuries done us. As the Levite sent the parts of his abused Concubine up and downe unto the Tribes of Israel to move them unto Indignation. So *Antony* in the funerall Oration upon *Julius Caesar* produced his Robe stained with the blood which *Brutus* and *Cassius* had shed, to worke a detestation of that fault in the people.

Now concerning all these causes together (because it would be too tedious to gather particular circumstances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude that Anger, as it riseth from any of them, is then only Regular and Just, when it keepe these conditions.

1. First, that it still observe proportion and conformity to the rules of Love: otherwise it is not *Ira in Delictum*, but *Ira in fratrem*, not against the Crime but the person of my Brother: for we know

know the nature of this passion is to be Transient, to goe out from us on our brother and reforme him. not Immanent to worke upon our selves and deforme us: I meane by soyling the habite of Charity, which ought alwayes to remaine inviolate.

2. Secondly, that it keepe likewise due proportion unto judgement, & that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not onely to be Angry with our brother, but, which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Judgement then must be true first, that is, cleare, settled, and untransported; and that likewise in two actions; in the Act of Interpretation, which reacheth unto the injury; and in the act of Direction or Government, which reacheth unto the Passion.

3. And next it must be a whole judgement: and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury. which ever receives its degrees of Intention or remission, not from the matter of the act, but from some particular Qualifications and Circumstances joyned thereunto.

Secondly, it must judge fully of the act of Passion, not onely in informing, *quod sit*, that reparation of our selves is lawfull; but *quomodo* too, in the manner and forme how to undertake it. Because as Passion, being without Reason in it selfe, wants the tongue of judgement to informe it what to doe; So, being blinde, it wants the hand of judgement to leade it in the doing of it: and

X x 2

this

*Ira de Causa
est iracundia de
vicio.
Μετρητον εστιν οργη
παθητικον λογος.*

*Dandum ita
spatium, Liv.
Ita Romani
pueros a Ju-
randileuitate
cohibentes, pri-
mus domo exire;
Iubeant ut ef-
fet deliberandi
spatium.
Vid. Plut qu.
Rom. qu. 28.
Vid. Plutarch.
de, accipit.*

his I take to be the proper way of governing this Passion. But that which was once prescribed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher unto *Agustus*, to repeat over the Alphabet betweene the Passion and the Revenge, is to boyish and flight, as diverting the minde from the occasion to some other trifle, which is onely to cozen and not to conquer our distemper: and therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of *Empericks*, which give present ease; but search not into the roote, nor leave such an habit within; as shall in after occasions limit the unrulinesse of such distempers, like those odours which use to raise men out of a fit of the falling sicknesse, but doe not at all cure them of the disease.

Now to speake a word or two of the Effects of this Passion: they are such as are wrought, either in our selves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which reach to our bodyes, or inward which Reflect upon Reason:

Those on the body are clamour (as *Saint Paul* calls it) in the Tongue; Tumor and Inflammation in the Heart, Fire in the Eyes, and Fiercenesse and Palenesse in the Countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or deformity of all which, depend upon the subordination of Passion unto Reason, or Dominion over it. For if it be Governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of these alterations in the body (which will not then be permitted to be excessive) namely the testification of our just displeasure

displeasures at an offence received, and the inliving or sharpening of us (if occasion require) to the prosecution of further lawfull redresse; for though I would not have a man in his passion suffer a Metamorphosis, and turne his face into a torment punishing himselfe as much with Deformity, as his adversary with feare, yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politique and stomack Anger, which cunningly shrouds it selfe under a calm and serene countenance; which being unnaturall to this passion (whose property it is, *Non insidiari sed palam agere*, not to worke by way of Ambush and Stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancour.

The inward Effect of this Passion, is an Excitation of Reason, to judge of the wrong and meanes of redresse, which is then Regular, when it is done Ministerially and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous, when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of Reason; which is to make it a party rather than a Judge.

Οἱ ἐπειταποληθόντες γὰρ ἀσθενέστεροι

*Which makes sometimes a Wise man breake
Into Distempers wild and weake.*

In which ill Office there is not any Passion more busie and fruitfull then this of Anger by reason of it's suddenesse, and of it's violence: both which are strong meanes to smother or

Vid. Senec. de Ira lib. 2. c. 35. Vosque, si media speculum spectetis in ira, Cognoscat faciem vix satis ulla suam; Ovid. de Arte Amandi. lib. 3. Vid. Plutarch. Plumbas iras gerunt Plaut. Etibic. lib. 7.

divert Reason, as we see in *Tiberius* himselfe, who though a man of close and sad judgement, and of most reserved Passions (insomuch as he lived in them and nourished them along time before either their working or discovery) yet when he was provoked by *Agrippina*, to a more violent Anger then usuall, his Passion we see for the time altered his nature. *Et veram occulti pectoris vocem elicit, Num ideo laderetur, quia non regnaret.* He brake forth into words, strange and unusuall from so close a disposition; to wit, Whether she were wronged because she did not Reigne? which is *Tacitus* his observation upon the Anger of that man.

The last Effect is expedition and Dexterity in executing those meanes which Reason judgeth needfull for satisfying our selves against the person that hath offended us; wherein it's assistance, while it is Regular, is of excellent use in mans actions, because it makes bold and resolute. But here one maine corruption is to be avoided, Precipitancy and impatience of Delay or Attendance on the determination of right Reason: which makes it commonly runne away with an halfe or a broken judgement. In which respect *Aristotle* in his Ethicks very elegantly compares it to a hasty Servant, that goes away posting with halfe his Errand, & to Dogs, which, as soon as ever they heare a noyse, barke presently before they know whether it be a Stranger at the doore, or no: so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justnes of seeking redresse, & then suddenly

*Fires injicit ad
pericula sube-
unda. Ethic. lib. 3
c. II.
Φύξις ἐν ἀμετρίᾳ
ὁπλῶν. Vid. Cael.
Rhod. l. 12. c. 53.
l. 7.*

suddenly hastens away without any further listening to the rules of *Decoram* and *Justice*, which it should alwayes observe in the prosecution thereof: Lest while it is too intent on his owne right, it fall into that extreame which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.

There is not any Passion which standeth more in need of *Moderation* then this doth, both because it is one of the frequentest which we are troubled with, and the most unruly, as that which can over-bear the rest, and, of all other, hath the least recourse to ^a Reason, being hasty, Impetuous, full of Desires, Griefe, Selfe-love, Impatience, which spareth no ^b persons, Friends or foes, nothings, animate or ^c inanimate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore ^d Grammarians tell us that it hath its name *Ira* from *Ire*, because a man in his *Anger* usually goeth away from his Reason, and as his *Anger* slackens, he is said, *ad se redire*, to returne againe unto himselfe. And therefore those men in whom Reason is most predominant, are least transported by this Affection, and most often displeased with themselves for it. It was a strange Commendation given to ^a *Theodosius Junior*, that never any man saw him Angry; And such a power had ^b *Lycurgus* over himselfe, that when an insolent yong man had done him no lesse injury then the striking out of one of his Eyes, by lenity and mansuetude hee convinced and gained him. ^c And *Pericles* that great Statesman and Oratour of Greece, being all the day reviled by an Impure companion, com-

^a *Ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνης*
ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ τῇ
πρὸς τὸν Πλούτωνα
καλεῖται τὴν ἰσχυρὰν
καὶ ἀκαταστάτην
τὴν ἰσχυρὰν
τὴν ἰσχυρὰν
τὴν ἰσχυρὰν
Thuchyd. lib. 2.
b Plutarch.

Seneca
Sen. de Ira lib.
3. cap. 28.

c Epist. 18.

c Ipsum compe-
dibus qui vinx-
erat Enno pige-
um. Juv. Sat.
10. Plut. de Ira.

d Donat. &

Cael. Rhod. l. 12.

c. 53.

a Socrat. lib. 7.

c. 22.

b Plutarch. in

Lyc.

c Plut. in Pe-

ricle.

* Senec. de ira
lib. 3. c. 12. & 38
Plut. de sevā
num: vindicat.

Sicut aquila &
leones inter am-
bulandum un-
gues intro a-
vertunt.

Vid. Plu. decu-
rios. Sen. de Ira.
lib. 2. cap. 28.
Indignatio a
nimio sui suspe-
ctu. Sen. de Ira
l. 3. c. 5. Senec.
l. 3. c. 12.

Plutarch de
Aud. poetis.

commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house * nothing more obvious then Examples of this kinde.

That we may therefore so manage this passion as to be *Angry but not sinne*, it will be requisite.

1. To let it have an Eye upward, as Moses did, who never expressed any other anger that wee read of but zealous, and Religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable that any thing will move too fast upward.

2. To convert it *inward* into a selfe-displicity and severity towards our owne Errours, for the more acquainted any man is with himself, the lesse matter hee will finde of Anger with other men, as having so much both *to doe*, and *to blame* at home. Anger ever ariseth from the Value which we set upon our selves, which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.

3 Follow it not too *Close*, joyne not too soon, nor too hastily with it; though it may be *used* sometimes, it must never be *incouraged*, being over-bold and forward of it selfe. And therefore as many drugges must be prepared before wee may dare to use them; so we must take heed of dispatching this affection without its due corrective. It must first be schooled before it be employed, as men bridle their horses before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water so soone as it is stirred, give it time to subside and settle.

4. Keepe it not *long*, it is the Spawne of Malice and Contention, and time will hatch it. It is a Corroding thing which will fret and staine the Vessell in which it is kept, Let not the Sunne goe downe upon it, tis ill being in the darke with so bad a Leader. It may passe through the heart of a wise man, but it *Resteth onely in the bosome of Fooles.*

5 Remove the *Occasions* of it, withdraw Fuell from so catching a Flame. They say of Turpentine, and some other like things, that they will draw and sucke Fire unto them. Certainely of all Fire there is none so ductile, so sequatious and obsequious, as this of Wrath. It was not ill done therefore of *Cotys* and *Augustus*, To cause those curious Vessels to be broken of purpose, which having beene accidentally broken might have made a breach likewise upon the discretion of their owners.

6 Give not an easie Eare to *Reports*, nor an Easie entertainment to *suspitions*; bee not greedy to know who or wherein another hath wrong'd thee. That which wee are desirous to know, or apt to beleewe, wee shall be the more ready to revenge. *Curiosity*, and *Credulity*, are the Handmaidens unto *Passion*. *Alexander* would not see the woman after whom he might have Lusted: Nor *Cesar* search *Pompeys* Cabinet, lest he should find new matters of Revenge. He chose rather to make a Fire of them on his Hearth, then in his Heart. In-

Y y

juries

Plut. Apopl.
Sen. de Iratib.
3.c.40. Cæsar.
Rhod. l. 12.
c. 52.

Sen. de Irat. 2.
c. 22, 23, 24.

Plut. in Alex.
& l. curiosi.
Dion. Cass. l. 41.

juries unknowne doe many times the lesse hurt; when I have found them, I then begin to feele them, and suffer more from mine one discovery then from mine enemies attempt.

7 Bee *Candid* in Interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest. Many times the glasse through which I looke, makes that seeme formidable, and the wave, that crooked, which in it selfe was beautifull and straight. Happly thou art Angry with that which could not intend to hurt thee, Thy Booke, thy Penne, the stone at which thou stumblest, the winde or raine that beats upon thee: bee angry againe, but with thy selfe, who art either so *bold* as to be Angry with *GOD*, or so *foolish* as to be Angry with *nothing*. Thou art displeased at a Childish or an Ignorant miscarriage, Call it not Injury, but *Imprudence*, and then pitty it. Thou art Angry with Counsell, Reproofe, Discipline; why doest thou not as well breake the Glasse in which thy Philitian Ministreth a potion unto thee? Bee Angry with thy sinne, and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee. Is hee that adviseth thee thy Superiour? Thine Anger is undutifull. Is hee thy friend? Thine Anger is ungratefull.

8 Give Injuries a *New Name*: and that will worke a new Affection. In blinde Agents call it Chance; in weake Persons, Infirmitie; In simple, Ignorance; In wise, Counsell; in Superiours,

perious, Discipline; In equals, Familiarity; in Inferious, Confidence; where there is no other construction to be made; doe as *Joseph* and *David* did, call it *Providence*, and see what God sayes to thee by it. Get a minde conversant with high and noble things, the more heavenly, the lesse Tempestuous.

9 Be not *Idle*, *Sluggish*, *Luxurious*, wee are never more apt to bee angry, then when we are sleepy or greedy. Weake resolutions and strong Desires are sensible of the least exasperation, as an empty ship of the smallest Tempest.

Againe bee not *over-busie* neither; That man can hardly bee master of his Passion that is not master of his imployments. A minde ever burdened, like a Bow alwaies bent must needs grow impotent, and weary, the fittest preparations this distemper. When a mans businesse doth not poise, but presse him, there will ever bee something either undone or ill-done, and so still matter of Vexation. And therefore our Minds as our Vessels must bee unloaded, if they would not have a Tempest hurt them.

Lastly, wrastle not with that which pincheth thee. If it bee strong it will hurt, if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. Hee that strives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempest breakes not the stalkes of Corne, which rends asunder the armes

Y y 2

*Minimus rerum discordia
turbat pacem
summa tenent
Lucan. Vid.
Sen. l. 4. c. 33.
Sen. de Ira l. 2.
c. 23, 26.*

*Plutarch.
περί αργυ.
Senec. l. 3. c. 6.
Sen. de Ira l. 3.
cap. 16.
--χημαρπίς
ὅσα δεινὰ γὰρ
ὕσιντες, καὶ ὁ-
ντες αὐτῶν
σ. 7. ἐλὰς τὰ δ'
ἀντίτε, οὐ
αὐτοὶ σπῖναι
ἀπελευθεῖται.
Sorb. an ig.
Pl. r. Synopf.
l. 2. q. c. 2.*

of

A Treatise of the Passions

of an Oake, the one yeelds, the other withstands it. An humble weaknesse is safer from injury, then a stubborne strength.

I have now done with the Passions of the Minde. And briefly proceede to those Honours and Dignities of the Soule of Man which belong unto it in a more abstracted Consideration.

* *

*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of the Originall of the Reasonable Soule,
whether it be immediately Created and
Infused, or derized by Seminall Tra-
duction from the Parents. Of the Deriva-
tion of Originall sinne.



He dignity of *Man* in respect of his
Soule alone. may be gathered from a
consideration either of the *whole*, or of
the *parts* therof. Concerning the whole;
we shall consider two things; Its *Originall*, and its
Nature. Concerning the *Originall* of the *Soule*,
divers men have diversly thought; for, to let passe
the Opinion of *(a) Seleucus*, who affirmed that it
was educed out of the Earth, and that *b* of *Origin*
and the *Platonists* who say that the Soules of men
were long ago created, and after deruded into
the Body as into a Prison: There are three Op-
inions touching this question. The first of those
who affirm the *Traduction* of the *Soule* by genera-
tion, some of which so affirm because they judged
it a *Corporeall* substance, as did *c Tertullian*. Others
because they beleevved that one spirit might as
easily proceed from another, as one fire or light
be kindled by another: as *d Apollinaris*, *Nemesius*,
and divers in the Westerne Churches, as *St. Hierome*
witnesseth. The second, of those who
deny the naturall *Traduction*, and say that the

A a

Soul-

a Philastri de Hares Seleuci, &c.

*b Justinian. Tract ad Mem-
nam contra Orig Hieron
Epist. ad Mar-
cell & Ana-
pyschiam Theo-
phyl. Alex. Ep.
Pasc. 2. Ana-
stas Sinuita
Arageg. con-
temp. l. b. 11.*

*c Aug. de Hares.
86. ep 157. de
Gen ad lit l. 10
c. 25. Tertul. de
Anima c. 5. 6.
7. 22. 25. 27.*

*d Hieron. Epist.
ad Marcellin-
um. Nemesius
de natura homi-
nis l. 2. Lucife-
rian apud Aug.
Hares. 81.*

e Hieron. ep. ad
Iam contra Io-
an. Hiens.
f Hil. de Trin.
l 10.
g Ambros. de
Noah & Arca.
c. 4.
h Lactant. de
opt. Hom c 9.
i Theod. de cu-
rand agr. affect.
ser. 4.
k Aeneas Gaz.
in suo Theo-
phrasio.
l Aug. ep. 7. 28
157 & Reira B.
l. 1. c. 1. de Gen-
ad lit. 10. & de
anima.
m Greg. 1. 7.
ep. 53.

Eccles. 11. 5.

Soule is by *Creation* infused into Bodies, organ-
iz'd and prædispos'd to receive them, of which
Opinion among the Ancients were *St. Hierom*,
i Hilarie, *Ambrose*, *h Lactantius*, *i Theodoret*, & *Ae-
neas Gazens*, and of the moderne Writers the Ma-
jor part. The third is of those who doe *hesitare*,
stick betweene both, and dare affirme nothing
certaine on either side, which is the moderation
of *l St Augustine* and *Gregory*, *m the Great*, who af-
firmeth that this is a question in incomprehensible,
and unsolvable in this life. Now the only rea-
son which caused *St. Austin* herein to hæsitare
seemeth to have been the difficulty of traducing
Originall sinne from the Parents to the Children.
For saith he (writing unto *St Hierome* touching
the Creation of the Soule) If this Opinion doe
not oppugne that most fundamentall faith of *Ori-
ginall sinne*, let it then be mine, but if it doe op-
pugne it, let it not be thine.

Now since that Opinion which denieth the
Traduction, seemeth most agreeable to the spiritu-
all substance of the Soule, I shall here produce
some few reasons for the *Creation*, and solve an
argument or two alledg'd for the *Traduction* of
the Soule, reserving notwithstanding unto my
selfe, and others, the liberty and modesty of *St.
Austins* hæsitation, which also I finde allowed
by the Holy Ghost himselfe.

Two things there are of certainty in this
point. 1. That the soul is not any corporeall
Masse or substance measurable by quantity, or
capable of substantiall augmentation. 2. That the
the

the *Traduction* of one thing out of another, doth connotate these two things, That the thing traduced doth derive Being from the other, as from its original principle, & that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but *Ratione seminali*, & *per modum decisionis*, by a feminall way and the decision, seperation, or effluxion of substance from the other : which things being laid, The Arguments against *Traduction* are these.

First, the testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the *Father of spirits*, as our naturall Parent the *Father of our bodies*, *Iob. 33. 4. Eccles. 12. 7. Esa. 57. 16. Num. 16. 22. 27. 16. Heb. 12. 9. Zach. 12. 1.* which though they doe not according to the judgement of *St. Aug.* conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet doe they much favour the probability of this Opinion.

2. To have Being by *Traduction*, is, when the soule of the Childe is derived from the soule of the Parent, by the meanes of seed : but the seed of the Parent cannot reach the Generation of the soule, both because the one is a Corporeall, the other a spirituall substance, uncapable of Augmentation, or Detriment. Now that which is *spirituall*, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeall : neither can any seed be discinded or issue out from the soule, being *substantia simplex*, & *impartibilis*, a substance simple, and indivisible.

3. That which is *separable* from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its being or making upon it, for if by the Gene-

ration of the Body the soule be generated, by the corruption of the Body it would be corrupted, for every thing that is generable, is corruptible; But the Soule can subsist and work without the Body, therefore it doth not from corporeall generation derive its Being.

4. If the Soule be feminally traduced, it must be either from the Body, or from the soule of the Parents; not from the Body, for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a Body, no cause being able to produce an effect out of its owne spheare, and more noble than it selfe; not from the soule, because that being a spirituall and impartible substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it by way of substantiall seed unto the constitution of another soule.

5. If there be nothing taken from the Parents, of which the soule is formed, then it is not traduced by naturall generation: but there is nothing taken from the Parents, by which the soule is formed, for then in all Abortions and miscarrying Conceptions, the seede of the Soule would perish, and by consequence the soule it selfe would be corruptible, as having its Originall from corruptable seed. These and divers other the like aguments are used to confirme the doctrine touching the Creation of the Reasonable Soule. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the fore-cited Fathers. St *Hierome* telleth us that the Originall of the soule in mankinde is not as in othe

*Hier. ad Pam-
mach & in l.
22. Ecclef. 12.
Comr. Rufficum
l. 2. c. 1. 2. &
dialog de Orig.
Anim. inter
opera ejus Tom.
8.*

livin

living creatures. Since as our Saviour speaketh, *The Father worketh hitherto.* And the Prophet *Esay* telleth us, *That he formeth the spirit of man within him, and frameth the hearts of all men;* as it is in the *Psalmes.* And so *Lactantius* (whom I doe wonder to finde numbred amongst the Authors that affirme the Traduction of the soule, by *Ruffinus*, and the Author of the Dialogue amongst the workes of *Hierome*) It may be questioned (saith he) whither the soule be generated out of the Father, Mother, or both. Neither of all three is true, Because the seed of the Soule is not put into the Body by either, or both of these. A body may be borne out of their Bodies, because something may be out of both contributed; but a Soule cannot be borne out of their Soules, in as much as from so spirituall and incomprehensible a substance nothing can issue forth or be severed for that use. So also *St. Hilary.* The Soule of man is the work of God; the generation of the flesh is alwayes of the flesh. And againe, it is inbred and an impress'd Beliefe in all, that our Soules have a divine Originall; And in like manner *Theodore*t, God (saith he) frameth the Bodies of living creatures out of bodies subsisting before, but the Soules, not of all creatures, but of Men only hee worketh *ex nihilo* out of nothing that had been before.

Against this Doctrine of the Soules Originall, The principall argument is drawn from the consideration of *Originall sinne*, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled

*Hilar. de Trin.
lib. 1. c. 6. in
p. c. 2.*

*Athenag de
Resur Gernad.
de Eccles. dog.
c. 13.*

Aug. ep. 28.

and staggerd *S. Augustine* in this point. For if the Soule be not naturally traduced, how should Originall sinne be derived from *Adam* unto it? And if it were not in the loynes: of *Adam*, then neither did it sinne in his loynes; whereas the Apostle expressly telleth us, that by one Man sinne came into the world, and that in one all have sinned; and that not only by imputative participation, but by naturall Propagation, deriving an inherent habituall pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soule of every man that entereth into the world, and is the fruit of *Adams* loynes.

Unto which Argument to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the Soule by the immediate contract of the flesh, and the Parents attinging the ultimate disposition of the Body, upon which naturally followeth the Union of the soule, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence, which he in the vertue of a *first and supreme cause* is to contribute unto them.) I shall set downie what I conceive to be the Truth in this point.

First then, it is most certaine that God did not implant *Originall sinne*, nor take away *Originall righteousness* from Man, but man by his *Prævarication* and Fall did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a *defiled nature* to his posterity. For as *Macarius* excellently speaketh, *Adam* having transgressed, did lose the pure possession of his Nature

Secondly,

*Aug. de Civit.
Dei. l. 13. c. 14.*

Macar. Ho. 12.

Secondly, Originall injustice as it is a sinne, by the default and contraction of Man, so it is also a punishment by the ordination, and disposition of Divine Justice. It was mans sinne to cast away the Image of God; but it is Gods just judgement (as hee hath that free dispensation of his owne Gifts) not to restore it again in such manner as at first he gave it unto that nature which had so rejected and trampled on it.

Aug contr.
Iul. l. 5. c. 3.

Thirdly, In this *Originall sinne*, there are two things considerable, The *Privation* of that Righteousnesse, which ought to be in us; and the *lust* or *Habituall concupiscence*, which carrieth Nature unto inordinate motions. The *Privation* and want of Originall justice is meritoriously from *Adam*, who did voluntarily deprave, and reject that Originall rectitude which was put into him, which therefore God out of his most righteous and free disposition is pleased not to restore unto his Nature in his posterity againe. In the *habituall lust* are considerable these two things *atrazia* the sinfull disorder of it, And *atquebia* the punishment of sinne by it. Consider it is as a punishment of *Adams* first Prævarication; and so, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the Order of his Justice, who did most righteously forsake *Adam*, after his wilfull fall, and leave him in the hand of his owne Counsell, to transmit unto us that Seminary of sinne which himselfe had contracted.

But if we consider it as a sinne, we then say that the immediate & proper cause of it, is lapsed nature
whole

whole and entire by Generation and Seminall Transduction derived upon us. But the *Remoter cause* is that, from which wee receive and derive this Nature. Nature I say first *fallen*; for unto Nature Innocent belonged Originall Righteousnesse, and not Originall sinne.

2. *Nature derived* by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loynes, and of the womb. For though Christ had our Nature, yet hee had not our sinne.

3. *Nature whole and entire*. For neither part (as some conceive) is the Totall spring and fountain of this sinne. For it is improbable that any staine should be transfused from the Body to the Soule, as from the foule vessell to the cleane water put into it. The Body it selfe being not Soly and alone in it selfe corrupt and sinfull; else, all Abortians and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin which cannot be the seat of Death the wages of sinne.

Originall sinne therefore most probably seemeth to arise by *Emanation*, partiall in the parts, totall in the whole; from Mans Nature as *guilty, forsaken*, and *accursed* by God for the sinne of *Adam*. And from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by vertue of their concurrence and *Union*, whereby both make up one compounded Nature. Though then the Soule be a partiall subject or seat of Originall sinne; yet wee have not our sinne and our soule from one Author; because sinne followes not the

the *part*, but the *Nature* whole and entire. And though we have not from our Parents *Totum Nature*, yet we have *totam naturam*, wee have our whole nature, though not every part of our nature. Even as *whole Christ* was the Son of *Mary*, who therefore by vertue of the Communication of properties in *Christ*, is justly called *Dei Genitrix*, the *Mother of God*, against the Nestorians in the Councell of *Chalcedon*. Though in regard of his divine Nature, he was without beginning; and the reason is, because the integrity of Nature ariseth from the *Union* of the two parts together, which is perfected by *Generation*; so then we say that *Adam* is the *Originall*, and *meritorious* cause. Our next *Parents*, the instrumentall and *immediate* cause of this sinne in us, not by way of *Physicall Emission* or *Transmigration* of sinne from them to us, but by *secret contagion*, as *S. Augustine* speaks. For having in the Manner aforesaid from *Adam* by our Parents received a nature, most justly forsaken by God, and lying under the Guilt and Cause of the first *prævarication*, from this *Nature* thus *derived*, as *guilty* and *accursed*, doth immediately and intimately flow *Habitually* pollution. So then *Habitually* concupiscence is from *Adam* alone *meritoriously* by reason of his first *prævarication*. From *Adam* by the mediation of our Parents *seminally* by naturall generation. And from *Nature* generated not as *Nature*, but as in *Adam* *guilty*, *forsaken* and *accursed*, by *secret* and *ineffable Resultancy* and *Emanation*. This is that which I conceive of this great difficulty, not

Contr. Julian.
l. 3. c. 14.

*Nihil peccato
originali ad
predicandum
notius, nihil ad
intelligendum
secratius, Aug.
de mor. b. Ec-
cles. cap. 22.*

unmindfull in the mean time of that speech of *S. Augustine*, That there is nothing more certaine to be knowne, and yet nothing more secret to be understood than *Originall Sins*. For other Arguments to prove the Traduction of the Soule, they are not of such moment; And therefore I passe them by, and proceed to the consideration of the Soule in its Nature.

CHAP. XXXIII.

*Of the Image of God in the Reasonable soule,
in regard of its simplicity, and spirituality.*



Concerning the dignity of the soule in its nature and essence, Reason hath adventured thus farre, to confesse that the soule of man, is in some sort a spark and beame of divine brightnesse. And a greater and more infallible Oracle hath warranted that it was *breathed* into him by God himselfe, and was made after his *Image and likenesse*, not substantially, as if there * were a Real Emanation and Traduction of the Soule out of God; which were blasphemous and impious to conceive: but only by way of Resemblance, and imitation of Gods properties in mans originall created nature, which is more notable in him, than in the other parts of the world; there is indeed in all Gods works some kind of image, and lineaments, and footsteps of his glory.

*Macro. de
somno. Scip. p.
1. c. 14. divina
particula auras.
αἰθέρα αἶμα
δα. Philo.*

** V. d. contra
hanc impieta-
tem discretum
cencil. Bracar.
cap. 5.
μεῖον ἢ τῆς
θείας ἰδέας
ἔως.
Damasc. de
orth. fid. lib. 2.
cap. 12.
Igneus est ollis
vigor & cele-
stis Origo.*

and Faculties of the Soule.

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*Deum namq; ire per omnes
Terrasque Tractusq; maris Cælumq; profundum &c.*
For all the tracts of Earth, of Sea, and Sky.
Are filled with divine immensity.

The whole world is a great * book, wherein we read the praise, glory, power, and infiniteness of him that made it, but man is after a more peculiar manner called *Εἰκὼν*, and *Δόξα*, the image and glory of God; the greater world is only Gods workmanship, wherein is represented the wisdom and power of God, as in a building the Art and cunning of the workman; but man (in the originall purity of nature) is besides that, as wax, wherein was more notably impressed by that divine spirit (whose work it is to seale) a spirituall resemblance of his owne goodnesse and sanctity. Again, the greater world was never other than an *Orator* to set forth the power and praises of God; but he made the soule of man, in the beginning as it were his *Oracle*, wherein he fastned a perfect knowledge of his law and will, from the very glimpses and corrupted Reliques of which Knowledge of his Law. some have beene bold to call men *Συγγενεὶς θεῷ*, the kindred of God, And *Senec. Liber Animus & Diis cognatus*; which is the same with that of *Aratus* cited by *S. Paul* *Τὸ γὰρ ὃ γένετο ἵουα*, for mee are his off-spring, yea *Euripides* (as *Tully* in his *Tusculans* observes,) was bold to call the soule of man, by the name of God; and *Seneca* will venture so farre too. *Quid*

* *Εἰς* & *ὅλα*.
Orig. apud Euseb. de præp. Evang. lib. 6. cap. 11.

Fixit in effigiem moderatum cuncta Deorum. *Ov. Met. 1*
In aliis creaturis est similitudo dei tantum per modum vestigiis; in Sola Rationali Creatura a per modum imaginis.
Vid. Aquin. part 1. qu. 93. art. 6.

Συγγενεὶς ὃ τοῦ θεοῦ σπαραγίδι θεῷ.

Philo apud Euseb. de præp. Evang. l. b. 7. cap. 18.

Ποῦμα θεῷ λογὸν καὶ ἐκείνα γενέσθων τῷ θεῷ.
σα. 1. 9. αὐτῷ.
Greg. Nyss. Ser. 1. in verba illa faciamus hominem &c. θεὸν ὁ θεός.
A ist. Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.

*Deorum cognatione tenetur Cic. de Divin. l. 1. & l. de Amicit. Porphy. apud Euseb. de præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 28. * Lib. 1. Clem. Alex. in fine A. 4. Stromas. Ipse etiam Cic. in somnio Scipio.*

Bbb 2

aliud

Senec. ep. 31.
& 41.

aliud vocas animum quàm deum in humano corpore hospitantem. But to forbear such boldnesse, as (it may be) one of the Originals of heathen Idolatry: Certaine it is, that there are (as *Tully* many times divinely observes) sundry similitudes betweene God and the minde of man. There are indeed some Attributes of God, not only incommunicable, but absolutely inimitable, and unshadowable by any excellency in mans soule, as immensity, infiniteness, omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, impassibility, and the like; but whatsoever spirituall, and Rationall perfections the power and bounty of God, conferr'd upon the soule in its first Creation, are all of them so many shadowes and representations of the like, but most infinite perfections in him.

The Properties then and Attributes of God, wherein this Image chiefly consists, are first these three: *Spirituality* with the two immediate consequents thereof, *Simplicity* and *Immortality*, in which the soule hath partaked without any after corruption or depravation. Concerning the former, it were vast, and needlesse, to confute those * sundry opinions of ancient Philosophers, concerning the substance of the soule; many whereof *Tully* in the first of his *Tusculans* hath reported; And *Aristotle* confuted in his first *de Anima*. Some conceived it to be blood, others the braine, some fire, others ayre; some that it consists in Harmony and number; and the Philosopher *Dicearcus*, that it was nothing at all but

Vid. Aug. de
Gen. ad lit. l. 6.
c. 12.

Ambr. Hexam.
lib. 6. cap. 8.

Tertul. lib. 2.

contra Marcio.
cap. 5. 9. 16.

Clem. Alex. in
Protrep. p. 30

Basil. Hexam.
Hemil. 10.

* Vid. Theodo-
red. Sermon. 5. de

Natura Hom.
& Nemes. c. 2.

Seu. Nyssen. lib.
de Anim. Plu-

tarch. de placit.
is Philosph.

l. 4. c. 2. Tertul.
de Anim. Senec.

Nat. qu. l. 7. c.
24.

but the body disposed and fitted for the works of life. But to let these passe as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the first property.

There are sundry naturall reasons to prove the * *Spirituality* of the Soule, as first, the *manner* of its *working*, which is *immateriall* by conceiving objects, as *universall*, or otherwise purified from all grossnesse of matter, by the Abstraction of the *Active understanding*, whereby they are made in some sort proportionall to the nature of the Intellect passive, into which the species are impressed.

Secondly, its *independence* on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the soule require the concurrence of the *Common sense* and *imagination*, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the *object*; not by way of assistance to the elicit and immediate act. They only present the *species*, they do not qualifie the *perception*. *Phantasmata* are only *objecta operationis*; the objects they are, not *instrumenta operandi*, the instruments of the soules working. The *Act of understanding* is immediatly from the soule, without any the least concurrences of the body thereunto, although the things whereon that Act is fixed and conversant, require, in this estate, bodily organs to represent them unto the soule; as light doth not at all concur to the act of seeing, which solely and totally floweth from the visive faculty, but only serves as an extrinsecall assistance for qualification of the *Medium* and ob-

*Vid. Nemes. de Anim. cap. 2.
Claudian. Mamercuri de statu Animæ. lib. 2.
Plotin. apud Euseb. de præparat. Evang. l. 15. cap. 21.
Demasce. de Oribol. fide l. 2. c. 12.
Plutarch. l. de placitis Philo-
soph. l. 4 c. 2, 3.
Aug. lib. de quantitate Ani-
me.

Lib. 3. de Anima cap. 5.

Ibid. cap. 5.

ject that must be seene. And this reason *Aristotle* hath used to prove, that the understanding, which is principally true of the whole soule, is not mixt with any body, but hath a nature altogether diuers there-from, because it hath no bodily organ, as all bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reason of his, to prove the *Soul immateriall*, because it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within it selfe, as is more manifest in the *Reflexion* of the soule upon its owne nature, being an operation (as hee expressly speaketh) *seperable there-from*, the soule being not only *actus informans*, a forme informing, for the actuating of a body, and constitution of a compound substance, but *actus subsistens* too, a forme subsisting ; And that *per se*; without any necessary dependance upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.

Another reason of *Aristotle* in the same place, is the difference betweene *Materiall* and *Immateriall power*. For (saith he) all bodily cognoscitive faculties doe suffer offence and dammage from the too great excellency of their objects, as the eye from the brightnesse of the Sunne, the eare from the violence of a sound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the like. But the *understanding* on the contrary side is perfected by the worthiest contemplations. and the better inabled for lower enquiries. And therefore

fore Aristotle in his *Ethicks*, placeth the most compleat happinesse of man in those heavenly intuitions of the minde, which are fastned on the diviaest and most remote objects; which in Religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatificall vision (which, as farre as Nature goes, is call'd the *contemplation of the first cause*) and an eternall satiating the soule with beholding the Nature, Essence, and glory of God.

Another reason may be drawn from the condition of the *Understandings Objects*, which have so much the greater conformity to the soule, by how much the more they are divine and abstracted. *Hoc habet animus argumentum sue divinitatis, (saith Seneca) quod illum divina delectant.* This argument of its divinenesse hath the minde of man, that it is delighted with divine things; for if the soule were corporeall, it could not possibly reach to the knowledge of any, but materiall substances, and those that were of its owne Nature; otherwise we might as well see Angels with our eyes, as understand any thing of them in our mindes. And the ground of this reason is, that axiome in Philosophy, that all reception is *ad modum recipientis*, according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are spirituall and divine, have greatest proportion to the soule of man, is evident in his Understanding and his will, both which are in regard of truth or good unsatisfiable, by any materiall or worldly objects, the one never resting in enquiry, till it attaine the perfect knowledge,

ledge, the other never replenished in desire till it be admitted unto the perfect possession of the most divine and spirituall good: to wit, of him who is the first of Causes, and the last of Ends.

From this attribute of *Spirituality* flowes immediately the next of *Simplicity, Unity, or Actuality*, for matter is the root of all perfect composition, every Compound consisting of two Essentiall parts, *matter* and *forme*. I exclude not from the Soule all manner of composition, for it is proper to *God* only to be absolutely and perfectly simple: But I exclude all *Essentiall composition*, in respect whereof the Soule is *meerely Actuell*; And so I understand that of Tully, *Nihil est Animus admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex.*

Aristar. de Anima lib. 3. c. 6.

Tuscul. q. 1. 1.
& lib. de Senectute.

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CHAP. XXXIV.

Of the Souls immortality proved by its simplicity, independance, agreement of Nations in acknowledging God and duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of understanding things immortall, unsatiableness by objects Mortall, freeness from all causes of corruption.



And from this *Simplicity* follows by a necessary and unavoidable consequence, the third property spoken of, * *Immortality*, it being absolutely impossible (as *Tully* excellently observes, and it is the argument of *Ful. Scaliger* on this very occasion) for any simple and uncompounded Nature to be subject to death and corruption; For (saith *Tully*) *Interitus est discessus & secretio ac direptus earum partium quæ conjunctione aliqua tenebantur*. It is a separation (and as it were) a divulsion of parts, before united each to other, so that where there is * no Union, there can be no separation, and by consequence no death nor mortality.

Another reason may be the same which was alledged for the *spirituality* of the Soul, namely, *independance in operation*, and therefore consequently in *Being* upon the body. And that In-

* Vid. Plut. lib. de placit. Philoloph. 4. c. 7. quæ ex Seneca in unum collegit Dionys. Gothofrid. in locis ex ipso Theologis. Titul. de Animo Cic. Tusc. qu. lib. 1. Catomajor, five de senect. & de Amicit. Istam materiam fusc tractarunt. Aug. Tem. 1. Euse. de præpar. Evang. li. 11. ex Platone Porphy. &c. Nemes. Eneas Gazæus in Bed. Era Contarenus. Alii. Nihil potest perdere esse quod non perdit actum per quem est: Istæ autem formæ:

[viz. Simples] non possunt perdere actum per quem sunt, quia sibi in se sunt Actus Nihil autem potest seipsum perdere. Contarenus lib. 1. de Immort. Animæ.

C c c

dependance

dependance is manifest, First, because the acts of the soule are educ'd immediately in it selfe, without the Intercedence of any organ whereby se firive faculties work. Secondly, because the soule can percieve and have the knowledge of truth of *universals*, of *it selfe*, of *Angels*, of *God*, can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any wayes be produced by the Intrinsecall concurrence of any material faculty. Thirdly, because in *Raptures* and *Extasies*, the soule is (as it were) drawne up above and from the body, though not from *in'orming* it, yet certainly from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soule is separable from the body in its Nature, and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortall as the body.

Another reason may be taken from the Universal agreement of all Nations in the Earth in * *Religion* and the worship of some Deity, which cannot but be raised out of a hope and secret Resolution that that God whom they worshipped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. *Nulla gens adeo extra leges est projecta ut non aliquos deos credat*, saith *Seneca*; whence those fictions of the Poets touching *Elysium* and fields of happinisse for men of honest and wellordered liv:s; and places of Torment for those that doe any way neglect the bonds of their Religion

Ergo

* *Quoniam de Animarum eternitate differimus, non de momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum ut timerent inferos aut colerent.*
Seneca. p. 117.

*Ergo exercentur penis, veterumq; malorum
Supplicia expendunt.*

Therefore they exercised are with paine,
And punishments of former crimes sustaine.
For in this life it is many times in all places
seene, that those which have given themselves
most liberty in contempt of Gods Lawes, and
have suffered themselves to be carried by the
swinge of their owne rebellious Passions, unto
all injurious, ambitious, unruly Practises, have
commonly raised themselves and their fortunes
more then others, who out of tenderesse and
feare have followed no courses but those which
are allowed them. And yet these men who suf-
fer so many indignities out of regard to Religi-
on, doe still observe their duties, and in the midst
of all contempt and reproach, fly into the bo-
some of their God: And as *Lucretius* himselve
that Arch Atheist confesseth of them:

Multo in rebus acerbis

Acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.

Their hearts in greatest bitteresse of minde,
Unto Religion are the more enclinde.

Their very terrors and troubles make them more
zealous in acknowledging some Deity and in the
worship of it. *Hic Pietas* ~~horos~~ ^{honor} would not
this easily have melted their Religion into no-
thing; and quite diverted their minds from so
fruitlesse a severity, had they not had a strong
and endeleble perswasion fastned in their soules,
that a state would come, wherein both their Pa-
tience should be rewarded, and the insolencie of
Ccc 2 their

their Advertaries repayed with the just Vengeance they had deserved ?

As for that Atheistickall conceit, that Religion is only grounded on Policie, and maintained by Princes for the better Tranquillity and Setlednesse of their States, making it to be only *Imperium Vinculum*, a Bond of Government, that the Common-weale might not suffer from the fury of minds secure from all Religion, it is a fancie no lesse absurd, then it is impious. For that which hath not only beene observed and honour'd by those who have scarce had any form of a civill Regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practice of the whole world, is not a Law of Policie and civill Institution, but an inbred and secret Law of Nature dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any humane impositions. Nor else is it possible for Legall institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of Humane Policy so much to entangle the hearts of men (of themselves enclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby only to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for feare of such a God, to whose Infinitesse, Power and Majestie they Assent by none but a civill Tradition. It must be a visible character of a Deitie acknowledged in the Soule, an irresistible Principle in Nature, and the secret witnesse of the heart of man, that must constrain it unto those sundry religious ceremonies (observed among all Nations) wherein even
in

in places of Idolatry, were some so irksome and repugnant to Nature, and others so voyd of Reason, as that nothing bur a firme and deepe Assurance of a Divine Judgement, and of their owne Immortality, could ever have impos'd them upon their consciences. And besides this consent of men unto Religion in generall, we finde it also unto this one part hereof touching the Soules immortality. All the wisest and best reputed Philosophers for Learning and stayednesse of life, and, besides them, even Barbarians, Infidels, and savage people have discerned it. *Adeo nescio quomodo inheret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum*, saith Tully. The Soule hath a kinde of presage of a future world; And therefore he saith, that it is in mans Body a Tenant, *tanquam in dome aliena*, as in anothers house: And is only in Heaven as a Lord *tanquam in domo sua*, as in its owne.

Tusc. qu. l. 1.

Though in the former of these, the ignorance of the *resurrection* made him erre touching the future condition of the Body, wherein indeed consists a maine dignity of Man above other creatures. And this Opinion it is which he saith was the ground of all that care men had for posterity, to sow and plant Common-weales, to ordaine Lawes, to establish formes of Government, to erect Foundations and Societies, to hazard their Blood for the good of their Country; all which **could not** have beene done with such freedome of Spirit, and prodigality of life, unlesse there were withall a conceit that the good

thereof would some way or other redound to the contentment of the Authors themselves after this life : for it was a speech favouring of infinite Atheisme.

Εγὼ δὲ τίς ἐστι μοι φρονιμία πρὸς

When I am, and in mine Urne?

What care I though the World turne?

Tull. Insc. qu.
lib. 1.

Sen. ep. 117.

Now although against this present Reason drawee from the *consent of men* (which yet Heathens themselves have used) It may be alledged that there hath beene a consent like wise of some, That the Soule is nothing else but the Eucrasie or good Temperature of the Body, and that it is therefore subject to those Maladies, Distempers, Age, Sicknesse, and at last Death, which the Body is; as among the rest *Lucretius* takes much paines to prove : yet the Truth is, that is *Votum magis quam Judicium*, never any firme opinion grounded on Judgement and Reason, but rather a desire of the heart, and a perswasion of the Will inticing the Understanding so to determine. For the conscience of lewd Epicures and sensuall minds, being sometimes frighted with the flashes and apprehensions of Immortality, which often times pursues them, and obtrudes it selfe upon them against their wills, shining like lightning through the chinks & crevices (as I may so speak) of their Soules, which are of set purpose closed against all such light, sets the Reason on work to invent arguments for the contrary side, that so their staggering and fearefull impiety may be something emboldned, and the Eye of their consci-

conscience blinded, and the Mouth muffled from breathing forth those secret clamors and shrieks of feare. The Deniall then of the Immortality of the Soule is rather a *wish* than an *Opinion*, a corruption of the Heart and Will, than any Naturall Assertion of the understanding, which cannot but out of the footsteps and reliques of those first sacred Impressions, acknowledge a spirituall resemblance in the Soule of Man unto some supreme Deity, whom the conscience in all its Enormities doth displease. And therefore it is observed that the Mind of an Atheist is continually wavering and unsatisfied, never able so to smother the inbred consciousness of its immortality, as not to have continuall suggestions of feare and scruple. Wheresoever there is an impious Heart, there is alwayes a shivering judgement.

Bacon Essay
of Atheisme.

Another Reason of the Soules immortality may be drawne from the dignity and preeminence of Man above other Creatures: for hee is made Lord over them, and they were ordained to be serviceable to him, and Ministers for his contentments: which dignity cannot possibly stand with the Mortality of the Soule. For should not many other Creatures far exceed Man in the Durance of their being? And even in their time of living together, how subject to weaknesses, sickness, languishing, cares, fears, jealousies, discontents, and all other miseries of Mind and Body, is the whole Nature of Man, of all which, other creatures feelee the least disturbance?

ὅτι μὲν γάρ τι
ἀνθρώπων ὄντος
τερον ἀνθρώπου
Iliad. p. 446.

Are

Diogenes voca-
re solent

τρίων Σπέντες
ἀντι τῶ τριῶν.
Διῆς.

Laert. lib. 6.

Πλάς ἀνδρῶν
ἐστὶ συμφορὰ.

Solon ad Cræ-

sum. vid. Theo-

doret. Serm. 5.

de natura Hom-

& Clean. Alex.

Sermon. lib. 3.

p. 316. 317.

Edit. Hienf.

Are not Men here, beyond the rest, the very proper subjects and recepracles of misery? Is not our heart made the Naturall center of feares and sorrowes? and our Minds, as it were, Hives to entertaine numberlesse swarmes of stinging and thorny Cares? Are wee not Vassals and Slaves to many distempered passions? Have not our very Contents their terror, and our Peacc disturbance? Are not all our Comforts, wherewith wee strive to glut and stuffe our selves here, the glorious Vanities, and golden delusions and co-senages of the world? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happinesse is unhappy? And for Reason, what comfort could wee finde in it, when it would alwayes be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternall losse of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of Annihilation? Mortality and Corruption makes Unreasonable a Priviledge; And in this case the Beasts would be so much the more happy than Man, by how much the lesse they know their owne wretchednesse. An Atheist would be in this life farre happier than he is, if he could bring himselfe to have as little Reason as he hath Religion.

Another Reason may be taken from the Nature of Mans reasonable Faculties. To every power in Man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath he given it Objects of equall extent thereunto, which are therefore able to accomplish its naturall desires, whereby

it fasteneth on them. And for this cause from the Nature of the Objects, wee easily rise to know the Nature both of the Faculties and Essence; for from the Essence flowes naturally the Faculty, from the Faculty is naturally educed the Operation, which requires naturally Objects proportionall, convenient, satisfactory, and of equall extent. Where therefore no mortall object beares full convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty, there it and the Essence, from which it flowes, are both immortall. Now we see sensitive Powers finde in this life full satisfaction, as the Sight from all the Variety of Colours, the Eare of sounds, and the like: only the Reasonable Parts, the Understanding, and the Will can never be replenished in this estate of Mortality. Have they as great and wide contentments, as the whole frame of Nature can here afford them; still their pursuites are restlesse, still they find an absence and want of something, which they cannot finde. *Orbis Alexandro angustua*; In this case every man is like *Alexander*. This world wherein wee now converse, is too straight and empty to fill the vastnesse, and limit the desires of the Soule of Man. Only the sight and possession of God; the most infinite good, can satisfie our Understandings and our Wills. For both these Faculties (as all others in *no Genere*) ayme at *summum*. The Understanding is carried *ad summam Causam* to the first of Things; the Will *ad summum Bonum* to the last of Ends; and therefore he only which is the First and the Last,

Fecisti nos ad te, & irrequietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. Aug. Confess. l. 1. c. 1. vid. Ibid. li 4. ca. 10. 12. de Trinit. li. 13 ca. 8. Omnis mihi Copia quæ Deus meus non est, Egestas est. Confess. li. 13. c. 8. Vid. etiam de Civ. Dei. li. 8. ca. 8. li. 17. c. 13. li. 12. c. 1.

can satisfie these two searching and unquiet faculties. *Hi motus Animorum atq; hac certamina.*

*These are the Motions, this the strife
Of Souls, aspiring unto life.*

All the Knowledge we heap up here, serves onely as a Mirrour wherein to view our ignorance, and wee have only light enough to discover that wee are in the dark. And indeed, were there no Estate wherein Knowledge should receive a Perfection, and be throughly Proportioned to the Heart of man, The labour of getting the Knowledge wee have, and the vexation for the want of what wee have not, and the grieve of parting so soone with it, would render the vexation of it farre greater then the content.

Hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est?

Is this the fruit, for which we fast?

And by pale studies sooner waste?

Dowe toyl and sweat, and even melt our selves away for that which wee sooner forsake than finde? Doe wee deny our selves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeall condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wishes in another estate? Is it naturall for gaining of knowledge to hasten unto that whereby we loose both it and our selves? and to labour for such a purchase, which like lightning is at once begun and ended, yea indeed sooner lost than gotten? Certainly were man not conscious of his owne immortalitie, there could

could be no stronger inducement to slothfulness, luxury, riot, sensuality, and all other unbridled pleasures. It is registered for the impiety of Atheists; *Let us eat and drink, for to morrow wee shall dye.*

Another Reason may be framed after the same manner, as was that to prove the *Spirituality* of the Soule from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on those two ordinary Axiomes in Philosophy, *That every thing is received according to the quality of the receiver, and that every thing hath the same manner of Essence, as it hath of operation.* Now the Soule of Man can easily receive impressions and conceits of immortality, and discourse thereupon: therefore also it is in its owne Essence and nature immortall. Wee see even betweene things mearely corporeall, as the *Object* and the sensitive *Organ*, how small a disproportion works incapacity. Much more must it be found in so great a difference as would be betweene immortality of Objects and corruption of the Soule that worketh on them. We cannot picture an Angel or Spirit, nor make any immateriall stamp in a piece of wax, since a *corporeall* substance is capable of none but corporeall impressions. And therefore wee see that even amongst Bodies, the more pure and subtile they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickest and most spirituall sense, the sight. Now the mind of man in Understanding, is but as wax to the seale, or as a Table and Picture to an Object which it represents: which

is the ground of that Paradox in *Aristotle*, that in understanding the Soule is (as it were) made the Object that is understood. Because, as the Wax, after it is stamped, is in some sort the very Seale it selfe that stamp'd it, namely *Representative*, by way of Image and resemblance; so the Soule, in receiving the species of any Object, is made the picture and image of the thing it selfe. Now the understanding, being able to apprehend immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeall substance, as if it were immortal, I meane by purging it from all grosse materiall and corruptible qualities) must therefore needs of it selfe be of an immortall Nature. And from the latter of those two Principles, which I speake of, namely, that the quality of the *Being* may be gathered from the Nature of the *Operation*, *Aristotle* inferres the *separability* and *independance* of the understanding on the Body, in the third *de Anima* afore named: For the Soule being able to work without the concurrence of any bodily Organ to the very act it selfe (as was before shewed) must needs also be able to subsist by its owne nature, without the concurrence of any matter to sustaine it. And therefore hee saith in the same place, that the *understanding* is *separable, uncompounded, impossible*; all arguments of *immortality*. Other reasons are produced for the prooffe hereof, taken from the causes of corruption, which is wrought either by Contraries working and eating out Nature; or by Defect of the Preserving cause, as light is decayed by absence

sence of the Sunne ; or thirdly by corruption of the subject whereon it depends. None whereof can be verified in the Soule. For first, how can any thing be contrary to the Soule, which receiveth perfection from all things? for *Intellectus omnia intelligit*, saith *Aristotle*, yea wherein all Contraries are reconciled and put off their Opposition. For (as a great man excellently speaketh) those things, which destroy one another in the *World*, maintaine and perfect one another in the *Minde*; one being a meanes for the clearer apprehension of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only Efficient of the Soule (being else in it selfe simple and indivisible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of Annihilation doth never faile, and hath himselfe promised never to bring it unto nothing. And lastly, the Soule depends not, as doe other Formes, either in Operation or Being, on the Body, being not only *Actus informans*, but *subsistens* too, by its owne absolute vertue.

Mornay of
Christian
Religion.
Chap. 14.

CHAP. XXXV.

*Of the Honour of humane Bodies by Creation,
by Resurrection; of the Endowments of glo-
rified Bodies.*

Vld. Cæl.
Rhodig. li. 2 c.
9. 10. 11. Aug.
de Gen. ad lit.
1. 6 c. 12. &c.
Platonica sententia
Carceris,
Apostolica
Templum.
Tert. de Anim.
Tertul. de Car-
ne Christi.
Vld. Aug. 1. 7.
de Trin. c. 6.



And now, that this particular of *immortality* may farther redound both to the honour and comfort of Man, I must fall upon a short digression touching mans *Body*, wherein I intend not to meddle with the Question, How mans Body may be said to be made after the *Image of God* (which sure is not any otherwise, than as it is a sanctified and shall be a blessed Vessell, but not as some have conceited, as if it were in Creation *Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed & Pignus*: As if Christ had been the pattern of our Honour, and not we of his Infirmitie, since the Scripture saith, He was made like unto us in all things, and that he assumed our Nature, but never that we were, but that we shall be like unto him) not, I say, to meddle with this, I will onely briefly consider the Dignity thereof in the particular of *immortality*, both in the first *structure*, and in the last Resurrection of it. The Creation of our Bodies, and the Redemption of our Bodies, as the Apostle calls it. What Immunity was at first given, and what Honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be *Secundum Imaginem*, after

and Faculties of the Soul.

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after his Image, who was *Primitive* the First fruits of them that rise. That as in his Humility his Glory was hid in our Mortality, so in our Exaltation our Mortality shall be swallowed up of his Glory. And for the first estate of Mans Body, we conclude in a word: that it was partly Mortall, and partly Immortall: *Mortall* in regard of possibility of Dying, because it was affected with the mutuall Action and Passion of corruptible elements: for which reason it stood in need of reparation and recovery of it self by food, as being still *Corpus Animale*, and not *Spirituale*, as S. Paul distinguisheth, a Naturall, but not a Spirituall Body. But it was *Immortall*, that is, Exempted from the Law of Death and Dissolution of the Elements, in vertue of Gods Covenant with man, upon condition of his Obedience. It was Mortall *Conditione Corporis*, by the condition of a Body; but immortall *Beneficio Conditoris*, by the Benefit of its Creation; else God had planted in the Soul such naturall desires of a Body wherein to work as could not be naturally attained; For the Soul did naturally desire to remain still in the bodie. In the naturall Body of *Adam* there was no sin, and therefore no death, which is the wages of sinne.

I come now to the Redemption of our Bodies already performed in *Pignore* & in *Primitiis*, In our Head, & in some few of his Members, *Enoch*, *Elias*, and (as is probable) in those dead Bodies which arose to testifie the Divine power of our crucified Saviour; and shall be totally accomplished

Aug. de Gen.
ad lit. l. 6. c. 25.
de Civ. Dei. li.
13. c. 19. Vide
quæ fæse &
erudite differit.
Geor. Zeeman.
tract. de Imag.
Dei. c. 8. sect.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. —

Ephes. 4 30.

Luk 21.28.

Luk. 1.68.

Heb. 9. 12.

Luk 21.28.

Rom. 8. 23.

Ephes. 1. 7.

Ioh. 1. 12.

Eph. 1. 14.

plished at that day of *Redemption*, as the same Apostle calls the Last day: that day of a full and finall Redemption, *when death, the last enemy, shall be overcome*. And well may it be called a day of *Redemption*, not only in regard of the *Creature*, which yet groaneth under the Malediction and Tyrannie of sinfull Man: nor yet only in respect of *Mans Soule*, which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased Possession of the Glorifying Vision, and lives no more by Faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abundant fulnesse thereof, as being the day of the Manifestation and plenary discovery both of the Pui shing Glory of God in the Wicked, and of his Mercifull and admirable Glory in the Saints: but also and (as I think) most especially in respect of the Body. For there is, by vertue of that Omnipotent Sacrifice, a double kinde of Redemption wrought for us: The one *Vindicative*, giving us *Immunity* from all spirituall dangers, delivering us from the Tyrannie of our Enemies, from the Severity, Justice, and Curse of the Law; which is commonly in the New Testament called simply *λύτρωσις* and *ἀπαλυσίς*, a Deliverance from evill; The other *Purchasing*, or Munificent, by not only freeing us from our own wretchednesse, but farther conferring upon us a Positive and a Glorious Honour, which St. John calls *ἐξουσία*, a Power, Priviledge, Prerogative, and Title unto all the Glorious Promises of Immortality: which likewise St. Paul calls *ἐπαλυσίς τῆς παροικίας*, the *Redemption of a purchased Possession*, and

and a *Redemption unto the Adoption of Sons*. Now then the Last day is not Totally and Perfectly a *day of Redemption* unto our souls in either of these senses, since they are in this life delivered from the Malediction of the Law, from the VVrath of the Judge, from the Tyrannie of the Enemie, from the Raigne of sinne, and by Death freed not only from the dominion, but from the Possession, or Assault of the Enemie; not only from the Kingdome, but from the Body of Sinne; and is withall in good part possessed of that Blisse, which it shall more fully enjoy at last. But our *Bodies*, though before that Great day they partake much of the benefits of Redemption, as being here sanctified vessells, freed from the Authority and Power of the Devill, World, Flesh, and from the Curse of death too, wherein they part not only with life, but with sinne; yet after all this doe they want some part of either Redemption: as namely to be raised and delivered from that dishonour and corruption, which the last Enemie hath brought upon them: and to be Admitted into those Mansions, and invested with that Glory, whereby they shall be Totally possessed of their Redemption. In a word, the Soule is in its separation fully delivered from all Enemies, which is the first; and in a great measure enjoyeth the Vision of God, which is the second part or degree of mans Redemption. But the Body is not till its Resurrection, either quite freed from its Enemie, or at all possessed of its Glory. I meane in its selfe, though it be in its

Head, who is *Primitia & Pignus Resurrectionis*, the first fruits and earnest of our Conquest over Death.

Touching the Dignity of our Bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the Expectation, than Curiosity in the enquire after it; yet what is usually granted, I shall briefly set down. And first, it shall be Raised a *whole entire and perfect Body*, with all the parts best fitted to be Receptacles of Glory; freed from all either the Usherers in, or Attendants and followers on the Grave, Age, Infirmary, Sicknesse, Corruption, Ignominie, and Dishonour: And shall rise a true, whole, strong, and honourable Body. For though every part of the Body shall not have those peculiar uses, which here they have, since they *neither eat, nor drink, marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God*: yet shall not any part be lost: *Licet enim officiis liberentur, judiciis retinentur*: Though they are freed from their Temporall service, for which they were here ordained, yet must they be reserved for receiving their judgement, whether it be unto Glory, or unto Dishonour.

The second Dignity is that Change and Alteration of our Body from a *Naturall* to a *Spiritual Body*, whereby is not meant any Transubstantiation from a Corporeall to a Spirituall substance: For our Bodies shall, after the Resurrection, be conformable unto Christs body, which, though glorious, *was not yet a Spirit, but had flesh and bone, as we have*. Nor is it to be understood of a thinne,

Tertull.

Vid. Aug. de
Civ. Dei. lib. 13.
ca. 20. & 23.
& Epist. 146.

a thinne, Aereall, Invisibile Body (as some have collected) since Christ saith of his Body, after he was risen, *Videte, Palpare*. Wheresoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all sensible qualities of a Body Glorified with it. It is a strong Argument, that it is not there, where it is not sensible; And therefore the Doctrines of *Vbiquity*, and Transubstantiation, as they give Christ more than he is pleased to owne, an Immensity of Body; so do they spoyle him of that, which hee hath been pleased for our sakes to assume; Extension, Compacture, Massinesse, Visibilibity, and other the like sensible Properties, which cannot stand with that pretended miracle whereby they make Christs Body (even now a Creature, and like unto ours in substance, though not in qualities of Corruptibility, Infirmitie, Ignominie, Animality) to be truly invested with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the Body of Christ hath an efficacie and operation in all parts of the world; it worketh in Heaven with God the Father by *Intercession*; amongst the blessed Angels by *Confirmation*; in Earth, and thā in all ages, and in all places amongst Men, by *Iustification*, and *Comfort*; in Hell amongst the Devils and Damned, by the Tremblings and Fears of a condemning and convicting Faith. But Operation requireth onely a presence of Vertue, not of Substance. For doth not the Sunne work wonderfull effects in the bowels of the Earth, it self notwithstanding being a fixed Planet in the Heaven? And why should not the

Sunne of Righteousnesse work as much at the like distance, as the Sunne of Nature? Why should he not be as Powerfull Absent, as he was Hoped? Or why should the Not presence of his Body make that uneffectuall now, which the Not existing could not before his Incarnation? Why should we mistrust the Eyes of *Stephen*, that saw him in Heaven, at such a Distance of place, when *Abraham* could see him in his own bowels through so great a Distance of Time?

That Speech then, that the Body shall be a Spirituall Body, is not to be understood in either of those former senses: but it is to be understood first of the more immediate Union and full *inhabitation* of the vertue and vigour of Gods Spirit in our Bodies, quickning and for ever sustaining them without any Assistance of Naturall or Animall qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompence of that, which by labour and infirmity, and the naturall opposition of the Elements, is daily diminished. Secondly, it shall be so called in regard of its *Obedience* & Totall Subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of Reluctance and dislike. Thirdly, in respect of those *Spirituall qualities*, those *Prerogatives of the Flesh*, with which it shall be adorned, which are

First, a *Shining* and Glorious *Light*, wherewithall it shall be clothed as with a Garment: for *the Just shall shine as the Sunne in the Firmament*. Now, this shall be wrought first by vertue of that *Communion*, which wee have with Christ our Head,

Head, whose Body, even in its Mortality, *did shine like the Sunne, & had his cloathes white as light.* And secondly, by *diffusion* and *Redundancie* from our Soule upon our Body, which by the Beatificall Vision, filled with a Spirituall and unconceivable brightnesse, shall work upon the Body, as on a Subject made throughly Obedient to its Power unto the Production of alike qualities.

The second Spirituall Property shall be *Impassibility*, not in respect of *Perfektive*, but in respect of annoying, disquieting, or *destructive Passion*. These shall not be any Warre in the members, any fighting and mutuall languishing of the Elements; but they shall be sustained in their full strength by vertue of Christs Communion, of the Inhabitation of the spirit, of the Dominion of the Glorified Soule. There shall be no need of rest, or slepe, or meate, all which are here requisite for the supply of our Infirmities and daily defects, and are only the Comforts of Pilgrimage, not the Blessednesse of Possession. For although Christ after his Resurrection did eat before his Disciples, yet this was none otherwise done, then that other, the Retaining of his wounds, which was only for our sakes; that our Faith touching the Truth of his Body, might not be without these visible and inferiour Witnesse, by which he was pleased to make his very Glorified flesh a proportioned Object to our fraile sense and faith, that so wee might thence learne confidently to rely for our selves as well on the Benefit of his Exaltation, as of his Humility. Or

De mirāvi A-
nime in Corpus
vide Cōl. Rō-
dig. li. II ca. 15.
10.

De Civit. Dei.
lib. 15.

it was done (as *St. Augustine* speaks) *Non ex Necessitate, sed ex Potestate*: as the Sunne is said to draw and suck up standing waters: *Non Pabuli Egestate, sed Virtutis Magnitudine*, Not to Nourish, but to Manifest its vertue.

Thirdly, the Body shall be a *strong and beautiful* Body, thoroughly able to minister unto the Soule any service, wherein it shall imploy it, and shall be no longer, as it is now, the clogge and luggage thereof. It shall likewise be free from all blemish and deformity (which ever ariseth out of the distemper & discord of the Elements) (as it is by good probability conjectured) reduced unto a full, comely and convenient stature, even in those, who were in their Death contemptible; Infants, lame dismembred, or any other way dishonoured with the miseries of corruption; *Nature, non injuriæ reddimur*, we shall be restored to our *Nature*, but not to our *shame*; the Dust shall still retaine and bury our dishonour, and it shall be one part of our Glory to be made fit for it.

The last quality of our Bodies, which I shall observe, is a perfect *subtily* and *agility*, best besitting their service for the Soule in all speedy motion; which surely shall be there so much the more requisite, then here on earth, by how much Heaven is a more ample and spacious Countrey. And thus while the Body is made an attendant on the Souls glory, it is likewise a partaker of it. Unto these, adde the sweet Harmony of the Affections, the exact and exquisite Operation of the senses,

*Ita nihil periturum de Corpore
ut nihil deforme
maneant in Corpore.*

*Vid Aug. Enchirid. c. 91. &
de Civ. Dei. lib.
22. cap. 19. 20.
Tertul. de resur
victa detraben
tur, Natura
servabitur.
Aug. de Civ. Dei.
l. 22. c. 27.*

senses, the Bodily communion and fellowship of the Saints, and, above all, the Eternall Corporall vision of that most sacred Body, whence all ours derive their degrees of Honour, whose presence were truly and without any Hyperbole able to make Hell it selfe a Place of Glory: how much more that Countrey, and those Mansions, where the Soule likewise shall be swallowed up with the immediate vision and fruition of Divine Glory. Our Souls are not here noble enough to conceive what our Bodies shall be there.

CHAP. XXXVI,

Of that part of Gods Image in the Soul, which answereth to his Power, Wisdom, Knowledge, Holines. Of Mans dominion over other Creatures. Of his love to Knowledge. What remainders we retain of Originall Iustice.

THe other Properties or Attributes of God, of which Mans Soul beareth an *Image* and dark resemblance, are those, which according to our Apprehension seeme not so Intrinsecall and Essentiall as the former. And they are such as may be either generally collected from the manifestation of his *Works*, or more particularly from his *Word*. These, which referre unto his *Works*, are his *Power* in Making and Ruling them; his *wisedome* in Ordering
and

and Preserving them; his knowledge in the Contemplation of them : and of these it pleaseth him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon mans Soule.

Concerning the Attribute of *Power*, most certaine it is that those great parts of Gods workmanship, *Creation*, and *Redemption*, are incommunicably belonging unto him as his owne Prerogative Royall. Insomuch that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto our selves the last resemblance of them. Yet in many other proceedings of Gods works there is some Analogie and Resemblance in the Works of Men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of *Nature*, but the Ordinary works of God ? All formes and intrinsecall Motive Principles are indeed but his Instruments ; *for by him we live, and move, and have our being*. And of all other works , mans only imitate *Nature* : as *Aristotle* observes of the Works of *Art*, which peculiarly belong unto Man (all other Creatures being carried by that naturall instinct , which is Intrinsically belonging to their condition , without any manner of Art or variety.) The Resemblances of *Nature* in the Works of Art are chiefly seene in these two Proportions : First, as *Nature* doth nothing in Vaine, but in all her Works aymes at some End, the *Perfection*, or the *Ornament*, or the *Conservation* of the Universe (for those are the three ends of *Nature* subordinate to the Maime, which is, the Glory of the Maker) so likewise are the works of Art all directed by the understanding to some
one

one of those ends; either to the perfection of Men, such are all those, which informe the Understanding, and governe the life: or to his Conservation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare and repairing, the decayes, or sheltering the weaknesles of Nature: or lastly to his Ornament, such as are those Elegancies of Art, and Curiosities of Inventions, which, though not necessary to his being, yet are speciall instruments of his delight, either Sensitive or Intellectual.

The second Resemblance, is betweene the Manner and Progresse of their Workes: for as the Method of nature is to proceed, *ab imperfectioribus ad Perfectiora, and per determinata Media ad suum Finem*, So Art likewise as is plaine in those which are Manuall) by certaine fixed rules, which alter not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more rough and unformed beginnings, by the help of Instruments, appropriated to particular services. But this, because it limits Mans dignity, as well as commends it, I forbear to speake of. Though even herein also we doe seeme to imitate God, who in his great worke of Creation did proceed both by succession of Time, and degrees of Perfection; only it is *Necessity* in us which was in him his *Will*.

To come therefore nearer, it is observable that in the first Act of Gods power, in the Making and Framing of the World, there was Nothing here below created properly, immediatly, and totally, but the Chaos and Masse, or the

Earth without forme, and voide, out of the Obedience whereof, his power did further educe and extract those Wonderfull, Various, and Beautifull Formes, which doe evidently set forth unto the Soule of Man, the Glory and Majestie of him that made them. By a small Resemblance of this manner of Working, Man also in those Workes of Art, peculiar to him from other Creatures, doth *ex potentia Obedientiali* (as the Schooles call it) out of the Obedience and Subjection of any proposed Masse produce, *Non per Naturam, sed per imperium*, not out of the Nature of the Subject, But by the command of Reason sundry formes of Art full of Decency and Beauty.

And for *Government*, I meane Subordinate, and by Derivation or Indulgence, it is manifest that all Creatures inhabiting the World with him were subdued unto Man; and, next unto the Glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit *. And therefore, when ever wee finde any of them hurtfull and Rebellious, wee cannot but remember that the occasion thereof was our owne disloyalty; they doe but revenge their great Masters wrong, and, out of a Faithfull care and jealousy to Preserve his Honour, Renounce their Fidelity and Obedience to a Traitor *. And indeed how can we looke to have our Dominion intire over Beasts and inferiour Creatures, when by continuall Enormities we make our selves as one of them?

This

* *Vid. Terul. de Resurrect. c. 26. Ambros. Hexam. l. 6. c. 5. Nyssen. Orat. 1. in faciamus hominem, &c. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 3. c. 20. Damasc. de Orthod. fid. lib. 2. cap. 30. Sanctius his animal moniti que capacius alta De erat adhuc, & quod Dominari in cetera posset Natus. Homo est Ovid. Met. l. 1. Quia per peccatum Homo deservit eum sub quo esse debuit subditus est eis supra que esse debuit. Aug. Tract. 8. in Johan.*

This *Dominion* of Man over the Creatures, sheweth it selfe in severall things. In the Admirable *skill* that man hath to *use* the Creatures, unto Rational and Artificiall Ends, which no other Creature can doe. As the Fire is an Instrument to the Smith, the Founder, the Chymist, to every Artificer. The winde and water ordered to grinde Corne, to carry up and downe Vessels: Stones and Timber to make goodly Frames of building. There is not the meanest of Creatures whereof the Reason of man hath not found out some needfull use tending either unto life, or health, or pleasure, or ease, or facility of operation, or some one or other end for the service of man.

In the *fear* that even now God hath placed in many great and strong Creatures towards Man, so that one Childe is able to drive a whole Herd of them before him. In the skill which Man hath to *tame* and subdue fierce Creatures, which otherwise might annoy him; and to make use even of Vipers, and poysonous Creatures unto wholesome ends. In the power which he hath to *instruct* docile Creatures, as the Elephant, the Dogge, the Horse, the Bird, to obey the Dictates, and to imitate the expressions of humane reason. In the strange Instinct that God hath put into some hurtfull Creatures to feare man, as the Serpent; into others to come abroad at such times only when man stayeth in, and *when the Sun* ariseth for man to goe forth unto his work, then they lye downe in their dennes.

*Vid. Plin. lib. 8.
cap. 8. 9. &c.
Jam. 3. 7.*

Plin. lib. 8. c. 3.

Psa. 104. 20, 23

Gen. i. 28. 9. 2.

The Grounds of this *Dominion* are, 1. The Originall grant and deed of Gift made by God unto man, both in the Creation of the world unto *Adam*, and in the Reparation of it, unto *Noah*. Unto both whom God brought the Creatures, and delivered them unto their custody and disposition. 2. The Order of Nature, which dictateth this Law unto the Creatures, that the more imperfect and ignorant should be regulated by those which are most wise and perfect; else power let loose from wisdom, would presently fill the face of Nature with confusion and disorder. 3. The Providence of God, implanting a notable instinct of awfulness, obedience, docility, serviceableness in the Creatures towards man; and of wisdom and sagacity in man for the use of them. 4. The generall end of Gods glory: For the other Creatures cannot actively and intentionally direct their Faculties or Vertues unto God, as having no Knowledge of him; But man having Gods glory for his own end, is able in the Use of all the Creatures (which God made for himselfe) to contemplate the various wisdom, power, goodness, providence of God, and to direct them all to the setting forth of his Glory.

This *Dominion* standeth first in a *solemne Delivery*, and Seisin, and possession given by God unto Man, when the Creatures were either by the Ministry of Angels; or some other act of Manuduction brought unto *Adam*, and put into his hands, and received names from him in

* token

and Faculties of the Soule.

* token of his speciall authority over them, to command them by their names. As the Subjects of a Prince doe in a more solemne manner present their homage and fealties before him at his Inauguration.

Secondly, in a *plenry* power over them, and that Two-fold; a *power to Awe*, and subdue them to his Government: *Let the feare of you and the dread of you be upon all living Creatures on the earth &c.* And a *power to use* them. Their *Natures* for Contemplation, and Delight. Their *Abilities*, Sagacities, Strength, Swiftnesse, Sympathies, Antipathies, unto such ends whereunto they should be serviceable. Their *Lives* and *Substance* to Aliment, Indument, Ornament, or any other use, when Mans Necessity should require it.

And this Power of Man over the Creatures, was most *Generall*, reaching to those with whom he had the least society; the Fishes of the Sea, and the Fowles of Heaven. Most *Easie*, both by reason of the *Instinct* which God put into the Creatures to feare and serve Man, and of the *Wisedome* which hee put into Man to discern the natures and fitnesse of severall Creatures for severall services, and accordingly to apply them. Most *Equall* and Just, without sin, tyranny, oppression, violence, under which the Creature now groaneth, and is made *subject unto Vanity*, as the Apostle speaketh.

This part of Gods Image in Man, is by his Fall much weakned, as wee may ob-

*Dominantis
enim est nomina
imponere. vid.
A. Gell. l. 17. c.
ult. Cic. ad Art.
l. 4. Ep. 14. lib.
7. ep. 8. Sueton.
in Otho. c. 101
Vid. Casab. in
Baron. exercit.
13. sect. 13.
Brisson de Form
lib. 7.

*Observatum Per-
veria ex Hugo-
ne in Gen. 1.26.*

serve by the Rebellion and Insurrection of the Creatures against him : So that though by wisdom hee tame many Creatures, yet hee cannot with his brow and countenance Awe them as hee could at first. Wee finde the Starres fighting against one, the Sunne and Moone against another; the Earth against *Cerah*, The Sea against *Pharoah*, the Fire against *Abazia*, the Lions against *Samaria*, the Quails against *Israel*, the Assle refusing the service, and rebuking the madnesse of *Balam*. The losse and diminution of this Power is notably seene in this, that mans Authority is perished, or much abated over the *greatest* and over the *smallest* of Creatures. The one with power and strength affright him, the other with nimblenesse, or with number escape him. The one an exprobration of his weakness, the other of his vilenesse. And therefore when God plagued Egypt, hee did it not by Lions and Tygers, but by Locusts, and Frogges, and Lice, the weakest and basest Creatures : So hee resisted the pride of *Pharaoh*, so he consumed the pride of *Herod*, making base things to vindicate his Glory, and weake things to execute his Justice upon the pride of those who thought themselves Great enough to rob him of his Glory, and to outface his Justice.

But though this Dominion be by sinne diminished, yet it is *not extinguished*, but in part Continued, and in part Renewed unto us,

Continued

Continued by the Generall Providence of God, whereby hee is pleased to preserve things in that course of Subordination wherein first hee made them, and like a gracious Prince, to continue unto Man the use of his Creatures, even then when hee is a prisoner unto his Justice. Renewed, by the Promise and Grant made againe unto Noah. And there is a Double Promise under which wee may enjoy the Creatures, the one a Morall Promise made unto Industry, as, *The Diligent hand maketh Rich*; and hee that *Ploweth his Land, shall have plenty of Corne*: the other an Evangelicall Promise made unto Piety, and Faith in Christ, whereby is given unto Christian men both a *freer use* of the Creatures than the *Jews* had, and a *purser use* than the *wicked* have. For, *unto the Cleane all things are Cleane*.

And this Grant of God doth sometimes shew it selfe *extraordinarily*, as in the Obedience of the Crowes to *Elijah*, the Viper to *Paul*, the Lions to *Daniel*, the Whale to *Jonah*, the Fire to the three Children, and the trembling and feare of wilde Beasts towards many of the Martyrs: alwayes *Ordinarily*, in ordering and dispensing the course of Nature so, as that Humane Society may be preserved, both by power in subduing the Creatures which hee must use, and by wisdom in escaping the Creatures which hee doth feare.

Now for the second Attribute, * *Wisdom*, there

Enseb. lib. 8. c. 7.
Ignis Polycarpum non tetigit.
Enseb. l. 4. c. 14.

* *Gen. 1. v. ult.*
Eccles. 7. 30.

Col. 3. 10.
Gen. 2. 19, 23.

* Job. 1. 5.
Eph. 4. 17, 18.
Rom. 3. 13.
Col. 1. 21.
Prov. 22. 15.

there is also a remainder of the Image thereof in Man : for albeit , the fall and corruption * of Nature hath darkned his eyes, so that hee is enclined to worke Confusedly, or to walk as in a Maze, without Method or Order (as in a Storme the Guider of a Vessell is oftentimes to seek of his Art ; and forced to yeeld to the windes and waves) yet certaine it is that in the minde of Man there still remaines a Pilot, or Light of Nature ; many Principles of Practicall prudence, whereby (though for their faintings a man do's often miscarry and walke awry) the course of our Actions may be directed with successe and issue unto Civill and Honest ends. And this is evident, not only by the continuall practise of Grave and Wise men, in all States, Times, and Nations ; but also by those sundry learned and judicious Precepts, which Historians, Politicians , and Philosophers have by their naturall Reason and Observation framed for the compassing of a mans just ends , and also for Prevention and disappointment of such inconveniences as may hinder them.

Lastly, for the Attribute of Knowledge, It was doubtlesse after a most eminent manner at first infused into the Heart of Man , when hee was able by Intuition of the Creatures to give unto them all Names, according to their severall Properties and Natures ; and in them to shew himselfe , as well a Philosopher, as a Lord. *Hee filled them, saith Siracides, with the*

and Faculties of the Soul.

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the Knowledge of *Vnderstanding*. And herein, if wee will beleeve *Aristotle*, the Soule is most neerely like unto *God*, whose infinite Delight is the Eternall Knowledge and Contemplation of himselfe, and his Works. Hereby, saith hee, the Soule of man is made most Beloved of *God*, and his minde, which is Allied unto *God*, is it selfe Divine, and, of all other parts of Man, most Divine. And this made the Serpent use that Insinuation onely, as most likely to prevaile, for compassing that Cursed and miserable project of Mans ruine. By meanes of which Fall, though Man blinded his understanding, and rob'd himselfe of this, as of all other blessed habits, I meane of those excellent Degrees thereof, which he then enjoyed: yet still the Desire remains Vast and impatient, and the pursuit so violent, that it proves often præjudiciall to the estate both of the Body and Minde. So that it is as true now, as ever, that Man is by Nature a Curious and inquiring Creature, of an Active and restless Spirit, which is never quiet, except in Motion, winding it selfe into all the Pathes of Nature; and continually traversing the World of Knowledge. There are two maine Desires naturally stamped in each Creature; a Desire of *Perfessing*, and a Desire of *Perpetuating* himselfe. Of these *Aristotle* attributeth in the highest degree, the latter unto each living Creature, when he saith, that of all the works of living Creatures, the most naturall is to Generate the like: and his Reason is *ἵνα τὸ κ' εἶναι τὸ οὐκ ἐμψυχον ἢ σπέρμα*. Because

Ethic. l. 10.

Lib. 2. de Anim.
c. 4.

G g g

hereby

hereby that Immortality (the Principall end (as hee there supposeth) of all naturall Agents) which in their own Individuals they cannot obtaine, they procure by deriving their Nature unto a continued off-spring and succession. But (though in regard of life it hold true of all) Man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this Assertion. And of himselfe that other desire of *Perfection*, which is principally the desire of Knowledge (for that is one of the principall advancements of the Soule) should not only in a Positive sence, as *Aristotle* hath determined in the Entrance to his Metaphysics, but in a Superlative degree be verified, that He is by nature desirous of Knowledge. This being the Principall thing (to use *Aristotle* his owne reason) whereby Man doth τὸ οὐκ ἀπογενέσθαι, Partake of *Divinity*, as I observe before out of *Aristotle* himselfe. And the reason of the difference betweene Man and other Creatures in this particular is : First, Because Man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his owne Immortality, which takes away the Necessary of Propagation to sustaine his Nature. And secondly, because Knowledge, the Perfection of the Soule, is to Man (as I may so speake) a kinde of *Generation*, being of sufficiency to exempt the Person, endued therewith, from all injurie of Time, and making him to survive and out-live his owne Mortality. So that when the Body hath surrendered unto each Region of the World those Elements and Principles,

ciples whereof it was compos'd, and hath not so much as Dust and Cinders left to testifie that Being, which once it had, then doth the Name lie wrapped in the Monuments of Knowledge, beyond the reach of Fate and Corruption.

The Attributes of God, which are manifested more especially in his Word, though sundry, yet (as farre forth as they had ever any Image in Man) may be comprized in this more Generall one of *Holinesse*. Whereby I understand that Absolute and Infinite Goodnesse of his Nature, which is in him most Perfect, Pure, and Eternal. Of which, though Man according to that measure, as it was unto him communicated, was in his great Fall utterly rob'd and spoyl'd, as not being able in any thing to resemble it, or to retain any the least Prints of those pure and Divine Impressions of Originall Righteousnesse; yet still there remaines, even in depraved and Polluted Nature some shadowes thereof: There is stil the *Opus Operatum* in many actions of Mortality, though the Obliquity of the Heart, and Ignorance of the true end, whether it should be directed, take away the Goodnesse and the Sanctity thereof. The top and highest pitch of Nature toucheth the hemme and lowest of Grace. We have in us the Testimonies, though not the Goodnesse of our first estate; the Ruines of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places thereof to be Inhabited. It is true indeed those great endowments of the most severe and illightned Heathen, were indeed but glorious

miseries and withered Vertues, in that they proceeded from a depraved Nature, and aymed at sinister and false ends: yet with all both the corruption of them proves their præcedent losse (which also the Heathen themselves espied in their distinction of Ages into Golden and Iron times:) And likewise the pursuit and practice of them (though weak, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly that there was much more an Originall Aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universall Purity. Now in this Rectitude and Perfect Regularity of the Soule in this divine Habit of Originall Justice did man most eminently beare the Image and Signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still Immortall, Spirituall, Reasonable; yet we are said to have defaced that Image in us by our hereditary Pollution. And hee alwayes recovereth most thereof, who in the greatest measure repaireth the ruines, and vindicateth the Lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime Originall Purity, wherein he was Created.

These are the Dignities of the soule considered wholly in it selfe. In all which it farre surmounts the greatest perfections, which the Body or any Faculty thereof are endowed withall. And yet such is the preposterous and unaturall baseness of many men, that they are content to make their soules vassals to their owne servant. How do they force their Understandings, which in their owne worthiest objects those deepe and Divine

Divine Contemplations, are as drowzie as *Endymion*, to spend and waste themselves in proud, luxurious vanishing Inventions? How doe they enthrall that Supream and Architectonicall Power in Mans little World, his will, to the Tyrannie of slavish appetite, and sensuall desires? as if they served here but as Cookes to dresse their owne Bodies for the Wormes? Strange is it that Man, conscious to himselfe of Immortality and of an Heroicall and Heavenly complexion, that hath received such immediate Impressions of God, and is the very Modell of all Natures Perfections, should so much degrade himselfe as to doat onely on that part, which is the vassall and slave of Death. If there were no other mischief which sinne did the Soule but to debase it, even that were argument sufficient for noble spirits to have it in detestation. For man being in honour, and which understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the Faculty of Vnderstanding. Its operations outward upon the Object, Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The naturall Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, Iudgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Severall kinds of Knowledge. The Originall Knowledge given unto Man in his Creation. The benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance Naturall, Voluntary, Penall. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion between the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatiousnesse of Conceits. The benefit of Modest Hesitancie.

Now it follows to speak of the parts or principall powers of the Soule, which are the *Vnderstanding*, and the *Will*. Concerning the *Understanding*, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the *Latitude* and excellent Varietie of its *Objects*, being the whole world of things (for *Ens & Intelligibile* are reciprocal, & *omnia intelligit*, saith Aristotle of the

the Understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the *Operations* of it both *Ad extra* in respect of the *Objects*, and *ad intra* in respect of the *will*. The one is a *Contemplative*, the other a more *Prætique* office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either Morall or Civill Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either Passive, or Active Operations. *Passive* I call those first Perceptions and apprehensions of the Soule, whereby it receiveth the *simple* species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministry of the Soule; as when I understand one Object to be a Man, another a Tree, by Administration and assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.

Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are *mixed Operations* of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which wee call *Discourse*. Of all which to speake according to their Logical Nature, would be impertinent. Their Excellencie chiefly stands in the End whereunto they move and serve, which is *Knowledge*; of the which, I shall therefore here speak a few things.

Knowledge is the Assimilation of the Understanding unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which doe Irradiate it, and put the power of it into Act. For as the beames of the Sunne shining on a glasse

*Aquin. part. 1.
q. 14. a. 2.*

*Aristot. de A-
nim. li. 3. ca. 4.
& 5.*

glasse, doe there work the Image of the Sunne: so the species and resemblances of things being conveyed on the Understanding, doe there work their owne Image. In which respect the Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becometh All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a Painters Table, wee call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the eye.

There is not any Desire more noble, nor more Naturall unto a Man (who hath not like *Saul* hid himselfe amongst the stufte, and lost himselfe in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) then is this *Desire of Knowledge*. Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its Specificall then upon its Genericall perfection. And hence it is that though *Man* be perfectest of all Creatures, yet many doe excell him in sensitive Perfection. Some in exquisitenesse of Sight; others of Hearing; others of Taste, Touch, and Smell; others of Swiftnesse and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminate them there, where when wee have made the best Provision wee can, many Beasts will surpassse us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our owne specificall and rationally perfection, to wir, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tyred, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfet on their Objects.

But

*Vid. Plin. lib. 7.
in Proem.
Et Lactant. de
Opif. Dei. l. 2. 3.
Et Cael. Rhodig.
lib. 2. cap. 9.*

But *Knowledge* as knowledge, doth never either burthen or cloy the Minde, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich : And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the * *Rest of the Understanding*, wherein it taketh delight as a Thing in its natural place.

And so great is this Delight, that Men have ventured on much trouble to procure it. * As *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, travelled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as *Salomon* sent to *Ophir* for Gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to bear them. A true Lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary distresse, if it do not violate, and restrain that particular appetite. If he may enjoy the Delights of Learning, he will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. *Archimedes* was not sensible of the losse of *Syracuse*, being wholly intent upon a Mathematical Demonstration. And *Demetrius Phalereus* deceived the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetnesse of his Studies. A Man is never afflicted to the quick, but when he is punished in his most delightful affections, of all which the most predominant in Rational men is this of Knowledge.

And therefore as the first Creature God formed was *Light* (to shew that all his Works were made in Wisedome, that they might

H h h

set

* Τὸ ἡρεμεῖν
ταὺς ἰσχυροὺς τῶν
διανοητικῶν ὀργάνων
καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι.
Arist. Physic.
l. 7. c. 3. Text 20.
ἐξ ἧς ἐκτινέται.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 2.
Τὸ πρῶτον τῆς
γνώσεως ἡ ἀνα-
παύσις. *Clem.*
Alex. prad. lib.
1. c. 6.
* *Vid. Valer.*
Max. l. 8. c. 7.
Theodoret. Serm.
de fide. Clem. A-
lex. Strom. lib. 1.
p. 222. 223.

Cicero de fini-
bns lib. 5.

set forth and manifest his Glory) so the first motion of *Adam* after his Creation was towards *Knowledge*. By his Exercise of *Knowledge* hee shewed Gods Image in him , and by the Ambition after more he lost it : As no man sinnes easier than in the Thing which hee best loves. And for this cause we may observe that Christs frequentest Miracles were shewed in opening the eyes of the blind, and the eares of the deaf and dumb. His Mercies being perfect , extended themselves on those Faculties which are the chiefe Instruments of *Knowledge* in Men which they most love.

And this love of *Knowledge* is seen evidently in this , that men had rather have sober Calamities , than mad pleasures , and more freely choose clear intellectualls with miserie , than disturb'd with mirth. Many Men better content themselves with but a crazie body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better Health at so great a Price as the losse of Learning.

But the Principall Excellency of *Knowledge* is this , That it guideth the Soule to God : and so doth all kinde of Right *Knowledge* in divers respects. For first , there is scarce any Science properly so called , which hath not its *Arcana* to pose and amaze the Understanding , as well as its more easie Conclusions to satisfie it. Such as are in Philosophy,
those

*Malunt homines
mente lamentari
quam letari in
Amentia. Aug.
Civ. Dei. l. 11.
cap. 27.*

those *Occult Sympathies and Antipathies*, of which natural Reason can render no Account at all : which overcoming the utmost Vigour of humane Disquisition, must needs enforce us to beleevè that there is an admirable Wisdoine that disposeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth those secrets which we are not able to fathome.

Again, since the *Knowledge of Things* is either of their *beings*, or of their *properties and operations* : And Nature abhorreth the Motion of proceeding ^a *in Infinitum*, in either of these, necessary it is, that the Mind of man ^b tracing the footsteps of natural things, must by the Act of *Logical Resolution* at last arise to him who is the fountain of all being, the first of all *Causes*, the Supreme over all *Movers*, in whom all the rest have their Beings and Motions founded. And this the Lord in the prophet hath delivered unto us. *I will hear the Heavens, and the Heavens shall hear the earth, and the earth the corne, and wine, and they Fexreel. Fexreel cannot subsist without Corn and Wine, she cries to them to help it; these cannot help without the Earth to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitful. The Earth can bring forth nothing of it self without influence benignity, and comfortable showers from the Heavens, it cries to them for aide. ^d The Heavens cannot give Rain nor Warmth of them-*

^a Ἡ οὐρανὸς ἀκούσει τὴν γῆν, καὶ ἡ γῆ ἀκούσει τὸν σπλῆν, καὶ ὁ σπλῆν ἀκούσει τὸν κριθὸν, καὶ ὁ κριθὸς ἀκούσει τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀκούσει τὸν θεόν. *Arist. de Generat. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1.*
^b Οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ. *Arist. Physic. lib. 7. cap. 1.*
^c Text. 3.
^d Vid. Justin. Martyr qu. ad Græc. qu. 3. Tertull. Apol. cap. 17. 18. De Resurrect. carnis cap. 12. Contra Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 17. 18. Basil. Hexam. Homil. 1. Aug. Confess. lib. 10.

cap. 6. Irenæus. lib. 2. cap. 9. Theophyl. Ad Antel. lib. 1. c. Hof. 2. 21, 22. d Jer. 14. 23. Job 38. 24. 37.

^a *vid. Plutarch.
lib. de E.*

Exod. 3. 14.

Isai. 40. 17.

Act. 17. 28.

Rom. 11. 36.

1 Cor. 8. 6.

Col. 1. 15. 17.

Heb. 1. 2.

^b Nehem. 9. 6.

Job 12. 10.

Pfal. 104. 29.

Isai. 40. 24.

^c Mat. 10. 29.

Prov. 16. 4.

Gen. 48. 28.

Act. 4. 27. 28.

^d Act. 17. 28.

Isai. 26. 12.

Job 10. 8.

Pf. 139. 15. 16.

1 Cor. 12. 6.

Isai. 10. 5.

selves, without him who is the Father of rain, and the Fountain of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The *Con-nexion* and concatenation of all second Causes to one another: The *Co-operation* of them together for the good of the Church: & the *Subor-dination* of them all to God, unto whom at length the more accurate inquiry into them doth man-uduct us. And this Subordination standeth in four things: 1. All things are subordinate unto God in ^a *Being*. He only hath Being *per Essen-tiam*, By Absolute and Original Essence; all other things *per participationem*, by derivation and dependance on him. 2. ^b In *Conservation*. For God doth not make his creatures as a Car-penter doth his house, which can after stand by it selfe alone: but having our very *Being* from him, that *Being* cannot *be* or *continue* with-out his supportance, as light in the house de-pendeth both in *being* and in *continuance* upon the Sunne. 3. In regard ^c of *Gubernation* and providence; for all things are by his Wisdome guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which flie out of the order of his Precepts, do fall into the order of his Pro-vidence. Lastly, in regard of ^d *Operation*. For in him we live and move; he worketh our works for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any causality till he be pleased to concur with them.

Again, since we finde that all other Crea-tures

tures have, answerable to the Instincts and Appetitions which Nature hath Grafted in them, proportionable Objects of equall latitude in goodnesse to the Faculties which are carried unto them; It must needs be reasonable that that be not wanting to the Excellentest of Creatures, which all the rest do enjoy. Since then the supreme Appetite of the Reasonable Soule is Knowledge, and amongst all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and satisfie this Desire: But that still there is both roome for more Knowledge and Inquiry after it: And besides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanied with Unquietnesse, and labour (as the Beast first stirres the mudde in the water with his feet, before hee drinks it with his Mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from these lesser Objects, the Soule be carried at the last to God, The Adequate and * Ultimate End and Object of all our Desires, as *Noahs* Dove was carried back to the Ark, when she found no place for the soale of her foot to rest on.

Againe, when wee see things which have no knowledge, work so regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to go, we must needs conclude they are guided by a mighty Wisdom and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flyeth directly to the Mark, I am sure it was the Hand of a skilfull Archer that directed it.

H h h 3

Unto

*Vid. Aug. Confess. lib. 1. cap. 1.
 & lib. 4. cap. 10.
 12. & lib. 13.
 cap. 8. de Trin.
 lib. 8. cap. 3.
 Dr. Field of the Church. lib. 1.
 cap. 1. Hooker
 Ecclesiastical
 Pol. l. 1. sect. 11.

Representatio
rerum. Judicium
de Rebus Repre-
sentatis. Aquin.
22x. qu. 173.
Art. 21.

Unto the Perfection of *Knowledge*, after due and proper Representation of *Objects* in themselves, or in their Causes, Effects, Principles, unto the Minde; There are in the *Subject* three things requisite.

First, Clearnesse of *Apprehension*, to receive the right and distinct Notion of the things represented, as the clearnesse of a Glasse serveth for the Admission of a more exact Image of the face that looks upon it, whereas if it be soild or dimm'd, it rendreth either none, or an imperfect shape.

Secondly, Solidity of *Judgement* to try and weigh the particulars, which we apprehend. That out of them we may sever for our use the precious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as Corne in the Straw; when by diligent enquiry after it, we have digged it up, and threshed it out, we must then bring it to the fire, and fanne, to give it us purified from drosse and levity. And this in speculation answereth unto the general vertue of *practical prudence* in Morality, whereby we weigh the severall Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the Best.

Thirdly, Fidelity of *Retention*: for he is not likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treasure as the Prophet speaks, into a **bag with holes*. For as Nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporeal strength, and nu-

triment,

Muse itaque di-
cta Jovis &
Mnemosynes fi-
lia. Cal. Rhod.
l. 11. c. 10.
* Hag. 2. 6.

triment, a *Retentive power* to clasp and hold fast that which preserveth it, until a through concoction be wrought ; so proportionably is the Faculty of *Memory* given to Reason, as a means to consolidate and enrich it. And *fluxes*, as in the Body, so in the Minde too, are ever Arguments and Authors of Weaknesse. Whence it comes to passe that in matter of learning many of us are faine to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit persons to breed up unto Learning ; wee should take a like course as wise Architects do in choice of fit Timber for Building. They choose first the straitest and that which hath fewest knots and flaws in it ; which in the mind answereth unto clearnes and evennes of Apprehension. For a clear mind, like streight and smooth Timber, will work easiest. Next, they take the heart and strongest substance, and cut out the sap : because that is best able to beare the weight that shall be laid upon it : And this answers unto maturity and firmnesse of judgement. Lastly, they do not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and such other materialls as are quickly apt to putrifie and wear away, but such Timber as is lasting and Retentive of its Nature, as Oake and Elme, which may make the Superstruction of the nature of the Foundation, strong and lasting : and this answereth to that excellent Faculty of the Mind, a *Rationall*

Memory :

Sene. Epist. 27.
Vid. etiam Cael.
Rhod. l. 11 c. 10.

Ut Grammati-
cos haberet
Analeſt. u.

Cicero in Bruto
& in Oratore.

Plin. l. 7. c. 24.
a M. Senec. Con-
trovers. lib. 1. in
Prolog.
b Plin. l. 7. c. 24.
Quintil. lib. 11.
cap. 2.

Val. Max lib. 8.
cap. 7. sect. 15.
c Alex. ab Alex.
lib. 6. cap. 18.
d Eli Spartian.
in Adriano.

e Ammian. Mar-
cell. lib. 16.
f Plin. Supra.

Suidas in Apoll.
Voss Instit. Orat.
l. 6. c. 6. f. Et. 2.
g De quibus
mentio apud Plin-
ium & M. Se-
necam & Quin-
til. ut supra.

memo y : from which one particular (I think more than any other) do arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicity in the minds of men addicted to the search of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappinesse of *Calvus Sabinus* in *Seneca*, who being at vast charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retain fast the Names of *Achilles*, or *Ulysses*: But, as his Parasite was wont deridingly to advise him, wanted a Grammatical Attendant to gather up the fragments which his Memory let fall. And *Curio* the Orator in *Tully*, was wont when he had proposed three things in an Oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to add a fourth; yea *Messala Corvinus* forgot his owne name, as *Pliny* telleth us. And as wonderful on the other side hath been the felicity of some others. ^a *Seneca* the Father could repeat 2000 words together in their order. ^b *Cyrus* and *Themistocles* could call all their Souldiers by their Names, (by which one Art of curtesie *Otho* aspired unto the empire) ^d *Adrian* could read a book which he never saw before, and after recite it by memory; and of the Emperor ^e *Julian* it is said, that he had drunk *Totum memoria dolium*, the whole vessell of memory. To say nothing of ^f *Simonides*, and *Apollonius Tyaneus*, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 years old, were very famous for the exquisitenesse of their memories; nor of *Cyneas*, *Charmidas*, *Portius Latro*, and divers others, who have been admired

mired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a Methodicall and orderly Disposition of minde, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for *Cyrus* to remember men in an *Army* than in a *Throng*. And hence hath proceeded the *Art of Memory* invented as *Pliny* tells us by *Simonides*, and perfected by *Metrodorus Sceptius*, consisting in the committing of severall Heades of matter unto distinct places, whereof *Quintillian* discourseth in his Oratory Institutions.

Of Knowledge there are severall sorts, according to severall considerations, with respect to the *Ends* of it. Some is *Speculative* for the improving of the Minde, as Physicall, Metaphysicall, and Mathematicall Knowledge. Others *Practicall* for fashioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of Men, as Ethicall, Politicall, Historicall, Military Knowledge. Some *mixt* of both, as *Theologicall* Knowledge, consisting in the speculation of Divine *Verities*, and in the direction of Divine *Duties*. Some *Instrumentall*, being only subservient unto others. as Grammaticall, Rhetoricall, Dialecticall learning. In regard of *Order*, some *Superiour*, others *Subalternate*, as Musick to Arithmetick, Opticks to Geometry. In regard of their *Originall*, some *Ingrasted*, as the supream *Principles* of Verity, and implanted notions of Morality, which is called the *Law of Nature*, and written in the Heart of all men, Rom. 2. 14. 15. Other *Ac-*

quired, and by search and industry laboured out of those *Principles*, and the others which are taught us. Other *Revealed* and Divinely manifested to the Faith of men, whereof the supreme *Principles* are these two. 1. That God in his Authority is *infallible*, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be beleaved, and therefore that every supernaturall Truth there plainly set downe in *terminis*, is an unquestionable Principle; and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in Theologicall and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the *manner* of Acquiring, some is *Experimentall*, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some *Habitnall*, a generall knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by *Invention* from a mans Industry, or by *Auscultation* and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of *Objects*, some *supreame*, as the Knowledge of *Principles* and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are knowne by evidence of their owne Tearmes. Others *derived* and deduced By argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of *Conclusions*. In regard of *Perfection*, *Intuitive* Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know

know things by the View, and *Discursive*, as that of Men, whereby wee know things by Ratiocination. In regard of *Order* and Method, *Syntheticall*, when wee proceed in Knowledge by a way of Composition from the Causes to the Effects; and *Analyticall*, when wee rise up from Effects unto their Causes, in a Way of Resolution.

With this noble Endowment of Knowledge, was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its first Creation: so farre forth as the Necessity of a happy and honourable life, of the Worship and communion wth God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himselve, and of the Instruction of his Posterity, did require Knowledge in him. For wee may not think that God, who made Man in a perfect stature of Body, did give him but an Infant stature of Minde. God made all things *exceeding Good*, and Perfect; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the Soule of Man, was doubtlesse given unto it, in its first Creation. Hee made Man *right* and straight; and the Rectitude of the Minde is in *Knowledge* and light; and therefore the Apostle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is *after the Image of him that Created us*, Coloss. 3. 10. Without Knowledge hee could not have given fir Names, and suteable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpose were

Iii 2

brought

De istâ Materia fusiùs disputant Scholastici ad l. 2. dist. 23. & ad part. 1. Tho. Aquin. 94. & Perer. in Gen 2. 19. 20. l. 5. disput. 1. de Amplitud. & Excellent. Scient. Adami,

brought unto him. Hee could not have awed and governed so various, and so strong Creatures, to preserve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongst them. Hee could not have given such an account of the substance and Originall of *Evil*. Of the End of her Creation to be the Mother of all living men, as he did. *Experimentall Knowledge* hee had not but by the Exercise of his Originall light upon particular Objects, as they should occurre. Knowledge of *future Events* hee had not, it being not Naturall, nor Investigable by imbred light, but Propheticall, and therefore not seene till Revealed. *Secret Knowledge* of the Thoughts of Men, or of the Counsellis of God he could not have, because *secret things belong unto the Lord*. But so much light of *Divine Knowledge* as should fit him to have Communion with God, and to serve him, and obtaine a blessed life; so much of *Morall Knowledge* as should fit him to converse in Love as a Neighbour, in Wisedome as a Father, with other men; so much of *Naturall Knowledge* as should dispose him for the Admiring of Gods Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which he had received Dominion; so much wee may not without notable injurie to the perfection of Gods Workmanship, and to the Beauty and rectitude of our first Parent, deny to have beene conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits

nefits of which singular Ornament of Knowledge, are exceeding Great. Hereby wee recover a largeness of Heart, for which Solomon is commended, 1 Reg. 4. 29.: Able to dispatch many businesses, to digest and order Multitudes of Motions, to have mindes seasoned with generous and noble resolutions; for that disposition is by the Philosopher called *μεγας ψυχη*, Greatnesse of Minde. Hereby wee are brought to a Just contempt of sordid and wormie affections. It is Darknesse which makes men grope, and pore, and looke onely on the things before them, as the Apostle intimates, 2 Pet. 1. 9. Illightned mindes see a greater lustre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, Pro. 3. 14, 15. The Excellencie of Evangelicall Knowledge made Saint Paul esteeme every thing in the World besides as *Dung*, Phil. 3. 8. As the light of the Sunne swallowes up all the petty light of the Starres: so the more noble and spacious the Knowledge of Mens mindes is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of those vanitious and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It disposeth Men for *mutuall Communion*, and helpfull Societie: for without Knowledge every Man is *feræ Naturæ*, like Birds of prey, that flie alwayes alone. Neither is it possible for a man to be sociable, or a member of any publick Body, any further than hee hath a propor-

Quod Plinio,
Et aliis obser-
vatum de Cæ-
sare; Et Alio
Spartiano. de
Adriano.

Vid. Aqu. 226.
qu. 188. Art. 6.
in C.

tion and measure of Knowledge : Since Humane Society standeth in the communicating of mutuall notions unto one another. Two men that are Deafe, and Dumb, and Blinde, destitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought *neerer unto God*, to admire him for his Wisdome, and Power ; to Adore him for his Greatnesse, and Majestie ; to Desire him, and work towards the fruition of him, for his light and Glory ; because in the Vision of him consisteth the Beatitude of Man.

This Knowledge is corrupted foure manner of wayes. First, By the Contempt of it in *Ignorance*. Secondly, By the Luxuriousefneffe and Wantonneffe of it in *Curiosity*. Thirdly, By the Defect and uncertainty of it in *Opinion*. Fourthly, By contradiction and Opposition unto it in *Error*.

There is a three-fold Ignorance wherewith the Minde of men may be blinded and defaced. The one is a *Naturall Ignorance*, which of Divine Things, so farre forth as those things are *Spiritually*, is in all men by Nature ; for the *Naturall Man* neither *Receiveth* with Acceptation, nor with Demonstration *discerneth* the things of the

Deum scire nemo potest nisi
Deo docente vid.
Iren. l. 4. c. 14.
Hilar. de Trin.
lib. 1. c. 5.

In quantum vide-
bimus in quan-

tuon similes erimus. Aug. Ep. 6. Vbi ad profunditatem sacramentorum perueniunt est, omnis
Platonico rum caligavit subtilitas. Cyr. Sp. Sancti. Aug. de Prædest. cap. 8. & de Doctr.
Christum lib. 2. cap. 6.

Spirit

Spirit of God ; And the Reason the Apostle gives, because they are *spiritually discerned*. For as the Eye is fitted to discern light by the Innate property of light and Cognation which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of sounds : so the Minde cannot otherwise receive spirituall Objects, than as it hath a similitude to those Objects in a spirituall disposition it selfe; whence that Expression of St. John, *wee shall be like unto him, for wee shall see him as he is*. Spirituall Things doe exceed the weaknesse of Reason, because they are *above it*, and so cannot be *discerned*; And they doe oppose the corruption of Reason, because they are *against it*, and so cannot be *Received*.

There is likewise in many Men much Naturall Ignorance, even in Morall and Naturall things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituall were lost, so were our Naturalls weakned too, as wee finde in the Great Dulnesse of many men in matters of learning, in so much that some have not beene able to learne the Names of the first Letters or Elements.

Vid. Hieron. advers. Jovin. l. 2.

*Cæli. Rhod. l. 11
cap. 10.*

Againc, there is a *Voluntary Ignorance* (of which wee have before spoken) whereby Men doe wilfully close their Eyes against Knowledge, and refuse it; and of this there may be a double ground, The one *Guile*, in Knowledge
That

that pertaineth to the Conscience, when a man chuseth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conscience disquieted with Exprobrations of contemning it. The other out of *Sluggishnesse* and Apprehensions of Difficulty in the Obtaining of Knowledge. When of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.

Thirdly, there is a * *Penall* Ignorance of which I shall not speake, because it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of Spirituall things, save onely in the relation that it hath to the Justice of God thereby provoked, who sometimes leaveth such men to their Blindnesse, that the thing which with respect to their owne choice of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto Gods Justice, may be a plague, and punishment unto them. Thus the Intellectuall Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.

* Mat. 13. 13.
A. 28. 26, 27.
Rom. 1. 28.
2 Thes. 2. 10.
11.

Ne intelligere
mentium
fuit delictum.
Tertul. Apol.
cap. 21. contr.
Marc. 1. 3 & 6.
Cyprian lib. 1.
Ep. 3.
Percussit
Ceciliae ut nec
intelligant De-
lictum. nec plan-

gant Indignantis Dei major haec ire. Cyp. de lapsis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. Ex Matth. & fuit
contra Julian lib. 5.

Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 1.
statim ab initio
Irenaei lib. 5.
cap. 23.
Vid. quaenam

contra hunc scientia praeiudicium apud Tertul. de Anima, cap. 1. contr. Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 1.
Aug. Ep. 29 & 56. & 72. & 157. Confess. lib. 11. cap. 12. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 2. cap. 9. &
lib. 10. cap. 23. Hieron.

In others it is abused by *Curiosity*, which may well be called the *Pride*, and the *Wantonnesse* of Knowledge, because it looketh after *high things* that are above us, and after *hidden things* that

are

are denied us. And I may well put these two together, *Pride* and *Luxurie* of Learning. For I beleeve wee shall seldome finde the *Pride* of Knowledge more prædominant than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectorall enquiries of Wit, and not out of scientificall and demonstrative Grounds. And I finde the Apostle joyning them together, when he telleth us of some, who *intruded themselves into things which they had not seene, and were Vainely puff'd up by a fleshy Minde.* And hee himselfe complaineth of Others, who were *Proud*, and languished about needlesse Questions; as it is ever a signe of a sick and ill-affected stomack to quarrell with usuall and wholsome meat, and to long for and linger after Delicacies which wee cannot reach too. When Manna will not goe downe without Quailes, you may be sure the Stomack is cloyed, and wants Physick to purge it. I will not here adde more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter Occasion.

A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge, is in the Fluctuation, wavering, and uncertainty of Assents, when the Understanding is left floating, and as it were in *Æquilibrio*, that it cannot tell which way to encline, or what Resolutions to grow unto; and this is that which in Opposition to Science, is called *Opinion*: For Science is ever *cum certitudine*, with Evidence and Unquestionable

Kkk

Conse.

In my Sermon
of the peace
of the Church
pag. 24. --26.

Aquin. 22 d. 9th.
1. Art. 4. C.

Consequence of Conclusions from necessary Principles : but *Opinion* is, *cum Formidine Oppositi*, with a feare least the contrary of what wee assent unto should be true : And so it importeth a Tender, Doubtfull, and Infirme Conclusion.

The Causes of *Opinion*, I conceive to be principally two : The first is a *Disproportion* betweene the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base : the one dazles the power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding *Tanquam luxen ad Vespertilionem*, as light unto a Batt ; which rather astonish than informe, and things too Materiall and Immerst, are like a mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath truth in it, bee the Object of the Understanding ; yet the Coexistence of the Soule with the Body, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onely the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those *Vespertiliones*, to which *Aristotle* hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence

sistence with the Body) there is required a mixture of contraries in the Ayre ; it must not bee too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up: But there must bee a kinde of Middle Temper cleerenesse of the Medium for conveyance, and yet some degree of Darknesse for qualification of the Object. Even so also the Objects of mans Understanding must participate of the two contraries, *Abstraction and Materiality*. Abstraction first, in proportion to the Nature of the Understanding, which is Spirituall. And Materiality too, in respect of the Sense, on which the Understanding depends in this estate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporall. So that where ever there is Difficulty and Uncertainty of Operation in the Understanding, there is a double defect and disproportion: first in the Power, whose Operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the Power. This is plaine by a familiar similitude; an Aged man is not able to read a small Print, without the Assistance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction seeme greater. Where first wee may descry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as cleare

and well-dispos'd as a young mans, hee would be able by his Naturall Power, without Art, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiency in the Letters; for if they had the same Magnitude and fitness in themselves, which they seeme to have by Refraction through the Glasse, the weakness of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them without those Helps. So that alwaies the Uncertainty of *Opinion* is grounded on the Insufficiency of the Understanding to receive an Object, and on the *Disproportion* of the Object to the Nature of the Understanding.

The next Cause of *Opinion* and Uncertainty in Assents, may be Acutenesse and Subtily of wit, when Men out of Ability, like * *Carneades*, to discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements betweene an equall weight of Arguments, are forc'd to suspend their assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclineable unto either part, or else, if to avoyd Neutrality, they make choise of some thing to averre (and that is properly *Opinion*) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion, as being accompanied with feare, floating, and Inconstancie.

* Nullam unquam in disputationibus rem defendit quam non probavit, nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit. Cic. de Oratore. l. 2. Non minoribus viribus contra Justitiam dicitur disseruisse, quam pro dei Justitia dixerat. Quintil. de Carnead. lib.

12. cap. 1. Plin. lib. 7. cap. 30.

And

And this indeed, although it be in it selfe a defect of Learning; yet considering the Estate of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Understanding by continuall Inquiry (man being bound in this also to recover that measure of his first fulnesse which is attainable in this Corrupted Estate by sweat of Braine, by labour and degrees *Paulatim extundere artes*) I lay in these considerations, Irresolution in Judgement (so it be not *Universal* in all conclusions; for that argues more weaknesse, than choise of conceit; not *Particular* in things of Faith and Salvation, which is not Modestly but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Usefull. Commendable, because it prevents all temper of heresie (whose nature is to *be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softnes of Judgement, which will not suffer it selfe to be captivated, either to its owne conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to discry weaknesse. And this is that which *Pliny* commends in his friend *Titus Ariston*, whose hesitancy and slownesse of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptines or unfurniture; but *ex diversitate Rationū quas acrimagnoq; Judicio ab erigine Causisq; primis repetit, discernit, expendit*, out of a learned cautiousnesse of judgement, which made him so long suspend his Assent, till he had weighed the severall repugnances of reasons, & by that meanes found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same *Pliny* elsewhere out of *Thucydides* observes) It is rawnes & deficiency of learning that

LII

makes

*Videtur utatuer
sus ceptices
disputat Ari-
stoteles apud Eu-
sebi. de prepar.
Evang. l. 14.
c. 18.*


** Ad quacun-
que sunt disci-
pl nam quasi
temestate de-
lasi a e m.
Tanquam ad
Saxum ad ha-
rescent, &c.
Acad. q. l. 4.
Plin. l. 1. ep. 22.*

Lib. 4. Ep. 7.

makes bold & peremptory: *ἀντιστάσεις ὅσων ἐρίει*. Demurs and fearfulness of Resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of Doubtings: First, they lessen the number of heresies, which are (as I said) alwaies obstinate. And next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the Truth, to those who shall find themselves best qualified for that service, But Heresie coming under the shape of Science, with shewes of Certainty, Evidence, & Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Understanding, and possesse it with false Assents than yeeld occasion of deeper search, unlesse it meet with a more piercing Judgement, which can through confidence descry weaknesse. For questionlesse the Errours of Great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldnes of Assertions, do either by possessing the judgement with prejudice of the Author, make it also subscribe to the error; or if a more impartiall eye see insufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deterrres from the opposing of his concept. Whereas when mens assents are proposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty: the Understanding is incited both to enquire after the reasons of Diffidence; as also to find out means for a more settled Confirmation and cleering of the Truth.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Errours: the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Falsifying them: or Transferring the Truth of them out of their own bounds. Affectations of Singularity, and Novell courses. Credulity and Thralldom of Judgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects corrupteth Judgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.

 He other maine Corruption of Knowledge was *Error*, whereby I understand a peremptory and habituall assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some fallhood under the shew of truth. It is *Aristotles* assertion in his *Ethicks*, that one man may conceive himselfe as certaine of his Error, as another man of his Knowledge; and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seems most neerly to resemble it.

If we enquire after the prime Fundamentall Cause, the Gate by which Error came first into the World. *Syracides* will tell us in a word; that *Error* and *Darknesse* had their beginning together with *Sinners*: and the reason is, because sinne

being a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is *Pater Luminum*, the Father and fountaine of all knowledge; and whose perfections man did at first one principall way by Knowledge resemble, cannot chuse but bring with it darknesse and confusion into the Soul. But I shall enquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these:

I A first and most speciall one is the Abuse of Principles: For the Understanding must have ever something to rest it selfe upon: and from the conformity of other things, thereunto to gather the certainty and evidence of its Assents. For it is the nature of mans minde, since it had at first it selfe a beginning to abhorre all manner of Infinity, *à Parte-Ante* (I meane in Ascending and Resolution) as well of Sciences and Conclusions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the Understanding is not quieted in Philosophicall inquiries about created things, till it have according to their severall differences ranged them severally within the compasse of some Finite Line, and subordinated the Inferiors of every kinde, *Sub uno Summo Genere*, under one chiefe, and rests not in the Resolution of Effects into their Causes, till it come to *Aliquid primum*, in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Causality, and Essentiall Dependance: so likewise it is in Knowledge & Truth, notwithstanding a *Parte Post*, downward, our pursutes of them seeme Infinite and Unlimited, by reason of our owne Infinities,
and

and Eternity that way : yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originals, the Understanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in *Infinitum*, and never rests till it finds a *Non ultra*, an utmost linke in the chaine of any Science, and such a *Prime*, Universal; Unquestionable, Unprovable Truth, from whence all Inferiour Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of *Principles* : which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestlings of any private conceipt, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streames have their proportionable corruptions.

Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by *Falsifying* and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their owne limits; as when Philosophicall Errours are falsly grounded upon Philosophicall Axioms, which is *Error Consequentia*, or *Illationis*, an Errour in the Consequence of one from the other : or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their owne bonds, into the Territories (as I may so speake) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject; which is *Error Dependencia*, or *Subordinationis*, an Error in the Dependence of one on the other. For the former, it hath been alwaies either the Subtily or modesty of error to throwd it self under truth, & that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undenyable grounds, & by a

* Liv. l. 28.

* Ex his eam
impugnatis, ex
quibus constat.
Tertul. de
Baptis. c. 2.
Vid. de præser.
c. 36. 39.
Sententias per
primus com-
munibus Argu-
mentis minu-
unt. de Ani-
mal. c. 2.
Inde sumentes
præsidia, quò
pugnant c. 50.
Omnia advei-
sus Veritatem,
de ipsa Veri-
tate constructa
sunt. Apolog.
c. 47.
* Clem. Alex. in
Protreptic.
* Cic. Orat. l. 1
In Irridentis
Oratoribus O-
rator Summus.
Liv. l. 26.
Nec aliter Nu-
ma Simulans
sibi cum dea
Ægeriâ no-
cturnos con-
gressus esse,
apud eundem.
l. 1. Vide Val.
Max. l. 1. c. 2.
Plut. in Numa.

strange kinde of Chimistry, to extract darknesse out of light. * *Fraus sibi ex parois*, (said *Fabius Maximus* in *Livy* upon another occasion.) I will alter it thus, *Error sibi ex principiis fidem præstruit ut cum magnâ mercede fallat*. * Unreasonable and groundlesse fancies alwaies shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. * As *Praxitiles* the Painter drew the Picture of *Venus* by the face of his Minion *Cratina*, that so by an honorable pretext he might procure adoration to a Harlot. * Thus as *Plato* is said, when he inveighed chiefly against Orators, most of all to have played the Orator (making a Sword of Eloquence to wound it selfe) so they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custome of that *Scipio*, honoured afterward by the name of his Punicke Conquest, alwaies before he set upon any busines, (as *Livy* reports of him) to enter the Capitoll alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justnesse, issue, and successe of his intended designs ; and then, *Apud multitudinem, plerumq; velut mente divinitus monitâ agebat* : Hee bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploits hee perswaded them to attempt, had all the approbation and Unerring Judgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whither an Ambitious hope of fastning an Opinion of his owne Divinenesse in the midst of the people, or an happy and politicke imposture, the better to presse those people (alwaies more inclinable to the perswasions

swasions of Superstitions than Reason) to a free Execution of his designs, it is not here necessary to enquire. Sure I am even in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like Impostors, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppose it: as *Jacob* in *Esa's* Cloathes, robbed *Esa* of the blessing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the Oake, doth withall weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first to entertaine Corrupt Conceits, and then to * wrest and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errors of the mind, as in the distempers of the palate usuall with men to find their own relish in every thing they read.

Concerning the other Abuse, it is an often observation of *Aristotle*, that Principles and Conclusions must be within the Sphære of the same Science; and that a man of Learning ought alwaies to be faithfull unto his owne Subject, and make no Excursions from it into another Science. And therefore he saith that it is an equall absurdity for a Mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) only to ground them on Rhetoricall probabilities, as it were for a Rhetorician, whose Arguments should be more plausible and Insinuitive, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may be proved by demonstrative principles. This leaping *a Genere ad Genus*, and confounding the dependan-

cies

* *Scripturarum esse volumus qua nostra sunt Aug. vid. que adversus hanc Curiositatis Lasciniam passim occurrunt apud Tertull. Apol. c. 46. 47. contr. Hermog. c. 1. d. praef. c. 17. 38, 39. 40 De Resurreit. c. 40. De fug. in perfect. c. 6. De Pudic. c. 26. Simpliciter sermonis Ecclesiastici, id volumus significare, quod ipsi sentiunt. Epiph. ad Joan. Hierosol. Justin Martyr. ad Zenam. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 7. p. 5. 45. D. Aug. contr. Pelag. & Coelest. l. 1. c. 42. De Gratia Christi.*

Πίστες πάντες
 ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας
 διπλὸν τὸ μὴ
 διαμαρτυρεῖται δια-
 κρινόντες πάντες
 ἀλλήλους τὰ δι-
 γὰ κοινὸν ἐκ
 τοῦ διανοήσαντος
 ἐκ δὲ μὴ κατὰ
 τὰ διὰ τῆς αἰσθη-
 σῆς τὸν λόγον
 ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας
 οὐκ αἰσθησάμενος
 τὰ τε κοινὰ καὶ
 τὰ ἴδια

Chm. Alex.

Siron. 6.

* I id. int. qui

Stoicm. &

Platonism. &

dial. Stoicm

Christian ssi-

mum protulerunt

le vel de pi-

scrip. c. 7

* Cic lib. de

Unive. so.

Plat. in T meo.

Euf. de prep.

Evan. I. 11. c. 29

Theod. 1er. 4.

Chm. Alex.

Strom. I. 5.

Quin & Resur-

rect. onem Phi-

losophis notan

(sed ex Hebra-

o un doctrinā)

affirmat Euf. I.

II. c. 33. 36.

Te 1. de Resur-

rect. carr. c. 1.

Nesc. o an hic

etiam retine-

ant illa. senat.

quod I. 63. cap. 30

cies of Truth, by transferring Principles unto Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudiciall to Knowledges; and Errour hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop & bow to Reason; & when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on meer humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with * Nature, and no farther. And hence it is that so many of the Philosophers denied those two maine Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (* although in some of them the very sight of nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those main Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther) that *ex nihilo nihil fit*; nothing can be made of nothing. And a *privatione ad habitum non datur regressus*; That there is no regresse from a Totall Privation to the Habit lost. And this reason was evidently implied in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the Root of all Errour, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection: *Erratis nescientes Scripturas usque Potentiam Dei*. Where are intimated two maine Principles of that Mystery of the Resurrection; the *Word*, and the *Power of God*. This later commanding our Assent that it may be: that other, our Assurance that it Will be. So that wherever there is an Ignorance

Ignorance of these two, and we goe about to examine this or any other mystery, rather by a disputing, then an Obeying reason: the immediate consequent of such peremptory & preposterous course, is Error and Depravation of the Understanding. *Pythagoras* and his Schollars, out of a strong conceit that they had of the Efficacy of Musick, or Numbers, examining all the passages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monstrous Errour, that Number was the first and most Essentiall Element in the Constitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured Glasse, have all Objects, how different soever represented in the same colour: so they examining all Conclusions by Principles forestalled for that purpose, thinking every thing of what nature soever to be dyed in the colour of their owne conceits, and to carry some proportion unto those Principles: Like *Antipheron*, *Orites* and others in *Aristotle*, who did confidently affirme every thing for Reall, which their imagination fancied to it selfe. But *Tully* hath prettily reprehended this abuse in that Satyricall reprehension which he gives to *Aristoxenus* the Musitian, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, wou'd conceit the Soule of man to consist of Harmony, *Hac magistro concedat Aristoteli, canere ipse doceat*: Let him leave these things to *Aristotle*, and content himselfe with teaching men how to sing; intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any Science beyond its owne bounds.

2. Another cause of Error may be Affecta-

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tion

Plus de plaisir.
Philos. l. 1. c. 3.
Laert in Peth.
Quincil. Instit
l. 10, c. 10.

T2 paratiquam
id est, de quo supra
est de musica
lib. de Memor.
& Reminis. c. 1.

tion of Singularity, and a Disdain of being but an accession unto other mens Inventions, or of Tracing their steps: when men shal rather desire to walke in wayes of their owne making, then in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented Errors, than content with a derived and imputed Learning; and had rather be accounted the purchasers of Heresie, then the Heires of Truth, *Quasi nihil fuisset rectum, quod primum est; melius existimant quicquid est aliud*, as *Quintilian* spake elegantly on another occasion: As if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteeme every thing therefore better, because new.

Non tam Auctoritas in disputando, quæ rationis momenta querenda sunt, &c.
Cic: de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

3. Another Cause may be the other Extreme (for a man may lose his way, as well by enclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. *Et credere, quàm scire, videtur reverentius*, we rather believe, then know what we assent unto. 'Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of learned men to read them alwayes with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing: But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. Wee may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans hand. Beliefe, without evidence of Reason, must be onely there absolute, where the Authority is Unquestionable, and where it is impossible to erre, there onely it

it is Impious to Distrust. As for mens Assertions, *Quibus possibile est subesse falsum*, what he said of Friendship, *Sic amataquam Osurus*, Love with that Wisdome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantagious in Knowledge : *Sic crede tanquam dissensurus*, so to believe, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much streightning of a mans owne Understanding, to intrall it unto any : or to esteeme the dissent from some particular Authorities, Presumption and Selfe-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, then Factions and Sidings. When as *Seneca* said of *Cato*, that he would rather esteeme Drunkenesse a Vertue, then *Cato* Vitious: So Peripatericks and Platonists, Scotists, & Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) shall rather count Errour, Truth, then their great Masters Erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a presumptuous dependance onely on his owne judgement with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Estate of the Learned; Inchoation and Progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning Judgement, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, *Aristotle's* speech is true, *Oportet discitem credere*, Beginners must believe. For as in the Generation of man, he receiveth his first life & nourishment

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from

*Vid. Aug. ep. 6.
Lib. de Vnitat.
Ecclesie. cap. 19.
contra Crescon.
Gramat. 42.
c. 32. & ep. 111.
Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3.
ad Cæsiliū.*

*Vid. Theodor.
serm. 1. de fide
& Platon.
apud Euseb.
l. 12. c. 1.*

Plat. lib. de
Audiend.
Poetis.
Vid. Senep. 64.

Hooker. l. 1.
Sect. 6.

Ἀποταμίαν μὲν οὖν
τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀποταμίαν
αἰσθητικὴν μὲν
ἐκείνην δὲ οὖν
ἀποταμίαν
Arist. Orat. 1.
de Rhet.

from one Wombe, and after takes onely those things, which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him; but when he is growne unto strength and yeares, he then receiveth nourishment not from Milke onely, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedom of his own choise or dislike: so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the Joynts and Members of it into one body is best affected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher (though even of his Tutors, Cato being a childe, was wont to require a reason) but being growne thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the liberty of its owne Judgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speak not this therefore to the dishonour of *Aristotle*, or any other, from whose Learning, much of ours, as from Fountains, hath been derived: Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challengeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration; And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which hath been given *Aristotle* by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of Natures Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, then the whole Series of Ages since hath in any particular member thereof: And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning doe well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference between Reverence and Superstition; we may Assent unto them as Antients, but not as Oracles: they may have our minds easie and inclinable, they may not have them

them captivated and fettered to their opinions: As I will not distrust all, which without manifest proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of Errour, so likewise will I suspend my beliefe upon probability of their mistakes: and where I finde expresse Reason of Dissenting, I will rather speak Truth with my Mistresse Nature, then maintaine an Error with my Master *Aristotle*. As there may be friendship, so there may be Honour with diversity of Opinions: nor are wee bound therfore to despise men, because we reverence them. *Plura sepe peccantur dum demeremur, quam dum offendimus*; We wrong our Ancestors more by admiring then opposing them in their Errors; and our opinion of them is foule and without Honour, if we think they had rather have us followers of them then of Truth. And we may in this case justly answer them as the young man in *Plutarch* did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjust thing; I wil do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid mee. For good men are ever willing to have truth preferred above them. *Aristotle* his Commendation of his middle Aged men, should be a rule of our Assent to him, and all the rest of those first Planters of Knowledge: VVe ought neither to over-prize all their VVritings by an absolute credulity, because they being *Men*, and subject to Errour, may make us thereby liable to *Delusion*; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, because being *great men*, and so well deserving of all Posterity, they may challenge from us an *Easiness*

Αἰσθητικὴ φύσις αἰ.
ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ
καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.
Arist. Ethic.
l. 1. c. 4.
Tacit.
*Veritas nec
mea est, nec illi-
us, aut illius.*
Aug. Confess.
l. 12. c. 25.

Rhet. l. 2.

of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it be only without and not against Reason) as *Tully* professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of Mans Soule, as Immortality: *Vt rationem nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frägeret*: Though *Plato* had given no reason for it; yet his Authority should have swayed assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose alwaies to be swayed by Truth, more then by the thousand yeares of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

4. Another Cause of Errour may be a Fastning too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the minde conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: As if Truth were the hand-maid to Passion: or Camelion-like could alter it selfe to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be Unquestionable and Authentically, when we have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the utmost Good of mans Nature (which amounted to the number of two hundred eighty eight, as was long agoe observed by *Varro*) which could not but be out of every particular Philosophers conceit, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his owne crooked Nature: so that every man sought Happinesse, not where it was to be found, but in himself, measuring it by the Rule of his owne distempered and intangled Judgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous Errours, according as the Minds

of

*Al dignitate est
na idn cupi
runt.*

*Arist. Met. 1.
Immoderata
est omnis sus
ceptarum vo
luntatum per
tinacia, &c.*

*Vid. Hil. init.
l. 16. de Trinit.*

*Vid. Aug. de
Civ. Dei. l. 19.
c. 1.*

of men were any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, Pompe, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensuall Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnaturall course; like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the Soule and Deity: For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the Understanding concerning Happines should precede the pursuit of the Will: they on the contrary side, first love their Errour, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because he conceiveth it would goe farre better with him in the end, then otherwise it is like to doe) and then this Desire allures the Understanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may perswade to the Beliefe thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion: *Quod nimis volumus facile credimus*, we easily believe what we will willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by Nature he love Sinne) yet he is altogether impatient of any check or conviction thereof, either from others, or himselfe; and therefore be his Errors never so palpable, his Affections never so distemperd, his Minde never so depraved and averse from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily perswade himselfe to thinke he is in the right course, and make his Judgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vitious Suggestions, *Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus*. When
once

once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resigne it selfe to be perverted, and the discourse of the Understanding will quickly bee drawne to the maintaining of either: So easie it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey:

And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those virall ones, which diffuse their vertue into the whole, the Weaknesse spreads, and over-runnes all the other, though remotest from it: so likewise the violent motion of partiall and unruly Appetites, which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of mans soule, out of the naturall Harmony and consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially doe they labour to winne over the Judgement unto their side, and there-hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the Understanding is regular, the chiefe Dominion thereof is over-Affection. And therefore we see alwayes that men of the most stayed and even judgements, have the most unresisted power in the government of Passions: so on the other side, when the Affections are strongly enclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality, or Object in Nature; the first Faculty whereon they strive to transerre their prejudice is the Reason, since without the Assent and Appro-

Aprobation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedome from distractions and feare, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophistry and Disputes of that Power. Thus as it is usuall with men of deceitfull palates (as before I touched) to receive in every thing they taste the same disagreeing rellish, wherewith their mouth is at that time distempered: So it is with mens Mindes prepossessed with any particular Fancy: *Intus Existens prohibet alienum*. They cannot see it in its own proper colours, but according as their Concepts are any way distempered and transported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in Naturall Philosophy sprang that Opinion of *Aristoxenus* the Musitian (which I spake of before) that the Soule of *Man* consisted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, *Velut in Cantu & Fidibus*, between the parts; and *Tully* intimates the Reason I spake of very prettily: *Hic ab artificio suo non recessit*: this man knew not how to leave his own Art; & more expressely of the same in another place: *Ita delectatur suis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre conetur*. Hee was so affected with *Musicke*, that he transferred it upon the Soule.

5. Another Reason, which I conceive of Corruption of the Vnderstanding by Errour, is Curiosity and Pushing it forward to the Search of things clasped up and reserved from its inquiry. 'Tis the naturall disease of mankind to desire the knowledge of nothing more than what is least attainable. *Ita Natura comparatum est* (saith *Pliny*) *ut*

proximorum incuriosi Longinqua sectemur; adeo animi rerum Cupido Languescit, cum facili occasio est.
 It is the vanitie of man, as well in Knowledge, as in other things, to esteeme that which is far fetched (as we say) and deare bought most pretious; as if Danger and Rarity were the only Argument of worth. The enquiry after the Estates of Spirits and seperated Soules, the Hierarchies of Angels; and (which is more) the secret Councels of God, with other the like hidden Misteries, do so wholly possesse the minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable Inquiries, and so become not onely hurtfull, in regard of their owne vanity and fruitlesnesse; but also in that they hinder more wholsom and usefull Learnings. And yet Ignorance is of so opposite a nature unto mans Soule, that though it be Holy, it pleaseth not; if there be but Evill (the worst of all Objects) unknowne. The Divell perswades *Adam* rather to make it by sinning, than not to know it.

But wee are to remember that in many things, our searchings and bold speculations must be content with those Silencing, more than Satisfying Reasons; *Sic Natura jubet, sic opus est mundo*: Thus God will have it, thus Nature requires. We owe unto Natures works, as well our wonder as our inquiry; and in many things it behooves us more to magnifie than to search. There are as in the countries of the World, so in the Travels of mens wits; as well *Præcipitia*, as *Via*; as well Gulfes and Quick sands, as common Seas. He that will be climbing

climbing too high, or sayling to tarre, is likely in the end to gaine no other Knowledge, but onely what it is to have a shipwrack, and to suffer ruine. Man is of a mixed Nature; partly Heavenly; partly *Morall* and Earthly; and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy disposition, to crawl on the ground, to raise the Soule unto no higher Contemplations than Base and Worldly, is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to spurne and disdain these Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts, To soare after Inscrutable Secrets; to unlock and breake open the closet of Nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deepe and impenetrable Counsels of Heaven, which we should with a holy, fearfull, and astonished Ignorance onely adore, is too bold and arrogant sacriledge, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell: For *Ero similis Altissimo*, I will be like the most high; was (as is beleev'd) the Divels first sinne: *Eritis tanquam Dij*, ye shall be like unto God, was I am sure his first Temptation, justly punished both in the Author and Obeyer with Darknesse; in the one, with the Darknesse of Tophet; in the other, with the Darknesse of Errour.

*Aug. de. gen. ad
lit. l. 11. c. 14.
Et. lib. de vera
Relig. c. 13.
De. Civ. Dei.
l. 12. c. 6.
Hier. Ep. 44. ad
Anton. de Mo-
destia, & in
c. 14. Isaie.
Greg. Moral.
l. 14. c. 17.
Damasc. de Or-
thod. Fid. l. 2.
c. 4.*

CHAP. XXXIX.

The Actions of the Understanding, Invention, Wit, Judgement : of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity : of Tradition, by Speech, Writing : of the Dignities and Corruption of Speech.



Hitherto of the more Passive Operation of the Understanding, which I called Reception or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active, which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in its Apprehension : And they are the Actions of *Invention*, of *Wit*, & of *judgment*. The former of these hath two principall parts; the *Discovering* of Truth; and the *Communicating* of it. The former only is properly *Invention*; the other a consequent thereof, *Tradition*: but both much making to the Honour of the Facultie. For the former, I shall forbear any large Discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplations, Practises, Dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of Lawes, Government of Life; and generally, whatsoever enterprize a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts; so great Beauty and Ornament

Ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of Learning.

The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,

First, a Despaire and Distrust of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe-Opinion is a maine Cause of Errour: so Diffidence and Feare is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those Faculties which she gave for enquiry, with Sloath and Dulnes. *Multis rebus inest Magnitudo* (saith *Seneca*) *non ex natura sua, sed ex debilitate nostra*: & so likewise, *Multis rebus inest difficultas; non ex natura sua, sed ex opinione nostra*. Many things seem hard & involved, not because they are so; but because our suspicion so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill-disposed Body, every light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the Constitution is stronger: So with fearefull and despairing wits, every Inquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Disopinion & slender Concept which they have of their owne Abilities. *Non calcant spinas, sed habent*. It were but ridiculous for a Blind man to complaine of dark weather; when the fault is not in the Aire, but in the Eye.

Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I observed before on another Occasion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of those who have gone before us: For when men shall so magnifie the Gifts of others, that they slight and neglect their owne; when out of a prejudicate Concept that the Antients have sufficiently perfected the

Body of more serious Learnings, they shall exercise their Wits (capable of greater employments) in degenerate and unusefull Studies; Knowledge must needs be hindred from attaining that Maturity, to which by their owne Inventions it might be rayed. Thus as it falls out among men of thirstlesse mindes in their Fortunes: *Divitiarum abundantia inter Causas paupertatis est.* Their profusenesse out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their Estates, drawes them quickly beyond their Fortunes: or as it was in the like case amongst the Romanes in those times of Publike Luxury, and Effeminate-nesse, the valour of their Ancestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from forreigne hostility, did also by the meanes of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their Weaknesse was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predecessors: So it is in the matter of Learning, when we spend our time onely in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seeke to improve it by our owne Inventions, the large measures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our posterous use made an occasion of a Large measure of Ignorance in other inquiries, wherein their Labours offer greater Assistance, than discouragement. There was not I perswade my selfe amongst the Ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwithstanding this Liberty was often the occasion of
many

many prodigious Births ; yet this disadvantage was countervailed with many fruitfull and goodly issues ; all which might haply have been undiscovered, had men laboured only in Traditions, and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errours being still examined, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleaved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other, Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Error in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to finde his Imaginary treasure ; yet that stirring and softning of the Ground is a meanes to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours when discovered in the Inquiry after Truth ; that they let us know what it is not : and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a Negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance : as he is sooner likely to finde out a place who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knowes not the way.

The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Vnfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Learning : For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued frame brancheth it selfe into sundry members : So that there is not onely in the Object of the *Will*, which is the *Good* of things ;
but

Tusc. q. l. 2.

but in the Object of the *Vnderstanding* also which is their truth, a certain mutuall Concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other; insomuch that in the handling of particular Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as doe necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of *Tully* is generally true, *Difficile est pauca esse ei nota, Cui non sint, aut pleraq; aut omnia.* All that addresse themselves either to the invention of Arts not knowne, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Experiments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Learning.

For the other part of *Invention*, which *I* call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, *I* comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech: Wherein *I* consider a double ministerial reference, the one to the eye; the other to the eare: that is *Vox scripta*, a Visible Voice; this *Vox viva*, an Audible Voice. To which purpose *Scaliger* acutely: *Est quidem Recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus.* The Dignities which this particular confers on man, and wherein it gives him a preheminance above other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every serviceable or Ministeriall Instrument is to be gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.

Arist. Polit. l. 1.
c. 2.

The end whereunto Living and Organicall Speech was principally ordained, is to maintaine mutuall

mutuall Society amongst men incorporated into one Body. And therefore *Tully* well calls it, *Humana Societatis Vinculum*, the Ligament and Sinnew, whereby the Body of Humane Conversation is compacted and knit into One.

It would be a long and large labour to speake of the Honour which God hath bestowed upon our Nature in this noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue *ἄγγελον λόγων*, as the Poet calleth it, The Messenger of Reason, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our Conceits with Characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I shall not engage my selfe on so great an Argument, which hath already filled the Volumes of so many learned men, who have written some Rhetoricall, others morall Institutions and precepts touching Speech. I shall therefore content my selfe with but naming some few particulars, by Consideration whereof we may acknowledge the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.

Eurip.

I For the Dignity hereof it appeares in this, That whereas in other lesse Considerable Perfections, other Creatures have an Exquisitenesse above man, yet in this man excelleth all other Inferior Creatures, in that he is able to communicate the Notions of Reason clothed in sensible Characters unto others of his owne kinde. For though some melancholy men have beleevved that Elephants and Birds, and other Creatures have a Language whereby they discourse with one another, yet we know that those narrow and poore

*Vid. Aug. lib.
Quæst. ex Ver.
Testan. q. 3.*

O o o

Voices

Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed only from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called λογική, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth only upon Reason. And as by this the Soule of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth his Body excell them too. First, in the Uprightnesse of his Stature, whereby he is made to looke up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth the Impression of that Light which dwelleth within him. For the Face is the window of the Soule.

Ὁς δὲν ἄρ' ἔστι
μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
στὰ τὸ ἦ φέρει
αὐτὸς ὃ ἦ ὅτι
εἰς αὐτὸν
Arist. de part.
Anim. l. 4. c. 10.
Vid. Law ent.
Anac. l. 1.
c. 2, 4.
Perer. in Gen.
2. 7. d. sp. de
præstantiâ.
Hum. Corp. q. 1.

*Provdq; cum spectent Animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit, Calumq; tueri
Jussit, & erectos, ad Sydera tollere Vultus.*

Whil'st other creatures downward fix their sight,
Bending to Earth an Earthly Appetite:
To man he gave a lofty Face; might looke
Up to the Heavens; and in that spacious Booke,
So full of shining Characters, descry
Why he was made, and whether he should fly,

Quim. Instit.
l. 2. c. 16.
Cæli. Rhodig.
l. 2. c. 30.
l. 16. c. 13.
Συμφορὰ ἡ
περὶ τῆς
Arist. de Inter-
pret. c. 1.
Greg. Nyss. de
Hom. opificio.
cap. 9.

Next in the Faculty of speech, which is the Gate of the Soule, through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits and Cogitations of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks; The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the Conceptions

Conceptions of the mind (and by that means to preserve humane society) to derive knowledge to maintain mutuall love and supplies; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrowes; but above all, to Honour God, and to edifie one another, in which respect our Tongue is called our *Glory*. *Pfal.* 16.2. *Aff.* 2.26.

The force & power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to expresse, How suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry Captive the Affections of men, *Cæsar* with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. *Menenius Agrippa* with one Apologue, the sedition of a people. *Flavianus* the Bishop of Antioch with one Oration, the fury of an Emperour. *Anaximenes* with one Artifice, the indignation of *Alex. nder*; *Abigail* with one Supplication, the Revenge of *David*; *Pericles* and *Pisistratus* even then when they spake against the peoples liberty, over-ruled them by their Eloquence, to beleeeve and imbrace what they spake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. *Pericles* and *Nicias* are said to have still pursued the same Ends, and yet with cleane different successe. The one in advancing the same busines pleased; the other exasperated the people; and that upon no other Reason but this, the one had the Art of perswasion which the other wanted.

Περὶ τοῦ εὐνοῦ
ἀνθρώπων λόγου
Euripid. Hec.
Sueton. in Cæs.
cap. 73.
Luc. lib. 1.
Πολλὰ τοι σμι-
κετο λόγοις ἔσση
λας ἦδ' ἔχ' ἡ-
τῶσθαι βροτῶν.
Sophocl. Elec.
Chrysost.
ἀνδρῶν ἡδ' κ.
Vide Cousin. de
Eloq. l. 1. c. 4.
Val. Max.
l. 8. c. 9.
Plutar. lib. de
Præcept. ge-
rend. Reip.

Ἀγλασσία ἢ πολλὰ κίε λ' ὀδὸς ἀνὴρ
 Δικαία λ' ἔσσι. ἵσσο· ἐν γλῶσσῃ φέρη.
 Νῦν δ' ἐν βίῃ σῶμασι τὸν ἀλὶ θέσται
 κλίσουσιν ὥστε μὴ δοκῇ ἂ χερὶ δοκῇν.

One shake the Right with a slow Tongue,
 Another fluently shake wrong.
 He lost, this stole the Cause, and got
 To make you thinke, what you thinke not,

And this power of Speech over the Minds of
 men is by the Poet, in that known passage of his
 thus elegantly described :

Virg. Ænead. 1.

——— *Magno in populo cum sæpè Coorta est
 Seditio, sævitq; Animus Ignobile vulgus
 Iamq; faces & Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat.
 Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis si fortè virūquem
 Conspèxere, silent, arrectisq; auribus astant :
 Ille regit dictis Animos & pectora mulcet.*

When in a Multitude Seditions grow,
 And Ulcerated Minds do overflow
 With swelling Ire; when stones & firebrands fly,
 (As Rage doth every where weapons supply)
 Then if some Aged man, in Honour held
 For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,
 And Moderate this Tumult : strait wayes all
 Rise up with silent Reverence, and let fall
 Their Angry Clamors; His grave words do sway
 Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.

The

The Vertues of Speech (whereby it worketh with such force upon the Minde) are many which therefore I will but Name, some *Grammaticall*, as Property, and Fitnesse, and Congruity, without Solacifines and Barbarousnesse, some *Rhetoricall* as choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspecuity, Gravity, Pleasantnesse, Vigor, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; some *Logicall*, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digesting, of all the Aydes of Speech; as Wit, Learning, Proverbs, Apologues, Emblemes, Histories, Lawes, Causes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some *Morall*, as Gravity, Truth, Seriousnesse, Integrity, Authority. When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleaved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appears, That they arise *ex fulco pectoris*, & have their foundation in Vertue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the selfe same Wine with pleasure in a pure and cleane Vessell, which he loaths to put unto his mouth, from one that is foule and soiled: so the selfe same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.

Λόγος ἐκ ἀδοξέων ἰσχύ.
καὶ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς ὁ ταύτην σβένει.

A Speech from Base men, and men of Respect,
Though't be the same, works not the same Effect.

O o o 3

And

Vid. Voss. Crat.
Instit. l. 4.
Causin. de Elog.
lib. 2.
Quint. l. 1. c. 5.
Et possim alibi.
Σαφηνότητα συν-
ταξια πρὸς τὸν
χρῆσιν.
Laert. in Zen.
l. 7.

Vid. A. Gell.
l. 1. c. 15.

Eurip. Hecub.

Plu. lib. de
Audr.
A. Gell. l. 18.
c. 3.

Quint. l. 12. c. 1.

— Οὐ σὺς
ἰσχυρὸς σὺς δὲ παρὲν
ἐπιδείξῃς σὺς
ὁ δὲ μὴ τιμῶν.
Sophoc. Ajax.

And therefore the Spartan Princes when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life and Opinion which they approved, they required another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his Judgement. For wee are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dresse it. And therefore it is a very true Character which *Tully* and *Quintilian* give of a right Oratour. That he must be *vir bonus dicendi Peritus*, as well a Good man as a Good speaker. Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their *Affections*. Like a fire made of greene wood, which is fed with it as it is fewell, but quenched as it is greene.

Lastly, some are *Civill* in Causes Deliberative, or Iuridicall, as Wisdome, pertinency and fitnessse to the Nature and Exigence of the end or Matter whereupon we speake. For in that case we are to ponder & measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereunto. *Paul* amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their *Poets*, & from confessed Maximes of *Reason*, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and leading them to Repentance. But amongst the Jews hee disputed out of *Scripture*. With *Felix* that looked for mony, he disputed of Righteousnesse and Judgement to come, but amongst the

and Faculties of the Soule.

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the Pharisees and Sadduces, of the Resurrection, that a Dissention amongst themselves might procure a party for him. It is not wisdom for a man in misery to speake with a high stile : or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The same speech may be Excellent in an umbratile Exercitation, which would be too pedantical, and smelling of the Lampe in a matter of serious and weighty debate ; and that may be dainty meat in one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinne for the Conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth like a double Hedge, that wee might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before we produce them.

These are the principall Vertues. And in Opposition unto these, wee may easily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content my selfe with but the naming.

The Vices in Grammer, are Solæcismes, Barbarismes, Obsoletenesse, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech. In Rhetoricke, Sordidnesse, Tedioufnesse, Obscurity, Flatnesse of Conceit, Argutenesse, and *Minutia*, Gawdinesse, Wordinesse, and Empty Ostentation. In Morals, the Vices may be comprised under these two Generals, *Multiloquium* and *Turpiloquium*, Garrulous and Rotten Communication. Lastly, in Civill Respects, Levity and Impertinency, like the advices of *Thersites*, *Αλοσυρτι τον Λαον* Many and to little purpose.

But

Μηδὲν ἀγὼ
ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁπασίν ἐστι
καὶ τὸ
Sophocl. Ajax.

Perulantia ver-
borum coercent
de vallum esse
oppositum den-
tium, &c.
A Gel. l. 1. c. 15.

Vil. Plat. de
Garrul. & The-
ophrast. Clem.
Alex. Pedag.
l. 2. c. 7.
Stack. Comiv.
l. 2. c. 17. & 19
C. l. Rhod. g.
l. 7. c. 26.

De Tupiloquio.
Clem. Alex.
Pædag. l. 2. c. 9.
Ejus species
quam plurima
extra Institutum
nostrum,
Ut blasphemie
perjurie, male
dicta, scommata
Dieterie; Ob-
scenitates, &c.

But besides all these, there is one thing which seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech. and that is a *Lye*. For as every thing is then most Regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution : So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluab; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be expresse and lively, we still call it a true Picture : whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) we still accompt it False and Corrupt : So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weaknesse and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Concepts of the mind, and make levell and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution : But be all other Excellencies never so great ; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its originall Office : and indeed, other Morall Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I spake of, without which they are but Hipocrisie, and come within the compasse of the noted Corruption, a Lie: for every Hipocrite is a

Lyer,

Lyer. I confesse there are Sins of Speech greater then a *Lye*, in the intention and degrees of their owne guilt: But herein is the difference, the tongue may in it (whether Morally religiously considered) beare a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)

First, it may be Vnconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vitious and unsavory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurreth, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion between Evill Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the thoughts.

And then secondly it may be disproportioned to the Conceits of the Mind in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly meant, and this is properly a *Lye*. Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of heinousnesse and Guilt, then in any other Speeches; (because all Guilt followes the Inconformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Sedition, may have a greater measure of wickednesse) but because in a *Lye* I finde both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceits of the Mind; but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Nature.

The next kind of Active Operations were those of *Wit*. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the Wrestings and

Abuse of it is the more dangerous. I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common Acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Concept, whether in Stile or Conference, which like rotten wood in the dark, have more Shine then Substance; whose use and Ornament are like themselves, Swift and Vanishing; at once both Admired and Forgotten: but I understand a settled, constant, and habituall sufficiency of the Understanding, whereby it is inabled in any kind of Learning, Theory, or Practise, both to sharpness in Search, subtilty in Expression, & dispatch in Execution. As for that other kind seen in Pannegyricks, Declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the brain, they are feats onely and sleights, not Duties and Ministeries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentation then use, and are only the Remission of the Mind and Unbending of the thoughts from more severe Knowledge: as walking for Recreation is rather Exercise than Travel, although by the violence of the motion, or length of the way, there may ensue Sweat and Wearinesse.

Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be diverse; yet none so immediate and certaine as it selfe, if alone: For Wit, though it be Swift, yet is often Blinde. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been eminent in this Faculty, if they swayed

swayed it by Moderation and Prudence: So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of Truth, then men best furnished with Acutenesse, when they turned the use of it to the strengthening of their owne Fancies, and not submitted it to Judgement and Examination. As the fattest Soiles in Greece caused the greatest troubles; and the Beauty of *Helena*, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy against the poison of the Mind; but being it selfe poysoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to bee for the right disposing of our Inventions, a mutuall reference and service between Wit and Judgement. It is a vexation of Minde, to discerne what is right and profitable, and have no inablement to attaine it: and that is Judgement without Wit. And to have a facility of compassing an End, and a working and restless fancy without direction to fasten it on a fit Object, is the onely course to multiply Errour, and to be still in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continuall toyle, without any proficience or gaine of Way; and this is Wit without Judgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutual Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to stirre up and quicken the Understanding: and Judgement is the Bridle to sway and moderate Wit: Wit is the Hand and Foot for Execution and Motion; but Judgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Lastly, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to furhter the progresse in any Inquiry; but Judgement is the Ballace to

Poife, and the Steere to guide the courſe to its intended End.

Now the manner of the Judgements Operation in directing either our Practiſe or Contemplation is by a diſcourſe of the Mind, whereby it reduceth them to certaine Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to bee conformable. And from hence is that Reason which *Quintilian* obſerves, why ſhallow and floating Wits ſeem often times more fluent then men of greater ſufficiencies: For, ſaith he, thoſe other admit of every ſudden ſlaſh or Conceit, without any Examination; but *apud Sapientes eſt Electio & Modus*: They firſt weigh things before they utter them.

The maine Corruption of Judgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepoſſeſſion. The Duty of Judgement is to diſcerne between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore tis true in this, as in the courſe of publick Judgements; That reſpect of perſons, or things, blind the eyes, and maketh the Underſtanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth: Though indeed ſome Paſſions there are, which rather hood-wink then diſtemper or hurt the Judgement; ſo that the falſe determination thereof cannot bee well called a Miſtake, but a Lye: Of which kind flatterie is the principal, when the Affections of Hope and Fear debase a man, and cauſe him to diſſemble his owne opinion.

CHAP. XL.

Of the Actions of the Vnderstanding upon the Will, with respect to the End and Means. The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Objects of the Will to be good and convenient. Corrupt Will looks onely at Good present. Two acts of the Vnderstanding, Knowledge & Consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happinesse Immortall. Ignorance and Weaknesse in the Vnderstanding, in proposing the right means to the last end.



Therto of the Actions of the *Vnderstanding*, *ad extra*, in regard of an *Object*. Those *Ad intra* in regard of the *Will*, Wherein the *Vnderstanding* is a Minister or Counsellor to it, are either to furnish it with an End, whereon to fasten its desires: or to direct it in the meanes conducible to that end. For the *Will* alone is a blind Faculty; and therefore as it cannot see the right Good it ought to affect without the Assistance of an *Informing* Power. So neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the di-

rectio of a *Conducting* power. As it hath not Judgment to discover an *End* : so neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right *Means*, whereby that may be attained: So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Understanding, whereby they are proportioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the Understanding is usually by the Schoole-men called *Imperium*, or *Mandatum*, a Mandate or Command; because it is a *Precept*, to which the Will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well, are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Understanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will, though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, is only a Regulating and Directing, it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will always is *Domina suorum actuum*: The Mistress of her own Operation: For *Intellectus non imperat, sed solum modo significat voluntatem imperantis*. It doth onely intimate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God, some seeds whereof remain in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of *Mandate*; but therefore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior Power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Understanding,

ding, but to sin against our Law-giver. As in Civil Policy, the offences of men are not against inferior Officers; but against the soveraign Power, which is the Fountaine of Law, and under whose Authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of government. Besides, *Ejus est imperare, Cujus est punire*: For Law and Punishment being Relatives, & mutually cannotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power onely can be an imposition of law from which may be an Infliction of Punishment.

Now the Condition under which the Understanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the VVill, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them *Goodnesse, Possibility*; and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) *immortality* too. Every true Object of any power, is that which beareth such a perfect Relation of convenience & fitnesse thereunto, that it is able to accomplish all its desires. Now since *Malum* is *Destructivum*, all Evill is Destructive; It is impossible that by it selfe, without a counterfeite and adulterate face, it should ever have any Attractive Power over the Desires of the VVill. And on the other side, since *Omne bonum*, is *Perfectivum*; since Good is perfective, and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the VVill, were it not that our Understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions, and the VVill it selfe corrupted in its owne Inclinations.

But

But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any Divine and Perfect Good; yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable & destructive to his Nature; since all Naturall Agents aime still at their owne Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or Evil pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Understanding doth alwaies propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their own Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Understanding it self, knowne to be evil; And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its owne Knowledge, as Evil; We may distinguish two opposite conditions in *Good* and *Evil*. For first, all evil of Sin, though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is *Destructive*; yet on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and *corrupt*. As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drinke for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death; but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, onely that hee may thereby

therby come to Destruction (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but onely to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise *Goodnes*, though it have the most absolute *Convenience* to man, as it is *Perfective* and in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet it hath as great a *disconvenience* toward mans corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to square them by, and in respect of its *Rectitude*. As light, though it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to distempered Eyes it works more trouble then delight, because as in Philosophy, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*; so, *Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetentis*. So that if the Appetite it self be by inherent pollution depraved and evill, it cannot but desire every thing that bears proportion & conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the maine reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, often times fasten Delight on those objects which they know to be Evill, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent unto as Good.

To which I may adde another, namely, the Resolution of a Corrupt Will to yeeld unto it selfe all *Present Satisfaction*, and not to suffer it selfe to be swayed with the Preoccupation of a *Future Estate*: Insomuch that the small content which mans Nature receiveth from the Actual fruition of some instant-conceited Good, prevayles more to draw on Appetite, then the fearful Expectation of ensuing Misery, can to deterre from it. And the present irksomnesse of pious Duties, have

Q q q

more

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδὴ
κατὰ τὴν φύσιν
τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ πόθος
τοῦ κακοῦ.
Arist. Ethic.
1.3. 6.7.

more power to divert the corrupt Minde from them ; then the Fore-conceit of Eternall blisse can have to allure the minde unto a Delight in them. Hence then it appeares, what I understand by that first condition, wherewith Reason is to propose any End or Meanes to the Will, that it may be desired ; namely, *Sub Ratione Boni*, under the Condition of Good, not alwayes true and Morall; but sometimes as it is so apprehended by a depraved Understanding, *Sub conceptu Convenientia*, as it bears Conformity to the present crooked Estate of mans Will: a *Depraved Understanding* I say, and not alwayes properly and precisely a *Darkned Understanding* ; *Depraved* by Neglect and *Inconsiderablenesse* ; not darkned by Ignorance and *Blindnesse*. For there may bee an Irregular Will with a Judgement rightly informed by Truth. Otherwise there could not be any offence of Presumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to consider that there is in a well-stayed Reason, a double Act in the directing of the Will. The one respecteth the Nature and Quality of the Object : the other more peculiarly the Circumstance of Time : the one is properly Knowledge ; the other *Circumspection*, arising out of Meditation, and more close pressing of the Object, which is knowne as Good to the Will, against Insinuations of Sensitive Desires, which aime onely at the Fruition of pleasure present. First, the Understanding proposeth to the Will *Felicity*, as an Absolute and eternall Good, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposeth means for the attaining

of

of it; namely, the practise of these Precepts, which are revealed unto us as necessary for purchasing the End desired. The *Will* being, besides its own Corruption, transported by the Sensitive Appetite, finds great Irksomnesse in those *means*. A restraint of all those present joyes, delights, satisfactions, which it instantly pursues: it perceiveth that great trouble is to bee expected, many prejudices and difficulties to be grappled with; a severe hand to be held over Passions; a narrow Restraint to be observed towards Mutinous and Rebellious Eruptions of the Minde, fewer inablenents for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment; which withdraw the *VVil*, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second Act of the Understanding, *Efficacy* and weight of *Consideration*, whereby it compares the Circumstances of that Difficulty of Good to the *VVill* in regard of the small time, they shall continue; with the consequent and unspeakable Good, that will in the end ensue there-from, and also with the unsufferable torments that follow the vilenesse of present pleasures. *VV*hence the *Wil* is made more inclinable (by the assistance of greater power then its owne) to go along rather through Thorns with Vertue, then with adulterate and painted pleasures to daunce towards ruine.

Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a *Blinded* Understanding; but the Defect of the Latter; namely, an Insufficiency

and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumstances, and pressing the endlesse Consequence of Good or Evil, workes properly a *Depraved* Understanding, in regard of Practicall or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in some deep Contemplation by a Ditch; though his Eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may haply fall into it; not out of *Blindnesse*, but out of *Inconsideratenesse*, as not fixing his conceit thereon; but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Understanding being taken up by the Imposture of the Affections, with the conceit of *present Good*, or *present Ill* in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a serious Inquiry, after the true Rectitude and Obliquity thereof, suffers the Will fearefully to plunge it self in danger and misery.

Another Condition, under which an *End* or *Meanes* are to be proposed by the Wil, is *Subra-
tione Possibilis*, as a good *Possible*. For if once the Understanding discover Impossibility in any Object, the Will cannot fasten any desire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can replenish and satiate the power. Now all Satisfaction is by Fruition; all Fruition necessarily presupposeth a possibility of acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left Hopelesse, and therefore Desirelesse; and therefore we see that the nearer any thing comes to Impossibility, the more averse is the Will of most men from it: as is plaine in these things that are perplexed and difficult to attaine. And if
here

here the wish of him in the Poet be objected :

O mihi praeſentis referas ſi Iupiter annos.

O that *love* would me reſtore,
The yeares that I have liv'd before.

It may be answered that this was a Wiſh only, and not a VVill. Since that which a man willet, he doth really endeavour to obtaine.

The laſt Condition (which is reſtrained onely to the utmoſt end of mans deſire) is that it be propoſed, *Sub ratione Immortalis*, as an *Immortal Good*. The endleſſeſſe of Happineſſe is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the mind of man naturally is carryed to an *Immortality of Being*; and therefore alſo conſequentially to an *Immortality of Happineſſe*; it being a neceſſary Deſire of all Naturall Agents, to attaine a perfection proportionate to the meaſure of their Continuance. So then mans End muſt not be onely *Good*, but *for ever good*, *Totally* and *Eternally*. not onely a Fulneſſe of *Joy* in the nature of it; but a Fulneſſe of *Perpetuity* in the Continuance. Moſt perfect in proportion in the *Spirituality*; moſt infinite in proportion to the *Immortality* of mans Soule. The Frailty and Languiſhing of any Good; and a Fore-ſight of the loſſe thereof, with the ableſt Minds doth much weaken the Deſire of it. And the reaſon is, becauſe Providence and Forecaſt is a certaine companion of the humane Nature; and he which is moſt a man, is moſt carefull to con-

Ethic. I. 1.

trive the advancement of his *Future Estate*. It is beaftiall to faften onely upon *Present Good*; this being a maine difference between the Understanding and the Senfuall Appetite, that this respecteth onely the present Joy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its owne immortality, fastens it selfe upon the remotest times; yea out-runs all time, and suffers it selfe to bee ever swallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an endlesse Happinesse. And therefore the reason that *Aristotle* brings against his Master's *Idea*, argues an Understanding lesse Divine in this particular then *Plato's* was, when he saith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, then Continuance doth the Nature of VVhite. For though it be true, that it is not any Essentiall part of Goodnesse in it selfe; yet it is a necessarie and principall condition to make Goodnesse *Happinesse*; that is an Adequat Object to mans desires; there is not then the same proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and VVhite. For Continuance is altogether Extrinsicall and Irrelative in respect of VVhite; but the Happinesse of man hath an Intrinsicall Connection with Immortality, because mans Utmost and Adequate Good must be proportioned to the Nature of his Mind: (for that is no perfect Good that doth not every way replenish and leave nothing behinde it that may be desired) So that man himselfe being Endlesse, can have none End able to limit his desires, but an Infinite and Immortall Good; which he may

may enjoy without any anxiety for After-Provision. I dare say there is not an Atheist in the world who hath in his life be-beasted himself by setting his desires onely on Transitory and Perishable goods, that would not on his death-bed count it the best bargaine hee ever made, to change soules with one of those whose diligence in providing for a future happinesse, he hath often in his beastly Sensuality impiously derided.

Now of these two directions of the Understanding to the will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more grosse and palpable in Assistance to the *Meanes*, then in the Discoverie of the *End*, and farre oftner failes the VWill herein then in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same Supreme and Immortall Happinesse, the Beatificall Vision; Every *Balaam* fastens on that; and yet their means unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any agreement in an End, where is such notable Discord in the wayes to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is the severall proportion, which the true End and the true Means there unto beare unto the Will of man. For it is observeable, that there is but one generall Hindrance or Error about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the VWill (being a most perfect
fulfilling

*Ignorantia &
Difficultas.
Ang.*

fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion between man and the right meanes of a true End is far Greater. For there is not only Errour in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other practick Faculties, proceeding from their generall Corruption in this Estate, and nayling the affection on the present Delight of Sensuall Objects. First, for the Understanding, I observe therein a double Hinderance concerning these *Meanes*: *Ignorance* and *Weaknesse*; the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or Inforcement upon the *Wil*. For the former of these, there seemes to bee an equall difficulty between the End and the Meanes, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is far more preventable (considering the Helpes we have to know it) then of the Means. Not but that there are as powerfull Directions for the Knowledge of the *Means*, as of the *End*; but because they are in their *Number* many, and in their *Nature* repugnant to mans corrupt Minds. There is therefore more Wearines, and by consequence, more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them, then after the *End*, because that is in it selfe but *One*; and besides, beares with it (under the generall Notion of *Happinesse*) such an absolute Conformity to mans Nature, as admits of no refusall or Opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way thither.

Now

Now besides this *Ignorance*, when the knowledge of the *means* is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exercise of them. For (as *Aristotle* observes) amongst all the Conditions required to Morall Practise, *Knowledge* hath the least sway. It hath the lowest place in Vertue, though the highest in Learning.

There is secondly in the Understanding *Weaknesse*, whereby it oftentimes connives at the Irregular Motion of the Will, & withdrawes it from Examining with a piercing and fixed Eye; with an Impartiall and Bribelesse Judgement, with Efficacy and weight of Meditation, the severall Passages of all our Actions, with all the present and consequent Inconveniences of crooked courses. It were a vast labour to runne over all the Oppositions, which vertuous means, leading to an Happy End, doe alwayes finde in the severall Faculties of man: how the Will it selfe is stubborn and froward; the Passions Rebellious, and Impatient of Suppression; the Sences and Sensitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping alwayes like those under-Cœlestiall Orbes into another motion, quite contrary to that which the *Primum Mobile*, Illightened Reason, should conferre upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Disproportion between the means of Happiness, and the generall Nature of Corrupt man. For all Goodnesse is necessarily adjoynd with Rectitude and Streightnesse (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a *Good* man is

called an *Upright* man; one that is every where Even and Strait. To which *Aristotle* perhaps had one Eye, when he called his Happy man, a *Four-square* man, which is every where smooth, stable, and like himselfe. But now on the other side, mans Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a Distorted and Crooked Nature; and therefore altogether unconformable to the Goodnesse which should as a Cannon, direct it to the true and principall End it aymeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are Impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling Movers necessarily require more Liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as we see in naturall Bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow bounds, as that which is Strait.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the Conscience ; its Offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, Watchfullnesse, Memory, Impartiality. Of Consciences Ignorant, Superstitious, Licentious, Sleeping, Frightfull, Tempestuous.



Here remains yet one higher and diviner Act of the Practicall Understanding, of most absolute power in man, and that is *Conscience*. Which is not any distinct Faculty of the Soule, but onely a Compounded Act of Reason, consisting in Argumentation : or a *practique Syllogisme*, inferring always some Applicative and Personall Conclusion, Accusing or Excusing.

The Dignities whereof are to be gathered from the Offices of it, and from the Properties of it.

The maine Offices are three ; *Direction, Conviction, Consolation*, whereof the two last alwayes presuppose the first with a contrary Qualification of Breach and Observance.

The *Direction* of Conscience consists in a Simple Discourse : or (as I may so speake) in a *Direct Ray* of Understanding, gathering morall or divine Conclusions from a presupposed habit

of Principles, either from the reliques of our Originall Knowledge naturally imprest, or by concurrence of Religion and Theologicall Precepts spiritually inspired into the Practique Judgement or hearts of men. The observance of which Conclusions it imposeth upon all those Executive Powers, which each particular Conclusion doth most immediately concerne upon paine of hazarding our owne Inward Peace, with that sweet repose and security of Mind which followes it; and also (as the Heathens themselves have observed) upon feare of incurring the displeasure of that God, concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his Penetrating and Searching Eye is able to read our most retyred Thoughts: so his impartiall and unpreventable Iustice hath thunder and fire in store for the Rebellions against this Facultie, which he hath made to be, as it were, his Officer and Herauld in all mens hearts.

The two latter of those Offices consist in a *Reflection* of that former discourse upon mens Actions, and according as is discovered in them, either an observance or neglect of those imposed Duties: the heate of that Reflection is either Comfortable or Scorching. Now of these two; that of Conviction is nothing else but a Performance of that Equivocall killing promise made by the Serpent to our seduced Parents; I meane an Opening of their Eyes, to know with desperate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregone; and with feare, shame and horreur, the
Evill

Evill which they plunged themselves and their whole posterity into. This one Act it is which hath so often confuted that Opinion of *Aristotle* touching Death, that it is of all things most Terrible; in that it hath pursued many so farre, as that it hath forced them to leape out of themselves and to preferre the Terroure of Death and Darknesse of the Grave, before the grisly Face of a convicting Conscience.

The chiefe Dignity hereof consisteth in *Consolation*, whereby it diffuseth into the whole man, from a secret assurance of divine favour (for nothing can thoroughly calme the Conscience, but that) a sweet Tranquillity, silent Peace, settled Stayednesse, and which is highest of all, a ravishing Contemplation, and (as it were) Pre-fruition of Blisse and Immortality.

The properties of the Conscience (whereby I understand the Ministeries, which it never fayles to execute in man) are as I conceive, principally three; *Watchfullnesse*, *Memory*, *Impartiality*. It keeps all always Centinel in a mans Soule: and like a Register, records all our good and ill actions. Though the Darknesse of the Night may hide us from others, and the Darknesse of the Mind seem to hide us from our selves; yet still hath Conscience an Eye to looke in secret on whatsoever we doe, whether in regard of Ignorance or Hardnesse. Though in many men it sleep in regard of Motion; yet it never sleeps in regard of Observation and Notice: it may be Hard and Seared, it can never be Blind. That writing in it which seems

Invisible and Illegible, like letters written with the juice of Lemmon, when it is brought to the fire of Gods judgement, will be most cleare. And for the next (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastened in the Memory, as that which Conscience writes: all her Censures are written with Indeleable Characters, never to be blotted out. All or most of our Knowledge forsakes us in our Deaths; Wit, Acutenesse, variety of Language, habits of Sciences; our Arts, Policies, Inventions, all have their period and fate: onely those things which Conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate & raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest; whether they be impressions of Peace or Horrour. The Testimonies of Comfort (if true) are fastened in the Heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to be taken out: and if they be Accusatory and Condemning, the Heart is so Hard, and they so Deep, that there is no way to get them out, but by breaking or melting the Table they are written in; that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget.

Then thirdly, it is a most Bribelesse Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our wayes. It is (if I may so speake) Gods Historian, that writes not Annals, but Iournals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Houres and Moments: never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares speake

Speake truth as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. Nero the Emperour shall feele as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poor Christians in to light him to his Lust. There is scarce one part in man, but may be seduced, save his Conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will, and themselves both may be drawn by perswasion contrary to their own propensions; this onely deales faithfully with him, whose witnesse it is, though it be to the confusion of it selfe and him, in whom it lodgeth. It may I know erre sometimes and mistake; but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its owne Iudgement, and register White for Blacke.

The Corruption of Conscience arises principally from two Extremes; the one occasioned by *Ignorance*; the other by *Sinne* (for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner) The one is when the want of due Knowledge draws the Conscience, to sinister determinations, either in Practice or forbearance. The other when evill Habits and Actions defile the Conscience. Now both these containe under them sundry Degrees of Corruption.

From Ignorance, first comes a Fettered and Restrained Conscience, fearfully binding it selfe to some particular Acts, without sufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience, giving Freedome to its selfe in such courses,

course, as wherunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it selfe from either.

Then from the other Root there comes: First, a *Dead*, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by Common and Customary Sinnes. A *Pale*, Sweating, and Affrighted Conscience by Atheisticall and Unnaturall Sinnes

———— *Tum frigida mens est*


Criminibus; tacitâ sudant præcordia culpa.

The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs,
Cold-sweating Horrour on their bosome brings.

A *Desperate*, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from Blasphemous and Open Sinnes. Not but that any of these may come from any Sinne; but that the Quality of some Sinnes doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kindes of a distempered Conscience; but because all these, as also this whole discourse pertaines to a higher Science, I shall here forbear to speake more of it.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Meanes to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Perswasive. Of Fate, Astrologie. Satanicall Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wils Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.



Proceed to the last Faculty of mans Soul, his Will. Which doth alone governe, moderate, and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; *Appetite, Liberty, Domination*. The former respecteth an *End*; the two Latter, the *Means* thereunto conducing. The *Desires* are fixed on some *Good* throughly proportionate to the widenessse of the Heart: then the *Liberty* of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Judgement, makes choise of such Means, as are most proper for attaining of that *Good*: and lastly, the *Dominion* imployes all inferiour Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.

*Arist. Ethic.
l. i. c. i.
Lib. 8. cap. 5.*

Ethic. I. i. c. 2.

Sundry Ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditionall occasions : but the true *Ultimate*, utmost, and *Absolute* Good is *God*. All other Ends are *Ministring* and *Subordinate* ; he only is *κυριώτατον* & *ἀσχετητόνικον*, as *Aristotle* calls his Felicity, the *Supream* & overruling End ; the Fountaine of all other Goods : from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that scantling of satisfaction & proportion, which they beare unto mans Will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him *Bonum* & *Bonum Superessentiale* the only Self-Sustaining, and Self-Depending Good, that is onely able thoroughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.

The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two Extremes of Excesse and Defect. The Extremes of Excesse are *Superstition* and *Idolatry* ; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of Originall Blindnesse, with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired : but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of Darknesse and unavoydable Doubting and Uncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the *Necessity* of a Duty ; but not to cleere the *Means* of Execution, Light enough to enjoy a walking ; but the way being a narrow way,

way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreeme of Defect, is either *Atheisme*, in not acknowledging, or *Ignorance* in not seeing, that God whom we ought to serve and desire. Both which (if *Affected* and Voluntary, as usually they are) proceed either from Guilt, or a *Conscience* of fearefull Crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted Spirits in the perswasion that no Iudge sees them; or else from a Sensuality and a *Desire* and purpose to give *Indulgence* to themselves in their evill courtes; thinking like that foolish Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no snare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but seiled up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their owne darknesse: Though herein both the Atheists discovers Divinity, and the Ignorant person Knowledge enough to convince their owne Consciences, and condemne themselves.

The Dignity of mans Will in regard of *Liberty*, consisteth in the Freedome which it hath to chuse or reject Means ordained for the Compasing some proposed End, according as the Understanding shall finde them more or lesse Conducibile for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a chusing of the Meanes: For Election (as *Aristotle* determines) is never of the End. Wee doe not *chuse*, but *necessarily Desire* to be Happy. The matter of our Happinesse being proposed without appearance of present inconveniencie: because every thing is naturally prone to its owne Perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities

ΕΑΔΘερα εἶς.
διαυλοτρ-
γία.
Zero spu l a-
ers. l. a. l. n. l.
Strict Sapien-
tes, Reiesap-
pellant.
16. d.
Ethic. l. 3 c. 1.

to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as wee say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sinne: So wee may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of inconvenience) have perfect Liberty: Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and unnaturalnesse. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite Depraved, being now in Corruption; without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, throughly disinabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and inthrall'd to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, onely in Naturall, Morall and in Civill Actions; Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeleble Foot-prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its owne and others Temporall Good.

The *Dominion* and Supreme Command of the Will is onely over those Powers to the Production of whose Operations, it doth by its immediate Authority concur as an *Absolute Efficient*, or at least, as a *Moving Agent*. It teacheth not therefore so farre as to the command of the *Vegetative Power*: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the vegetative

vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither teacheth it to an Vniversall Command of the *Senses*; but onely by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Sovereigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing, not immediately, but by the *Locomotive Power*, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the *Sensitive Appetite*, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy, Irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will, and the Law of the Members carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Sovereigne over those Apprehensions of the *Understanding*, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it not to discourse about such Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the Evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perswasive, The one is Absolute, working on meere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditionall, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an *Oeconomical* Government in respect of the body, and the Moving Organs thereof, as over *Servants*: and it hath a *Politique* or Civill Government

towards the *Understanding*, *Affection*, and *Sensitive Appetite*, as *Subjects*, with which by reason of their often *Rebellions*, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as *Princes* from their *seditions* and *Rebellious Subjects*. So that the *Corruption* of this *Power* in the *Will*, is either *Tyranny* in it selfe, or *Usurpation* in another; An abuse of it, and a *Restraint* of it. The *Abuse*, when the *Will* absolutely *gainfayes* the *Counsels*, *Lawes*, and *Directions* of the *Understanding*, which is wrought by the *Allection*, *Inticing*, & *Insinuation* of the *Sensitive Appetite*, secretly winning over the *Will* to the *Approbation* of those courses, which are most *delightfull* to *sense*: for since the *Fall*, the *sweet Harmony* and *Subordination* of *Sense* to *Reason*, and of *Reason* to *God* is broken; and the highest *Faculties* of the *Soule* become themselves *Sensuall* and *Carnall*. And the *Restraint* when the *Will* is desirous to obey the *Dictates* of *Reason*, or of *Grace*; and *Lust* by her *tyranny* over-bears the *Soule* and leads it *Captive* to the *Law* of *Sinne*, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a *Bird* whose wings are be-smeared and intangled with some *viscous slime*, though he offer to *flie*, yet falleth downe againe.

Now touching the *Corruption* of the *Will* in regard of *Desire*, *Liberty* and *Dominion*: there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to *Naturall* and *Divine Causes*, and so make the *Will* to be corrupted only, *ab Extrinseco*, and that *Necessarily*. The *Stoicks*, they framed a *supreme swaying*

swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion & flux of causes, which they call Fate. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing but the Vniforme and Unchangable working of those beautifull Bodies, the Heavenly Orbes and their Influencies upon inferiours, annexed unto them a Binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practises of men. Inquire the reason why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breaks out into Exorbitant courses?

*Anne aliud, quàm ———
Sydus, & occulti mirandapotentia Fati?*

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,
And wondrous power of secret Destiny.

It is not to be denied, but that the Heavens having strong and powerfull Operations on all Sublunary Corporall Substances may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kind of Influence (if it may bee so called, upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding, the Actions of mans Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, &c. Wee doe not onely impiously take away the *Guilt* of Sinne; in that we make all mens
Lapses

*Laert in Zen.
Plut. de placit.
Philos. l. 1.
c. 27, 28.
Sen. Ep. 96.
A Gel. l. 6. c. 2.*

*Vid. Enseb. Cæsariens. de præparat. Evang. lib. 6. & Max. Tyrium dissert. 3.
Plut. advers. Stoicas.
Tertul. Apol. c. 1. & ibi. notas Herald.
Aug. de Civ. Dei l. 5. c. 1, 7, 8*

Lapses to be wrought without free Principle in himselfe (and so derogate from the Justice of God, in punishing that, whereunto we were by other of his Creatures unavoydable determined) not onely rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those vertuous dispositions of the mind (which are his immediate Breathing into man) unto the happy Aspect of the Heavens) but withall we deny to the Soule both Naturall Motion and Spirituality. *Naturall Motion* first; since that alwaies flowes from an *Inward Principle*, that is Essentiall to the Mover (which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impressiō made by some Extrinsicall Worker. And then *Spirituality* likewise; since the Heavens, being Corporall Agents, can therefore extend the Dominion of their Influence no farther then over Bodily Substances.

Others there have been yet more Impious, which seeke to fasten all the Corruptions of their Wils on something above the Heavens, even the Eternall Foreknowledge and the Providence of God: As if my Foreknowledge, that on the morrow the Sunne will rise; or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the Cause-working Necessity of the next Day, or the last Judgement. It is true indeed, Gods *prescience* imployes a Necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknows: but this is *Necessitas* onely *Infalibilitatis*, in regard of his Undeceivable Knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly cometo passe by the free

Εξήμιον ἀρ-
σασὶ καὶ
ἐμμεναι οἱ δὲ
καὶ τοὶ σοῦ-
σιν ἀτασθα-
λίαν. ὅτι μί-
νον ἀλγὶ ἔ-
χουσιν.
Homer. Odyss. a.

free or naturall workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not *Neceſſitas Coactionis*, or *Determinationis*, whereby the Will of man is without any other diſpoſition or propenſion in it ſelfe, inforced or unſpontaneouſly determined to the producing of ſuch Effects. The Actions of our Will are not therefore neceſſarily executed, becauſe they were foreknowne; but therefore they were foreknowne, becauſe our will would certainly execute them, though not without Freedom and Election. And for Providence, notwithstanding there be *Providentia Permiſſiva*, whereby God hath determined to ſuffer and permit men to ſinne; and moreover a *Diſpoſing Providence* in Ordering all things in the World unto his owne Glorious Ends, yet we may not preſume to think that God doth determine, or actuate, impell, and overrule the wills of men to Evil. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all reſpects doth will, ſhall not be done with the ſecret Will of his good pleaſure (for who can withſtand his Will) and that his purpoſes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature: but yet he doth not ſo worke his Will out of mens, as thereby to conſtraine and take away theirs (for indeed the constraint of a liberall and free Faculty, is (as it were) the extinction thereof) This were an Argument of Weakneſſe, as if hee were not able to bring his owne Ends about, but by chaining and fettering his Oppugners from exerciſing the Freedom which he firſt gave them; nor doe his own Will, but by taking away his owne Gifts. But

T t t

herein

Aug. de Civ.
Dei. l. 11. c. 17.
l. 8. l. 14. c. 26.
lib. de Contin.
c. 6. de Corrept.
& Gat. c. 10.
Epiſt. 120.
Cap. 2. de Gen.
Contr. Manich.
l. 2. c. 28.
De Gen. ad lit.
l. 11. c. 4.
de Trin. l. 3. c. 4.
Oſoginta
triumque. q. 21.

vid. Euseb. de
preparat.
Evangel. l. 6. c. 6.

Cyrril. Alex.
contra. Jul. 1. 4.

Hinc etiam
quod faciunt
contra voluntatem
Dei, non
impletur, nisi
voluntas Dei.
Aug. de præd.
Sant. l. 1. c. 18.

Rom. 7. 17.

Matth 4. 3.

herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence, and the great Wisedome of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his owne heart, and that even Rebellionously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, hee is able to raise his owne Glory (the End whether we will or no, of all our Actions) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerfull to fulfill it. For as sundry times Gods *Revealed Will* is broken, even by those whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keepe it: so alwayes his *Secret Will* is performed, Even by the free and Selfe-mooving Operations of those who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any Supream Destination Extrinsicallly moving, or Necessarily binding any Inferiours to particular Actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casual Causes (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the Intrinsicall Operation of all Inferiour Agents (which wee call Nature) produce one maine and Supream End, without straying or violating the proper Motions of any.

Lastly, many men are apt in this case to father their sinnes upon the motions of Satan, as it hee brought the necessity of sinning upon them; and as Saint Paul said in Faith, *Not I, but sinne in me*: So they in Hypocrysie, *Not I, but evill motions cast into me*; and because the Divell is in a speciall manner called the Tempter, such men therefore thinke to perswade themselves, that their Evill cometh not

not from any Willingnesse in themselves, but from the violence of the Enemies Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the Devill hath a strong Operation on the Wils of Corrupt men,

1 First, because of the *Subtilty* of his *Substance* whereby he can wind himselfe and his suggestions most inwardly on the Affections and Vnderstanding.

2 Secondly, because of the *Height* of his *Naturall Vnderstanding* and policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himselfe into an *Angel of light*, and so to method and contrive his devices, that they shall not misse of the best advantage to make them speed.

3 Thirdly, because of the vastnesse of his *Experience*, whereby he is the better enabled to use such plots as have formerly had the best successe.

4 Fourthly, because of his manner of Working, grounded on all these, which is *Violent* and *Furious* for the strength; and therefore he is called a *Strong Man*, a *Roaring Lyon*, a *Red Dragon*; & *Deep* for the subtilty of it; and therefore his working is called a *Mystery of Iniquity*, and *Deceivablenesse of Iniquity*. Which is seen: First in his *Accommodating* himselfe to our particular Humours and *Masures*, and so following the tyde of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Temptations according to our *Vocations* and Personall Imploiments, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing, or any other the like qualifying of his Suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other Circumstances. But yet wee doe not

Luke 11. 21.
1 Pet. 5. 8.
Rev. 12. 3.
2 Thes. 2. 7.
Heb. 3. 13.
Rom. 7. 11.

Eph 6.11.
 Ephes. 7. 2.
 2 Tim. 2. 26.
 Ephes. 6. 11.
 2 Cor. 2. 11.
 2 Tim. 2. 26.

James 1. 14.

Vitiij Author
 Diaboli decipi-
 entis Callidi-
 tas & Homi-
 nis Consuetu-
 tis voluntas.
 Aug. de peccat.
 Orig. l. 2. c. 37.

Lib. de Serâ
 nomine vin-
 dictâ.

find in any of these any violation of mans Will, nor restraint of his Obedience; but rather the arts that are used to the inveigling of it. The working then of Evill *Angels*, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men; and in respect of Evill men, they are but as those of a *Prince* over his Subjects; or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives; which may well stand with the Freedom of mans Will. And therefore his temptations are in some place called the *Methods*; in others, the *Devices*; in others the *Snares* of Satan: All words of Circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own Wils: Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Tempter belonging to him; yet wee are told in another place, that * *Every man is tempted, when he is drawne away of his own Concupiscence, and inticed.* So that the Devil hath never an effectuall Temptation (such an one as carryes and overcomes the Will) but it is alwaies joyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne, proceeding from the deceitfulness of our our own lusts. So that in this case every man may say to himselfe, as *Apolodorus* in *Plutarch* dreamed of himselfe, when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe.

Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty which I will but name. As first for the *manner* of its Operations. In some cases it worketh *Naturally* and *Neccessarily*, as in its Inclination unto *Good* in the whole latitude, and gene-
 rall

rall apprehension thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the generall and formall notion of Evill. In others *Voluntarily* from it selfe, and with a distinct view and *knowledge* of an End whereunto it worketh. In others *freely*, with a *Liberty* to one thing or another, with a power to elicit, or to suspend and suppress its owne Operation. In all *Spontaneously*, without violence or compulsion: For though in some respects the Will be not free from *Necessity*, yet it is in all free from *Coaction*. And therefore though *Ignorance* & *Feare* may take away the complete *Voluntariness* of an Action proceeding from the Will (because without such Feare or Ignorance it would not have been done; As when a man casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a shipwracke; And when *Oedipus* slew *Laius* his Father, not knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the Will to doe that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of *Good* thereunto.

Secondly for the *Motives* of the Will. They are first *Naturall* and *Internall*. Amongst which, the *Vnderstanding* is the principall, which doth passe Judgement upon the *Goodnesse* & Convenience of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater or lesser excellency thereof, represent it to the Will, with either a *Mandatory*, or a *Monitory*, or a *permissive* Sentence. The Will likewise doth move it self. For by an *Antecedent* willing of the End, she setteth her self on work to will the *Means* requisite unto the obtaining of that End.

And the *Sensitive Appetite* both *Indirectly* move

it too. By suppressing or bewitching and inticing the Iudgment to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensuall things. And then, as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glasse: so such as a mans owne Affection is, such will the End seeme unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.

Next *Supernaturally* God moveth the *Wills* of men. Not only in regard of the *Matter* of the Motion: For *in him we live, & move, & have our being*; but in regard of the *Rectitude* and Goodnesse of it in Actions Supernaturall, both by the *Manifestation* of Heavenly Light, *They shall be all taught of God*; and by the *Infusion* and Impression of Spirituall *Grace*, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to Will and to Doe of his owne pleasure.

Lastly, for the *Acts* of the *Will*, They are such as respect either the *End* or the *Means* for attaining of it. The *Acts* respecting the *End* are these three. 1. A *Loving* and Desiring of it in regard of its beauty and goodnesse. 2. A serious *Intention* and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its *distance* from us. 3. A *Fruition* or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two things. In *Affecution* or possession, whereby we are Actually joyned unto it; and in *Delectation* or Rest, whereby we take special pleasure in it.

The *Acts* of the Will respecting the *Meanes*, are these. 1. an act of *Vsing* or Imploying the Practicall Iudgement, an application and Exercising of it to consult & debate the proper means conducible unto that End. Which Consultation having passed: and by the practicall Iudgement, a
Repre-

Representation being made of the Means discovered, there next followeth an embracing of those means, and inclining towards them with a double Act. The one an act of *Consent*, whereby wee approve the means dictated, as *proper* and *possible*: the other an Act of *Election*, whereby, according to the different weight of Reasons, we adhere unto one *Medium* more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more feasible. Thirdly, because the means doe not bring us unto the End by being *Chosen*, but by being *Executed*. Hereupon followeth another Act of *Mandate* to all the Faculties interested in the Execution of those means, to apply and put forth their Forces with vigor and constancy, till the End be at the last by the due Execution of those means attained and enjoyed.

Now wheareas the Philosopher doth often distribute the things belonging unto the *Soule*, into *Affections*, *Faculties*, and *Habits*. For the *Faculties* are moved by the *Passions*, & the *Passions* are regulated and managed by the *Habits*; The *Habits* procured for Facility and constancy of *Action*, and the *Actions* directed to the obtaining of an *End*: This Method of the Philosopher would now lead us to speake further.

First of the *Habits* of the Reasonable Soule, and they are either *Rationall* only, and in the *Mind*, as the Habits of Wisedome, of Principles, of Conclusions, of art and Prudence; or besides that *Vertuous* and *Vituous*, conversant about Good or Evill *Morall*. Which are first the *Habits* of *Practicall Principles*, called *Synteress*, and next the *Habits*

Ethic. l. 2. c. 6.
Idem. l. 2. c. 2.

bits of *particular Vertues*, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. Vnto the felicity of all which are required these four conditions,

1 *Justice* and *Rectitude* disposing the Will to render unto God, unto our selves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right we owe unto them.

2 *Prudence*, discovering that which is in this manner *Right*, Iudging of it, and directing unto it,

3 *Fortitude*, enabling the Will firmly to persist in her vertuous purposes, according to the Instructions of Practicall prudence, notwithstanding the labour it must undergoe, the delaies it must sustaine before it can obtaine the End, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withall.

4 *Temperance*, suppressing and subduing those Sensuall Appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divert us from these constant Resolutions.

Next becaule all *Habits*, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of *Actions*, wee should thereby be led on to the consideration of *Humane Actions*, *Fortuitous*, *Violent*, *Naturall*, *Voluntary*, *Involuntary*, *Mixed*. As also, to the grounds of the *Goodness* or *Illness* of *Actions* taken first from the *Rule* of them unto which they are to conforme. Secondly, from the *Principles* of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, *Knowledge* and *Faith* to see, *Will* to purpose, *Love* to do, *Subjection*

subjection, to obey strength, to finish and fulfil what Vertue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed. By which consideration, we should be led to take a view of the right end, and *ultimate felicity*, unto which all these actions should lead and carry us; not as the causes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.

But these pertaining to a nobler Science, and being without the limits of the *Subject* which I proposed to speak of, I shall follow *Pliny's* counsel, and look back to the Title of my Book; which having (as well as my weaknesse was able) endeavoured to go thorow, it now calls upon me to go no further.

F I N I S.
